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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the connection between industrial protest and the 
crime committed in Wellington during the 1913 General Strike. The possibility 
that the ways in which the criminal law was implemented changed in 
response to the strike has also been examined. The crimes focused upon 
include violence, theft, anti-state actions, seditious utterances, verbal abuse, 
threatening behaviour and desertion. Crimes committed in Wellington during 
and in the two years before the start of the strike have been researched. In 
all, 1757 criminal charges for violence, theft or potential anti-state actions are 
studied. 
Some comparisons are made with violence, crime, prosecutions and policing 
during the 1890 Maritime Strike and the 1951 Waterfront Dispute. 
International research on crime, protest, prosecutions, policing and industrial 
disputes is also discussed to provide a basis for the New Zealand case study. 
Six hypotheses from the international research are tested against the data 
gathered on Wellington. Three of these hypotheses concern crime as protest 
by strikers. The other three hypotheses focus on the uses made of the 
criminal law during industrial disputes (through arrests, prosecutions, verdicts, 
sentences, the refusal of bail, and jury trials). 
Offences by strikers against their employers and against strike-breakers are 
found to have been surprisingly infrequent in Wellington in late 1913. Crime 
as protest by strikers and sympathisers against special constables was very 
common. There is no evidence, however, that theft was used as a form of 
protest during the strike. 
The response of the police to the 1913 strike and the related disorder was to 
intensify their efforts to control certain types of offences, in particular, socially 
threatening "crimes" associated with the strike. Overall, the police displayed a 
surprising degree of restraint in making arrests. The analysis of conviction 
and sentencing patterns indicates that the Wellington judiciary responded 
firmly to the period of disorder and heightened social tensions, but that this 
response was neither malicious nor indiscriminate. The criminal law was not 
used as a means to remove (through conviction and imprisonment) all 
"undesirables" or potential "troublemakers" from the streets of Wellington. 
Many of those who were convicted of strike related offences received longer 
terms of imprisonment and larger fines than were imposed prior to the strike. 
These sentences were intended to deter potential offenders and prevent 
further disorder, as well as to punish those caught. The penalties were firm 
but not as severe as the law allowed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Terrorism At Wharves - Lawless Mob Outbreaks - Steamers Rushed by the Strikers -
Police to be Re-inforced - The Shipping Operations Paralysed 
(large) headline in The Dominion, 25 October 1913, p.5, cols. 7 and 8 
Stephen Thomas Hunt, one of the party of special constables who arrived from 
Palmerston on the night of October 29, stated that as they were proceeding to the 
police station they passed a number of men at the corner of Bunny Street. One of 
the men called out, "Here's these ----- ----- scabs! Let's take to them!" This crowd 
followed them all the way to the police station, shouting similar language and 
throwing stones. Witness was one of those who were hit. 
Report in The Dominion, 05 February 1914, p.9, cols. 4-5 of 
Thomas Acland's Supreme Court trial for taking part in a riot 
and using obscene language on 29 October 1913. Acland, a 
waterside worker who had gone on strike in 1913, was 
convicted by the jury on both charges. 
In view of the gigantic conspiracy to smash organised labour, and the life and death 
struggle throughout New Zealand in order to preserve unionism against armed 
blacklegism, we call upon your union to make it a common cause by refusing to work 
till the armed scabs leave the city. Auckland is magnificently solid. Will you follow? 
Labour's defeat means labour's annihilation. 
The manifesto of the United Federation of Labour calling for 
a general strike in Wellington - issued 10 November 1913.1 
The [United] Federation of Labour is a cancerous growth which has been eating into 
the vitals of legitimate labour unionism as well as threatening the healthy 
development of the industries and trade of the country. 
editorial in The Dominion, 14 November 1913, p.6, col. 5 
The 1913 General Strike was one of the most turbulent and violent 
industrial disputes in New Zealand's history. In late October and early 
November 1913 riots in Wellington were an almost daily occurrence. 2 This 
thesis seeks to determine the connection between the industrial protest and 
Quoted in P. N. Pettit, The Wellington Watersiders - The Story of Their 
Industrial Organisation, (Wellington: Wellington Branch of the New Zealand 
Waterside Workers' Union, 1948), p.60. (Pettit cites as from G. G. Hancox and J. 
Hight, 'The Labour Movement and the Strike of 1913 in New Zealand', The 
Economic Journal, June 1914, p.l91). 
2 See Richard S. Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove: The 
Modernisation of Policing in New Zealand 1886-1917, (Palmerston North: 
2 
the crime committed during the strike. The uses made of the criminal law in 
response to this period of social tension and civil strife will also be examined. 
The two month strike began in Wellington on 18 October 1913 and in 
Huntly on 20 October. It quickly spread throughout the country. In total, 
between 14,000 and 16,000 unionists went on strike, nearly all of whom were 
either watersiders, seamen, coal miners, carters or labourers.3 
Central to the strike was the struggle between militant unionists and 
employers (who were aided by the State) for control over industrial relations in 
New Zealand. For the striking unions the struggle for control eventually 
devolved into a battle for survival, which they ultimately lost. The dispute was 
not fought over wages or conditions, but was an industrial battle concerning 
who controlled the balance of power in industrial relations. 
The dispute was depicted by the strike leaders as involving a 'gigantic 
conspiracy to smash organised labour'. Those opposed to the strike 
considered the national trade union organisation (the United Federation of 
Labour) which the majority of the strikers and strike leaders supported to be a 
'cancerous growth' and a serious threat to the country's well being. 
To maintain order in the port cities the Government called for the 
enrolment of special constables. Thousands of men from both rural and 
urban areas volunteered for service. In Wellington the volunteers initially 
Dunmore Press, 1995), pp.305 and 308-314. Also see Chapter Five in the current 
thesis. 
3 John E. Martin, Holding the Balance: A History of New Zealand's 
Department of Labour 1891-1995, (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 
1996), p.116 provides the figure of nearly 14,000 unionists involved nationally taken 
from the AJHR, 1914, H-l1, p.13; H. Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand: Past 
and Present, (Wellington: Reed Education, 1973), p.38 estimates that about 16,000 
men joined the strike nationally: 2,000 seamen, 4,000 miners, 5,000 watersiders, and 
5,000 others. (no reference given) 
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required the protection of the regular police and the New Zealand army. On 
30 October two newly enrolled special constables were chased by a crowd 
along Lambton Quay, and one of them had to be rescued from Whitcombe 
and Tombs bookshop by the regular police.4 During the height of the strike, 
angry crowds of unionists and their supporters faced Royal New Zealand 
Artillerymen armed with rifles and machine-guns at the barricades 
constructed at the Taranaki and Tory Street intersections with Buckle Street. 
Behind the barricades was the Defence Department's Mount Cook complex at 
which the volunteer constables from rural areas and their horses were 
quartered.5 
Other men, including clerks, farmers, rural labourers, accountants, 
butchers, ship's officers, employers, and former strikers, acted as 
replacements for those who were on strike.6 Rival unions, known as 
Arbitration unions, were formed in opposition to those unions which had 
chosen to strike. The founding membership of the (Arbitration) Wellington 
Wharf Labourers' Industrial Union of Workers were mainly farmers, farmers' 
sons and farm labourers.? In the following week the membership of this 
4 The Dominion, 22 November 1913, p.6, col. 7 (evidence given at a criminal 
prosecution related to this incident), and Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, 
pp.308-309. 
5 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.308, 309 and 312-313; and see 
Erik Olssen, The Red Feds: Revolutionary Industrial Unionism and the New 
Zealand Federation of Labour 1908-14, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1988), 
pp.183-184. 
6 See The Dominion, 25 October 1913, p.5, cols. 7-8, and p.6, coIs. 2-3; 13 
November 1913, p.8, col. 3; 14 November 1913, p.9, col. 5; 18 November 1913, p.9, 
col. 1; 19 November 1913, p.8, col. 5; 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 7; 25 November 
1913, p.8,"col. 3; and The Evening Post, 17 November 1913, p.8, col. 5; and 18 
November 1913, p.3, col. 4 and p.8, col. 2. Also see Chapter Five, p.188 and the 
references in footnote 102 on p.191 in the current thesis. 
7 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 7. 
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Arbitration union grew from 'nearly seventy' to four hundred and thirty.8 The 
majority of these 430 replacement watersiders were farmers and farmers' 
sons, though there was 'a good sprinkling of ordinary workers as well,,9 
The months of October through December 1913 were unquestionably 
a period of heightened social tension and overt social conflict in the port cities 
and mining communities of New Zealand. In addition to mass 
demonstrations, angry crowds, fiery rhetoric from the strike leaders, the 
presence of hundreds of mounted special constables armed with batons, and 
the replacement of strikers with volunteer workers there were outbreaks of 
serious violence and rioting and the fear of further disorder and violence. 
International research into the social history of crime by historians, 
sociologists, criminologists, and political scientists, has frequently, and often 
convincingly, hypothesised a connection between periods of high or 
heightened social tension and crime. This connection has usually been 
described in terms of certain criminal activities (varying from context to 
context) having been used, to varying extents, as forms of protest against 
perceived oppression or injustice. 
Within the historiography of crime two general types of linkages 
between crime and protest have been formulated: first, the situation where 
criminal activities are used as an additional means of protest during a period 
8 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 7; and 14 November 1913, p.7, 
col. 7. 
9 Letter, E. C. Jack (Dominion Secretary of the New Zealand Farmers' Union) to 
James G. Wilson (Dominion President of the New Zealand Farmers' Union), 
14 November 1913, 1. J. Wild Collection of Sir James G. Wilson Papers, MS 137: 
Container 9: Inwards Correspondence, undated (held at Alexander Turnbull Library, 
Wellington), as quoted in Virginia Hughes, ' 'Massey's Cossacks': The Farmers and 
the 1913 Strike', (unpublished MA research essay, University of Auckland, 1977), 
p.25. 
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of union pickets, demonstrations, or other overt and mass protest; and 
secondly, instances where the criminal acts themselves are a major form, if 
not the main form, of protest, usually in a context where mass protest is not 
attempted. 
The international research on these two basic connections between 
crime and protest will now be examined, to demonstrate that the study of 
crime and protest has been (especially in the last twenty-six years), and still 
is, an important, valid, and much disputed aspect of social history, historical 
criminology and historical sociology. Expanding this type of research into the 
New Zealand context through this thesis will be shown to be a valid and 
useful contribution to the history of labour disputes, of crime, and of policing 
in New Zealand, as well as to the international social history of crime and 
protest, and international research on the policing of protest. 
The discussion in this chapter will consist of a broad overview of a 
variety of areas within the study of crime and protest. The purpose of the 
overview is to indicate the range and variety of the general findings of the 
research on crime, protest and industrial disputes. Where relevant or 
necessary conclusions from other areas of the study of crime and protest will 
also be discussed. (For example, because of the relatively few studies on 
theft and industrial disputes it will be necessary to explore the conclusions of 
works which have examined other types of protest and theft). This overview 
will provide the basis from which the specific details of the relationship 
between crime, protest and industrial disputes can be closely investigated in 
the remainder of the thesis. 
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In Chapter Three a detailed examination of certain topics within the 
international research on crime as protest by strikers will be conducted. This 
discussion will focus on the specific types of crime which have been used by 
strikers as acts of protest during industrial disputes and the targets for, 
motivations for and causes of such offending. The research and examples 
presented in Chapter Three will be drawn from studies of crime as protest 
during industrial disputes and from other relevant sources. In Chapter Four 
there will be a similarly detailed examination of particular aspects of 
international research on the use of the criminal law during industrial disputes. 
In Chapters Five and Six the ideas and hypotheses presented in Chapters 
Three and Four will be tested against the data gathered on crime and criminal 
prosecutions in Wellington during the 1913 strike. 
One of the first researchers to argue that there was some connection 
between industrial disputes and crime was the criminologist Hermann 
Mannheim in his study of crime in England between 1919 and 1939.10 For 
Mannheim the increases in the official crime statistics for the years of the 
General Strike (1926) and the strike wave of 1912 are best explained as a 
result of the economic, political and social turmoil caused by these major 
industrial disputes. As well as linking large increases in 'typical strike 
offences' such as intimidation (from 105 charges in 1925 to 994 in 1926) and 
malicious damage (from 13,711 to 20,301) to the General Strike of 1926, 
Mannheim agreed with the compilers of the Criminal Statistics of 1926 (whom 
he quotes) that the twenty-one percent increase in the number of simple and 
10 Hermann Mannheim, Social Aspects of Crime in England between the 
Wars, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1940), pp.153-159. 
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minor larcenies in 1926 was also largely attributable to the General Strike. 11 
Mannheim also noted that 'the national strike of 1912 coincided with a 
noticeable rise in crimes, particularly against the person and against property 
without violence' .12 Though based solely on compiled official statistics, 
contemporary opinion and a few general histories, and constituting only a 
small part of his overarching study, Mannheim's discussion is important to the 
history of the study of crime and mass protest because it was one of the first 
to critically examine the idea that there was a direct linkage between industrial 
conflict and criminal activity. 
In 1960 Irving Bernstein drew attention to the quantitative impact of 
industrial disputes on criminal prosecutions in the United States during the 
late 1920s. 'It is a commentary on the state of labor relations in the late 
twenties to note the appallingly large number of arrests for felonies (murder, 
dynamiting, kidnaping [sic], extortion, criminal libel, riot, inciting to riot, 
assault, malicious mischief, unlawful assembly, sedition, even treason) as 
well as for misdemeanors (disorderly conduct, obstructing traffic, disturbing 
the peace, trespass, loitering, assembling without a permit, even selling 
insurance without a license). In the New York garment strike of 1926, there 
were 7500 arrests in the first fifteen weeks; in the New York fur strike of that 
year, 884 arrests and 477 convictions; in the New Bedford textile strike of 
II Mannheim and the Criminal Statistics of 1926 both suggest that many of these 
larcenies 'may have been committed not by strikers but by persons who took 
advantage of the diversion of the Police from ordinary duties' (Mannheim, Social 
Aspects of Crime, p.158). 
12 Mannheim, Social Aspects of Crime, p.156. 
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1928, 2000 arrests; in the Elizabethton textile strike of 1929, 300 arrests in a 
single day; and so on and on.'13 
Later researchers have extended our knowledge of the connection 
between industrial protest and crime. The types of crime focused upon in the 
vast majority of these studies have been highly public acts of violence, such 
as rioting, assaults on police and strikebreakers, property damage, looting, 
and arson. Michelle Perrot's research on industrial disputes in France 
between 1871 and 1890 hig hlig hted the use of window-breaking as protest 
against the actions of employers, and as one of the two major forms of strike 
related collective violence in this period. 14 Such violence usually 'resulted 
from encountering an obstacle; that is, first and foremost, the bosses' 
resistance. It was their refusal to negotiate, their intransigence, bad faith and 
volte-faces when they sensed the strike was beginning to weaken, that were 
at the origin of most of the disturbances.'15 Perrot also found that strikes with 
more than 810 participants or which lasted more than 32 days were much 
more likely to involve collective violence than relatively small or relatively short 
strikes. 16 The second of the two major forms of collective violence, and the 
more frequent, were brawls between strikers and those who acted as 
strikebreakers (whether by their refusal to strike or by accepting employment 
before the strike had been called off).17 
13 Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American Worker 
1920-1933, Penguin Books edition, (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1966 
[original edition 1960] ), p.204. 
14 Michelle Perrot, Workers on Strike: France 1871-1890, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1987), pp.172, 175, 180,183 and 185 (translated from 
the French original (1984) by Chris Turner). Also see Perrot, pp.167 -172. 
15 Perrot, Workers on Strike, p.170. 
16 Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.166-172, and see p.114. 
17 Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.114 and 167. 
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Philip Taft and Philip Ross chronicled American labour violence from 
1877 to the late 1960s, and attempted to account for its frequency and 
explain its causes. 18 In 1973 Howard M. Gitelman added his own analysis 
and research to the basis provided by Taft and Ross's study.19 Both works 
emphasised the influence the employment of strikebreakers had on the 
outbreak of violence.2o Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones explored the causes of labour 
violence in the United States by concentrating on the explanations offered by 
Americans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for industrial 
violence. 21 Michael Wallace's general survey of violence in the United States 
concluded that labour (including strikers) 'seldom initiated violence against 
employers, except to destroy their property,.22 
The broad range of factors which contributed to the Battle of Orgreave 
(a violent confrontation between pickets and police during the 1984-1985 
British Miners' Strike) have been analysed by David Waddington. His work 
demonstrates the potential complexity of the causes of industrial violence. 
That the strike had been defined as a 'threat to democracy' and 'illegitimate', 
the presence of 'symbolic targets of derision (lorries, strikebreakers)', the 
recent history of relations between police and strikers, and the occupational 
18 Philip Taft and Philip Ross, 'American Labor Violence: Its Causes, 
Character, and Outcome', in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), The 
History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp.281-395. 
19 Howard M. Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', 
Business History Review, vol. 47, no.l, Spring 1973, pp.1-23. 
20 Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', pp.294 and 381-382; Gitelman, 
'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', pp.9, 11 and 12. For more details on 
their arguments also see Chapter Three of the current thesis. 
21 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, 'Theories of American Labour Violence', Journal of 
American Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, August 1979, pp.245-264. 
22 Michael Wallace, 'The Uses of Violence in American History', The 
American Scholar, vol. 40, no.1, Winter 1970-71, p.93. 
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cultures of both the police and the miners ('in which solidarity and toughness 
were highly valued') all interacted with numerous other factors to generate 
violence.23 
J. A. Frank's analysis of four of the violent labour conflicts in Canada 
between 1968 and 1978 emphasised the importance of five "ingredients" in 
violent labour conflict. The five factors were '(1) the relative power and 
organization of the union (or movement in the case of Murray Hill); (2) the 
aims it pursues; (3) the type of collective action that it employs; (4) the 
attitudes of the employers and the authorities toward the workers; and (5) the 
policies and aims of employers, political leaders, and the police.,24 
Industrial violence in Australia shared some of the characteristics of 
strike violence in Britain, France and the United States, in particular the 
hostility and violence directed at strikebreakers. R. B. Walker's study of 
violence in industrial conflicts in New South Wales in the late nineteenth 
century concluded that 'intimidation of and assaults on strikebreakers became 
the most familiar forms of lawbreaking'. Walker, however, considered that 
'restraints on the use of violence and its total avoidance in some contentious 
situations were even more significant. Non-violence as well as violence 
requires explanation.,25 
23 David Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder: A 
Comparative and Historical Approach, (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 
pp.94 and 99-107. (The quotes are from pp.l06 and 107). 
24 J. A. Frank, 'The "Ingredients" in Violent Labour Conflict: Patterns in Four 
Case Studies', Labour / Le Travailleur, 12, Fall 1983, pp.87-112. (The quote is 
from p.87). 
25 R. B. Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in New South Wales in the 
Late Nineteenth Century', Historical Studies, vol. 22, no. 86, April 1986, pp.55-63. 
(The quotes are both from p.55). 
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Not all strikes or lockouts involved violence. Michelle Perrot calculated 
that in only 3.6 per cent of the 2,923 strikes in France between 1871 and 
1890 were acts of 'collective, physical aggression against persons or property 
committed'. The annual percentages fluctuated between 0.4 per cent and 10 
per cent. Perrot counted 'fights among the workers themselves' separately. 
Reports of 'brawls' between workers were found concerning 165 strikes (5.6 
per cent of the total).26 Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly estimated the 
proportion of violent strikes in France at 3.2 per cent for 1890-1914, and 'at 
scarcely 0.5 percent for 1915-35,.27 Their minimum criteria for considering a 
strike to be violent was a 'disturbance' during the dispute 'in which (a) at least 
one group of fifty or more persons took part and (b) some person or object 
was damaged or seized over resistance.'28 
Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly's research on Germany 
found that between 1891 and 1913 there were 'some 31,000 strikes 
producing 72 violent disturbances'. For the earlier period of 1864 to 1880 
they counted 'some 1,200 strikes, 24 of which clearly involved violence.' 
'These numbers suggest a decline (from about 5 to 0.25 percent) in strike 
26 Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.7, 114 and 167. 
27 Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France 1830-1968, (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), p.378, note 20; and see p.81. For those fluent in 
French (which does not include myself) Charles Tilly and Edward Shorter, 'Le D6clin 
de la greve violente en France de 1890 a 1935,' Le Mouvement Social, no. 76, July-
September 1971, pp.95-118 provides a more detailed discussion of their findings. 
(This is the reference given by Shorter and Tilly, 1974, p.378, note 20). Gitelman, 
'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', pp.2 and 3 states that Tilly and 
Shorter, 'Le D6clin', found forty-five violent strikes in France between 1890 and 1914 
(of which twenty-nine occurred in the three years 1904-1906), and eight outbreaks of 
industrial violence between 1915 and 1935. 
28 Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France 1830-1968, p.56 and see p.80. Also see 
Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), p.313. 
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violence - a decline which inclusion of strike threats would affect still more'. 29 
Their criteria for strike violence was a slightly modified version of the criteria 
used for Shorter and Tilly's research on France: 'Our quantitative sample 
defines collective violence as a disturbance of the peace within an 
autonomous political system (German states excluding Austria) involving 
physical violence or damage to persons or property by at least twenty 
persons. ,30 
James E. Cronin analysed strikes and riots in Britain between 1865 
and 1914. The pattern over the period was for the number of riots for any 
cause to decline, and 'for riots and strikes to become distinct, and ultimately 
antithetical, modes of action. (The exception, of course, was the continuation 
through 1914 of riots against the use of police and troops to protect blacklegs 
during strikes.)' From 1865 to 1894 there were fifty-six 'situations in which 
riots were associated with strikes', but only eighteen from 1895 to 1914.31 In 
the latter period 13,478 strikes were officially recorded, and for 1870 to 1894 
there were at least 8,645 strikes. 32 Cronin noted that his figures on riots were 
probably not complete, but the trend over time was still instructive. 33 
29 Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, p.227. 
30 Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, p.318; and see 
pp.313 and 318-320. 
31 James E. Cronin, 'Strikes 1870-1914', in Chris Wrigley (ed), A History of 
British Industrial Relations 1875-1914, (Brighton, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 
1982), pp.77-78 (the quotes are from p.77). E. W. Evans and S. W. Creigh (,The 
Natural History of the Strike in Britain', Labour History, no. 39, November 1980, 
p.51) agree: 'In general [between 1893 and 1914] the quiescence of the new unionism 
meant that stoppages rarely involved violence or bitterness on a scale likely to cause 
concern.' Evans and Creigh, p.53, note the exception of the major strikes of 1910-
1912. 
32 The number of strikes are derived from Table 4.1 in Cronin, 'Strikes 1870-
1914', p.76. For the incompleteness of the available data prior to 1888 see Cronin, 
p.93, note 3, and his Figure 1 (p.92). For 1876 to 1879 the higher count of the two 
provided has been used. The number of strikes for 1865 to 1869 are not given in 
13 
R. B. Walker argued that industrial dispute violence in Australia was 
also rare in the late nineteenth century.34 Even in the United States the 
outbreak of violence during a strike was not a certainty. Gitelman counted 
fifty violent strikes in the United States between 1890 and 1914 (twenty-two of 
which occurred in the four years 1910-1913). The total number of strikes 
from 1890 to 1905 was 30,352, with figures for 1906 through 1913 being 
unavailable. For 1915 to 1935 Gitelman found forty-four outbreaks of 
industrial violence, out of 38,941 strikes.35 These violent strike figures are 
under-estimates, but the rough size of their proportion of all strikes is still 
evident. 36 Based on 'the most reliable numerical guide, that of strike 
mortalities' Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones concluded 'it is clear that American labour 
violence never attained proportions that were exceptional in international 
terms. For example, in 1904, one of the peak years for United States strike 
mortalities, only forty-one men were killed. Thus the number of strike deaths 
Cronin. The focus of his work was 1870-1914. His source on riots (including strike-
related riots), however, spanned 1865 to 1914. 
33 Cronin, 'Strikes 1870-1914', p.94, note 13. 
34 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', pp.54-55. 
35 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', pp.2 and 3. 
36 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', p.2, warns the 
reader: 'All the U.S. violence data employed herein are therefore to be viewed as 
rough underestimates.' Gitelman, p.2, footnote 4 and p.3, footnote 6 states he derived 
the figures from the study of Taft and Ross ('American Labor Violence'). Also see 
Gitelman, pp.1-2 and p.2, footnote 2. Taft and Ross, p.383, note that 'Except for 
contemporary examples, we have not dealt with the numerous minor disturbances, 
some of them fairly serious, that were settled by the use of the normal police force.' 
Taft and Ross's study was also purely qualitative, not involving the more thorough 
and more time consuming extensive newspaper research which Shorter and Tilly, and 
Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly used as the basis for their quantitative analyses (see Shorter and 
Tilly, Strikes in France 1830-1968, pp.56-57, 80, 81 and p.382, note 2; and Tilly, 
Tilly, and Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, p.313). For some of the 
violent strikes not included in Taft and Ross see Sidney L. Harring, Policing a Class 
Society: The Experience of American Cities, 1865-1915, (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1983), pp.114 and 128-129. 
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per million Americans was .54. This ratio may be compared with that of .52 
for France in 1908, and 2.5 for Wales in 1911.,37 
The relatively small proportion of industrial disputes which involved 
violence in no way lessens the significance of studying this violence, or 
searching for violent incidents during specific disputes. Intriguing questions 
are raised concerning why some strikes are violent and others are not, if 
strikes by workers in certain occupations were more likely to be violent, the 
causes of violence in particular disputes, the types of violence which 
predominate, and the targets for this violence. Answers for some countries or 
regions over certain periods of time or for numerous individual disputes have 
been presented by authors such as Michelle Perrot and R. B. Walker (as 
briefly discussed above). These explanations will be explored in more detail 
in Chapters Three and Four. 
Only a few researchers have examined whether or not theft and other 
larcenies have been related to periods of industrial disorder. Padraic Kenney 
argued that petty theft was used as resistance and protest by textile workers 
both before and after the September 1947 Poznanski Textile Strike in L6dz, 
Poland. Before the strike 'workers used various types of "indiscipline" to 
resist the erosion of their position. Petty theft in the factory, which had at one 
time been a weapon against the Nazi occupiers, and had remained a source 
of survival in the first years of reconstruction, was now invested with 
righteousness - stolen goods made up for the income withheld by the state.' 
After the strikers' defeat 'younger workers, briefly active during the Poznanski 
37 Jeffreys-Jones, 'Theories of American Labour Violence', p.246. 
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strike, retreated to a form of individual protest, expressed, again, by theft,.38 
The role of theft while the strike was in progress was not investigated. 
The work of Ted Robert Gurr (which is discussed in more detail below) 
tentatively suggests that industrial disputes in London in 1919-1920, 1929-
1931, 1957 and 1969-1971 and in Sydney in 1886-1888, 1917, 1919 and 
1929 may have had some influence on the increase in convictions for theft 
during the same years or in the immediately following year.39 Due to the 
breadth of analysis Gurr conducted and the annual official crime statistics 
which he analysed it is not possible to reach any firm conclusions concerning 
the relationship between any of the particular strikes referred to and theft, or if 
any dispute related theft was most prominent before, during, or after an 
individual strike. 
Further important insights and evidence for those investigating crime 
and industrial disputes are provided by research which is not specifically 
focused on industrial protest. One of the most valuable of these studies is 
Ted Robert Gurr's analysis of crime and periods of mass protest in London, 
Stockholm, Calcutta and Sydney from the 1750s to the 1970s. The mass 
protests investigated include industrial disputes and mass protests over non-
industrial issues such as food shortages, taxes, suffrage, military levies and 
conscription. Gurr argued that there is 'more than sufficient reason for 
expecting a positive but less than perfect connection between crime and [civil] 
38 Padraic Kenney, 'Working-class Community and Resistance in pre-Stalinist 
Poland: The Poznanski Textile Strike, L6dz, September 1947', Social History, 
vol. 18, no. 1, January 1993, pp.34 and 50. 
39 Ted Robert GUIT, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', in Ted Robert 
GUIT, Peter N. Grabosky, and Richard C. Hula, The Politics of Crime and Conflict: 
A Comparative History of Four Cities, (Beverly Hills, California, and London: Sage 
Publications, 1977), pp.666-668, 670 and 671. 
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conflict.,40 He listed three reasons for this general relationship. The first and 
second reasons include crime as protest as well as indicating the influence of 
more self-gratifying motivations. 
One of the most pervasive assumptions of theories of crime and conflict is 
that both are rooted in social tensions that are manifest in a prevailing sense 
of anomie, alienation, or discontent. It is plausible to suppose that such 
states of mind will motivate some to join in collective action and others, 
depending on their needs and opportunities, to take more individualistic 
courses of action. A second line of argument is that widespread and 
prolonged group conflict causes or increases the breakdown of moral order. 
People in disorderly times are more likely to do what they feel like doing than 
what others say is right and proper. 41 
Gurr's third factor emphasised the impact on crime and prosecution rates of 
the official response to strife and dissent. 'Elites faced with real or threatened 
resistance probably intensify efforts at social control across the board, 
increasing policing, prosecuting, and punishment.,42 Gurr's analysis is 
particularly useful because it highlights the range of motivations which can 
cause increases in crime rates and criminal prosecution rates during periods 
of civil conflict. Part of such increases can be explained in terms of crime as 
protest, but other factors can be equally influential. Consideration of the 
impact of intensified use of the criminal law and the police by the State and 
elites is also vital for any study of crime and protest.43 
The statistical evidence Gurr presented indicates that there is 
frequently a link between the outbreak of protest and short-term increases in 
40 Gurr, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', p.667. Gurr includes 
industrial disputes as one of his types of civil conflict. Most of his discussion is based 
on an analysis of overall levels of civil conflict 
41 Gurr, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', pp.666-667. 
42 Gurr, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', p.667. 
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violent crime and theft. 'Objective criteria have been used to identify 29 
sUbstantial increases in violent crime, measured mostly by reference to 
changes in conviction rates. Nineteen of the 29, or 66 percent, coincided with 
serious internal conflict. Of the increases in theft, thirteen of 25 also 
coincided with civil strife. ,44 The precise nature of this link is less certain and 
requires further research, but for Gurr 'there is not much doubt that the 
correlation reflects the existence of a pervasive and important social 
phenomenon.'45 The probable complexity of the link is visible in one of the 
"crises of public order" Gurr has found in the history of New South Wales. 
The effects of the Depression also are evident in the form of a simultaneous 
rise in economic crime [theft] and economic protest.'46 Some of the increase 
in theft may have been committed as acts of protest (some perhaps in 
connection with particular protest movements), much was probably a result of 
increasing unemployment and poverty, with other potential influences 
including greater vigilance by the police, and less willingness by the victims of 
theft during a period of economic hardship to overlook or resolve informally 
(that is, outside the court system) relatively minor thefts.47 
43 
44 
673. 
45 
See Chapter Four of the current thesis for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
GUIT, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', p.674. Also see pp.666-
Gurr, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', p.674. 
46 Gurr, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', p.670. The 'economic 
protest' during the Depression years of 1929-1931 is described on p.671 as 'Major 
strikes in 1929; recurrent demonstrations, [and] eviction riots ... in [the] early 1930s'. 
47 On the multitude of factors which can cause an increase (or a decrease) in the 
number of criminal prosecutions, convictions and reported crimes see Gurr, 'The 
Comparative Analysis of Public Order', pp.666-667 (as discussed and quoted above); 
Robert Reiner, 'The Case of the Missing Crimes', in Ruth Levitas and Will Guy (eds), 
Interpreting Official Statistics, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.189 
and 194; Clive Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750-1900, 2nd edition, 
(London and New York: Longman, 1996), pp.25-34, 36-37, 40-41 and 48-49; and 
Jennifer S. Davis, 'Prosecutions and Their Context: The Use of the Criminal Law in 
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David J. V. Jones warns of the difficulty of distinguishing protest crime 
(or social crime) from offences committed for purely personal gain or private 
revenge. In his study of Rebeccaism and the Rebecca riots in south-west 
Wales between 1839 and 1844 Jones commented on the problems he had in 
'establishing the motive behind poorly reported offences which could have 
been simply random acts by opportunist amateurs or professional criminals.' 
His solution was to discount those offences for which there was a lack of 
information or which were unlikely to have been acts of protest. The 
remainder of the cases, Jones argued, 'seem to have had some connection 
with the Rebecca movement.,48 
An extensive range of criminal offences were used by the Rebbecaites 
of south-west Wales to protest perceived oppression and injustices. Mobs, 
often in disguise, attacked nearly three hundred tollgates, tollhouses, bars, 
and chains. In other incidents arson and assaults were committed, and 
houses, outbuildings, fences, walls, weirs, corn, trees, and equipment 
damaged or destroyed by mobs. The violence was usually limited and the 
targets carefully selected. Threatening letters were sent and individuals were 
intimidated by crowds.49 'Even some fairly anonymous cases of burglary, 
animal maiming, cattle rustling, corn stripping, and the removal of private 
gates, fences, and houses have the 'Rebecca' hallmark on them. Action such 
Later Nineteenth-Century London', in Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder (eds), 
Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 
pp.399-402 and 407-426. 
48 David J. V. Jones, Rebecca's Children: A Study of Rural Society, Crime, 
and Protest, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp.258-259, 264 and 309-312 (the 
quotes are from p.259). Also see David J. V. Jones, Crime, Protest, Community 
and Police in Nineteenth-Century Britain, (London and Boston: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1982), pp.14-17. 
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as this was often sanctioned at the night meetings, and carried out by small 
parties in disguise.'50 
Not all researchers into the criminology of periods of industrial protest 
and other forms of mass protest have found a connection between crime and 
mass protest, nor between collective violence and overall levels of crime. 
Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly examined the statistical trends in 
crime and the statistical trends in collective violence in France between 1826 
and 1962. One of their tests was a comparison of trends in the number of 
accused (per 100,000 of population) prosecuted for 'major crimes' against 
persons ('murder, poisoning, infanticide, patricide') and for 'major crimes' 
against property ('theft, robbery, and willful destruction') with the trends for 
collective violence. They concluded that 'there is no correspondence at all 
between these criminal trends and trends in collective violence.'51 Arrests for 
vagrancy rose 'dramatically' in the years immediately preceding some of the 
peaks of collective violence, but 'if there is a connection there, it is mediated 
and attenuated by other factors.'52 The figures for total criminal convictions in 
France had maxima around 1833, 1852, 1894, 1912, 1934, and 1942. 'They 
are at least in the vicinity of considerable clusters of violence. Their 
distribution might possibly justify the inference that repression tends to follow 
major upheavals, rather than that outbreaks of crime and collective violence 
come together. However, the violent years of the 1860s and 1870s were 
49 Jones, Rebecca's Children, pp.l99-318, especially pp.201, 249-250, 259, 
262-263 and 311-312. 
50 Jones, Rebecca's Children, p.264. Also see pp.311-312. 
51 Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, pp.78-79 (the 
quotes are from p.79); and see pp.81-83. They define 'major crimes' as 'those 
prosecuted by the Assize Courts' (p.78). 
52 Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, p.78. 
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actually low points for criminal convictions. The turbulent period from 1944 to 
1948 produced a significant decline in convictions. ,53 
Abdul Qaiyum Lodhi and Charles Tilly (whose data and statistical 
analysis forms part of the information upon which Tilly, Tilly and Tilly base 
their findings) also concluded that 'there is no detectable association between 
crime and collective violence' in nineteenth century France. 'Collective 
violence fluctuated independently of crimes against property and crimes 
against persons and much more sharply than either one of them.'54 
Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly found no statistically significant direct 
correlation between strikes and collective violence in France between 1830 
and 1968. The year-to-year fluctuations in a wide range of variables were 
compared including the number of strikes, strikers, man-days worth of strikes, 
incidents of collective violence, participants in collective disturbances, and the 
mean duration of strikes.55 
As part of a broader study Peter N. Grabosky analysed the influence of 
industrial unrest on arrest and conviction rates for various categories of crime 
in New South Wales between 1914 and 1969. Industrial unrest was 
measured through 'mandays of work lost in strikes and lockouts per 1000 
trade union members, N.S.W.' Six crime rates were considered: the arrest 
rate for crimes against the person, the conviction rate for serious aggressive 
crime, the arrest rate for acquisitive crimes against property, the conviction 
53 Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, p.78. Italics as 
in the original. 
54 Abdul Qaiyum Lodhi and Charles Tilly, 'Urbanization, Crime, and Collective 
Violence in 19th-Century France', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 79, no. 2, 
September 1973, pp.296 and 303 (respectively). 
55 Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France 1830-1968, pp.81-102, and 383-384 
(note 8). 
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rate for serious acquisitive crime, the arrest rate for crimes against sexual 
morality and custom, and the conviction rate for serious crimes against sexual 
morality and custom. Grabosky's findings were that there were no statistically 
significant correlations between his measure of industrial unrest and any of 
the crime rates. (Five of the six standardised regression coefficients were 
between -0.00 and 0.03. The sixth coefficient, for the conviction rate for 
serious aggressive crime, was 0.19, but when the effects of trend over time 
were controlled for the correlation was no longer significant).56 
It is clear that no consensus exists among researchers concerning the 
relationship between crime and mass protest (whether industrial or non-
industrial). In some instances mass protests and protest movements have 
been accompanied by riots, assaults, theft and increases in the number of 
reported crimes and criminal prosecutions. In other periods or simply for a 
different strike or demonstration mass protest and crime appear completely 
unrelated. The only way to determine which possibility is more accurate for a 
specific context of mass protest is to conduct a detailed case study of that 
context, as will be done within this thesis for Wellington in 1913. 
Additional evidence in the international research in favour of the 
hypothesis that crime and protest can be linked has been generated from 
studies of individual or small group protest. A significant number of studies 
since the late 1950s have convincingly argued that a wide range of criminal 
56 Peter N. Grabosky, Sydney in Ferment: Crime, Dissent and Official 
Reaction, 1788 to 1973, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1977), 
pp.l66-167 and 197, note 3. These results were also published in Peter N. Grabosky, 
'Sydney: The Politics of Crime and Conflict, 1788 to the 1970s', in Ted Robert OUIT, 
Peter N. Grabosky, and Richard C. Hula, The Politics of Crime and Conflict: A 
Comparative History of Four Cities, (Beverly Hills, California, and London: Sage 
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actions have been utilised as forms of protest by individuals or small groups 
during periods of high or heightened social tension. In these instances the 
criminal activities were themselves a major form, if not the main torm, of 
protest. The victims of these protest crimes were usually members of the 
ruling or dominant groups in a society and the offenders from the ruled or 
subordinate groups. 
Two broad categories of criminal activity are distinguishable within the 
international research as having been used as "weapons" of protest by 
individuals or small groups. The first category consists of those overt or 
public crimes for which, it is argued, the main (or at least a major) purpose of 
was as an act of rebellion directly against perceived oppressors or their 
property, or as a more generalised act of protest against injustice and 
exploitation, or both of the above. In 1959 a theoretical revolution took place 
in the study of crime and protest: Eric Hobsbawm published his conception of 
the social bandit. This idea would become one of the most enduring and 
most investigated concepts in the study of the history of crime. Hobsbawm's 
social bandits existed during periods when economic hardship (in particular 
widespread poverty), and a sense of being oppressed by the dominant 
groups in rural, pre-capitalist, southern Italian society was prevalent. The 
social and economic tensions allowed certain individuals, who resisted the 
ascendancy of the dominant groups through "criminal" means, to be elevated 
to the status of champions of the people. These "primitive rebels" or social 
bandits became heroes of the poor because they utilised crime (including 
theft and violence), as a means of protest against oppression, (though in 
Publications, 1977), pp.450-451 and 463, note 8. For the offences included in each of 
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some instances social bandits also used crime for more individually utilitarian 
motives).57 
Hobsbawm's work has been vital to the study of the history of crime 
and protest for two reasons. Hobsbawm was the first to explicitly argue that 
under certain circumstances banditry and its related criminal activities (such 
as robbery, assault, arson, and other property damage) can be understood as 
forms of protest, rather than being merely criminal and anarchistic. The 
second, and more important, reason for the significance of Hobsbawm's 
study was his realisation that protest, and the crime associated with protest, 
did not have to involve large masses of individuals demonstrating in public 
places. The latter conceptual breakthrough allowed and aided the expansion 
of the study of the history of crime and protest into the area of individual and 
small group protest. This area of study has proven a rich source of 
supporting evidence for those who hypothesise a connection between crime 
and protest. 
In the late 1970s Hobsbawm's concept of the social bandit was applied 
to the Australasian region. The works of John McQuilton and Pat O'Malley 
Grabosky's categories of crime see Grabosky, Sydney in Ferment, pp.177 -182. 
57 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social 
Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1959), pp.5-6, 16-17 and 23-25. For a useful summary and discussion of 
subsequent research on social banditry see Paul Vanderwood, 'Bandits, Real and 
Imagined: An Introduction to the Theme in Mexican History', in Clive Emsley and 
Louis A. Knafla (eds), Crime History and Histories of Crime: Studies in the 
Historiography of Crime and Criminal Justice in Modern History, (Westport, 
Connecticut; and London: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp.229-251, especially pp.231, 
235-236 and 238-240. For a recent study (not included in Vanderwood's discussion) 
which found' a strong undercurrent of social protest to much of the banditry' in Cavite 
province in the Philippines in the nineteenth century see Greg Bankoff, Crime, 
Society and the State in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines, (Quezon City, 
Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996), pp.21 and 64-65 (the quote is 
from p.65). 
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suggest that the bushrangers of rural nineteenth-century Australia displayed 
many characteristics of Hobsbawm's social bandits. McQuilton examined the 
Kelly Outbreak in northern Victoria of 1878 to 1880. He persuasively 
asserted that the Kelly Gang's bank robberies and burning of mortgage 
papers were in large part acts of protest. These protests were against the 
oppression and poverty it was felt the rural elite (the "squatters") and their 
allies, the banks and the police, were inflicting upon the lower classes. 
O'Malley concluded, from a broader study, that the crimes committed by 
many Australian bushrangers were interpreted, and supported, by the lower 
classes of their local communities as acts of protest and class vengeance, 
even if the actual motivation behind the crime was personal financial gain or 
aggression.58 Though differing in the specifics of their conclusions the 
studies of both McQuilton and O'Malley illustrate the existence of a linkage 
(whether real or psychological) between crime and protest. That this linkage 
existed within the context of a British colony which as well as being physically 
and culturally close to New Zealand, shared numerous other similarities, 
suggests that some type of connection between crime and individual or small 
group protest may be found in New Zealand. 
The second category of crime utilised by individuals or small groups as 
forms of protest are the type of covert criminal activities James C. Scott labels 
58 John McQuilton, The Kelly Outbreak 1878-1880: The Geographical 
Dimension of Social Banditry, (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 
1979), [1987 paperback edition], pp.2-4, 23, 27, 38,48, 51-53, 58-59, 61-62, 64, 91-
92, 94, 109-111, 116, 118-120, 144-149, 151, 168-170 and 187-190. Pat O'Malley, 
'Class Conflict, Land and Social Banditry: Bushranging in Nineteenth Century 
Australia', Social Problems, vol. 26, no. 3, February 1979, pp.271-283, especially 
pp.271, 273 and 275-279. 
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as "weapons of the weak".59 The criminal "weapons of the weak" are crimes 
which were conducted covertly with the intention of maintaining the anonymity 
of the perpetrators, while still inflicting some form of retribution upon an 
oppressor or as an act of protest (or both). Douglas Hay and Cal Winslow 
were the first social historians to develop the hypothesis that certain types of 
covert crime has been used by members of subordinate groups as a means 
of protest. In his study of poaching in eighteenth century England Hay 
convincingly argued that retribution for, resistance to and protest against the 
perceived injustice and infringement upon customary rights of the Game Laws 
was conducted in large part through the covert crime of poaching. Winslow 
reached similar and equally persuasive conclusions to Hay's with regard to 
the Excise Act and smuggling in Sussex during the 1740s and early 1750s.6o 
David J. V. Jones argued that in nineteenth century Wales 'certain breaches 
of the Game and Fishery Laws also fell into that hazy divide between crime 
and protest.' Traditional rights to game and fish were limited or ended by 
legislation which was intended to assist landowners in their recreational 
59 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant 
Resistance, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, 
'Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance', The Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 13, 
no. 2, January 1986, pp.5-35. 
60 Douglas Hay, 'Poaching and the Game Laws on Carmock Chase', in Douglas 
Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, Albion's 
Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, (Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975), pp.l89-253, see especially pp.200, 207-208, 219 
and 228; Cal Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', in Hay, Linebaugh, Rule, Thompson, and 
Winslow, Albion's Fatal Tree, pp.l19-166, see especially pp.120-121, 149 and 159. 
Winslow's work was influenced in part by the ideas of Hobsbawm. This can 
be seen in Winslow's discussion of the variety of ways in which Sussex smugglers 
corresponded to Hobsbawm's description of social bandits. (See Winslow, pp.157-
159). 
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hunting and fishing. Aspects of this legislation were resented and ignored, 
'which turned ordinary people into poachers and poachers into criminals.'61 
The work of James C. Scott constituted an important addition to and 
expansion of the field of research first explored by Hay and Winslow. Scott's 
detailed anthropological study of peasants in late 1970s Malaysia highlighted 
the importance of a previously under-examined aspect of the study of covert 
crime utilised as a form of protest by individuals or small groups. His work 
demonstrated that protest (whether through crime or through other means) 
can occur even in contexts which experience no or minimal protest of a public 
nature. Scott described how open and public resistance or demonstrations 
were not viable or safe forms of protest for Malaysian peasants and small 
farmers who were experiencing deprivation (first relative, then real) and 
increasing inequality within their villages as rapid agricultural change took 
place. He argued that because open protest was impractical these rural 
Malaysians instead made use of the "weapons of the weak", that is covert and 
anonymous forms of resistance and protest, some of which were criminal 
such as petty theft, arson and sabotage.62 Scott's investigation provides 
valuable evidence that protest can be enacted through a wide range of 
activities, criminal and non-criminal, which at first glance appear to have 
absolutely no connection to protest and widespread discontent. 
Scott's research in addition is one of the best examples of the potential 
connection between common theft (in particular petty theft) and protest. 63 
61 Jones, Rebecca's Children, pp.173-175. (The quotes are from pp.173 and 
174 respectively). 
62 Scott, 'Everyday Resistance', pp.6, 8,10-12 and 14-22. 
63 A distinction is drawn here between the common theft of clothing, money, 
food, jewellery, valuables or other similar goods, and such forms of larceny as 
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Scott suggested that the theft of paddy (rice in the husk) was used by some 
poor rural Malaysians as one form of protest against, and retribution for, the 
ending of such customary rights as zakat (the Islamic tithe) bonuses to 
harvest labourers and small loans and gifts, given by the elite to the 
peasantry; these changes were part of a broad range of social and economic 
alteration occurring during this period. 64 In contrast to Scott the linkage 
between common theft and protest is not examined by most researchers of 
crime and individual or small group protest; largely because it is 
overshadowed by the more obvious and more easily proven connection 
between violence or violent crime and such protest. 
Even among those researchers who suggest that common theft and 
individual or small group protest can be related, some only imply that an 
association exists between protest and theft. For instance, Winslow stated 
that house-breaking (burglary) was used during the same period as 
smuggling as another aspect of a general defiance of authority, but does not 
poaching and smuggling. Hay ('Poaching', pp.207-208) argues that a sharp 
differentiation was made within rural communities in eighteenth century England 
between legitimate types of larceny and common (or casual) theft. He states that there 
were very strong communal sanctions against casual theft, though the appropriation of 
certain goods through such practices as smuggling, poaching, or coal miners taking 
coal as perks were legitimised, because the goods involved were sharply distinguished 
from other property. The popular view was that only the gentry lost from such acts as 
poaching, but that loss by casual theft was a common occurrence at every social level. 
This thesis agrees with the division Hay has made between types of larceny. This 
distinction is also useful and necessary for the current examination of the international 
research on the study of crime and protest because such crimes as poaching and 
smuggling are limited to specific regions and time periods, whereas common theft is 
universal. Instances of the two different types of larceny being used as forms of 
protest need to be distinguished and analysed separately. 
64 Scott, 'Everyday Resistance', pp.11-12 and 19-21. Also see Scott, Weapons 
of the Weak, chapter 7 for his discussion of other types of theft used as forms of 
protest and resistance. 
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explicitly argue that this type of common theft was used as an additional form 
of protest. 65 
Several researchers have argued that common theft has been used by 
members of oppressed groups as a permanent form of resistance, rather than 
purely as a means of protest during a limited period of high or heightened 
social tensions. James C. Scott is one of the foremost proponents of such an 
argument, though he also believes (as described above) that the quantity of 
theft may increase during periods of heightened class, economic or social 
tension. 66 Alex Lichtenstein concluded that for slaves in the American South 
theft was a form of economic or proto-political resistance to slavery. 'For the 
slaves '" the theft of food was not just a matter of diet. The struggle to 
control and define the right to sustenance was a question of power,.67 David 
Barry Gaspar considered theft to be one of the 'weapons' of 'day-to-day 
resistance' 'possessed and used' by slaves in Antigua.68 In a later essay 
Lichtenstein argued that pilfering as resistance continued after the end of 
slavery in the American South. Petty theft 'was, for black plantation workers, 
a distinctive tool of resistance to sharecropping and other inequitable forms of 
postbellum land tenure and labor.' Rural blacks, in particular sharecroppers, 
65 Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', pp.120 and 154-155. 
66 Scott, 'Everyday Resistance', pp.11-12 and 18-22, especially pp.l9-20. 
67 Alex Lichtenstein, 'That Disposition To Theft, With Which They Have Been 
Branded: Moral Economy, Slave Management, and the Law', Journal of Social 
History, vol. 21, no. 3, Spring 1988, pp.418 and 421 (the quote is from p.418). 
68 David Barry Gaspar, 'Antigua Slaves and Their Struggle to Survive', in 
Herman J. Viola and Carolyn Margolis (eds), Seeds of Change, (Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), pp.130-131, quoted in Sidney W. Mintz, 'Slave 
Life on Caribbean Sugar Plantations: Some Unanswered Questions', in Stephan 
Palmie (ed), Slave Cultures and the Cultures of Slavery, (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1995), p.16. 
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'often employed it [theft] to acquire or maintain their economic independence 
from whites, as they had when enslaved,.69 
Each of these cases of 'everyday resistance' through minor theft is 
further evidence that theft can be more than simply an act of need, greed, 
mischief, or malice. The difference between limited term protest against 
oppression and permanent resistance to such oppression is not that great 
when it is enacted through covert forms of crime such as theft: the means are 
the same; the risks are similar; and the overall impact of each crime is 
generally minor. As such, those studies which argue that 'everyday 
resistance' against oppression has been enacted through common theft 
provide additional, if slightly indirect, support for the premise that theft has the 
potential to be utilised as a "weapon" of protest during periods of high or 
heightened social tensions. 
International research over the last forty years has clearly generated a 
wide range of hypotheses concerning the relationship between crime and 
individual or small group protest. Each hypothesis is supported by extremely 
persuasive evidence obtained from extensive and detailed case studies. 
These hypotheses generally compliment each other and, taken as a whole, 
suggest that during periods of high or heightened social tension a connection 
often exists between crime and protest, though the exact relationship varies 
between theories and between contexts. The work on crime as a potential 
form of protest by individuals or small groups also compliments the research 
69 Alex Lichtenstein, 'Theft, Moral Economy, and the Transition from Slavery to 
Freedom in the American South', in Stephan Palmie (ed), Slave Cultures and the 
Cultures of Slavery, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1995), pp.l76-186. 
(The quotes are from pp.177 and 184 respectively). 
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focused upon the relationship between crime and industrial or non-industrial 
mass protest. 
The overall conclusion which can be drawn from the broad 
historiography of crime and protest (which includes a significant number of 
criminological, sociological, and political science analyses focusing upon 
historical contexts) is that this field of research is both valid and active: with a 
continuously expanding body of research, with ongoing debate, and with the 
continual modification and reworking of theories to explain different contexts. 
The potential for further research is also considerable, including on the history 
of crime and industrial protest in New Zealand. 
The connection between crime and protest in New Zealand during 
industrial disputes has received relatively little attention from New Zealand 
historians. Nick Fahey's undergraduate research essay which examined 
violent crime and disorder prosecuted during the 1913 General Strike in 
Wellington has been the only detailed study specifically focused upon the 
relationship between crime and industrial conflict. 7o Fahey found that during 
the dispute there was a significant increase in the number of criminal 
prosecutions for violence and serious public disorder. The vast majority of 
the increase was caused by crimes which were clearly identifiable as being 
directly related to the strike. These strike related crimes usually involved 
special constables or regular police as the victims, or were acts of defiance 
70 Nick Fahey, 'Violent Crime and the 1913 Wellington Waterfront Dispute: A 
Micro-history of Crime and Conflict', (unpublished HIST 316 research essay, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1996). The current thesis will utilise a different and broader 
selection criteria for the crime data collected than Fahey, will analyse the data using 
different statistical techniques, and will, in general, test different hypotheses, though 
utilising the same criminal records as the central primary source for 1911 to 1913. 
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directed at the authorities with no actual victim (except, perhaps, "public 
order" as it was defined by the authorities).71 
Valuable, but more broadly focused, treatments of the disorder 
experienced during major industrial disputes and the response of the state 
and the police to these events can be found in the work of Richard Hill 
(concerning the nation-wide strikes of 1890 and 1913, and the Waihi Strike of 
1912), Erik Olssen (writing about the disputes of 1912 and 1913), R. J. 
Campbell (on the 1912 Waihi Strike), and of Sherwood Young (concerning 
the waterfront dispute of 1951).72 Stanley Roche's 'informal account' of the 
1912 Waihi Strike provides important information on crime, criminal 
prosecutions and policing during the dispute.73 
The discussion and analysis of crime related to the 1913 strike in the 
works of Hill and Olssen focused largely upon the riots. Apart from the 
charges against the strike leaders only brief mentions were made in their 
works of the criminal prosecutions or the sentences those convicted received. 
The potential use of obscene language, insulting behaviour, desertion, or 
theft as forms of protest and social conflict were not examined. Hill's study 
provides a detailed analysis of the policing strategies implemented during the 
strike, but the use made of the power to arrest and prosecute was not 
investigated except for the charges against the strike leaders and the 
71 Fahey, 'Violent Crime and the 1913 Wellington Waterfront Dispute', 
pp.17, 28-29 and 35. 
72 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.2-3, 71-75, 274, 283-295 and 
304-323; Olssen, Red Feds, pp.153-160, 180-198, 200 and 208; R. J. Campbell, 
'The Role of the Police in the Waihi Strike: Some New Evidence', Political Science, 
vol. 26, December 1974, pp.34-40; Sherwood Ivan Young, 'The Activities and 
Problems of the Police in the 1951 Waterfront Dispute', (unpublished MA research 
essay, University of Canterbury, 1975). 
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accuracy of allegations that certain regular constables (who were allegedly in 
sympathy with the strikers) had 'shirked their work' by choosing not to arrest 
rioters./4 
Campbell's article contains a useful summary of the criminal 
prosecutions and sentences related to the 1912 Waihi strike. 75 The details 
which could not be included in a three paragraph summary warrant additional 
research and analysis. The nature of the 'various offences', the victims, the 
proportion of all prosecutions which concerned a particular type of charge (for 
example, assault or obscene language), and the context of the incidents from 
which these charges arose intrigue those interested in crime and protest. 
Olssen's analysis of the prosecution of the leaders of the striking union 
presents a glimpse of the events and actions which were considered by the 
police to be disorderly, illegal, and to warrant prosecution. 76 Roche provided 
detailed and entertaining descriptions of the court proceedings arising from 
the Waihi strike.77 Campbell, Hill and Roche each discussed at length the 
events at the Miners' Hall on 12 November 1912 which resulted in the death 
of Frederick Evans, a striker. Olssen's work contains a one paragraph 
summary of the disturbance. 78 Campbell, Hill, Olssen and Roche also each 
mentioned, in varying degrees of detail, reports of other disorderly or violent 
73 Stanley Roche, The Red and the Gold: An Informal Account of the Waihi 
Strike, 1912, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp.80-131. 
74 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.305-321; Olssen, Red Feds, 
pp.180-198, 200 and 208. 
75 Campbell, 'The Role of the Police in the Waihi Strike', p.37 (including note 
20) and p.38, note 25. 
76 Olssen, Red Feds, p.l55. 
77 Roche, The Red and the Gold, pp.85-90, 92-94, 98 and 100-101. 
78 Campbell, 'The Role of the Police in the Waihi Strike', pp.38-40; Hill, The 
Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.288-291; Roche, The Red and the Gold, 
pp.l17-131; Olssen, Red Feds,p.159. 
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incidents related to the strike. Their discussions of such incidents were not 
intended to be exhaustive or to systematically analyse all disturbances or 
prosecutions. 
Policing strategies used during the 1951 waterfront dispute were the 
central focus of Young's research. The use made of criminal prosecutions 
was not considered. 
The relationship between crime and protest during periods of industrial 
dispute is an important, though as yet only partly explored, area in both the 
historiography of industrial relations and the historiography of crime in New 
Zealand. The uses made of the criminal law during industrial disputes 
(through arrests, prosecutions, verdicts, sentences, and jury trials) also 
require further research. This thesis is intended to go some way towards 
alleviating this lack of historical knowledge. 
This thesis seeks to determine the connection, if any, between 
industrial protest and the crime committed during New Zealand's 1913 
General Strike. The uses made of the criminal law in response to this period 
of social tension and civil strife will also be examined. As has been 
demonstrated (and will be demonstrated in greater detail at the start of 
Chapter Five), the strike was a time of great social tension and overt social 
conflict. This thesis will analyse the extent to which protest was 
simultaneously conducted through legal methods, which included strikes, 
picketing and chanting, and through illegal actions such as violent crime and 
theft. The types of crime which were used as protest, the context and 
frequency of these incidents, and who were the accused and the victims of 
these crimes will be investigated. The possibility that the ways in which the 
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criminal law was implemented changed in response to the strike will also be 
considered. 
To analyse the relationships between crime, protest, the uses ot the 
criminal law and the 1913 strike a case study has been conducted of one of 
the major New Zealand ports of the period, Wellington. One city alone has 
been chosen to make the research manageable. Wellington has been 
chosen because it was one of the two centres in which the strike began (the 
other centre was the coal mining town of Huntly) and the location of the first, 
the most numerous, and the most violent disturbances.79 In addition, the 
Minister of Justice, Alexander Herdman, considered Wellington to have been 
'the real centre of the struggle'. 'It was recognised from the outset that if the 
trouble could be stamped out here it would gradually diminish in other 
places.'8o Wellington also had the largest watersiders' union in the country 
with 1531 members in 1911, and about 1600 striking watersiders in 1913. 81 
Erik Olssen's research on New Zealand watersiders in the years immediately 
preceding the 1913 strike found that 'the sub-culture of the youthful wharfies' 
was 'characterized by a high degree of transience, violence, gambling, and 
control of their own work patterns'. This 'not only made wharfies quick to 
79 See Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.305 and 308-319; and Erik 
Olssen, 'The Great Strike of 1913', New Zealand's Heritage, vol. 5, part 73,1973, 
pp.2023-2024. 
80 Both quotes are from Herdman's telegram in reply to a telegram from C. J. 
Parr, Mayor of Auckland, to Herdman, 04 December 1913. ('1913 Strike - North 
Island File' - held at Archives New Zealand, Wellington - AAAC - W3539 / 52b). 
Herdman's telegram in reply is not dated but appears to have been sent on 04 
December 1913. Also quoted in Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.305. 
81 Olssen, Red Feds, p.224 (1911 figure); and Hill, The Iron Hand in the 
Velvet Glove, p.305 ( 1913 figure). The membership in 1911 of the Auckland 
watersiders' union was 796, with 428 in the Lyttelton watersiders' union, and 386 in 
the Dunedin watersiders' union (Olssen, Red Feds, p.224). 
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anger but, as the men joined the union, became a source of solidarity.'82 
These factors suggest that if violence was used as a form of protest 
anywhere in New Zealand the most likely place for it to have been used was 
Wellington. 
It must be noted, though, that Wellington cannot be taken as typical of 
the New Zealand situation as a whole. Each port produced different 
experiences of the strike, depending on the number of strikers, the number of 
striking unions and other less quantifiable variables such as the policing 
strategies adopted by the senior local police officials, and the willingness of 
strikers to resort to violence. 83 For example, Wellington experienced the most 
violent and the most frequent confrontations between strikers and special 
constables. The level of violence in Auckland was also high, but Christchurch 
experienced relatively few confrontations and there were no major incidents in 
Dunedin or on the West Coast.84 The size and scale of the strike also varied 
considerably throughout the country. Auckland produced the largest number 
of strikers, especially during the two weeks of its general (all unions) strike, 
Wellington was close behind, while the strikes in Christchurch and Dunedin 
82 Olssen, Red Feds, p.86. 
83 See Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.305-319; Olssen, Red 
Feds, pp.190, 193 and 196-199; and see footnote 85 below. The difference between 
the ports in their experience of the strike is also clearly evident in the scenes reported 
in the strike columns of The Dominion, The Evening Post and The New Zealand 
Times throughout the strike. 
84 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.308-319. For a valuable 
discussion of the different experiences of the 1913 strike in Auckland, Wellington, 
Christchurch, Dunedin and on the West Coast see Innes Moffat, ' "Let all Hands 
Wade in with Batons": A Study of the Enrollment and Composition of the Special 
Constables who Volunteered in the South Island during the 1913 Waterfront Strike', 
(unpublished BA Hons research essay, University of Otago, 1992), especially pp.vi-
vii, and 16-63. 
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were relatively small-scale.8s As such, any conclusions reached by this study 
cannot be directly applied to the conflicts in other New Zealand ports and 
mining towns without further research, though it is likely a ::;irniial ~dUern 
would emerge, given New Zealand's relatively small size and the influence in 
each of the strike centres of the United Federation of Labour and its 
supporters. 
The focus of this case study will be on three types of crime which were 
the most likely to be influenced by social tensions, if social conflict took the 
form of crime in these periods of industrial unrest: those crimes involving 
violence, and those involving theft, (as means of protest and conflict both 
against the person and against the property of those who opposed the strike 
or who were perceived to be attempting to defeat the strike); and thirdly, all 
other crimes committed against the State, the enforcers of its laws, and the 
State's definition of "public order" of a serious or criminal nature. 86 All crimes 
85 Pettit, Wellington Watersiders, p.60 cites Hancox and Hight's ('The Labour 
Movement and the Strike of 1913 in New Zealand', The Economic Journal, June 
1914) estimate that in Wellington there were about 6,000 men in all out on strike, 
including drivers, seamen, building labourers and waterside workers. Roth, Trade 
Unions in New Zealand, p.38 provides the figure of 7,000 strikers during the height 
of the general strike in Auckland. Given Martin's and Roth's estimates of 14,000 and 
16,000 strikers nationally (see p.2, footnote 3 above), then the numbers of strikers in 
Christchurch and Dunedin must have been relatively small. Especially considering 
that Roth (p.38) states there were 4,000 miners on strike as well, most of whom would 
not have been included in the figures for the four major port cities. Because these 
separate figures do not tally it would appear that some of these estimates are incorrect, 
but the general trend and ratios described are probably accurate. 
For the different experience of the 1913 Strike in Dunedin as compared to 
other New Zealand ports see Erik Olssen, A History of Otago, (Dunedin: John 
McIndoe, 1984), pp.117, 119 and 120. 
86 The distinction made in this category is between crimes which could 
conceivably be, or obviously were, forms of social conflict or perceived threats to the 
hegemony and power of the State, such as rioting, illegal assemblies, obscene 
language, resisting arrest, and obstruction; and public nuisance type offences, such as 
drunkenness, disorderly conduct while drunk, indecent behaviour, and traffic law 
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of violence, larceny, or anti-state actions which were committed during the 
dispute, and brought before the Magistrate's Court in Wellington, will be 
investigated for any evidence that these crimes were used CiS a rneans of 
protest or social conflict. 8? The two year period before the strike started has 
also been examined, data collected and analysed on the same range of 
crimes, to provide a set of comparative data for the analysis. 
Before any analysis is undertaken, the methodology which determined 
the selection and classification of the data collected will be discussed; this will 
constitute Chapter Two. In Chapters Three and Four six hypotheses on the 
connection between protest, social conflict and crime will be developed and 
described. Chapters Five and Six will test the explanatory power of these 
hypotheses for the 1913 General Strike using quantitative and qualitative data 
gathered concerning the crimes prosecuted in Wellington during this dispute. 
Reports of crimes for which there were no prosecutions will also be 
considered. 
The first three of the six hypotheses which form the central 
components of this analysis will focus upon whether or not crime was utilised 
by strikers as a weapon in their industrial struggles with employers, strike-
breakers, the State, and others who opposed (or were perceived to be 
violations. The former could be utilised as effective means of protest or social 
conflict, while the latter would in almost every instance be of absolutely no influence 
or impact. 
87 The geographical definition of Wellington crime includes all crimes heard by 
the Wellington (City) Magistrate's Court which were committed in Wellington city 
and suburbs itself, in the immediate Wellington rural district, and in the close and 
accessible Hutt electorate which incorporated the minor population centre of Lower 
Hutt. Crimes committed on ships while in port in Wellington, or on ships travelling 
between another port and Wellington have also been included. The rest of Wellington 
Province has been excluded since these cases were usually dealt with by subsidiary 
courts, and these crimes were unlikely to have been influenced by a waterfront 
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opposing) the strikers' efforts. These three hypotheses will examine the 
applicability to the New Zealand context of three conceptions of how protest 
and social conflict could be manifested through crime: first, the idea of crime 
as a form of protest against employers; secondly, violent vengeance against 
strike-breakers; and thirdly, protest against the State through crime. 
The remaining hypotheses will examine the ways in which the criminal 
law has been implemented by the State and those in positions of power. The 
first of these hypotheses will analyse whether "prosecution or persecution" is 
the more accurate term to describe criminal prosecutions by the police during 
industrial struggles. The second hypothesis will investigate the concept of a 
judicial "crackdown" on offending during a period of public anxiety and 
tension. Magistrates and judges had the power to exercise considerable 
discretion in the severity of the sentences they imposed and in their verdicts 
in cases in which the accused pleaded not guilty and was not tried by a jury. 
Finally, the ways in which governments have used or modified the criminal 
law in response to industrial disputes will be examined. Violence by police 
during industrial disputes will also be discussed in Chapter Four. 
These explorations into theories of protest and social conflict will allow 
the linkage, or lack there of, between industrial protest and the crime 
committed during the 1913 strike to be determined. Hopefully, these 
explorations will also be of benefit to others interested in crime and the use of 
the criminal law during industrial disputes; perhaps as a framework, or part of 
a framework, for future research. This is the second focus of this thesis. The 
international examinations of crime as protest by strikers (Chapter Three) and 
dispute, being mainly inland towns and rural districts far from the port city. 
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the uses which have been made of the criminal law during industrial disputes 
(Chapter Four) are not intended to be definitive. The purpose is to bring 
together information from a wide range of industrial disputes and authors and 
by presenting these conclusions and evidence thematically to indicate the 
possible ways in which strikers could protest through crime and the criminal 
law could be applied by the police and the judiciary. Research on the use of 
the criminal law during industrial disputes is rare and the available analyses 
are usually scattered throughout more general works on specific industrial 
disputes or the policing of industrial disputes. The discussion and analysis in 
Chapter Four was thus particularly needed to begin the process of drawing 
together data on this under-examined aspect of the histories of protest, 
industrial disputes, policing, crime, and the uses made of the criminal law. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
Any study which involves a great deal of quantitative material gathered 
by the researcher needs to have the methodological foundations of its 
research explicitly stated. This is the focus of this chapter. 
This chapter has two purposes. The first purpose is to discuss the 
methodology which has been used in this thesis to research crime committed 
in Wellington during the 1913 strike and in the two years prior to the strike. 
The second intention is to describe the method by which individuals were 
allocated to occupational categories. General methodological issues affecting 
research into crime and policing will be examined, as will the specific 
methodological issues involved in studying Wellington between 1911 and 
1913. 
The structure of this chapter will be to first introduce the type of crimes 
this study is focused upon. Secondly, the nature and merits of the major 
primary sources available and used will be discussed. Thirdly, the 
methodology by which this primary data was collated into the sets of 
information which are analysed in detail in Chapters Five and Six, will be 
described. 
Three types of crime form the main focus of this thesis: violent crime, 
larceny, and thirdly, crimes against the State, the enforcers of its laws, and 
the State's definition of "public order" of a serious or criminal nature. 
The criterion for the selection of the violent crimes was any crime 
which involved violence that could have been in some way utilised as a form 
of social conflict or retribution. This definition allowed crimes involving 
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property damage, breaking the peace, and the use or threatened use of 
firearms to be classified in the same general category as more traditionally 
recognised forms of violent crime such as assault, murder, and fighting. 
The small number (one and fifteen, respectively, during the strike and 
pre-strike periods) of prosecuted cases of sexual assault and rape are not 
included in this analysis. This is because sexual crimes involve a different 
and wider range of variables than other violent crimes, and are of a 
complexity which need to be studied separately. It is highly unlikely that the 
major motivation of sexual crime was as an act of social or industrial protest. 
It protects the statistical validity of this research to exclude such anomalous 
data. Disorderly behaviour, abusive language and lunacy charges have also 
been excluded from this analysis, unless the behaviour led to violence, 
resisting arrest (an offence against the enforcers of the State's laws) and/or 
property damage. 
All theft or attempted theft which was prosecuted in the Magistrate's 
Court has been included in this study. 
The third category of crime was in part created from the categories of 
violent crime and theft: those crimes which involved offences against the 
State or the enforcers of its laws, whether they were police, military, 
government departments or the "good order" required by the State. Any 
crime involving the State as the victim (for there were no cases where the 
State was the accused) whether it was of violence, breaking the peace or 
theft was included in this third list, while remaining concurrently in the violence 
or theft category. All other crimes which could be considered as potential 
forms of anti-State action were also incorporated into this third category. 
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Such offences include those which did not lead to physical violence but 
threatened physical violence in the view of the enforcers of the law: such as 
threatening or insulting behaviour (or language) with the intent to provoke a 
breach of the peace. 
Also incorporated into the third category are actions which threatened 
the power and ascendancy of the State and the police, (though no specifically 
violent actions against individuals or specific property were necessarily able to 
be proven, and as such there were no individual victims),1 which included 
rioting, unlawful assembly, inciting violent actions against the forces of the 
State, or seditious language. Also included are instances of minor violence 
against police officers which could not be considered as assault, such as 
resisting arrest and obstruction. The last major category of potential anti-
State crime considered was abusive or obscene language, specifically 
prosecuted by the police; presumably since they or their superiors saw such 
actions as a breach of civil order and the "public peace".2 This third category 
in its entirety will be used to analyse the extent and forms of protest against 
It is this distinction that has led to these crimes not being grouped as violent 
crimes. The main (and often only) victim was the State and society in general terms. 
2 Any cases of abusive or obscene language which were taken to Court by 
individuals, and not by the police, have been excluded from this analysis. The number 
of such private prosecutions was reasonably small (much less frequent than 
prosecutions by the police) and they largely seemed to be disputes within families or 
extended families or between those living in close proximity to each other. These 
cases were often not taken overly seriously by anyone involved, with the prosecutor 
failing to appear in court on a number of occasions, adjournments of months at a time 
were repeatedly granted, and the majority appear to have been (eventually) withdrawn 
by the parties or dismissed for want of prosecution or want of evidence. They were in 
effect more civil matters than criminal ones (though the law stated that they were to be 
tried in criminal hearings), and the judiciary treated them as relatively non-serious and 
non-criminal matters. Thus, they are not relevant to be included in a study of social 
and industrial protest through crime. 
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the State through crime during the strike. 3 
There are three major types of sources of information on crimes 
committed in Wellington between 1911 and 1913: the criminal court records, 
the local daily newspapers, and the New Zealand Police Gazette.4 Some 
other police records do survive and are of use but the most useful police 
sources on individual crimes, the Police Charge Books, have been destroyed. 
The main source of information on the crimes committed in Wellington 
is the Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Books. This source 
provides a complete record of all crimes prosecuted by the police or private 
individuals in the Wellington city, suburban and immediate rural region, as 
well as some crimes committed in the Hutt electoral district. 5 
These official unpublished records do not, however, provide any 
information on crimes where no one was ever prosecuted for the offence. 
There is also the problem of unreported crime. It is impossible for social 
historians or criminologists to determine the total level of crime in any society 
because of uncertainty over how large a proportion of crime is actually 
reported and how this varies over time and between areas. Only crime that is 
3 See the section of Chapter Five entitled 'Protest Against the State through 
Crime'. 
4 The criminal court records are the Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal 
Record Books, and the Wellington Supreme Court Return of Prisoners Tried and 
Sentenced. 
The daily newspapers are The Dominion, The Evening Post, and The New 
Zealand Times. Additional information on some Wellington criminal prosecutions is 
provided in The New Zealand Truth (a weekly newspaper published in Wellington 
and distributed throughout New Zealand). The Maoriland Worker's coverage of the 
Supreme Court trials of the strike leaders is also worth consulting. (The Maoriland 
Worker was a weekly newspaper published in Wellington and distributed throughout 
New Zealand). 
5 For the geographical definition of Wellington used to gather information on 
the crimes committed in Wellington see Chapter One, footnote 87 (pp.37-38). 
44 
reported and/or prosecuted can be statistically studied. Unreported crime is 
also known as the "dark figure" or "grey area" of crime. 6 
Even given these limitations the Criminal Record Books are an 
extremely valuable source, as well as being the best available. The entries in 
the Criminal Record Books contain a wealth of information useful to the social 
historian of crime. These details includes the names of the accused and the 
victims, specifics of the crime (date, location, type of offence, and value and 
type of items stolen or damaged), as well as the magistrate, plea, verdict and 
sentence (if any) for the crime.? The one major piece of information, vital to 
any analysis of social conflict, almost never recorded in the Court records is 
the occupation of either the accused or the victim.8 
A second set of Court records for the most serious of offences exist in 
the Supreme Court Return of Prisoners Tried and Sentenced. These higher 
6 For discussions of these problems see Reiner, 'The Case of the Missing 
Crimes', pp.188-189; Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750-1900, 2nd 
edition, pp.24, 30 and 153; Jones, Crime, Protest, Community and Police in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain, pp.2-3; and George Rude, Criminal and Victim: 
Crime and Society in Early Nineteenth-Century England, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985), p.3. Also see the three references provided in footnote 2, p.171, of P. J. 
R. King, 'Prosecution Associations and Their Impact in Eighteenth-Century Essex', 
in Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain 
1750-1850, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). For two particularly useful discussions 
of why many crimes were not reported or not prosecuted also see Davis, 
'Prosecutions and Their Context: The Use of the Criminal Law in Later Nineteenth-
Century London', pp.399-402 and 407-426; and Jones, Rebecca's Children, pp.158-
160,166,170,171,172,178 and 182-183. These last two works add social context 
and social explanations to the statistical explanations provided by many other 
researchers. For a New Zealand perspective see Graeme Dunstall, A Policeman's 
Paradise? Policing a Stable Society 1918-1945, (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 
1999), pp.4, 132-134 and 397 (note 7). 
7 Unfortunately for those interested in studying crime and criminal prosecutions 
during the 1890 Maritime Strike the Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record 
Books only survive from 1893 onwards. 
8 The exceptions to this usual lack of occupational data include police 
constables, prostitutes, and seamen who deserted their ships. 
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court records do not provide any extra details than those contained in the 
Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Books, but they list the outcome and 
sentence (if any) of cases which are referred to the Supreme Court, and 
occasionally list an occupation not noted in the lower court records. 
Local daily newspapers in early twentieth century New Zealand often 
provided a wealth of details on crimes prosecuted in the local courts. Nearly 
every day there was a report (often lengthy) on the proceedings in the 
district's courts, both Magistrate's and Supreme. Crime and judicial 
proceedings clearly fascinated newspaper readers, even more so than they 
do today. Sometimes the reports on specific cases were brief, just giving the 
name of the accused and victims, type of offence, verdict and sentence (if 
any). Frequently, however, there was an in depth account of the hearing or 
trial, the family background, occupation and motives of those involved and 
lengthy descriptions of the crime itself (information which was not entered into 
the court records). 
Newspaper coverage of prosecutions is not as thorough as that 
provided by the Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Books, but the coverage 
is still substantial. For the 1911-1913 case study there were newspaper 
reports on nearly all of the 1757 relevant criminal prosecutions gathered from 
the Criminal Record Books.9 
The New Zealand Police Gazette, published weekly, lists by prison all 
those who were released from gaol each week, and lists by Magistrate's 
9 For a period forty years earlier Caroline Daley, 'Interpersonal Conflict in 
Colonial New Zealand - A Study of Violence and Civil Litigation in Wellington, 
1870-1872', (unpublished BA Hons research essay, Victoria University of Wellington, 
1986), p. 7, estimated that the reportage rate of Wellington prosecutions for violent 
crime by The Evening Post between 1870 and 1872 was 75%. 
46 
Court most of those individuals who were convicted but were not required to 
serve a term of imprisonment. The details within these listings include the 
occupation and previous convictions of the accused. The New Zealand 
Police Gazette is an invaluable source of information on the occupation of the 
vast majority of those convicted of Wellington crimes. 1o 
Research using the Court records, local newspapers and the New 
Zealand Police Gazette does not provide the occupations of all of those 
involved in the specific crimes under investigation. The use of further primary 
sources are needed to fill in these gaps. Two major sources provide 
additional information for analyses of the occupational relationship of the 
victims and the accused: the Electoral Rolls, and Wises Street Directories. 11 
The Electoral Rolls provide occupation and address for both victims and 
accused with relatively uncommon names, as do the Wises Street Directories. 
Both the Electoral Rolls and Wises Street Directories have problems as 
historical sources, but if they are used carefully the information they contain 
\0 The released from gaol lists of the New Zealand Police Gazette also record the 
occupation of those accused who were committed to the Supreme Court for trial and 
were released on bail after spending time in prison waiting for their bail requirements 
to be arranged and approved, but who were subsequently not convicted. 
11 The rolls for the election held in December 1914 for the six electoral districts 
in the Wellington region (the four Wellington city electorates, Wellington Suburbs 
and Country District, and the single Hutt electorate) contain over 54,000 names. The 
four Wellington city electoral districts were Wellington Central, Wellington East, 
Wellington North, and Wellington South - all were classified as solely urban areas. 
Wellington Suburbs and County District incorporated the rest of what is today 
suburban Wellington (including the Miramar Peninsula, Khandallah and most of 
Kaori) and extended past Porirua to Pukerua Bay (incorporating Johnsonville and 
Tawa). This electorate was classified as 78% urban, 22% rural. Hutt electorate 
covered Lower Hutt, Upper Hutt, Petone, and Eastbourne, and contained a similar 
urban-rural split (75% to 25%) as Wellington Suburbs and Country District. (Source: 
Alan McRobie, New Zealand Electoral Atlas, (Wellington: GP Books, 1989), 
pp.74-75). Both McRobie and the individual electoral rolls provided similar figures 
of slightly over 54,000 electors. 
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can be of considerable assistance for understanding the relationship between 
the victims and accused in crimes in New Zealand. 12 
Due to time constraints it has not been possible to search the Electoral 
Rolls and Wises Street Directories for every victim and accused whose 
occupations were not recorded in the Court records, local newspapers and 
the New Zealand Police Gazette. Searches have been conducted with some 
success for the accused and victims in strike period criminal prosecutions, 
and for roughly a quarter of the accused and victims in the pre-strike period. 
Where appropriate this additional occupational information has been 
incorporated in to the analyses in Chapters Five and Six. Because of the 
incompleteness of the data on the occupations of the victims of pre-strike 
offences no attempt has been made in Chapters Five and Six to compare the 
occupations of strike period victims with those of pre-strike victims. 
It should be noted that nearly all the occupations of the accused 
presented in Chapters Five and Six were obtained from either the New 
Zealand Police Gazette or newspaper reports. Almost all the data on the 
occupations of the victims in strike related offences has been gathered from 
the newspaper reports, with some corroborative evidence concerning 
offences against regular or special constables being provided by the entries in 
the Criminal Record Books. (The newspapers were particularly informative 
12 The New Zealand Electoral Roll has three significant limitations: first, it 
includes no one under the legal voting age of 21; secondly, the occupations listed for 
women are often relatively unhelpful for a social analysis, since the vast majority of 
women are listed as either married or spinster; thirdly, to be listed on the electoral roll 
a person must have been resident in a particular area for at least six months. 
The second problem can be overcome in many instances if the woman lived at 
the same address as her husband, father or another male relative of the same surname 
and that person is on the electoral roll; though a reasonably large number are not able 
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on the occupations of the accused and victims in strike related cases). The 
source on the occupations of the victims in strike period but not strike related 
offending is evenly split between newspaper reports and the Electoral Rolls. 
Once occupation had been determined for each victim and accused 
each person was allocated to a class category dependent on occupation. 13 
The division between middle class and blue collar workers was modelled on 
the categorisation developed by Paul Meuli, though not all the subdivisions 
within each category have been utilised when presenting the data. Meuli 
argued that skilled and independent manual workers should be considered 
blue collar, not middle class. To some extent this 'flouts' the generally 
accepted sociological convention. The supposition that an independent 
labourer or craftsman had more in common with someone of the .same skill 
level than an equally independent stock-broker in this period is a reasonable 
assumption and one which will also be used in this analysis. 14 Any 
occupation not listed in Meuli's extensive listing is categorised to the class 
grouping that would seem most appropriate. 
The basic categories of occupational classification into which the 
workforce is broken down are as follows: 
to be identified in this way, especially if they have a relatively common name such as 
Mary Smith. 
13 In this thesis the terms "blue collar" workers and "working class" will be used 
more or less interchangeably, unless otherwise stated in specific instances. 
14 Paul Meredith Meuli, 'Occupational Change and Bourgeois Proliferation: A 
Study of New Middle Class Expansion in New Zealand 1896-1926', (unpublished 
MA thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1977), pp.19-24. 
Meuli bases his classification system on that devised by C. Wright Mills, 
White Collar: The American Middle Classes, (New York, 1953), cited in Meuli, 
p.19. Meuli's listing of occupations categorised by class is included as Appendix 1. 
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a) Middle Class = Free Professionals, Businessmen, Farmers, 
Salaried Professionals, Salespeople, White Collar 
Workers. 
b) Blue Collar = Skilled and unskilled manual workers. 15 
Further difficulties concerning the allocation of a person into a class 
category arise even once an individual's occupation has been identified. The 
major problem is that of 'insufficiently detailed occupational titles. For 
example; does "engineer" refer to a professional, a mechanic, an assisting 
labourer, a consultant employer, a government employee? Added to this is 
the problem of equivalent titles - establishing continuity when two or more 
descriptions are used for the same job - or even by the same person on 
different occasions.'16 These problems have been encountered within this 
research project, for instance with "engineers" and "boot manufacturers". 
(What is the exact distinction in scale between a boot maker and a boot 
manufacturer, and who chooses which title to use?). Where possible, other 
qualitative evidence such as the value of items stolen, has been used to 
allocate the individual to a specific class. Where this type of corroborating 
evidence has not been overly helpful, or not locatable, these persons have 
been allocated to the "unknown" class category. 
15 
16 
As summarised by Daley, 'Interpersonal Conflict', p.8. 
Greg Ryan, 'Where the Game was Played by Decent Chaps. 
New Zealand Cricket 1832-1914', (unpublished, PhD thesis, 
Canterbury, 1996), p.18. 
The Making of 
University of 
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Chapter 3 
Crime as Protest during Industrial Disputes 
- international Perspectives 
Within international research into the history of crime and protest there 
is considerable evidence to suggest that crime and the enforcement of the 
criminal law during periods of heightened social tension can often be closely 
related to those social tensions. As discussed in Chapter One authors such 
as Howard M. Gitelman, Michelle Perrot, Philip Taft and Philip Ross, David 
Waddington, R. B. Walker, Michael Wallace, and J. A. Frank have shown that 
during the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century violence has 
frequently been used by strikers as an additional form of protest during 
industrial disputes. The work of Hermann Mannheim and Ted Robert Gurr 
indicate that there has been a connection between certain major industrial 
disputes and large increases in the number of prosecutions for violent crime 
and theft. Gurr also emphasised the impact on crime and prosecution rates 
of the official response to strife and dissent. 1 
In the current chapter and Chapter Four a series of hypotheses based 
on the international research will be developed. These hypotheses will 
demonstrate the specific ways in which crime has been used by strikers and 
the criminal law has been implemented by the authorities during periods of 
heightened industrial and social tension. The hypotheses will also provide a 
framework for analysing the extent to which, and the forms through which, 
crime was used as protest and the enforcement of the criminal law changed 
For a broad overview of international research on a variety of topics within the 
study of crime and protest (including the relevant works by the authors named above) 
see Chapter One. 
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during particular industrial disputes. The current chapter will focus on 
"criminal" activities initiated by strikers and their supporters. Chapter Four will 
examine the ways in which the criminal law has been enforced during periods 
of industrial dispute and heightened social tensions. In Chapters Five and Six 
these tests will be applied to the crime data gathered on the 1913 General 
Strike. 
Protest Against Employers Through Crime: 
Studies of the history of crime and violence have allowed criminal acts 
to be understood and analysed as potential forms of protest and social 
conflict. International research indicates that three general types of crime 
have been utilised at times during industrial disputes as protest by strikers 
against their employers and managers: interpersonal violence, violence 
against property, and theft. The evidence for regarding each of these three 
categories of crime as potential forms of social conflict will be presented 
below. Through this discussion it will be demonstrated that examining crimes 
committed during industrial disputes for evidence of their use as protest is a 
valid and useful undertaking. Even if it is discovered through detailed case 
studies (such as that in Chapter Five) that crime was not used as a means of 
protest in specific disputes, this is still a useful finding. It allows the 
consideration of why crime, an ever-present potential form of social conflict 
and protest, was not utilised during particular periods of heightened social 
tension and mass protest. 
Robert G. Neville's study of the considerable violence in Yorkshire 
related to the British coal mining lockout of 1893 provides a useful example of 
the variety of forms in which violence has been and can be used as industrial 
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protest. 'At several mines there were acts of violence, destruction and arson, 
which soon assumed a stereotyped form. Colliery managers' offices were 
wrecked, windows smashed, coal wagons derailed and ignited, books and 
papers scattered over pit yards, and colliery officials and blacklegs assaulted 
and intimidated.'2 These incidents involved both interpersonal violence 
between the opposing groups involved in the industrial dispute and various 
types of violence by strikers against the property of their employer. 3 
Direct physical violence between strikers and their employers has 
been, however, relatively uncommon in industrial disputes. In Quebec in 
1937 an inkpot was thrown in the face of the President of the Dominion 
Textile Company when he visited a textile plant which was on strike.4 
Numerous additional examples of striker assaults on their employers, 
managers or overseers can be found, but such incidents occurred in only a 
tiny proportion of all strikes.5 Michael Wallace's general survey of violence in 
2 Robert G. Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout: The 
Featherstone "Massacre" " International Review of Social History, vol. 21, part 3, 
1976, p.341. For similar disturbances during the 1910 coal mining dispute in 
Durham, England see Dave Douglass, 'The Durham Pitman', in Raphael Samuel (ed), 
Miners, Quarrymen and Saltworkers, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 
pp.270-271. 
3 Assaults by strikers against strike-breakers (who are also known as blacklegs, 
blacksheep or scabs) is another important aspect of protest and conflict through 
violence during industrial disputes, which will be examined in detail in the next 
section of this chapter: 'Violent Vengeance against Strike Breakers'. 
4 Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and 
Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66, Study No. 22 for Task Force on Labour 
Relations, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), p.261. 
5 For further examples of striker assaults on their employers, managers or 
overseers see Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', p.346 (quoted 
on p.52 of this chapter); Merfyn Jones, 'Y chwarelwyr: The Slate Quarrymen of North 
Wales', in Raphael Samuel (ed), Miners, Quarrymen and Saltworkers, (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p.106 (slate quarrymen at Hafod y Wem Quarry in 
Betws Garmon, North Wales in 1876); Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.l09 (in 
Pittsburgh during the 1877 railroad strike); and Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.181-
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the United States concluded that labour (including strikers) 'seldom initiated 
violence against employers, except to destroy their property,.6 Specifically 
examining industrial violence in the United States from 1860 to 1960 Howard 
M. Gitelman found that 'Most physical assaults by workers were directed 
against other workingmen rather than against employers.'? Even rarer were 
instances where employers inflicted interpersonal violence on strikers. An 
incident and court case from the Queensland shearers' strike of 1891 though, 
indicates that such confrontations sometimes took place. On 23 February 
1891 troops arrived in the town of Clermont and were met by a group of 
strikers. The commander of the troops, Major Ricardo, addressed his men 
before the strikers and other locals, and there was some heckling by 
unionists. John Burn, the manager of Retro sheep station and Justice of the 
Peace, "bonneted" a striker standing in front of him who had heckled the 
Major. Burn was fined £5 in the Magistrate's Court for his action. 8 
Various explanations have been offered for the infrequency of 
interpersonal violence between strikers and employers. Most emphasise the 
lack of opportunity caused by the distance separating employers and 
employees during industrial disputes. 9 Simply because this type of violence 
was relatively rare does not mean that such violence is irrelevant for those 
182. Perrot also concludes that assaults against factory owners were rare in French 
disputes between 1871 and 1890 (p.181). Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in 
Great Britain 1758-1834, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1995), pp.348-349 argues that in Britain after 1834 (through to the 1990s) physical 
attacks on employers were rare. 
6 Wallace, 'The Uses of Violence in American History', p.93. 
7 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', p.12. 
For a discussion of violence by strikers against 'other workingmen' see the 
'Violent Vengeance against Strike Breakers' section of the current chapter. 
8 Stuart Svensen, The Shearers' War: The Story of the 1891 Shearers' 
Strike, (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1989), pp.94 and 102. 
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interested in protest and social conflict during industrial disputes. Evidence of 
interpersonal violence by strikers against employers should still be looked for, 
and regarded as valid evidence of protest through crime, even if the 
researcher should not be overly surprised if no such incidents are found in a 
particular case study. 
Violence by strikers against their employer's property has been a 
feature of many industrial disputes. The variety of forms of such property 
damage are clear from the example of the Yorkshire coal mines in 1893. 
Other employers throughout the world experienced similar types of violence 
against their property. During the 1891 and 1894 shearers' strikes in 
Queensland, Australia arson was frequently used as an act of protest. In 
1894 numerous employers' woolsheds were burnt down by strikers, while in 
the 1891 dispute boundary gates and fences on sheep station owners' 
property were common targets for arson and other forms of violent damage. 1o 
In the textile workers strike at Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912 strikers cut 
belts, shredded cloth, and smashed electric light bulbs in their textile plants. 11 
Striking hotel and restaurant workers at Broken Hill, New South Wales in 
1912 raided a hotel and wrecked the dining room. 12 Mine shafts were 
sabotaged by strikers during coal mining disputes, for example in France in 
9 For example see Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.l81-182. 
10 Ruth Kerr, Freedom of Contract: A History of the United Graziers' 
Association of Queensland, (Brisbane: United Graziers' Association of Queensland 
(Union of Employers), 1990), pp.23, 28, 33 and 34. Concerning the 1894 woolshed 
arsons also see Mark Finnane, 'The Varieties of Policing: Colonial Queensland, 1860-
1900', in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds), Policing the Empire: 
Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940, (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1991), p.44. 
II Sidney Lens, The Labor Wars: From the Molly Maguires to the Sitdowns, 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1973), pp.172-173. 
12 The Dominion (Wellington morning newspaper), 29 February 1912, p.5, col.3 
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1890. 13 The derailing of trains was used as a weapon of industrial conflict 
during railway strikes in Sierra Leone in 1920.14 Petty sabotage was another 
weapon in the striker's arsenal, though one which was often ineffectual, as in 
the New South Wales Great Strike of 1917 when strikers smeared two miles 
of railway line ascending a steep gradient with grease so that a goods train 
took forty minutes to crawl over the two-mile distance. 15 
Probably the most frequently used form of protest against employers 
through violence against property was the smashing of windows. Michelle 
Perrot reached this conclusion through her detailed research into violence 
during industrial disputes in France between 1871 and 1890. 
We must now turn to an examination of the object, forms and degrees of 
violence perpetrated during strikes. To be schematic, we may say that such 
violence had the factory as its prime target, window-breaking as its major form 
and the stone as its principal weapon. At the outset, then, this locates the true 
level of violence: it is simple stone-throwing, doing little actual damage and 
13 Roger Magraw, A History of the French Working Class, vol. 2: Workers 
and the Bourgeois Republic 1871-1939, (Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell, 1992), p.l 0 1. 
14 H. E. Conway, 'Labour Protest Activity in Sierra Leone during the Early Part 
of the Twentieth Century', Labour History, no. 15, November 1968, p.54. 
15 Dan Coward, 'Crime and Punishment: The Great Strike in New South Wales, 
August to October 1917', in John Iremonger, John Merritt and Graeme Osborne (eds), 
Strikes: Studies in Twentieth Century Australian Social History, (Sydney: Angus 
and Robertson, 1973), p.61. For further examples of a wide range of violence by 
strikers against their employer's business property see: John Gray, City in Revolt: 
James Larkin and the Belfast Dock Strike of 1907, (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 
1985), pp.93 and 95-97 (Belfast, 1907); Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.120 
(Milwaukee streetcar strike of 1896); The Dominion, 03 February 1912, p.6, col. 4 
(Paris, 1912, taxi-cab drivers strike); and Miriam Dixson, 'Rothbury', in Robert 
Cooksey (ed), The Great Depression in Australia, (Canberra: Australian Society for 
the Study of Labour History, 1970), p.l9 (Rothbury, New South Wales, 1929-1930 
coal miners' lockout; on 16 December 1929 miners cut telephone wires to the colliery 
office). 
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having, in fact, an essentially symbolic value. It is a mock violence, and its 
object is to frighten rather than destroy.16 
Though Perrot's conclusions are not universally applicable, especially in the 
context of the extreme strike violence so prevalent in the United States, there 
is considerable evidence in the international research to suggest that window 
smashing was a very common form for industrial protest through violence. 
For example, on 1 September 1967 pickets in Stockport, England hurled 
stones and bricks at the windows of the Roberts-Arundel factory around 
which they were marching. Forty windows were broken. Earlier in the same 
strike, on 22 February 1967, twenty windows at the same factory had been 
shattered by stones and bottles thrown by pickets. The smashing of these 
windows were acts of protest against an employer and, as Roger Geary 
emphasises concerning the September disorder, the property of that 
employer was the specific target. 'There is little doubt that this violence was 
directed at property rather than persons as the factory was closed, 'blacklegs' 
and management having taken the day off. ,17 The 1984-1985 British Miners' 
Strike involved similar incidents. In August 1984 '1,000 stone-throwing 
pickets launched a night attack on Silverstone and Harworth collieries; cars 
and pit windows were smashed and a police spokesman said he was 
convinced the strikers had "given up picketing in favour of vandalism".'18 
Perrot's analysis is a useful model to apply to any case study where strike 
16 Perrot, Workers on Strike, p.172. 
17 Roger Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.68-69 and 70; the quote is from 
p.69. This industrial dispute involved workers at the Roberts-Arundel textile 
machinery manufacturing factory, and lasted from 28 November 1966 to 13 May 
1968. During the 1921 coal miners' strike angry pickets had also engaged in window-
smashing at the Broidwood Colliery near Motherwell (Geary, p.50). 
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violence is found, and her conclusions may well be applicable in any case 
where window smashing is a significant feature of industrial disputes. 
Almost all protest against employers through property violence by 
strikers was aimed against the business property of employers, not against 
employers' homes or other personal property. Rare instances of attacks on 
the homes of employers can be found. For instance, during the Quebec 
textile strikes of 1937 stones were thrown through the windows of some 
English-speaking executives' homes. 19 Also in Quebec in the late 1930s two 
fires of suspected incendiary origin threatened the home of a prominent 
employer during a shipyard strike in Sorel.20 In connection with the 1910 coal 
mining dispute in Durham, England the private residences of the manager 
and assistant manager of Murton colliery were attacked by crowds. At the 
assistant manager's home 'the railings enclosing the gardens were pulled 
down' and 'stone after stone was hurled through the large windows and the 
out-houses.'21 
Another form of illegal action by strikers against the property of 
employers was non-violent trespass on or the unlawful occupation of 
employers' property. In June 1936 one and a half million French workers 
occupied their factories in 9,000 sitdown strikes. Similar occupations, though 
on a smaller scale, were used throughout the remainder of 1936, with some 
sitdowns in 1937 and 1938.22 The 'occupation tactic' was less frequently 
18 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.140. 
19 Jamieson, Times of Trouble: ... Canada, 1900-66, p.261. 
Jamieson, Times of Trouble: ... Canada, 1900-66, p.261. 
Douglass, 'The Durham Pitman', p.271. 
20 
21 
22 Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France 1830-1968, pp.127 and 128; also see 
their analysis of the 1936 strike wave (pp.128-137). For another analysis of the strike 
wave see Magraw, A History of the French Working Class, vol. 2, pp.262-269. 
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used in nineteenth century France. Perrot found only six occupations 
between 1871 and 1890.23 Sitdown strikes in the United States from 
September 1936 to May 1937 involved 484,711 workers. 24 In December 
1906 I.W.W. members at General Electric's complex in Schenectady went on 
strike after three Wobblies had been fired. Instead of leaving the factory, to 
set up outside picket lines, they used the tactic of remaining at their 
workbenches for the next sixty-five hours. 25 At Lambton, New South Wales in 
1879 four thousand striking coal miners occupied the pithead without 
violence.26 
Threats against employers and their property were a further means 
through which strikers expressed hostility towards, and illegally protested 
against, the actions and attitudes of their employers. Michelle Perrot 
analysed the spoken and written language used by French strikers between 
1871 and 1890. She found that 'language at the grass-roots level, coming 
from anonymous authors who had no mandate' 'was full of insults and 
threats,.27 'The bosses and their "acolytes" were the favourite target. Hatred 
for them was spread over walls, burst forth in cries and songs, and provided 
material for conversation.,28 The examples she quoted included: "We must 
23 Perrot, Workers on Strike, p.11l. 
24 Thomas R. Brooks, Toil and Trouble: A History of American Labor, 2nd 
edition, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), p.180, and see pp.180-185 and 192. Also 
see Lens, The Labor Wars, pp.285 and 291-318; Sidney Fine, Sit-Down: The 
General Motors Strike of 1936-1937, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1969); Joseph G. Rayback, A History of American Labor, expanded and updated 
edition, (New York: The Free Press; and London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1966), 
pp.353-355; and Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', pp.383-384. 
25 Lens, The Labor Wars, p.l56. 
26 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.56. 
27 Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.211-217 (the quotes are from pp.212 and 213, 
respectively). 
28 Perrot, Workers on Strike, p.213. 
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strike down these bloodthirsty vampires [the bosses] and not allow ourselves 
to be bled dry"; and that the Saint-Quentin weavers sang "The masters are 
swine, we'll hang them all" as they marched in the streets.29 '''That rogue of 
a manager has brought us to Bousies to die of hunger. He must be killed 
within the week or we shall perish", one read on the gates to the weaving mill 
in Seydoux. ... "Arm yourselves then with daggers and revolvers. Time is 
short to kill our masters and managers and, most of all, those great layabouts 
of overseers. Kill-kill-kill, Shoot-shoot-shoot", exhorted one handwritten 
placard posted up at the Dulac factory in Armentieres. ,30 During the 
Queensland shearing dispute of 1891 threats were allegedly made by strikers 
to let loose 600 rabbits and to cut boundary fences so as to wreck havoc 
among the sheep.31 
In connection with the Brisbane General Strike of 1912 the manager of 
the Brisbane tramways reported receiving several threatening letters.32 
These letters may not have been sent by strikers but the possibility that they 
were should not be ignored. In France a threatening letter was sent by the 
Solesmes weavers to their employers: "Messieurs our masters ... we, your 
workers, we're warning you that if you cut wages any more, we'll ruin your 
mills for yoU.,,33 
29 
30 
31 
Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.214 and 215, respectively. 
Perrot, Workers on Strike, p.214. 
Kerr, Freedom of Contract, p.24. 
32 The Dominion, 09 February 1912, p.5, col. 4. For a useful analysis of 
threatening letters as social protest see E. P. Thompson, 'The Crime of Anonymity', 
in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, 
Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, 
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975), pp.255-308. 
33 As quoted in Perrot, Workers on Strike, p.215. The year of the industrial 
dispute is not specified on p.215 but would have been between 1871 and 1890. 
60 
From the preceding analysis of the international research it is clear that 
to fully understand the variety of forms through which protest could be 
enacted during industrial disputes the violence and violent crime during those 
disputes need to be examined for evidence of their use as acts of protest and 
defiance. Violence has always been a potential weapon for the discontented; 
knowledge of its use, or lack of use, during industrial disputes allows insights 
into the general history of industrial conflict and the history of crime, as well 
as enhancing our knowledge of particular industrial disputes.34 
Theft as a form of protest by strikers against employers during 
industrial disputes is an understudied aspect of labour history and the history 
of crime. The work of Hermann Mannheim provides evidence that overall 
larceny rates during Britain's 1912 strike wave and 1926 General Strike 
increased.35 Research on annual official crime statistics by Ted Robert Gurr 
tentatively suggests that industrial disputes in London in 1919-1920, 1929-
1931, 1957 and 1969-1971 and in Sydney in 1886-1888, 1917, 1919 and 
1929 may have had some influence on the increase in convictions for theft 
during the same years or in the immediately following year.36 Due to the 
breadth of their studies and the sources they were utilising neither Mannheim 
or Gurr examined the influence of strike related theft from employers on the 
increases in overall theft rates. 
Padraic Kenney argued that petty theft from their employers was used 
as resistance and protest by textile workers both before and after the 
34 For a well argued example of a range of more general historical insights 
gained through an investigation of industrial dispute violence see Walker, 'Violence 
in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', pp.65-70. Some of these insights will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, p.216. 
35 Mannheim, Social Aspects of Crime, pp.156 and 158. 
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September 1947 Poznanski Textile Strike in L6dz, Poland. 37 The role of theft 
while the strike was in progress was not investigated. 
Some instances of theft having been utilised as a means of protest and 
social conflict against employers during disputes can be found in studies in 
which this topic was not one of the specific focuses for the research or 
analysis. At Murton colliery, County Durham, England, there was 'a mass raid 
on the coal heap by many hundreds of men, women and children, who were 
able to hopelessly outnumber the police, and to carry away coal for their 
homes' during the 1910 coal mining dispute. 38 In Queensland, Australia there 
were reports of cattle being stolen and slaughtered for food from station 
owners (the employers) during the shearing dispute of 1891.39 Detailed case 
studies of theft and specific industrial disputes are required to provide more 
conclusive evidence on the frequency with which theft was used as protest 
against employers during strikes and lockouts, and on the types of goods 
which were stolen. 
By examining the broader field of research into crime as protest and 
social conflict the potential for theft, burglary and other larcenies to have been 
used as protest is apparent. The work of James C. Scott, Douglas Hay, Cal 
Winslow, Eric Hobsbawm, John McQuilton, and David J. V. Jones all 
demonstrate how a range of illegal activities which can be classed as 
acquisition crimes have been used as forms of protest and conflict in 
particular circumstances of extreme or heightened social tension or social 
36 QUIT, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', pp.666-668, 670 and 671. 
Kenney, 'Working-class Community and Resistance in pre-Stalinist Poland', 
pp.34 and 50. For a more detailed discussion of the findings of Mannheim, QUIT, and 
Kenney see Chapter One of the current thesis. 
37 
38 Douglass, 'The Durham Pitman', p.270. 
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conflict. All these researchers focus on non-industrial, and usually pre-
industrial, contexts, but since there is almost no research which examines 
theft during industrial disputes, these are very valuable analyses for the 
researcher into crime during industrial disputes. 
Such non-industrially focused research also provides a general model 
for identifying instances where social conflict through theft is the most likely to 
occur. These instances are usually periods of extreme or heightened social 
tension or social conflict where open protest or rebellion is impractical as the 
dangers of violent repression by the ruling classes and their ally the state are 
too high.40 However, instances where covert forms of theft were combined 
with overt violence have also been found by historians such as Hay and 
Winslow. In tandem with the covert acquisition crimes of poaching and 
smuggling in eighteenth century England, assault and robbery were used to 
protest against perceived class oppression. 41 Overt forms of theft, such as 
highway and bank robberies, have also been used alongside overt violence 
by Hobsbawm's social bandits and McQuilton's Australian bushrangers.42 If 
theft can be used as a weapon of social conflict in conjunction with certain 
forms of overt violent protest (as has been found by Hay, Winslow, 
Hobsbawm and McQuilton), then it may be possible (and it is as yet an 
unconfirmed indication only) that covert theft can be used as a weapon of 
social conflict even during periods when large scale overt protest took place. 
Strikes and the demonstrations and picketing they involve are such periods of 
39 Kerr, Freedom of Contract, p.24. 
40 Scott, 'Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance', pp.5-6, 8, 12 and 14-15. 
41 Hay, 'Poaching', pp.195-197; Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', pp.119-120, 
130, 154-155, 158, 159 and 161-166. 
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large scale overt protest. The investigation of whether or not theft was used 
as a criminal form of protest and social conflict during industrial disputes will 
enhance our understanding of industrial disputes by resolving the uncertainty 
and gap in our historical knowledge which currently exists concerning the 
relationship between theft, protest, social conflict and industrial disputes. 
To determine if protest against employers through crime (particularly 
violence and theft) occurred in Wellington during the 1913 strike a detailed 
search of the relevant court records, police records, and newspapers has 
been conducted. The results will be presented in Chapter Five. Both 
prosecuted and unprosecuted offences will be analysed. Crimes against 
employers whose workers were not on strike but whose actions were 
perceived by strikers to be assisting efforts to defeat the strike will also be 
examined. 
The expectations from the international research are that interpersonal 
violence against employers during the strike should be low, while violence by 
strikers against the business property of employers is more likely, though not 
certain, to be found. Significantly different findings are not completely 
unexpected, given the wide range of types and levels of violence, disorder, 
and crime apparent from different case studies in the international research. 
An expectation on the likelihood of theft having been used as protest or social 
conflict during the strike is difficult to make due to the lack of international 
research examining theft during industrial disputes. Theft as a weapon of the 
weak and oppressed has been identified during periods of extreme or 
heightened social tension or social conflict. Wellington in 1913 experienced 
42 Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, p.S; McQuilton, Kelly Outbreak, pp.3, 109-
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such social tension and class conflict. It is possible that theft was used as 
another form of protest and social conflict in Wellington, though it is equally 
possible that other factors mitigated the need to use theft as a form of protest, 
or inhibited the use of theft as protest. 43 
Violent Vengeance against Strike Breakers: 
Physical attacks on the "scabs" or "blacklegs" who replace strikers are 
a common feature of protracted industrial disputes in which "free labour" is 
hired by employers. These strikebreakers can be outsiders to the occupation, 
industry or firm at the centre of the dispute (whether they were previously 
unemployed or under-employed, or are short-term volunteers who have 
regular jobs to return to once the dispute or "crisis" is resolved), former 
strikers who decide to return to work while the strike or lockout is still in 
progress, or those who refused to stop work when the dispute began.44 
During the 1890 Maritime Strike strikebreaking wharf labourers in Sydney 
111, 153, 155, 157, 159-167 and 168. 
43 For a discussion of possible mitigating or inhibiting factors see Chapter Five, 
pp.215 and 216-217. 
44 For examples of the considerable variation in the previous employment status 
of those who act as strikebreakers (from locals who continued to work and imported 
strikebreakers to 'leading businessmen and pastoralists, some attired in bell toppers 
and white gloves') see Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', 
pp.56-57, 59 and 63. Also see Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.103. In addition, 
see Chapter One, pp.3-4 and Chapter Five, p.188 and the references in footnote 102 
on p.191, in the current thesis for examples of clerks, farmers, rural labourers, 
accountants, butchers, ship's officers, employers, and former strikers acting as 
strikebreakers in Wellington in 1913. During the 1949 coal strike in New South 
Wales and the New Zealand waterfront dispute of 1951 soldiers were used as 
replacements for the striking or locked out unionists (see Phillip Deery, 'Chifley, The 
Army and the 1949 Coal Strike', Labour History, no. 68, May 1995, pp.80-97; and 
Robert Chapman, 'From Labour to National', in Geoffrey W. Rice (ed), The Oxford 
History of New Zealand, 2nd edition, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
p.374, respectively). 
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were attacked by angry strikers.45 Striking seamen in Australia in 1935-1936 
and Portland, Oregon in 1906 assaulted scabs who had taken over their 
jobs.46 In rare instances scabs were murdered by strikers, as at Gray's 
Harbor, Washington state during the 1906 strike of the Sailor's Union of the 
Pacific.47 Pre-emptive violence by strikers against those who were 
approaching the struck workplace seeking work also occurred, for instance, 
during the South Johnstone Sugar Mill strike in Queensland in 1927.48 
Another frequently used type of interpersonal striker initiated violence was the 
stoning of scabs by strikers, as occurred during the Belfast Dock Strike of 
1907 and the Maritime Strike of 1890 at Newcastle, New South Wales.49 
Howard M. Gitelman has found that in the United States 'most worker-initiated 
strike violence took the form of physical assaults upon strikebreakers and 
upon fellow employees who attempted to cross picket lines.'5o Further 
examples of such violent vengeance by unionists against strikebreakers can 
be found in industrial disputes throughout the world in the late nineteenth 
century and the twentieth century. 51 
Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.63. 45 
46 L. J. Louis, 'Recovery From the Depression and the Seamen's Strike 1935-6', 
Labour History, no. 41, November 1981, p.85; Taft and Ross, 'American Labor 
Violence', p.311. 
47 Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', p.311. 
48 K. H. Kennedy, 'The South Johnstone Strike and Railway Lockout, 1927', 
Labour History, no. 31, November 1976, pp.3-4. 
49 John McHugh, 'The Belfast Labour Dispute and Riots of 1907', International 
Review of Social History, vol. 22, part 1, 1977, p.3; Gray, City in Revolt: James 
Larkin and the Belfast Dock Strike of 1907, pp.61-62 and 154; Walker, 'Violence 
in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.69. 
50 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', p.11. 
5! For example see Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', p.305 
(Pennsylvania Anthracite Coalfields 1902); Harring, Policing a Class Society, pp.113 
and 114 (McCormick reaper works strikes, Chicago, 1885 and 1886); The Evening 
Post, 03 November 1911, p.lO, col. 5 (miners at Lithgow, New South Wales 1911); 
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The same central motivation for physical violence against 
strikebreakers has been found by research on the United States, Australia 
and Britain. These studies also emphasised the high likelihood of violence in 
industrial disputes where scabs were employed, that the targets of striker 
initiated violence were usually strikebreakers, and that the prevalent form of 
violence against strikebreakers was assault. The overt aim of the 
employment of free labour is to hasten the end of the dispute in the favour of 
the employers. Strikers realise that they are becoming powerless to legally 
influence the outcome of the dispute, and that an eventual return to their jobs 
is threatened by the scab replacements. Feelings of frustration, 
powerlessness and anger build. Frequently these feelings are expressed in 
the form of illegal acts of violence against free labourers. Howard M. 
Gitelman concluded that the use of strikebreakers in the United States from 
the 1860s to the 1960s 'was almost a guarantee of violent striker response.'52 
The expectation of returning to work at the conclusion of a strike was 
jeopardised by the legal and popularly sanctioned right of employers to hire 
and fire at will. When this jeopardy was made manifest by the introduction of 
strikebreakers, their frustration and rage provoked workingmen to acts of 
violence. The grievances their actions [the strike] had attempted to redress 
had been compounded beyond rational recourse, and they struck out in 
desperation. 53 
Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France 1830-1968, p.42 (smelting and forge workers in 
Rive-de-Gier (Loire), France 1893); Brian Didsbury, 'Cheshire Saltworkers', in 
Raphael Samuel (ed), Miners, Quarrymen and Saltworkers, (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp.179-180 (Weaver watermen's strike of 1892, Cheshire); 
Douglass, 'The Durham Pitman', p.276 (miners at Usworth, County Durham, England 
1879). 
52 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', p.ll. 
53 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', p.9. 
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it was ... more broadly the frustration attendant upon having the daring act of 
striking nullified in any aggressive way by the employer that precipitated the 
violence. 54 
Taft and Ross argued along similar lines: 'Workers were, however, unwilling 
to watch their jobs forfeited to a local or imported strikebreaker.,55 'Facing 
inflexible opposition [from employers] .... Frustration and desperation 
impelled [union] pickets to react to strikebreakers with anger. Many violent 
incidents followed efforts of strikers to restrain the entry of strikebreakers and 
raw materials into the struck plant' or workplace.56 
Not all the striker violence which accompanied the use of 
strikebreakers in the United States (or elsewhere in the world) was directly 
against strikebreakers. Often the police, military, volunteer police or private 
guards protecting or escorting strikebreakers became the targets of violence 
when they interposed themselves between the strikers and their intended 
prime targets: the strikebreakers. 57 Violence could also be initiated by those 
instructed to protect the strikebreakers. Such violence in the American 
context was frequently extreme and excessive.58 The conclusions of 
Gitelman and Taft and Ross quoted above refer to all these various types of 
violence related to the use of strikebreakers to defeat strikes. This 
54 
55 
Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', p.12. 
Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', p.294. 
56 Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', pp.381-382. Sidney Harring, 
Policing a Class Society, p.103, concluded that 'The confrontation between striking 
workers and police-protected scabs was at the root of virtually all strike violence' in 
the major cities and the smaller industrial cities of the Great Lakes / Ohio Valley 
region of the United States between 1884 and 1915. For the extensive research and 
analysis on which he bases this conclusion see Harring, Policing a Class Society, 
pp.101-106, 110, 111-144 and 146-148. 
57 For detailed discussion of this type of striker violence see the 'Protest Against 
the State through Crime' section of this chapter. 
58 For discussion of this type of industrial dispute violence see Chapter Four. 
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consideration, however, does not lessen the validity of their conclusions 
concerning the motivation for and frequency of striker initiated violence 
against strikebreakers. Violence against strikebreakers was a significant 
aspect of American labour violence. 
It should be noted that in some disputes in the United States ethnic or 
racial tensions were a second important factor in generating physical violence 
against strikebreakers. Such disputes form part of the large set of cases from 
which Taft and Ross and Gitelman drew their conclusions. In these disputes 
employers hired the replacements for their strikers from a different ethnic 
group to those who were on strike. (The strikebreakers in such disputes were 
most often from a minority ethnic group). Attacks on strikebreakers also 
frequently occurred in strikes or lockouts where both the strikers and 
strikebreakers were from the same ethnic group. This suggests that ethnic or 
racial tension was not the primary cause of the violence against 
strikebreakers in most of the disputes in which the strikers and their 
replacements were from different ethnic groups. Ethnic or racial hostility, 
though, may have increased the likelihood of violence against strikebreakers 
and may have made strikers more willing to use extreme violence against the 
strikebreakers. 59 
R. B. Walker's detailed study of violence during industrial disputes in 
late nineteenth century New South Wales reached similar conclusions as 
Gitelman and Taft and Ross regarding the motivation of striker violence 
against strikebreakers. 
59 On this broad topic see Jeffreys-Jones, 'Theories of American Labour 
Violence', pp.254-257; Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', 
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By contrast [to skilled occupations], in [the semi-skilled occupations of] wharf 
labouring, shearing and mining there were no safety laws and regulations to 
prevent inexperienced labour being substituted for experienced union labour. 
Consequently, these workers sought to ensure the effectiveness of strikes by 
strict picketing and, if necessary, to back up moral suasion with physical 
coercion. Intimidation of and assaults on strikebreakers became the most 
familiar forms of lawbreaking. Despite its vulnerability, destruction of property 
was less frequent. 6o 
Walker's findings indicate that some conclusions concerning American labour 
violence (which in many aspects was exceptional when compared 
internationally) can be applicable to other parts of the world.61 
Walker's research is also valuable as its focus is a location and period 
very close to the case study which is the focus of this thesis. This closeness 
in time and space, as well as the central involvement of wharf labourers in the 
New Zealand dispute (one of the three occupations Walker has found to be 
'associated with disorder in industrial disputes'), suggest that Walker's 
conclusions may well be valid for Wellington in 1913.62 If the experiences of 
New South Wales and Wellington are similar then it is expected that assaults 
on and intimidation of strikebreakers will have been more frequent during the 
1913 strike than violence against property by strikers and their sympathisers. 
These American and Australian conclusions on the motivation for and 
frequency of violence against scabs appear to be equally applicable to the 
pp.l3-15; Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.112; and Wallace, 'The Uses of 
Violence in American History', p.94. 
60 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', pp.55-56. 
61 For a more detailed discussion of the aspects of labour violence in the United 
States which were exceptional in the international context see Gitelman, 'Perspectives 
on American Industrial Violence', pp.15-16 and 20-22. Also see pp.67 and 81-82 in 
the current chapter. 
62 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.55. 
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history of industrial disputes in Britain. Though no broad survey which 
examines the relationship between the use of strikebreakers and violence 
against scabs in Britain seems to have been published, case studies of 
specific industrial disputes and Roger Geary's history of the policing of 
industrial disputes provide an indication of the motivation for this violence and 
its frequency. John McHugh, in his work on the Belfast Dock Strike of 1907, 
argued that 'the use of blackleg workers raised the temperature of the strike 
and provoked the strikers to violence in the form of stone throwing directed at 
the blacklegs.'63 In September 1893 there were numerous riots in Yorkshire 
associated with the British coal mining lockout. Robert G. Neville found that 
'nearly all the riots seem to have started at pits where "blacksheep" were 
working, or where coal was being moved from stockpiles, or where it was 
rumoured that such activities were taking place.'64 Roger Geary reached a 
related conclusion with regard to the dominant form of disorder by strikers in 
Britain between 1909 and 1914. In this period collective action by strikers 
was concerned with 'obstructing, sometimes quite violently, "blacklegs" or 
non-unionists.' 'Disorder now typically occurred at the factory or colliery gate 
and only at the time when imported labourers attempted to enter or leave.'65 
The Wellington unionists who went out on strike in 1913 experienced 
the preconditions for the exact scenario of violent vengeance described 
above. The striking unionists would have experienced feelings of 
powerlessness as the hope of the first few weeks of the strike began to fade, 
63 McHugh, 'The Belfast Labour Dispute and Riots of 1907' , p.3. 
64 Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', p.340. Neville, 
p.340, defined "blacksheep" as 'miners who continued working during a strike or 
lockout'. 
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when the vacancies they had left on the wharves and ships were quickly filled 
by free labourers and seamen. The strikers had been effectively replaced, 
and their individual effect on the outcome of the strike was severely 
diminished. Such powerlessness would have created a desire for revenge in 
many, and what better symbol to bring the wrath of their vengeance down 
upon than those who had taken their jobs, threatened their pre-strike 
livelihoods, and effectively negated the impact of the strike: the free 
labourers? 
To test this interpretation the occupation and role in the strike of the 
participants in the most common form of violent crime, assault, will be 
investigated. Assault is the simplest and most direct form of non-fatal 
vengeance that can be taken by one person or group on another. That the 
assault was an act of retribution is usually obvious to the victim. In contrast, 
unexplained property damage or theft can be misinterpreted as having been 
caused by other, or even, random factors. This quality makes assault both 
easier to analyse for the social historian, and more appealing to the vengeful, 
since a large part of the reward of revenge is the intimidation the offender 
knows it causes. Any other crimes in which the victim or the accused was 
acting as a strikebreaker will also be analysed. 
Violence by strikers against strikebreakers usually consisted of minor 
to moderate assaults which seldom went beyond pushing, punching and 
kicking. Shootings were generally rare, though there were exceptions such 
65 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.25, 26, 28-29, 31-32, 
33,34 and 46·A7. (The quotes are from pp.25 and 47, respectively). 
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as mining disputes in the United States.66 The use of explosives and rockets 
against strikebreakers is not unknown, but such events are exceptional, and 
there is always the problem with such indirect attacks of who initiated them: 
strikers, sympathisers, or simply hooligans taking advantage of a period of 
disorder or conflict. Such was the problem facing police and unionists in 
Minmi, a mining town in New South Wales in 1895 when two home-made 
rockets were fired into the strikebreakers' camp; no one was convicted for the 
incident and the actual identity of the perpetrators is still unknown to 
historians today.67 
If the conclusions of Gitelman and Walker are applicable to the 
Wellington context then a large proportion of (if not most) worker-initiated 
strike violence should take the form of minor to moderate physical assaults 
upon strikebreakers (including upon any fellow employees who attempted to 
cross picket Iines).68 Thus, it is expected that this form of protest and 
industrial conflict should comprise a prominent proportion of the interpersonal 
physical violence committed and prosecuted in Wellington during the 1913 
dispute. 
The likelihood of protest by strikers against the personal property of 
strikebreakers through theft or property damage is low, except for any 
strikebreakers who lived locally. For example, during the 1879 strike by coal 
miners in Usworth, County Durham, England, 'a party of young miners [who 
were on strike] went to the house of one of the blacklegs with the intention of 
66 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', pp.II-12; and 
Perrot, Workers on Strike, pp.114-115. 
67 1. W. Turner, 'An Incident at Minmi, 1895', Labour History, no. 6, May 
1964, pp.7-9; Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.58. 
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persuading him to come out with them. The man came at the deputation with 
a gun, but this was wrested from him and smashed to pieces, as were the 
door and windows of his house.,69 In connection with the South Wales coal 
strike of 1910-1911 there were 'attacks on the, usually unoccupied, houses of 
'blacklegs'.' 70 
Protest Against the State through Crime: 
The targets of striker vengeance and violent frustration were not limited 
to employers and strikebreakers: another focus for crime used as protest 
during industrial disputes was the State and the enforcers of its laws (the 
police, the military, and state officials). Sidney Lens has argued that striker 
'defiance of what is commonly called "law and order" , was frequent during 
industrial disputes in the United States where 'law and order was specifically 
directed at crushing their union' or strike. 71 The central component of Lens's 
argument for understanding striker-initiated violence and crime is the 
perception held by strikers that the forces of the State were not remaining 
neutral during industrial disputes, but were actively helping employers to 
defeat the strike. An illustrative example can be drawn from the Belfast Dock 
Strike of 1907. 
Union leaders argued that the action of the police and military in protecting 
blackleg dockers and directing blackleg carters around Belfast was a breach of 
the strikers' right to picket and evidence of collusion with employers. .... In the 
event the use of police as escorts in the transportation of goods around the city 
68 Gitelman, 'Perspectives on American Industrial Violence', 
'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', pp.55-56. 
69 Douglass, 'The Durham Pitman', p.276. 
70 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.29. 
71 Lens, The Labor Wars, p.266. 
p.ll; Walker, 
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provoked frequent and violent clashes between strikers and the Royal Irish 
Constabulary.72 
The same perception and resulting unlawful actions, with specific variations 
from case to case, can be found in a wide-range of industrial conflicts 
throughout the world in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
This section will focus on the ways in which violence and other crimes 
by strikers and their sympathisers against the State can be understood as 
potential forms of protest during industrial disputes. The issue of violence by 
the police against strikers will be examined in the following chapter. Five 
variations of such protest crime against the State will be presented: striker 
violence against three specific groups (respectively, the police, the military, 
and State officials), striker violence against state property, and finally, the 
theft of state property. 
At the outset of this discussion it should be noted that the violence and 
crime against the state which will be described was not revolutionary. 
Michelle Perrot articulately captures the reality of most confrontations 
between strikers and the police: such confrontations 'were more an 
expression of anti-authoritarian feeling than genuine rebellion, and they were 
certainly not insurrectionary.,73 Violence and disorder by strikers during 
attempted or successful revolutions, such as those in Russia in 1905 and 
1917 or in Germany between 1918 and 1920, will be excluded from the 
following analysis due to their exceptional nature with regard to industrial 
72 
73 
McHugh, 'The Belfast Labour Dispute and Riots of 1907', p.9. 
Perrot, Workers on Strike, p.184. 
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disputes. 74 Threats of, and calls for, revolutionary uprisings that did not lead 
to actual revolutionary activity will be included in the discussion where 
appropriate, since many non-revolutionary strikes did involve such threats, 
though usually the threats were more fiery rhetoric than realistic. 
Violence by strikers against the police was a frequent outcome of the 
police protecting or escorting strikebreakers or protecting employer property. 
The usual forms of such violence were stone-throwing, direct assault and 
rioting. The use of firearms and explosives was rare, though less so in the 
United States. For example, during the 1892 silver and lead miners dispute 
at Broken Hill, New South Wales eight policemen were injured when a 
trainload of police and strikebreakers was heavily stoned. 75 I n Belfast in 1907 
there were numerous violent clashes between strikers and the police 
escorting strikebreakers as described above.76 Police guarding employers' 
property were not immune from strikers expressing frustration and seeking 
vengeance through violence. The policeman guarding the Eroungella 
74 For useful analyses of the role of strikers in the Russian Revolution of 
February 1917 see Robert B. McKean, St. Petersburg Between the Revolutions: 
Workers and Revolutionaries, June 1907-February 1917, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1990), pp.460-476 and 491-494; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, 
The February Revolution: Petro grad, 1917, (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1981); George Katkov, Russia 1917: The February Revolution, (London: 
Longmans, 1967); and Diane Koenker and William G. Rosenberg, Strikes and 
Revolution in Russia, 1917, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1989). Concerning the 1905 Russian Revolution see Gerald D. Surh, 1905 in St 
Petersburg: Labor, Society and Revolution, (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1989); and Henry Reichman, Railwaymen and Revolution: 
Russia, 1905, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 
1987). With regard to the German revolution of 1918 to 1920 see Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an 
Authoritarian State, (London: Arnold, 1995 - translated from the German original 
(1990) by Richard Deveson), pp.238-239 and 241-254. 
75 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.59. 
76 See p. 73; and McHugh, 'The Belfast Labour Dispute and Riots of 1907' , p. 9. 
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woolshed in New South Wales during the 1894 shearers' strike was 
overpowered by strikers and the woolshed burnt down.77 Similar events took 
place during the 1984-1985 British Miners' Strike. 'In Yorkshire, at Kiveton 
Colliery, a police horse was stoned to the ground and three policemen were 
cut by broken glass when their coach was attacked by angry miners, while in 
South Wales strikers occupying crane cabins at Port Talbot [Steelworks] 
threw a variety of missiles at police 120 feet below.,78 
Violence could also be initiated by strikers when the police were 
escorting employers. At Clermont, Queensland during the 1891 Shearers' 
Strike members of the Special Pastoralists' Executive (the employers' 
association) and their police escort were welcomed by strikers with a barrage 
of stones. Police Sergeant Dillon received a deep head wound.79 
Mass demonstrations and picket lines were often contexts and sites for 
striker violence against the police. At such mass gatherings police and 
strikers were in close proximity to each other, often for extended periods of 
time. Tension was almost inevitable, as the police were present to counter 
any potential threat to "public order" or "the law" posed by the strikers. At 
times tension became actual conflict and violence. In some instances striker 
violence was a response to perceived or real police provocation; in others the 
strikers were clearly seeking a confrontation; and in some situations the 
frustration caused by the success of the police in "maintaining law and order" 
could simply no longer be controlled. 
77 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.61. 
78 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.141. For further 
examples from the 1984-1985 dispute of violence by strikers against the police see 
Geary, pp.138-141. 
79 Kerr, Freedom of Contract, p.22. 
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Perceived police provocation was the immediate cause of violence at 
Warrington during the largest mass picket of the British newspaper dispute of 
1983. On 30 November the strikers made their 'ritual attempt to block the 
route of newspaper delivery vans. Previously, picketing had taken the form of 
pushing and shoving on both sides, but the confiscation of union banners and 
the pickets' public address system by the police led to the throwing of stones 
and bottles by strikers. ,80 Geary argues that many of the disorderly incidents 
associated with the British General Strike of 1926 were directly due to 
physical provocation by the police and Specials (volunteer constables) 
involving repressive baton charges. 81 Geary also suggests that this same 
pattern can be found in much of the industrial dispute related violence in 
Britain between 1915 and 1945.82 
Strikers desiring a confrontation with police was another source of 
industrial violence. During the British national steel strike of 1980 'pickets 
turned up at Hadfields [private steel works in Sheffield] on 12 March seeking 
a confrontation. The police anticipated trouble and had drafted in 
reinforcements from neighbouring forces. Pickets charged them and there 
80 Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, pp.97-98. Also see 
Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.135. 
81 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.65 and 66; and see 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.97. A similar conclusion 
was reached in 1926 by Emile Burns, The General Strike May 1926: Trades 
Councils in Action, (London: Labour Research Department, 1926), [1975 Lawrence 
and Wishart edition used], pp.72-73 and 74. For other discussions of the violence 
during the 1926 General Strike see Jane Morgan, Conflict and Order: The Police 
and Labour Disputes in England and Wales 1900-1939, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1987), pp.203-204; Patrick Renshaw, The General Strike, (London: Eyre Methuen, 
1975), pp.18-19; and the references given in footnote 96 on p.128 of this thesis. 
82 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.66, and see pp.48 and 
64. Also see Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.97. 
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was hand-to-hand fighting.'83 A similar striker motivation can be inferred from 
part of Waddington's discussion of the British Miners' Strike of 1984-1985. 
He describes the flashpoint for mass violence at Orgreave on 18 June 1984: 
'a group of youths rolled a tractor tyre towards the police line. Some officers 
broke ranks and were met with a volley of stones' from the picket line.84 It 
seems unlikely that such a minor incident would have led to stone throwing 
unless at least some of the strikers were willing, if not actually waiting, to 
initiate a violent confrontation with the police. 
A related cause of violence on picket lines or during demonstrations 
was frustration. When the police were successful in maintaining the 
employers' legal right to keep their workplaces operational this limited or 
negated the impact of the strike and the picket line. This caused frustration 
among the strikers. For some such frustration grew until it could no longer be 
controlled and it was expressed as violence against the police. An earlier 
clash at Orgreave on 29 May 1984 illustrates this sequence of events. 
83 
84 
85 
From the outset, the police demonstrated a consistently uncompromising 
attitude. One crowd of pickets was prevented from getting within half a mile of 
the gates by lines of police officers, while a second group, who had managed 
to assemble earlier opposite the gates, was charged by police horses and dog 
handlers. When the convoys of coke lorries arrived, any attempt at picketing 
was rendered ineffectual: whenever serious pushing was exerted against 
police lines, snatch squads were instantly deployed. Sensing the futility of their 
actions, some miners threw stones. This was answered by the production of 
full-length riot shields and, as the throwing intensified, mounted horses with 
baton-wielding riders were sent in.85 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.l01-102. 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.105. 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.105. 
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Police making arrests or attempting to make arrests were further 
potential occasions for violence. In Pittsburgh in 1877 four policemen 
arrested a brakeman for assaulting the Assistant Superintendent of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad. To do so the police had to fight their way through 
railway workers trying to protect their fellow striker.86 At Rockingham Colliery, 
Yorkshire in 1893 'six constables arrived at the height of the disturbances and 
attempted to arrest the first six rioters they encountered. The mob reacted 
violently and bombarded the police so severely that the constables were 
compelled to retreat without their prisoners.'87 During the Brisbane General 
Strike of 1912 two constables at Townsville (where sympathy strikes were in 
progress) were pelted with stones by a mob of strikers after arresting a 
drunken man.88 
Police stations have also been the sites and targets of violent protest 
by angry strikers and their sympathisers. In Preston during the British 
General Strike of 1926 'a mob of 5,000 tried to storm a police station to 
rescue a striker arrested during earlier attacks on buses. After three baton 
charges local police had to call for reinforcements from the Lancashire 
Constabulary. Fighting lasted for a further two hours before the mob was 
finally dispersed.'89 Further north in connection with the same dispute, at 
Tranent in East Lothian, Scotland, 'a serious fracas took place between a 
86 Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.109. 
87 Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', p.342. 
88 The Dominion, 07 February 1912, p.5, col. 4 and 08 February 1912, p.5, col.5 
In each of these riotous incidents the mobs were probably not entirely made up of 
strikers. However, it is logical to assume, given the context of each disturbance, that 
strikers and their sympathisers comprised a significant proportion of these mobs, and a 
sizeable proportion of those involved in the violence. 
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large crowd and the police, arising from a road picketing incident. The police 
retreated to the police station, which was then besieged by the crowd of some 
1,000 people, and all the windows were smashed.'90 The 1984-1985 British 
Miners' Strike saw 200 angry miners stone a police station at Maltby near 
Rotherham in June 1984, and a crowd attack Stainforth police station on 8 
November 1984, breaking every window in the building and overturning 
several cars.91 
Striker violence against the military took very similar forms to those 
used against the police, and the same range of motivations for such violence 
were involved. In Parma, Italy on 19 June 1908 a large crowd of agrarian 
strikers and their sympathisers gathered outside the railway station to prevent 
the passage of 380 strikebreakers. When authorities tried 'to clear the large 
square in front of the station by use of cavalry .... there were violent clashes 
as the troops, supported at times by "volunteer workers", tried to push the 
crowd into the adjoining streets. Although they succeeded, riots soon 
exploded in the center of the city. The scuffles continued for most of the 
day.'92 
At Ackton Hall Colliery, Yorkshire, during the events leading to and 
following the Featherstone "Massacre" of 1893, troops sent to prevent any 
89 Christopher Farman, The General Strike May 1926, (London: Rupert Hart-
Davis, 1972), p.192. This confrontation is also described in Renshaw, The General 
Strike, p.18. 
90 Ian MacDougall, 'Edinburgh', in Jeffrey Skelley (ed), The General Strike 
1926, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p.150. Also see Farman, The General 
Strike May 1926, pp.l92-193. 
91 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.l40 and 141, 
respectively. 
92 Thomas R. Sykes, 'Revolutionary Syndicalism in the Italian Labor 
Movement: The Agrarian Strikes of 1907-08 in the Province of Parma', 
International Review of Social History, vol. 21, part 2,1976, pp.203-204. 
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further disorder and property damage repeatedly became the targets of 
stone-throwing. The first contingent of 26 troops, a police inspector and two 
constables arrived at the colliery after the initial disorder (the overturning of 
thirteen loaded coal wagons) was over and the mobs responsible had left. 
Neville emphasises 'that when the soldiers arrived at Ackton Hall Colliery 
there was "no crowd or disorder" except for about twenty men who derisively 
jeered the troops.,93 
News of the arrival of the troops spread rapidly and created an air of 
excitement in the local community. Crowds of people, some armed with 
cudgels, began to assemble in the streets and the concourse gradually 
increased in size. A deputation from the crowd demanded that the troops be 
removed, and when [the colliery manager] Holiday intimated that this was not 
within his power he and the police inspector were pelted with stones. The 
colliery was surrounded, the engine house [where the troops were awaiting the 
arrival of a JP to read the Riot Act] stoned, all the windows in the building were 
broken and the crowd taunted the frightened soldiers. One rioter tried, 
unsuccessfully, to ignite the engine house in order to flush out the troopS.94 
Later that day, in a separate confrontation also involving stone-throwing, 
these soldiers fired at the rioters, severely wounding two men who later died 
of their injuries. Two hours after the shootings when a second detachment of 
ninety soldiers arrived 'they too were pelted with stones.'95 
The cases of Parma, Italy, and Yorkshire illustrate the usual types of 
violence used by strikers and their sympathisers against the military: stone-
throwing, direct assault, and rioting. Gun battles between strikers and the 
93 
94 
Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', p.345. 
Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', p.346. 
95 Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', pp.347-348. Also see 
Clive Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History, 2nd edition, 
(London and New York: Longman, 1996), pp.115-116. 
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military took place, as in Pittsburgh during the railroad disputes of 1877 and in 
the Colorado mining strike of 1913-1914,96 but such incidents were extremely 
rare outside of the United States. 
A number of important motives for striker violence against the military 
are also clear from the experiences of Parma and Yorkshire. In Parma the 
military were overtly aiding the defeat of the strike by rendering the blockade 
of the railway station ineffectual. The reaction of the strikers and their allies 
was violence. In Yorkshire the deployment of soldiers to Ackton Hall Colliery 
signalled an unwelcome development in a dispute which had already dragged 
on for five weeks. Neville suggests 'it may well have been that after five 
weeks without work, the [striking] miners had become angry and embittered, 
for acute poverty and hardship increasingly rendered their lives more 
96 For the Pittsburgh gun battle see Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles, 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p.17. For the Colorado gun battles see Yellen, 
American Labor Struggles, pp.231-236; Graham Adams, Jr., Age of Industrial 
Violence, 1910-15: The Activities and Findings of the United States Commission 
on Industrial Relations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp.156-161; 
Howard M. Gitelman, Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre: A Chapter in American 
Industrial Relations, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), pp.1-5 
and 10-20 (especially pp.1 and 17-20); Howard Zinn, The Politics of History, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp.91-101; Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', 
pp.330-332; Richard Maxwell Brown, 'Historical Patterns of Violence in America', 
in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), The History of Violence in 
America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1969), pp.74-75; Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, 
p.109; Louis Adamic, Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America, 
(Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1960 [reprint of the 1934 revised edition] ), 
pp.257-260; Bernstein, The Lean Years, pp.157-158; John J. Flagler, The Labor 
Movement in the United States, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Lerner Publications 
Company, 1970), pp.64-67; and Max Eastman, 'Class War in Colorado', in Norman 
S. Cohen (ed), Civil Strife in America: A Historical Approach to the Study of 
Riots in America, (Hinsdale, Illinois: Dryden Press, 1972), pp.l62-168. The most 
infamous incident of the Colorado strike was the Ludlow Massacre and gun battle on 
20 April 1914. The numerous gun battles of the following ten days were the response 
of the strikers to the events at Ludlow. 
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intolerable.'97 The arrival of the military to protect an employer's property was 
a provocation, which, when combined with striker frustration, anger, and a 
desire for vengeance and confrontation (visible in the earlier overturning of 
the coal wagons), was likely to lead (as occurred) to escalating striker 
violence. 
Each of these motives is a rational reason for protest. In the above 
cases violence was the form through which this protest was expressed: 
protest against the state for intervening on the side of employers during 
industrial disputes. 
Sometimes demonstrations by strikers and sympathisers were held to 
explicitly protest the use or deployment of the military or the militia in 
industrial conflicts. These protests could also become violent, as in Baltimore 
in 1877.98 
State officials were a third target of striker violence. In Yorkshire in 
1893 'gangs of [striking] colliers were blocking some of the major roads and 
demanding toll money from travellers.' On 6 September a Police 
Superintendent and a Justice of the Peace (JP) 'returning from a riot at 
Elsecar Colliery were attacked in Hoyland. They were beat about the head 
and forced to pay a toll.'99 At Ackton Hall Colliery during the same dispute the 
JP who read the Riot Act was stoned. 
With tremendous patience [JP] Hartley tried repeatedly to persuade the crowd 
to go home peacefully so that he would not have to read the Riot Act. All his 
97 Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', p.340. For a full 
discussion of the variety of factors contributing to the disorder in Yorkshire generally, 
and the deaths at Ackton Hall Colliery specifically, see Neville, pp.337-357, 
especially pp.340-341 and 345-354. 
98 Yellen, American Labor Struggles, pp.13-14. 
99 Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', p.344. 
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efforts failed, and he made a final plea to those with intelligence to leave 
directly as he was about to read the Riot Act, whereupon the troops would be 
empowered to take action. It was now dark, and Hartley read the Act by the 
light of a lantern in relative silence, but as soon as he had finished fusillades of 
stones were hurled in his direction. 10o 
The latter violent incident clearly involved protest against the 
intervention of the State in the industrial dispute. The exact motivation for the 
first incident is impossible to discern. The attack may have been specifically 
directed against the state officials for being agents of the State. A second 
explanation could be that they were simply in the wrong place at the wrong 
time during a period of widespread disorder and protest associated with the 
industrial dispute as a whole. The crucial factors are if the miners had known 
that the two men were state officials, and if this knowledge would have 
influenced the strikers' actions. The sources do not elaborate on these 
points. The usefulness of this example is that it reminds the researcher that 
not all violence against the enforcers of the State's laws was necessarily 
protest against the involvement of the State (though much was). Violence 
could be a more generic form of protest concerning the industrial conflict as a 
whole. Alternatively, both of these motivations could be present and 
expressed simultaneously. 
possible. 101 
A complex interplay of motivations was 
Violence against state property could be used by strikers as both an 
overt and symbolic form of protest. On the Orgreave picket line in 1984 'a 
100 Neville, 'The Yorkshire Miners and the 1893 Lockout', pp.346-347. 
101 For a fuller discussion of the range of motivations for violence and other crime 
against the State during industrial disputes see pp.75-82 of this chapter. 
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police riot shield was captured and symbolically set alight. ,102 Attacks on 
police stations have already been described above, and many such incidents 
would have had symbolic as well as overt meaning for those involved. 
The theft of state property during strikes has not been examined by 
labour historians or researchers of the history of crime. From the work of 
researchers on other periods of protest it appears possible that theft could 
have been used as a means of protest against the State. 103 
To test the hypothesis that crime may have been used as protest 
against the State in Wellington in 1913 the crimes perpetrated directly against 
the State and its enforcers of the law (that is, the police and the military) will 
be closely examined. The criminal prosecutions which involved individual 
representatives of the State as the victims will be analysed, as will cases in 
which the State prosecuted persons whom it felt had been threatening civil 
order or had perpetrated riotous behaviour, though there was no specific 
individual victim. Obscene language prosecutions will also be investigated. 
The frequency of such crimes and their proportion of total prosecutions 
will be considered, as will the occupational backgrounds of the accused in 
these cases. The number of prosecutions during the strike will be compared 
to the rate of prosecutions in the preceding two years. 
102 
103 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.105. 
See Chapter One. 
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Chapter 4 
The Use of the Criminal Law during Industrial Disputes -
International Perspectives 
In June 1913 John Reed claimed that the criminal law, along with 
excessive violence by the police, was used during the Paterson, New Jersey, 
silk mills strike of 1913 to repress the strikers and defeat the strike. 
There's war in Paterson. But it's a curious kind of war. All the violence is the work 
of one side - the Mill Owners. Their servants, the police, club unresisting men and 
women and ride down law abiding crowds on horseback. Their paid mercenaries, 
the armed detectives, shoot and kill innocent people. Their newspapers, the 
Paterson Press and the Paterson Call, publish incendiary and crime-inciting appeals 
to mob-violence against the strike leaders. Their tool, Recorder Carroll, deals out 
heavy sentences to peaceful pickets that the police-net gathers up. They control 
absolutely the Police, the Press, the Courts. 1 
Some would dismiss Reed's account as biased and exaggerated. They 
would suggest Reed's ideological allegiances, given he was a workers' 
advocate and reporter for a workers' newspaper, distorted his reporting to the 
extent that his account had little resemblance to the actual events. 
The international research into policing and judicial decisions during 
industrial disputes, however, provides considerable evidence that such 
actions as Reed described at Paterson were sometimes more than simply the 
imagination of the working-class press. In certain instances it is difficult to 
John Reed, 'War in Paterson', in William L. O'Neill (ed), Echoes of Revolt: 
The Masses, 1911-1917, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), p.143 [originally 
published June 1913]. Extract also quoted by Norman S. Cohen (ed), Civil Strife in 
America: A Historical Approach to the Study of Riots in America, (Hinsdale, 
Illinois: Dryden Press, 1972), p.160. 
Kevin Michael Rosswurm, 'A Strike in the Rubber City: Rubber Workers, 
Akron, and the IWW, 1913', (unpublished MA thesis, Kent State University, Ohio, 
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describe the role of the police and judiciary using any other term than 
repressive. In other situations their actions can be interpreted as purely 
attempts to maintain social order (or minimise disorder) through intensified 
efforts to police, prosecute and punish offenders. Such a "control response" 
could contribute to an impression that the criminal law was being misused. 
The conclusion suggested by this large body of research is that all 
major strikes should be examined for evidence of a control response or of 
repressive activities by the state, the police and the judiciary. Within this 
thesis such an examination will be conducted for the New Zealand General 
Strike of 1913, specifically focusing on the use of the criminal law (which has 
not yet been studied in detail by New Zealand researchers). 
To provide a basis for analysis this chapter will explore the 
international research. First, the findings of three important works on the 
uses which have been of the criminal law will be presented. These works 
illustrate that the enforcement of the criminal law was not simply concerned 
with prosecuting offenders and imposing an appropriate punishment. The 
enforcement of the criminal law often had considerably greater social and 
political significance. Next, the precedents and potential for similar uses of 
the criminal law in New Zealand society in 1913 will be briefly discussed. 
Then three forms through which the criminal law has been used in response 
to industrial disputes will be investigated. Section a) will focus upon the 
theory that the police have often used their legal powers to persecute strikers, 
or to enact a less malicious "crackdown" on offending, in reaction to 
heightened social tensions. Section b) will examine the response of the 
1975), p.5 notes that 'in their effort to break the strike, city police arrested 2,338 
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judiciary to periods of heightened social tension and civil disorder, and the 
potential for a "judicial crackdown" will be highlighted. Section c) will discuss 
ways in which governments have used or modified the criminal law in 
response to protest movements and strikes. The applicability of these 
hypotheses for Wellington in 1913 will be tested in Chapter Six. 
One of the first social historians of crime to closely examine the use of 
the criminal law was Douglas Hay. For Hay the criminal law and its extremes 
of the death penalty and pardon were used 'to mould the consciousness by 
which the many submitted to the few' in eighteenth century England.2 
Subsequent research has shown that use of the criminal law and the 
criminal justice system to maintain the dominance of certain social groups 
was not limited to the eighteenth century. V. A. C. Gatrell convincingly argued 
that the issues of power and control are crucial to understanding the history of 
crime and of policing in Britain in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Over the past couple of centuries, the policeman-state protected and still 
protects an unequal and fissiparous society; and it did so supported by the 
convenient and enduring belief that most criminals were likely to be found 
among poorer people. The history of crime, accordingly, is largely the history 
of how better-off people disciplined their inferiors; of how elites used selected 
law-breakers to sanction their own authority; .... In these senses, the history 
of crime is not always about legality - or about liberty, either. Certainly, the 
rhetoric of liberty, justice and impartiality has always been usefully turned 
against the pretensions of the great; but those values have been more 
frequently compromised before the more expediential, discretionary and 
prejudicial devices of law as they were wielded in practice by policemen, 
people' during this twenty-two week strike by 8,000 Paterson silk-workers. 
2 Douglas Hay, 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law', in Douglas Hay, 
Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, Albion's Fatal 
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, (Harmondsworth, 
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judges and politicians. Historians might profitably remind themselves that the 
history of crime is a grim subject, not because it is about crime, but because 
it is about power.3 
A related scenario suggested by the work of Ted Robert Gurr is a 
police or judicial "crackdown" (or control response) on offending during 
periods of social tension, such as industrial disputes. Gurr hypothesised that 
'elites faced with real or threatened resistance probably intensify efforts at 
social control across the board, increasing policing, prosecuting, and 
punishment.' His study of the response of elites and police in London, 
Stockholm, Calcutta and Sydney to periods of sectional and class tension 
from the 1750s to the 1970s provided strong supporting evidence for this 
hypothesis.4 
It should be noted that not all "crackdowns" are intended as repressive 
by those who enact them. The motivation may simply be to prevent or 
discourage disorder and needless violence. The impact, however, can be 
very similar to crackdowns which have the explicit intention of thwarting the 
protest of specific groups. If strikers are successfully prohibited from 
picketing their former workplace, their strike is usually lost. The outcome is 
not affected if the motivation for the prohibition was to prevent injuries to the 
strikers and the general public, rather than to aid the employer against 
"troublesome" workers. Both types of motivation need to be considered when 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1975), pp.25-26, 44, 49-53, 61 and 62-63. (The quote is 
from p.26). 
3 V. A. C. Gatrell, 'Crime, Authority and the Policeman-State', in F. M. L. 
Thompson (ed), The Cambridge Social History of Britain 1750-1950, 3 volumes, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), volume 3, 'Social Agencies and 
Institutions', pp.245-246. 
4 GUIT, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', pp.667 and 674. (The 
quote is from p.667). 
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evidence of a crackdown is found. In many specific instances the repressive 
intention of actions by the police or the elite is obvious, examples of which will 
be presented throughout ttlis chapter. 
New Zealand had not been immune to the use of its police force to 
suppress "dissident" groups prior to 1913, although since the colonial frontier 
had been tamed by the 1870s its role had mostly been of a benign nature. 
But when 'state power or sovereignty seemed under threat ... policemen were 
readily able to respond to police and/or political decision-makers' 
requirements for a tactical shift on the social control continuum back to overt 
and condign coercion.'5 Such a 'tactical shift on the social control continuum' 
was implemented in 1913, and to a lesser extent during the 1890 Maritime 
Strike.6 The question of whether the State's law enforcers limited themselves 
to the role of maintaining civil order, or used the criminal law to repress 
strikers, will be answered in Chapter Six. Such an analysis will provide 
valuable evidence on the response of the New Zealand police and judiciary to 
the 1913 strike and the disorder associated with the strike. 
a) Prosecution or Persecution by the Police? 
International research on strikes, violence during strikes and the 
policing of strikes indicates that the public police have often not acted as the 
neutral keepers of the peace during industrial disputes? In Germany 
5 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.2-3. 
6 See Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.71-75 and 308-323. 
7 Within this thesis the use of the term 'police' refers to publicly funded and 
operated police forces unless otherwise specified. Special constables and special 
deputies who were enrolled in public police forces in times of perceived emergencies, 
and private police, need to be analysed separately from the regular public police. 
Specials and private police were, for example, often more aggressive, more hostile to 
strikers and more prone to violence than the regular police. 
91 
between 1890 and 1914 'scenes of policemen harassing picketers, 
conducting strikebreakers to work, or clearing the streets with truncheons and 
bayonets provided unforgettable (altl1ough far from peculiarly Prussian or 
German) images of the police acting in the service of the rich and powerful.' 
'Instances of heavy-handed police repression of strikers remained far more 
numerous and well publicized than were examples of police resistance to 
employer wishes.'8 During the Chicago teamsters' dispute of 1905, Sidney 
Harring argued, 'it was the Chicago police who broke the backbone of the 
strike. .... Regular escort service of wagon convoys, guards assigned to 
wagons, and immediate dispersal of any crowds collecting in the streets 
broke down the resistance of the strikers and got the wagons moving again. 
Private goons ['the private strikebreaking forces'] extended the capabilities of 
the police, but they nonetheless relied on the police for arrests of strikers and 
strike leaders, for protection of wagon convoys, and for legitimacy,.9 Similar 
events have taken place throughout the world. 1o 
8 Elaine Glovka Spencer, Police and the Social Order in German Cities: 
The Dusseldorf District, 1848-1914, (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1992), quotes pp.13 7 and 139 respectively. 
9 Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.125. 
10 For further analyses and examples see the remainder of this chapter. Also see 
David Killingray, 'Guarding the Extending Frontier: Policing the Gold Coast, 1865-
1913', in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds), Policing the Empire: 
Government, Authority and Control, 1830-1940, (Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1991), pp.121-122 (concerning the Gold Coast of 
Africa, 1902-1906); Sidney L. Harring and Lorraine M. McMullin, 'The Buffalo 
Police 1872-1900: Labor Unrest, Political Power and the Creation of the Police 
Institution', Crime and Social Justice, 4, Fall-Winter 1975, pp.5, 10-12 and 13, 
(concerning Buffalo, New York, 1872-1900); Sidney L. Harring, 'Policing a Class 
Society: The Expansion of the Urban Police in the Late Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries', in David F. Greenberg (ed), Crime and Capitalism: Readings 
in Marxist Criminology, (Palo Alto, California: Mayfield, 1981), pp.303-305 and 
311 (concerning a wide range of strikes in eighteen large and middle-sized cities in 
the United States between 1877 and 1915); and Phil Scraton, 'From Saltley Gates to 
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The police generally acted as agents of the powerful and wealthy 
during industrial disputes, whether intentionally or through the enaction of law 
which was class-biased. Lawrence M. Friedman has described the United 
States police in the late nineteenth century as 'an army of the status quo. 
They took the side of law and order, and this often meant the side of the 
employer, the factory owner, the boss. It would not exaggerate much to call 
the police, in some cases, strikebreakers plain and simple.' The police, in 
short, were invaluable agents of the employer side. .... the main point, 
beyond a doubt, was more deeply ideological: the police ranged themselves 
on the side of the constituted order. They were the seNants of power and 
wealth.'11 The conclusion R. B. Walker reached concerning Australia in the 
late nineteenth century adds a valuable dimension to Friedman's ideas. 'In 
industrial disputes they [the colonial governments] publicly adhered to the 
principle of neutrality; in practice the law was so constituted that its 'neutral' 
Orgreave: A History of the Policing of Recent Industrial Disputes', in Bob Fine and 
Robert Millar (eds), Policing the Miners' Strike, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1985), pp.156-l57 (concerning the 1981 Laurence Scott engineering works dispute in 
Manchester, England). The Laurence Scott dispute involved a particularly clear 
example of overt and premeditated collusion between an employer and senior police. 
Scraton discusses the considerable police assistance provided to protect the 
employer's creative strikebreaking technique. A large number of police were 
deployed hours in advance to control twenty or so pickets while two helicopters 
landed inside the factory walls and airlifted goods and equipment to customers. The 
strikers had no warning an airlift was to take place, senior police obviously knew in 
advance, and this action was successful in defeating the strike. For a useful general 
discussion of strikebreaking activity by United States police from the 1860s to the 
1930s see Tony Platt, Jon Frappier, Gerda Ray, Richard Schauffler, Larry TrujiIlo, 
Lynn Cooper, Elliott Currie, and Sidney Harring, The Iron Fist and the Velvet 
Glove: an Analysis of the U.S. Police, 3rd edition, (San Francisco: Crime and Social 
Justice Associates, 1982), pp.l2, 16, 17,23-24,25,26-28,29,39-40 and 42. 
II Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1993), quotes pp.104 and 105 respectively. 
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enforcement favoured capital rather than labour.'12 The police did not have to 
go beyond the boundaries of the law to repress strikes (though in many cases 
individual police officers did). Walker's finding is also a useful reminder that 
not all police actions which can be interpreted as detrimental to strikers and 
their cause were necessarily intended to be harmful. Some police, probably 
many, were doing their duty and nothing more. 
The range of ways in which the police could aid employers and hinder 
or help to defeat strikes was diverse as is clear from the work of Spencer, 
Harring and Friedman: including escorting strikebreakers, violence, arrests, 
the dispersal of crowds and guarding employer property. Those repressive 
repertoires of policing (to borrow and modify Charles Tilly and Sidney 
Tarrow's term) associated with the criminal law will now be explored, to help 
develop a series of tests which can be applied to specific strike situations. 13 
The focus for this discussion will be the repressive repertoires of policing 
which utilised the criminal law or which would have been considered and 
prosecuted as criminal acts if they had not been committed by the enforcers 
of that law. 
In any analysis of the policing of social conflict the role of the 
government cannot be ignored. The government, whether local, regional or 
national, is the employer of the police. During periods of social tension the 
government will often direct the police as to the type of policing the situation 
12 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', p.63. For a 
useful related analysis of class bias in American law see Platt, et aI., The Iron Fist 
and the Velvet Glove, pp.11-13. 
13 For Tarrow's use of the term "repertoires of contention" see Sidney Tarrow, 
Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd edition, 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially chapters 2 
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requires. The enforcement of the criminal law can be lenient or strict. 
Demonstrations and picket lines can be allowed, banned, or limited to a 
certain size and to certain places. In this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, 
the discussions of the policing of the criminal law will generally focus on the 
police themselves. The police are those who choose to make the majority of 
arrests and whose wide powers of discretion within the existing criminal law 
decide which acts are criminal and which are permissible within a given 
situation. Government directives will have little impact if the police decide not 
to implement them: no or few arrests can be justified by individual police as 
due to a lack of criminal actions, rather than the subversion of policy 
directives. Where evidence is available to indicate or demonstrate the 
influence of the government on policing decisions related to the criminal law 
this will be discussed. A related issue is the degree of similarity in the 
attitudes of high-ranking commissioned police officers and ordinary 
constables towards "criminal" behaviour and protesters, strikers and similar 
"potentially disorderly" groups. Any divergence or conflict between those who 
issue the orders and those who are supposed to carry them out during 
periods of social tension will be noted. 
The most visible form of police repression against strikers has been 
the use of unnecessary or excessive violence on picket lines and at 
demonstrations. 14 Evidence indicates at least two unionists 'died within 
and 6. For a useful discussion of Charles Tilly's uses of "repertoires of contention" 
see Tarrow, Power in Movement, pp.30-32. 
14 The discussion of police violence related to industrial disputes in this chapter 
is not intended to be definitive. Such an international analysis would require a thesis 
in itself, if not more than one. The aim of this section is to indicate the potential for, 
and some of the varieties of, police violence, so as to provide a basis for the analysis 
in later chapters of this thesis and for future research. 
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several months of injuries inflicted by police in the clashes of early 1930' 
associated with the 1929-1930 northern New South Wales coal miners' 
lockout. 15 Romano Canosa and Donatella della Porta have argued that in 
Italy in the late 1940s and 1950s 'the primary means of keeping public order 
was the use of firearms by policemen against protestors, strikers, peasants 
who occupied land, etc.'16 For della Porta 'the fact that almost 100 
demonstrators died in the 1940s and 1950s when police charged go-ins and 
sit-ins using firearms is a grim testament to the truth of this statement.'17 For 
For useful analyses of police violence during industrial disputes and changes 
in such violence over time in Britain between 1893 and 1985 see Geary, Policing 
Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, especially pp.40-45, 64-66, 69-70, 85-86, 89-90, 
109-115 and 144-145; and Robert Reiner, 'Policing Strikes: An Historical 'U' Turn', 
Policing, vol. 1, no. 3, Summer 1985, pp.138-141, 143 and 144. Also see 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, pp.96-107 for a critique and 
revision of some of Geary's ideas concerning industrial dispute violence. 
For a useful general examination of police violence and brutality (focusing on 
the 1980s and 1990s) see William A. Geller and Hans Toch (eds), Police Violence: 
Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force, (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1996). James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behaviour: The 
Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968) pp.44-48, writing on the United 
States in the 1960s, also raises a number of important issues worthy of consideration. 
Neither Geller and Toch (eds) nor Wilson specifically examine police violence during 
industrial disputes. 
15 Miriam Dixson, 'Stubborn Resistance: The Northern New South Wales 
Miners' Lockout of 1929-30', in John Iremonger, John Merritt and Graeme Osborne 
(eds), Strikes: Studies in Twentieth Century Australian Social History, 
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973), p.140. Also see Dixson, 'Rothbury', p.25. 
These deaths were in addition to the earlier accidental death at Rothbury of Norman 
Brown, a locked out miner, on 16 December 1929. Brown, who was well clear of a 
developing confrontation between pickets and police, was killed by a police bullet 
which ricocheted. (For a useful analysis of the circumstances of Brown's death see 
Dixson, 'Rothbury', pp.14 and 17-19). 
16 Romano Canosa, La Polizia in Italia dal1945 ad oggi, (Bologne: II Mulino, 
1976), p.l81, translated and quoted in Donatella della Porta, 'Social Movements and 
the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest', in Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural 
Framings, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.67. 
17 della Porta, 'Social Movements and the State', p.67. 
96 
Harring 'the two great [Chicago] garment workers' strikes of 1910 and 1915 
demonstrated that the Chicago police department had degenerated into little 
more than the hired sluggers of the manufacturers.,iS 
Their major antistrike tactic was wholesale clubbing of strikers, carried out on 
such an extensive scale and in so cold-blooded a manner that the strikers 
won considerable support from "reform" women's groups and anti-machine 
aldermen. The pattern of clubbing in both strikes was similar: clubbings were 
wholesale and indiscriminate, directed against both strikers and any member 
of the public at large who looked out of place in the strike district. Large 
numbers of women were clubbed by the police, with no attempt to hide their 
actions. 19 
Police initiated violence was a feature of the strike of 16,000 rubber workers 
in the small industrial city of Akron, Ohio in 1913. The strike had progressed 
peacefully for three weeks until the events of 7 March. Five hundred strikers 
'had formed a human chain in front of the Goodrich plant when Sheriff 
Fergusson asked the pickets to move across the street. As the crowd began 
to move it was charged by 20 Akron police officers, reinforced by 30 special 
deputies'. Sixty strikers and one police officer were injured in 'the vigorous 
wielding of clubs' which followed. 'The organized beating had a devastating 
effect on the strikers. This scene was repeated throughout the next two 
[working] days, with squads of police and specials attacking workers' 
assemblies. The indiscriminate nature of the police clubbing can be seen in 
18 Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.12S. 
19 Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.126; and see pp.l26-127. Gerda W. Ray 
notes that many of the women who were 'savagely beaten' by the Chicago police were 
strikers. (Gerda W. Ray, 'Police Forces', in Wilma Mankiller, Gwendolyn Mink, 
Marysa Navarro, Barbara Smith, and Gloria Steinem (eds), The Reader's 
Companion to U.S. Women's History, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1998), p.4S3). 
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the fact that Sheriff Fergusson was accidentally struck in the face by a special 
deputy.'2o 
The history of industrial relations in Britain has also been marred by 
incidents of excessive and indiscriminate police violence and brutality on 
picket lines and at demonstrations. Roger Geary has found 'considerable 
evidence that the police engaged in indiscriminate violence when attempting 
to deal with strike disturbances' during the South Wales miners' strike of 
1910. 'Newspaper reports, such as the following from The Times, suggest 
that all the members of a crowd became targets for the police batons 
irrespective of whether or not they had actually committed an offence: "That 
the police are using their batons with effect is obvious from the number of 
bandaged and bleeding ears which are to be seen. They have no time to 
discriminate and it is a case of "Whenever you see a head hit it!".'21 
20 Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.130. Also see Rosswurm, 'A Strike in 
the Rubber City', pp. 77 -81. Rosswurm (p.78) describes how another policeman, 
detective Martino, was clubbed unconscious by a special deputy on 7 March. Sheriff 
Fergusson was struck on 8 March (Rosswurm, p.79). It should be noted there are a 
few conflicts in the details presented by Harring and Rosswurm. For example, 
Rosswurm (p.52) states the number of strikers reached a peak of 16,000 in the middle 
of February 1913, while Harring (p.130) writes 20,000 workers walked out of the 
rubber plants on 10 February. The location of the speeches by the Wobblies and 
Socialists on 7 March can also be interpreted differently from the two accounts. 
Rosswurm's account appears the more precise on this point. Both authors, however, 
agree on the location, extent and nature of the police violence, as well as agreement on 
the other major aspects of the dispute, including the considerable hostility of city 
officials to the strike. For another United States example and detailed description of 
unnecessary and excessive police violence against strikers (from the Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin woodworkers' strike of 1898) see Harring, Policing a Class Society, 
p.l29. For a more general discussion and summary involving cases drawn from 
eighteen cities in the United States between 1877 and 1915 see Harring, 'Policing a 
Class Society' (1981), pp.304-305. 
21 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.40; also see pp.40-43. 
The quote from The Times is dated 9 November 1910. 
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Similarly indiscriminate police violence accompanied the Glasgow 
general strike of 1919. 'On Friday 31 January a large, but orderly, crowd of 
strikers had assembled in St George's square outside the City Chambers. 
The police decided to clear a path through the crowd, by mounting a baton-
charge on the strikers and spectators in the way. This police action was 
carried out, according to the Glasgow Herald, with: 
a vigour and determination that was a prelude to the extraordinary scenes 
which the Square was afterwards to witness, and to which the city, with all its 
acquaintance with labour troubles, can happily offer no parallel. A strong 
body of police '" swept the crowd in front of them, raining a hurricane of 
blows which fell indiscriminately on those actually participating in the strike 
and on those who had been down to the scene merely through curiosity.22 
Geary argues that 'this account constitutes particularly impressive evidence of 
police brutality since it appears in a newspaper that was very unsympathetic 
towards the strikers. Indeed, the editor described the formation of the Strike 
Committee as "the first step towards that squalid terrorism which the world 
now describes as Bolshevism". An editor with such a viewpoint would hardly 
be likely to overemphasise indiscriminate violence on the part of the police. ,23 
22 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.64. The quote from the 
Glasgow Herald is dated 1 February 1919. Hugh Armstrong Clegg, A History of 
British Trade Unions Since 1889, volume 2: 1911-1933, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), p.270, agrees that 'the police cleared the square with a good deal of brutality.' 
For another useful discussion of the police behaviour (or misbehaviour) in Glasgow 
on 31 January 1919 see lain McLean, 'Popular Protest and Public Order: Red 
Clydeside, 1915-1919', in Roland Quinault and John Stevenson (eds), Popular 
Protest and Public Order: Six Studies in British History 1790-1920, (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp.230-231 and 237. 
23 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.64. The quote from the 
Glasgow Herald is dated 19 April 1919. 
For further examples presented by Geary of police brutality in Britain related 
to crowd control during industrial disputes see Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 
1883 to 1985, pp.44-45 (1911 national railway strike), 64-65 (1926 General Strike), 
85-86 (the mass picketing at Grunwick Processing Laboratories in 1977), 109 (dispute 
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Police brutality on the picket line was again evident during the British 
Miners' Strike of 1984-1985. McCabe and Wallington vividly describe a 
number of examples of police officers using 'unnecessary and unjustifiable 
force' against strikers. In one case an 'observer witnessed an incident at 
Kiveton Park Colliery on 22 August 1984. He was on his way to the nearby 
railway station and stopped at the picket line to speak to a friend. Seeing the 
police bearing down on the pickets he moved off but heard and saw one 
policeman kicking a youth to the ground. This police officer was joined by 
three others who kicked the youth for fully three or four minutes. He went on: 
"Another collier was on the ground being kicked by another group of 
policemen. After they had had a good kicking the two pickets were dragged 
back towards the colliery gates." He ends his report: "I did think for a 
moment of stopping one of the officers and asking why none of them were 
displaying their numbers, but I was honestly under the impression that 
anyone who got in the way of the police on that particular morning would have 
been flattened".'24 Two months earlier a television camera captured 'the 
not specified), 110-111 (1972 miners' strike), 111-112 (1980 steel strike), and 144-
145 (1984-1985 miners' strike). Also see Morgan, Conflict and Order, pp.l99-200 
(concerning the 1925 anthracite miners' strike in Carmarthenshire, South Wales), and 
206-207 (1926 national coal strike); Susan Bhaumik, 'The Strike in the Regions: 
Glasgow', in Margaret Morris, The General Strike, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1976), pA07 (Glasgow, 1926 General Strike); and Scraton, 'From 
Saltley Gates to Orgreave', p.158 (concerning 'the indiscriminate truncheoning of 
pickets' associated with the Warrington Messenger newspaper dispute of 1983). For 
an intriguing analysis of influences on and regional variations in police violence 
against British miners in the 1920s and 1930s see Barbara Weinberger, 'Police 
Perceptions of Labour in the Inter-War Period: The Case of the Unemployed and of 
Miners on Strike', in Francis Snyder and Douglas Hay (eds), Labour, Law, and 
Crime: An Historical Perspective, (London and New York: Tavistock Publications, 
1987), pp.150-151, 152-153, 154, 158-159 and 163-175. 
24 Sarah McCabe and Peter Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and Civil 
Liberties: Legacies of the Miners' Strike, (London and New York: Routledge, 
1988), p.81. Also see McCabe and Wallington, p.81; Phil Scraton, The State of the 
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violent attack upon a fleeing picket by a police officer at Orgreave.' McCabe 
and Wallington argue that 'the truncheon blow appeared to be quite 
gratuitous and without the justification of self-defence which police officers 
can put forward in less public circumstances. Yet no official action was taken, 
apart from a swift reference to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who 
advised that the evidence available was not strong enough for a conviction.'25 
Less frequently, police violence targeted groups or individuals distant 
from the sites of mass protest. In Draveil, France in 1908 'police shot dead 
two union organizers by firing unprovoked through the windows of the strike 
headquarters.'26 A National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) Branch Secretary 
interviewed by Geary reported being assaulted by police for no justifiable 
reason while walking home from a picket line during the 1984-1985 British 
Miners' Strike. 'I was walking back home with two mates when police van 
pulls up and out gets four or five coppers and they just laid into us. I got cut 
lips and big bruises - others were worse. Eric's nose got broke - we didn't 
resist at all. All of us were in our fifties. It's destroyed what little faith I had 
left in police I can tell yoU.'27 In connection with the 1892 switchmen's strike 
Police, (London: Pluto Press, 1985), pp.l-5; and John Field, 'Police Monitoring: 
The Sheffield Experience', in Bob Fine and Robert Millar (eds), Policing the 
Miners' Strike, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985), pp.209-21O, for further 
examples of similar police violence during the 1984-1985 miners' strike. 
25 McCabe and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and Civil Liberties, 
p.88, and see p.77. McCabe and Wallington (p.88) also note: '(It is, of course, 
generally accepted that the prosecution of members of the police force is not 
undertaken without much stronger evidence than is thought to be appropriate in other 
cases).' For an extremely useful analysis of the variety of causes of the force and 
violence Gustifiable and unjustifiable) used by both the police and strikers at Orgreave 
see Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, pp.95 and 104-107. 
26 Magraw, A History of the French Working Class, vol.2: Workers and the 
Bourgeois Republic 1871-1939, p.113. This dispute involved quarry workers. 
27 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.l44-145. The location 
of the incident is not stated by Geary to protect the identity of the union officials and 
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in Buffalo 'railroad workers and their supporters were beaten [by the city 
police] blocks away from the strike district.'28 
Unnecessary brutality by the police against strikers was possible within 
police stations as well. In Stockport, England on 22 November 1967 six 
pickets were arrested in connection with scuffles between pickets and police 
that day. Three of the six men arrested appeared in court the next morning 
with broken noses, severe bruising and in one case a neck injury. One of the 
pickets was so badly injured that he collapsed outside the court and had to be 
taken to hospital. The men alleged that they had been beaten at the police 
station and told to shout "Mercy, mercy". Although an enquiry conducted by 
an officer from another force concluded that three Stockport policemen had a 
case to answer for "assault occasioning actual bodily harm" no criminal or 
even disciplinary charges were brought. Nevertheless, £2,280 agreed 
damages were paid to the men by the pOlice.'29 A number of striking 
asbestos workers in Quebec in 1949 were arrested, 'badly beaten and 
subjected to hours of interrogation without counsel' by the provincial police. 30 
From the events at Draveil, at Stockport, and in Quebec it is clear that 
research on police violence and physical repression associated with industrial 
police officers he interviewed or had informal discussions with. See Geary, pp.2-4 for 
his methodology and the number of interviews and informal discussions conducted. 
For further examples from the 1984-1985 strike of unnecessary police violence distant 
from the picket line or demonstration see McCabe and Wallington, The Police, 
Public Order, and Civil Liberties, pp.73 and 83; and Scraton, The State of the 
Police, ppA-5. 
28 Harring, 'Policing a Class Society' (1981), p.305. 
29 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.69-70. The strike in 
Stockport involved workers at the Roberts-Arundel textile machinery manufacturing 
factory. For a 'similar but less serious incident' of police brutality during the 1972 
British miners' strike see Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.112-
113. 
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disputes benefits from being more broadly focused than simply the locations 
of picket lines and demonstrations. 
Abuses of the power of the police to make arrests and prosecutions on 
questionable charges have also taken place during strikes. In Lawrence, 
Massachusetts in 1912 and during the British Coal Strike of 1984-1985 police 
arrested and detained hundreds of strikers against whom no charges were 
ever made. Of the 9,808 persons arrested in England and Wales in 
connection with the 1984-1985 dispute, 1,891 (almost 20 percent) were never 
charged. 31 Many of these instances were simply random arrests and acts of 
intimidation against strikers by the police.32 
Evidence of the questionable basis for many arrests where charges 
were laid is the high number of cases which were eventually withdrawn. In 
the Strathclyde region of Scotland 745 people were arrested and charged in 
relation to the 1984-1985 coal strike. The charges were dropped in 436 (59 
percent) of these cases. 33 Stuart Jamieson has reached a similar conclusion 
30 Jamieson, Times of Trouble: ... Canada, 1900-66, pp.330 and 331; the 
quote is from p.330. 
31 Lens, The Labor Wars, p.176; McCabe and Wallington, The Police, 
Public Order, and Civil Liberties, pp.161-162 and 104 (note 14). 
32 For examples see McCabe and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and 
Civil Liberties, pp.94-96 and 88; and Scraton, The State of the Police, p.2. John 
Field, 'Police Monitoring: The Sheffield Experience', p.209, has reached a related 
and compatible conclusion with the argument presented above concerning many 
arrests during the 1984-1985 miners' dispute: 'At picket lines, arrests were often 
arbitrary, and appeared to follow unexplained changes in the ground-rules being 
imposed by the police; often, men were being arrested simply to reinforce the 
authority of a new force as it replaced a previous shift.' For a discussion of other 
forms of intimidation and harassment used by the police during the 1984-1985 
miners' strike see Cathie Lloyd, 'A National Riot Police: Britain's "Third Force"?', 
in Bob Fine and Robert Millar (eds), Policing the Miners' Strike, (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1985), pp.68-70. 
33 McCabe and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and Civil Liberties, 
p.164. In the rest of Scotland 738 persons were arrested and charged. Only one of 
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concerning Canadian coal mining disputes of the 1930s. 'In general, the 
record of the years 1930 to 1935 in coal mining is a monotonous recital of 
dozens of strikes and arrests in the hundreds. Strikers were arrested, not 
just for violence, but for such minor reasons as "violation of the 1.0.1. Act" (i.e., 
going on strike without first applying for conciliation). In many cases, the 
purposes of the arrests were revealed by the withdrawal of charges as soon 
as the strikes were ended.,34 
Stuart Svensen's study of the Queensland shearers' strike of 1891 
provides numerous vivid examples of repressive and unjustified arrests and 
prosecutions of strikers, and the subsequent withdrawal of charges or 
acquittal of the unionists. 
One of the problems faced by the government at the end of the [shearers'] 
war [i.e. the strike] was what to do with the dozens of unionists who were still 
in custody, but who had not yet been tried. It could hardly let them stand trial, 
for there was little or no evidence against them. Nor could the gaoled 
unionists be released immediately, for that would have been a tacit admission 
that they had been unfairly arrested. Most of the men involved were held until 
a week before their trial date, then released. 35 
Queensland Colonial Secretary 'Tozer was ordering the arrest of people 
against whom there was not the slightest shred of evidence. Of the 163 
charges laid against unionists which were serious enough to warrant trial by 
these cases was not proceeded with. (p.l64). It should also be noted that in Scotland 
only 21 of the 1,504 persons arrested were not charged. (p.164). Also see Peter 
Wallington, 'Policing the Miners' Strike', The Industrial Law Journal, vol. 14, 
no. 3, 1985, p.150; especially footnote 24. 
34 Jamieson, Times of Trouble: ... Canada, 1900-66, p.221. Also quoted in 
Lome Brown and Caroline Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP [Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police], (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1973), p.68. 
35 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.192. 
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jury, the government' only obtained 22 convictions. 36 It could be argued that 
pro-union juries, rather than police bias generated this very low conviction 
rate. However, the large number of charges which were withdrawn, and thus 
never went before a jury, indicates that pro-union juries cannot be the only 
explanation for the low conviction rate. 37 
The charges on which such questionable arrests were made in 
Queensland ranged from conspiracy and intimidation to arson, and from 
assault to vagrancy.38 Dubious charges relating to the 1984-1985 British 
Miners' Strike which were withdrawn or resulted in acquittals included 
threatening behaviour, breach of the peace, insulting language, obstruction of 
the highway, and unlawful assembly.39 A number of the acquittals were due 
to the prosecution offering no evidence against the accused.40 
36 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.186. 
37 Svensen, The Shearers' War, does not state the exact number of charges 
which were dismissed by juries, nor the number which were withdrawn before trial. 
The conclusion that many serious charges were never placed before a jury is an 
impressionistic one generated from Svensen's detailed discussions of the arrests, 
charges, prosecutions and trials related to the 1891 strike (pp.86, 101-104, 11 0-111, 
122-123, 126, 132, 133, 134, 135, 141-142, 143-145, 157, 167, 180, 190-193, 197 and 
304). A number of charges were also dismissed at committal hearings (for two 
examples see pp.l 02 and 167). A more definitive conclusion may be possible through 
examining Queensland State Archives COL / 414 (b) 'List of offences committed in 
the areas affected by the shearers' strike' (reference from Svensen, pp.325 and 311, 
notes 58 and 68). 
38 For examples see Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.86, 101-104, 110-111, 
122-123, 126, 132, 133, 134, 135, 140, 141-142, 143-145, 156, 157, 167, 180, 189, 
190-193, 197,246,253-254 and 304. 
39 McCabe and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and Civil Liberties, 
pp.94-95, 96 and 99-100. Rioting could be included in the above list, since there were 
no convictions from 295 riot charges in England and Wales. Rioting has been left out 
because linking such charges to police bias is extremely problematic in late twentieth 
century Britain. As McCabe and Wallington (pp.99 and 104 (note 18) ) observe 
charges of riot are difficult to sustain and create some grave evidential problems. In 
some other contexts the repressive use of the charge riot can be clearly seen, as in the 
example of Estevan, Canada in 1931 discussed later in this chapter. For discussion of 
the riot charges arising from the 1984-1985 strike see McCabe and Wallington, pp.75, 
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Writing more generally on the relations of power and control between 
the police and workers Harring and McMullin argue that arrests and 
prosecutions for 'offenses such as disorderly conduct, vagrancy, tramp, 
drunkenness can be freely used to control any group of working class people 
if the police are so inclined.,41 One of the examples Harring and McMullin 
present to support their argument provides further evidence of the broad 
range of charges which could potentially be used by police against 
"troublesome" strikers. The year 1894 is most noted in [American] labor 
history for the Pullman Strike, one of the nation's most widespread strikes 
involving the railroad unions. Buffalo, a major railroad center, also saw a 
great deal. of strike activity. The arrest rate that year rose by 35 percent, 
almost entirely in arrests for vagrancy, tramps, and disorderly conduct.,42 In a 
separate article Harring provides specific examples of strikers being arrested 
and imprisoned as tramps in Buffalo during the 1892 railroad switchmen's 
strike.43 
90 (note 16),99, 100, 104 (note 18), 162, 164 and 165. The figure of295 riot charges 
is given on p.162. Also see Wallington, 'Policing the Miners' Strike', p.151, 
concerning unlawful assembly charges related to the miners' strike. 
40 For examples see McCabe and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and 
Civil Liberties, pp.94-95 and 165. 
41 Harring and McMullin, 'The Buffalo Police 1872-1900', p.l2. 
42 Harring and McMullin, 'The Buffalo Police 1872-1900', p.l2. For a more 
detailed discussion of tramp and vagrancy laws and particularly their repressive use in 
Buffalo from 1892-1894 see Sidney L. Harring, 'Class Conflict and the Suppression 
of Tramps in Buffalo, 1892-1894', Law and Society Review, vol. 11, no. 5, Summer 
1977, pp.873-911. This article (p.886) also provides a detailed breakdown of 'Arrests 
for Major Public Order Crimes by Specific Offence in Buffalo: 1886-1900'. In 1893 
there were 1,820 arrests for vagrancy and 1,925 for being a tramp; in 1894 there were 
4,764 arrests for vagrancy and 4,716 for being a tramp; in 1895 arrests almost returned 
to their 1893 levels with 1,690 and 2,464 arrests on the respective charges. For a 
useful summary of this article see Harring, 'Policing a Class Society' (1981), pp.306-
307. 
43 Harring, 'Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps in Buffalo, 1892-
1894', p.889, and see pp.886-887 and 907 for Harring's general comments concerning 
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Research on policing in Britain has highlighted similar opportunities for 
repressive use of the criminal law as those found by Harring and McMullin. 
Barbara Weinberger perceptively comments: 'Offences such as obstruction or 
behaviour likely to cause a breach of the peace are so imprecise that virtually 
any public behaviour could be made an arrestable offence. To talk of the 
police duty to enforce the law for such [public order] offences is a fiction, 
since the law is here reduced to a tool for the police to use as they find 
necessary.' In addition, the English or Welsh constable's 'independence, is 
further strengthened by the judicial system in which he operates, whereby the 
decision on whether to prosecute and what charges to lay is left to the 
individual pOliceman.'44 The potential for unjustified arrests and charges is 
clear. 
these types of arrests. It is not entirely clear whether these strikers were arrested for 
being strikers, or because they were mistaken for tramps, though presumably they 
would have protested their innocence. In either case, the purpose of the arrests was to 
help defeat the strike. The Buffalo Chief of Police had ordered the city to be cleared 
of tramps one week into the strike to ensure tramps did not join with, or incite, the 
strikers (pp.888-889 and see pp.880, 881, 882-883, 890 and 893-894). It should be 
noted that American "tramps" of the 1890s included many unionists (skilled and 
unskilled) and some socialists who were unemployed due to the major economic 
depression, some union organisers, and also large numbers of itinerant or migratory 
workers (see pp.875-876, 881, 895 and 905). For Harring's analysis of the 
relationship between tramp or vagrancy arrests and strikes see pp.879, 880, 881, 882, 
886-887, 888-890 and 907. 
44 Barbara Weinberger, Keeping the Peace? Policing Strikes in Britain, 1906-
1926, (Oxford and New York: Berg Publishers Limited, 1991), pp.2 and 1 
respectively. In Scotland the Lord Advocate rather than the police has historically 
had, and continues to have, responsibility for prosecutions. (Wallington, 'Policing the 
Miners' Strike', p.151; and Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder, 'Using the Criminal 
Law, 1750-1850: Policing, Private Prosecution, and the State', in Douglas Hay and 
Francis Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), pp.28-29 and 32-33). Wallington, 'Policing the Miners' 
Strike', p.151, also usefully notes that breach of the peace in Scottish law is an even 
broader offence than in English law. 
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Specific British industrial disputes in which questionable arrests under 
the criminal law have been made include the 1984-1985 miners' strike (as 
already discussed), the 1926 general strike and miners' dispute, and the 
1976-1978 Grunwick dispute (a mail-order film processing factory). A total of 
7,960 persons were prosecuted in connection with the 1926 general strike 
and miners' lockout.45 Of the 7,316 persons whose cases had been disposed 
of by 24 January 1927, 1,175 (16 percent) had the charges against them 
withdrawn or dismissed.46 In May 1977 the convictions of six pickets for 
obstructing the highway outside Grunwick's Chapter Road premises were 
quashed on appeal by the Middlesex Crown Court. The ruling was made 'that 
in certain circumstances people could obstruct the pavement if they were 
peacefully picketing.' 'The court severely reprimanded the police for using the 
pretext that more than six pickets were an obstruction and took the extremely 
unusual step of awarding costs of £3,500 against the pOlice.'47 In March 1977 
45 Morgan, Conflict and Order, p.211. For discussions of the prosecutions 
arising from just the General Strike (03 to 12 May 1926) see Geary, Policing 
Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.65-66; Morgan, Conflict and Order, p.209; 
Barbara Weinberger, 'Communism and the General Strike: Documentary Essay', 
Society for the Study of Labour History Bulletin, no. 48, Spring 1984, pp.31-33; 
G. A. Phillips, The General Strike: The Politics of Industrial Conflict, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), pp.203-205; Farman, The General Strike May 
1926, pp.199-201; and Renshaw, The General Strike, pp.18-19 and 169. There is 
some disagreement among these authors concerning the exact number of prosecutions 
and arrests. 
46 Morgan, Conflict and Order, p.2l0 (footnote 73). 
47 Jack Dromey and Graham Taylor, Grunwick: The Workers' Story, 
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978), pp.85, 86-87 and 91; the quotes are from 
p.91. Also see Scraton, 'From Saltley Gates to Orgreave', pp.l52-153; and Joe 
Rogaly, Grunwick, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977), p.124. (It 
should be noted that Rogaly gives the wrong year on p.124: the relevant date is 
February 1977, not February 1976). The alleged offences took place on 01 November 
1976, seven months before the mass picketing began. The entire picket line of nine 
pickets were arrested on that date, six of whom were found guilty at Willesden 
Magistrates' Court on 24 February 1977. Labour Party Councillor Cyril Shaw was 
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Jack Dromey, one of the members of the Grunwick Strike Committee, was 
arrested for the use of insulting words towards a policeman. Dromey reports 
his exact words were "You're nothing but a company force", and were 
provoked by abusive comments from the policeman concerned. The police 
later added the charge of 'insulting behaviour and obstruction of a police 
officer in the course of his duty', concerning the same incident. Dromey was 
acquitted on all charges.48 These examples, along with the others analysed 
within this chapter, provide valuable evidence of the incidence and forms of 
dubious arrests and prosecutions of strikers and their supporters. They also 
demonstrate that such problematic use of the criminal law has not been 
limited to one country or one continent. 
Situations where only a small fraction of the strikers arrested were 
given significant sentences suggest further instances of dubious arrests and 
prosecutions. For example, during the 1909-1910 New York women clothing 
workers dispute 771 pickets were arrested, of whom 19 were given jail terms 
in the workhouse and 248 fined. 49 If most of these charges had been 
legitimate a higher number of serious sentences would be expected. 
one of those arrested but not convicted. (Dromey and Taylor, pp.8, 9, 85, 86-87 and 
91). For useful analyses of the mass picketing of 1977, its policing and related 
violence see Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, pp.84-88; McCabe 
and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and Civil Liberties, pp.46 and 70; 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, pp.97 and 100-101; 
Dromey and Taylor, Grunwick, pp.lO-ll, 103-114, 118-153, 156, 160, 161, 165-179 
and 192-197; and Rogaly, Grunwicl{, pp.68-69, 77-90, 96-97, 98, 103-105, 107-115 
and 122-136. 
48 Dromey and Taylor, Grunwick, p.90, and see p.85. For more details on 
Dromey's role in the Grunwick dispute see Dromey and Taylor, pp.8-9, 55, 57, the 
outside back cover, and p.202 (the index listing for Dromey, Jack); and Rogaly, 
Grunwick, pp.60-62, 64 and 69. Dromey was not a Grunwick employee but became 
involved in the dispute through his position as Secretary of the Brent Trades Council 
(Dromey and Taylor, p.53 and their outside back cover; and see Rogaly, p.60). 
49 Taft and Ross, 'American Labor Violence', p.314. 
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The legal right of the police to arrest and detain could be a powerful 
weapon during industrial disputes. By removing the most prominent strike 
leaders and the most active and enthusiastic strikers from picket lines the 
police aided the employers' goal of defeating the strike, as in Parma, Italy in 
June 1908. 
Intervening to restore order, troops pushed the strikers back across the 
bridge; and in a hail of stones from the roof tops, infantry and cavalry 
proceeded through the streets to the headquarters of the chamber of labor . 
.... At this point, the police broke down the door, invaded the building, 
arrested members of the strike committee and executive committee of the 
organisation in the midst of a meeting, and confiscated documents and 
money ..... In the space of a morning, the authorities had decimated the 
cadres of the unions through mass arrests and occupied the headquarters of 
the chamber of labor. 50 
In some instances, perhaps many, such arrests were justifiable in terms of 
legitimate threats to public order and public safety, but the opportunity for the 
abuse of the ability to arrest was everpresent. As the Queensland shearers' 
strike of 1891 neared collapse a prominent 'unionist, Gilbert Casey, had 
surreptitiously arranged a load of rations for Barcaldine', one of the largest of 
the strikers' camps. Police Magistrate Ranking feared that the strike would be 
prolonged by such actions and by Casey's fiery speeches. Ranking had 
Casey 'arrested on a weak case of inciting arson and seditious speech which 
meant he was out of the way for two weeks. ,51 
A few weeks before Casey's arrest Colonial Secretary Tozer had been 
'perturbed by the fact that there was [sic] still some active union leaders who 
50 Sykes, 'Revolutionary Syndicalism', p.205. 
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had not yet been locked up. He issued another decree - this time the 
Vagrants Act was to be used against any union leader who could not be got 
at any other way. He informed [Police Magistrate] Hartley on 26 May that all 
union pickets were to be treated as vagrants. The Charleville [strike] camp 
chairman Ormsby was arrested on this charge, but the case was eventually 
dropped.'52 Two months earlier Tozer had telegraphed to Police Magistrate 
Ranking: "The law is strong enough to get at every prominent unionist".53 
Tozer's comment offers a useful insight into the potential for misuse of the 
criminal law during strikes. Similar events have occurred in Britain. 
Weinberger, for example, argues that strike leaders in Glasgow in 1919 were 
'arrested on very flimsy evidence' at the behest of the British government. 54 
Incidents such as these emphasise the need for arrests during industrial 
disputes to be carefully examined for any evidence of their use as acts of 
police repression. 
Another possible way in which the police could aid the defeat of strikes 
was to prosecute the leaders of groups which supported strikes but were not 
themselves on strike. While the Toledo, Ohio automobile strike of 1934 was 
51 Kerr, Freedom of Contract, p.28. Also see Svensen, The Shearers' War, 
pp.190-192. Casey was not tried on these charges. After the strike had collapsed he 
was discharged on the orders of Tozer. (Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.192). 
52 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.145. 
53 Queensland State Archives COL / 421 - Tozer to Ranking, 24 March 1891, 
quoted in Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.186. Also see Svensen's summary of the 
ways in which Tozer's statement was enacted in 1891 (The Shearers' War, pp.253-
254). 
54 Barbara Weinberger, 'Keeping the Peace? Policing Strikes 1906-26', 
History Today, vol. 37, December 1987, p.34. Clegg, A History of British Trade 
Unions Since 1889, volume 2: 1911-1933, p.270 describes the arrests in the 
following terms: 'Although their part had been to try to control the [rioting] crowd 
[gathered in St. George's Square], Gallacher, Kirkwood, and Shinwell were arrested'. 
For more details on the arrests, trial, verdicts and sentences see McLean, 'Popular 
Protest and Public Order: Red Clydeside, 1915-1919', pp.229-230, 231 and 232-233. 
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in progress two Lucas County Unemployed League 'leaders were arrested, 
tried on the charge of violating the injunction [against picketing - the League 
was picketing in support of the strikers] and released with a court warning not 
to do any further picketing.'55 Although rare such actions need to be looked 
for during strikes. 
The police could choose to arrest strikers for minor offences which 
would have been tolerated in other circumstances. During the 1933 
pulpwood cutters strike in Thunder Bay, Ontario 'numerous strikers were 
arrested on charges of ... riding on trains without paying fares. (The latter 
was a widespread practice during the depression and usually ignored by 
authorities.),56 Such selective enforcement of the law suggests that the 
motivation of the police involved was not simply to prevent fare-dodging. 
David Waddington describes similar types of arrests, though for 
different offences, in connection with the 1984-1985 British Miners' Strike. 
'On the picket lines themselves, the police made uncompromising use of the 
discretion available to them under public-order law. Minor offences, e.g., 
stepping off a pavement or shouting 'scab' - activities generally tolerated in 
industrial disputes - were sometimes used as the pretext for an arrest.,5? 
Police bias against strikers could extend as far as jury trials and 
judiciary only hearings. The evidence presented by the police as witnesses 
and by police prosecutors was generally crucial to the conviction of the 
accused. In some cases the validity of such police evidence has been 
extremely questionable. In 1931 coal miners in the Bienfait-Estevan area of 
55 
56 
57 
Lens, The Labor Wars, p.264. 
Jamieson, Times of Trouble: ... Canada, 1900-66, p.227. 
Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.l 03. 
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Saskatchewan province, Canada went on strike. On 29 September 1931 a 
confrontation between police and strikers in the town of Estevan escalated 
into a riot. Trials of strikers for rioting, unlawful assembly, and assaulting and 
wounding police officers followed. Lorne Brown and Caroline Brown argue 
that 'the evidence at the trials added up to a complete mockery of justice.'58 
One exhibit purporting to be weapons carried by the miners consisted of 
pieces of lead and iron pipe, axles, shafts and other automobile parts, and an 
old, broken army rifle. The Regina Leader-Post questioned the authenticity of 
this exhibit: "Judging by the size of some of the weapons, some husky men 
must have been in the crowd to wield them, or to throw them any distance." 
Evidence suggests that the police or their collaborators gathered up the 
"weapons" from an old scrap heap. Defence counsel W. H. Hefferman 
specifically charged Police Chief McCutcheon with having paid some boys to 
go out and collect the material; the chief, of course, denied the charge and 
claimed he had two constables gather it up from the riot scene. 59 
Brown and Brown agree with, and cite, the research of S. D. Hanson. 
'Hanson points especially to the absurdity of including the old army rifle in the 
exhibit: "Is it likely that any miner would have transported an old, broken army 
rifle to Estevan much less have dared to throw such an object at the police? 
Surely any individual with even a minimal degree of common sense would 
realize that his chances of being shot by the nearest police officers were 
exceeding great should he be seen even picking up such a weapon. 5011 
Hanson concludes that the miners threw stones, washers, pieces of metal 
58 
59 
Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, p.74. 
Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, p.74. 
60 S. D. Hanson, 'The Estevan Strike and Riot, 1931', (unpublished MA thesis, 
University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus, 1971), p.139, quoted in Brown and 
Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, p.74. 
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and chunks of wood at the police during the riot, but considers these a far cry 
from the "armaments" exhibited in court.'51 
Certain documents presented by Queensland police and government 
prosecutors in 1891 were of little more reliability than the "weapons" of the 
Estevan rioters. While the shearers' strike was still ongoing fourteen strike 
leaders were placed on trial for conspiracy. To gain convictions the 
prosecutors had to convince the jury that the accused were linked in a series 
of conspiracies to commit illegal acts or illegally prevent others (especially 
strikebreakers) from undertaking their legitimate occupations. A significant 
part of the crucial prosecution evidence of these conspiracies were written 
communications between the accused. For instance, a letter from Prince to 
Fothergill connected the two in conspiracy (at least in the prosecutor's view). 
The letter purporting to connect Stuart and Taylor was more problematic, the 
signature had been torn off, but it was still presented as clear evidence of the 
conspiratorial link between the twO. 52 Police Magistrate Ranking telegraphed 
his concern with a number of other pieces of proposed evidence to the 
Queensland Colonial Secretary before the trial began: 'Re. Fothergill's 
telegrams there may be a difficulty in proving his signature many letters 
purporting to be signed by him are in the handwriting of some person whom 
61 Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, pp.74-75. 
For a recent example of fabrication of evidence and false testimony by police in 
numerous cases in a non-strike situation (Los Angeles in the 1990s) see Cathy Booth, 
'L.A.'s Bandits in Blue', Time, 28 February 2000, p.33, and Adam Cohen, 'Gangsta 
Cops', Time, 06 March 2000, pp.26-30. As of February 2000 the Los Angeles 
authorities had identified forty people who had been wrongly convicted on the basis of 
such evidence (Booth, 'L.A.'s Bandits in Blue', p.33; Cohen, 'Gangsta Cops', p.26). 
62 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.l75. For a full discussion of the conspiracy 
trial and the related charges and evidence see Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.81-
82, 109-110, 125-126, 157-158, 164-181, 186-187 and 267-272. Also see Geoffrey 
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we have been unable to identify.'63 Yet, the problematic telegrams were still 
presented in the trial, and became pivotal in the prosecution's case. Twelve 
of the fourteen accused were subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 
three years' hard labour.64 The use of dubious, or even fabricated, evidence 
by the police needs to be carefully looked for when searching through the 
records of trials held during periods of overt social conflict, including industrial 
confrontations. 
Police prosecutors also sometimes had the opportunity to suppress 
evidence which brought into question their central evidence of the "guilt" of 
the unionist. In Queensland in late April 1891 a striking shearer, James 
Martin, was tried for sedition concerning speeches he had given at two public 
meetings of strikers and their sympathisers. One of the central prosecution 
witnesses in the jury trial was John Blair, a reporter for the Rockhampton 
Morning Bulletin who had been present at and had reported on both 
meetings. 'Blair's competence as a shorthand note-taker could have become 
an important issue if the prosecution had not suppressed other evidence. 
[Police Magistrate] Ranking advised Solicitor-General Thomas Joseph Byrnes 
on 18 April that a witness named Campbell had been supoenaed [sic]. 
Campbell was a reporter for the Western Champion. Ranking advised Byrnes 
that Campbell's evidence did not support Blair's. He recommended that the 
subpoena on Campbell be withdrawn; it was, and the jury remained unaware 
of Campbell and his conflicting evidence. Ranking justified the suppression 
of this evidence on the ground that Blair was a shorthand writer while 
Bolton and Helen Gregory, 'The 1891 Shearers Strike Leaders: Railroaded?', 
Labour History, no. 62, May 1992, pp.l17-122. 
63 quoted in Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.l68. 
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Campbell was not.' Martin was found guilty by the jury, with a strong 
recommendation for mercy, and received two years' hard labour, followed by 
securities of good behaviour for another year. Martin was the only one of the 
four persons accused of sedition during the shearers' strike to be convicted. 65 
If a satisfactory verdict was not given against strikers by a judge or a 
jury the police could choose to re-arrest the accused on new charges. 
Svensen's research has revealed such preparations were made concerning 
the strike leaders on trial for conspiracy in Queensland in 1891. 'The jury re-
entered the court room at 10 a.m ..... [Police Magistrate] Ranking waited 
patiently in the audience, half hoping for an acquittal. He had warrants for the 
arrest of all fourteen prisoners in his pocket, kindly arranged by [Colonial 
Secretary] Tozer. It would be worth an acquittal to see the looks on their 
faces when he clapped the irons on them again.'66 The conviction of twelve 
of the fourteen men alleviated the need to use the warrants, and neither of 
the acquitted were re-arrested.67 Police bias against strikers could permeate 
all stages of the criminal justice process: from arrest, to prosecution, to trial, 
and could even continue after the accused had been acquitted. 
Interactions between police and strikers were not always hostile. The 
British General Strike of 1926 saw a football match played between police 
and strikers at Plymouth. The strikers won 2_1.68 A public billiard match, 
64 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.171 and 180-181. 
65 See Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.l28-129, 157 and 158-163; the quote is 
fromp.163. 
66 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.180. 
67 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.l80-181. 
68 Clive Emsley, 'Police Forces and Public Order in England and France during 
the Interwar Years', in Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (eds), Policing 
Western Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940, (New 
York, Westport, Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1991), p.l70; Keith 
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concerts, a tug-of-war, and athletic matches, each involving both police and 
strikers, were also held.69 At one colliery during the 1972 British Miners' 
Strike the village policeman gave the strikers lifts in his police car to and from 
the picket line.70 The police have deputised strikers or sworn them in as 
special constables, as in 1874 in the Ohio Hocking Valley town of New 
Straitsville, and in 1913 in Akron, Ohio.71 In 1926 the strike committee 
provided all of the special constables recruited at Lincoln during the British 
General Strike. The local Chief Constable also refused the assistance of 
either the military or mounted police. 72 These decisions would have severe 
consequences for the Lincoln police officials involved. 'The alleged lack of 
strong action by the police was to lead, after the strike, to an inquiry by the 
Laybourn, The General Strike Day By Day, (Phoenix Mill, Stroud, Gloucestershire: 
Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1996), p.93. Henry Pelling, A History of British Trade 
Unionism, 5th edition, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, and London: 
Macmillan Press, 1992), p.l77, provides a useful assessment of the broader 
implications of the football match being played: 'Conditions varied locally: at 
Plymouth things were so quiet a football match could be arranged between the strikers 
and police; at Newcastle there was rioting, baton charges by the police, and arrests of 
strike leaders.' 
69 Farman, The General Strike May 1926, p.184. 
70 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes 1883 to 1985, p.94. 
71 Herbert G. Gutman, 'The Worker's Search for Power: Labor in the Gilded 
Age', in H. Wayne Morgan (ed), The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1963), p.58 (concerning New Straitsville); Rosswurm, 'A 
Strike in Rubber City', p.56 (concerning Akron). The Hocking Valley dispute 
involved coal miners. The Akron strike was by rubber workers. 
72 Farman, The General Strike May 1926, p.184; Margaret Morris, The 
General Strike, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), p.55; and 
Morgan, Conflict and Order, pp.122-123. See Burns, The General Strike May 
1926, pp.72, 73 and 74 for further examples of friendly relations between police and 
strikers in 1926. Also see David Englander, 'Police and Public Order in Britain 
1914-1918', in Clive Emsley and Barbara Weinberger (eds), Policing Western 
Europe: Politics, Professionalism, and Public Order, 1850-1940, (New York, 
Westport, Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1991), p.92, for the permanent 
under secretary of the British Home Office's statement in September 1911 that' it may 
sometimes be perfectly legitimate to enroll strikers as Special-Constables', and his 
justification for this belief. 
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inspector of constabulary. The outcome was to be the resignation of the chief 
constable of Lincoln, as well as the chairman of the local watch committee.,73 
In VVest Yorkshire, and at times in Derbyshire, during the 1984-1985 British 
Miners' Strike the police stopped vehicles crossing picket lines 'to give pickets 
the opportunity to speak to the occupants. This extended on occasion to 
pickets being allowed to board buses to address the passengers.'74 Herbert 
Gutman has even found that police officials in the coal mining town of 
Braidwood, Illinois 'enforced the law more rigorously' against outside 
strikebreakers than against the resident striking miners in 1874.75 However, 
such examples of friendly, or even pro-strike, actions by the police are 
relatively rare in comparison to instances of police violence, repression and 
bias against unionists during industrial disputes. 
Further evidence of the potential for police persecution of the lower 
classes during periods of class tension can be found in non-strike related 
contexts: for example, McQuilton's work on the Kelly Outbreak of 1878-1880 
in Australia. During a time of conflict over land ownership and use between 
"squatters" (large landholders) and poor lower class "settlers", individual 
members of the police frequently and intentionally arrested and prosecuted 
the "settler" members of the Kelly Clan (and associated kinship group) on 
false or paltry charges based on rumour and circumstantial evidence. These 
73 Morgan, Conflict and Order, p.123. 
74 Wallington, 'Policing the Miners' Strike', p.153. Wallington, p.153, 
emphasises that 'these practices were generally regarded by both police and pickets as 
contributory factors in lowering tension and reducing the risk of disorder, especially 
when persuasion was successful.' Wallington's analysis, p.153, of why 'this 
constructive arrangement rarely occurred in other areas' during the strike is also 
extremely useful. 
75 Gutman, 'The Worker's Search for Power', p.51. 
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actions continued over a seventeen year period, and constituted police 
persecution.76 
A second, less malicious, use of the criminal law and prosecutions was 
the relatively benevolent type of police "crackdown" (or control response) on 
offending during periods of social tension, such as major strikes, discussed 
above. Examples of such "benevolent" crackdowns are extremely difficult to 
find, since their results are generally so similar to an intentionally repressive 
crackdown. The possibility of such "benevolence" does need to be looked for 
while undertaking research and considered when analysing results. Some of 
the cases and examples described in this chapter could be interpreted as 
examples of a relatively "benevolent" police crackdown, but the repressive 
intention motivating almost all the incidents presented is clear from the 
evidence. 
To determine if the police used the criminal law to persecute or to 
enact a "crackdown" in Wellington during the 1913 strike a series of tests will 
be conducted in Chapter Six on the criminal prosecutions of the period. The 
monthly rate of prosecutions during the strike will be compared to the monthly 
rate before the strike, as will the particular types and proportion of charges 
laid. The international research suggests that if an increase in the number of 
prosecutions was found this was caused by police persecution, a police 
"crackdown", or an increase in offending. To help clarify the cause of any 
increase in prosecutions the number of cases withdrawn before they reached 
trial will be examined as will the types of charges withdrawn. The work of 
McCabe and Wallington, Jamieson, and Svensen indicate that significant 
76 McQuilton, Kelly Outbreak, pp.2-3, 69-73, 82, 92,170-171 and 196-198. 
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increases in withdrawal rates is strong evidence of police persecution of 
strikers. A third test will be an analysis of the pleas of the accused. If an 
increase in the proportion of not guilty pleas is found this supports the 
hypothesis of police persecution rather than a simple increase in offending or 
police vigilance. 
b) The Judicial Use of the Criminal Law 
Instances of individual members of the elite using their judicial powers 
for the benefit of themselves and fellow members of governing groups at the 
expense of the subordinate social groups, are common throughout the social 
history of crime and the criminal law. One gap in this historiography involves 
the judiciary during industrial disputes. Apart from a few instances, which will 
be discussed below, the judiciary's application of the criminal law during 
strikes has not been analysed by international or New Zealand researchers. 
The analysis in the current thesis will help to alleviate this situation, though, 
by necessity, the theory and tests utilised will be drawn from only a small 
number of industrial dispute situations supplemented with evidence from a 
range of non-strike contexts. 
The most useful research on the use of the criminal law by the judiciary 
during industrial disputes can be found within Stuart Svensen's The Shearers' 
War. As part of a general history of the 1891 Queensland shearers' strike 
Svensen has conducted detailed research into the prosecutions and trials 
related to the strike. The evidence he presents raises a number of questions 
about the impartiality of judges and magistrates in times of major industrial 
conflict. 
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The judiciary could collude with the government in "stretching" the 
applicability of the criminal law in ways which were harmful to strikers, as 
occurred in Queensland in 1891. 
[Colonial Secretary] Tozer dug up another law to victimise unionists. Any 
unionists who were in possession of meat for which they could not produce a 
butcher's receipt were to be charged with "having stolen meat in their 
possession for which they could not satisfactorily account" under section 5 of 
the Cattle Stealing Prevention Act. All the charges laid against unionists 
under this Act related to mutton, not beef. Tozer selected the cattle stealing 
Act because under it a magistrate had the power summarily to sentence 
offenders to six months' hard labour. If unionists were charged with sheep 
stealing, they would have to be tried before a judge and jury, a risky 
business. 
Six unionists [were] arrested for stealing sheep at Darr River Downs 
on 14 April.... [Police Magistrate] Ranking and [Police Inspector] Ahern 
attempted to persuade [the local police magistrate] Francis to proceed 
against the men under the cattle stealing Act, but Francis was not convinced 
that sheep and cattle were the same animal. He was enlightened by Tozer, 
who informed him that it was "not wise at present to commit for the felony the 
object being deterrent, a severe penalty under clauses 5 & 9 of Cattle 
Stealing Prevention Act will more readily accomplish the objects". Five of the 
men were fined £50 each plus costs, or six months in default. They took the 
six months.77 
Police Magistrate Francis may have been influenced in his decision to 
eventually acquiesce to the Colonial Secretary's strategy by an incident the 
previous month. Tozer had transferred the Barcaldine police magistrate, 
John Macarthur, to the Queensland judicial equivalent of Siberia for not taking 
a strong enough stance against the union "threat".78 Whether or not collusion 
77 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.137-138. 
78 See Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.92, 114-115 and 145. One of the major 
differences of opinion between Macarthur and Tozer concerned the need to swear in 
special constables in Barcaldine. Macarthur repeatedly reported to Tozer that 'the 
121 
by the judiciary in the "stretching" of the law was entirely voluntary, the 
magistrates who allowed prosecutions and convicted strikers for possessing 
mutton under the cattle stealing Act were obviously not acting in a completely 
impartial manner. 
The judiciary could sometimes remand strike leaders in gaol or police 
custody, rather than release the accused, when the prosecution presented 
insufficient evidence to allow them to be committed for a jury trial. Five of the 
fourteen Queensland unionists who would stand trial for conspiracy in the 
Rockhampton Supreme Court made their first appearance on these charges 
in the Clermont police court, and experienced this form of questionable 
judicial decision making. 
[Senior Sergeant] Dillon was cross-examined by the defendants. He admitted 
that he had not seen any of them partake in the [Clermont] "riot". He had 
never, he admitted, seen Stuart take part in any disturbance. Some letters 
were read to the court. There was one from Glassey to Taylor in which he 
advised that only constitutional measures should be used. There was one 
from Stuart to Taylor which advised of certain blackleg movements, and 
asked Taylor to "interview if possible" [i.e. talk to the strikebreakers]. The 
other letters were equally innocuous. [Police Magistrate] Morey was in a fix. 
There was not sufficient evidence to commit the men, but he knew he would 
unionists were orderly and that the nine policemen in town were sufficient to control 
the situation.' The eligible residents of the town were also reluctant to be sworn in as 
special constables, and Macarthur indicated to Tozer that 'if he needed any additional 
manpower, he would swear in some of the unionists as specials.' (Svensen, The 
Shearers' War, p.114). Strikebreakers were sworn in as special constables during 
the dispute. (Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.92). In May 1891 Tozer would send a 
telegram to Police Inspector Urquhart stating 'that he had already removed two police 
magistrates who had shown "maudlin sympathies with the strike, a kind of 
sentimental socialism",' (Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.l4S), 
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not be too popular with Tozer if he let them go. He decided to send them to 
Barcaldine and let [Police Magistrate] Morris worry about them. 79 
Two weeks later these strike leaders were committed by the Barcaldine police 
magistrate to the Supreme Court for a jury trial, and four of the five were 
subsequently convicted and sentenced to three years hard labour. so 
The refusal to allow bail for defendants awaiting a trial was another 
way in which the judiciary could aid the defeat of strikes. The longer 
unionists, especially the most important strike leaders, were kept in police 
cells or gaols the less influence they could have on maintaining and 
strengthening the strikers' resolve to continue the industrial action. Not all 
instances of the refusal of bail were necessarily motivated by animosity to 
unionists. Genuine judicial concern that the individual would commit more 
crimes or create more disorder if released was likely to be the primary 
consideration in many such decisions. However, cases where the refusal of 
bail was clearly questionable have been found by historians. In Queensland 
in 1891 Police Magistrate Ranking committed seven unionists accused of 
rioting at Clermont to trial. 'Bail was refused in accordance with a directive 
from Tozer that bail should not be granted to any unionist.,s1 The unions 
appealed the bail decision, calling upon the Crown to show cause why bail 
79 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.165-166, the quote is from p.166. 
Concerning Tozer's attitude to magistrates who appeared to be sympathetic to the 
strikers see p.120 in the current chapter and footnote 78. 
80 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.167 and 180-181. Svensen does not 
describe the prosecution evidence presented at the Barcaldine committal hearing, nor 
does he state if any new evidence was presented. 
81 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.101-103; the quote is from pp.l02-103; and 
see Kerr, Freedom of Contract, p.23. For accounts of the Clermont "riot" see 
Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.98-100, and Kerr, Freedom of Contract, pp.22-
23. Also see Bolton and Gregory, 'The 1891 Shearers Strike Leaders: Railroaded?', 
p.118. 
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should not be granted to the prisoners. The matter was heard by Queensland 
Chief Justice Charles Lilley. 
The chief justice said there was no evidence that the men were likely to lail to 
appear if they were granted bail. The police, he said, seemed to have lost 
their heads over the condition of things in the central districts [of 
Queensland]. There was no point, he continued, in refusing what in the 
normal course of the law was almost a man's right. He granted bail to each 
prisoner to the sum of £80, with two sureties of £40 each. The men were not 
released. Tozer had already decided to have them rearrested on other 
charges in the event of bail being granted. News of this had leaked to the 
press, and the plan was published in the papers the same day that Griffith 
[the Queensland premier and attomey-general1 telegraphed his approval. 
The men decided not to waste their money, and remained in custody.82 
At their jury trial nearly a month after the original bail ruling had been 
overturned all seven men were found not guilty of rioting. 83 
During the same Queensland strike none of the fourteen strike leaders 
committed to trial for conspiracy were allowed bail. 84 This lack of bail 
appears even more suspicious if the report is true that upon hearing of Bill 
Hamilton's arrest for conspiracy the local military commander, Major Jackson, 
went to the Clermont court house and offered to put up a cash bond of 
£2,000 for Hamilton's release on bail. The reported rationale for Jackson's 
offer was that 'he believed Hamilton was a steadying influence on the 
82 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.l 03. 
83 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.l03-104; and Kerr, Freedom of Contract, 
p.23. Only three of the seven unionists were actually freed after the jury's verdict. 
The others remained in custody to face additional strike-related charges. Three of 
these four men were subsequently convicted and imprisoned. The fourth, William 
McCarthy, was eventually discharged after spending nearly three months in custody. 
(Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.104). 
84 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.164. 
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unionists. ,85 Could the magistrates have been more interested in weakening 
the leadership of the strike, than allowing a 'steadying influence' to return to 
the strikers' camps? 
Bill Kewley, another Queensland strike and union leader who had 
strong support from "respectable" citizens experienced similar difficulties in 
1891 in obtaining bail. Kewley was arrested and charged with perjury 
concerning evidence he gave in the court trial of a striker convicted of 
'molesting hired servants'. He was also accused of being an accessory in the 
burning of the Lorne woolshed. On each charge the evidence was rather 
insubstantial. 'He was held in the lock-up for several months before the 
charges were eventually dropped, even though almost every businessman in 
Blackall offered to put up securities for his release on bail. ,86 These three 
examples illustrate the value in carefully examining the bail aspects of 
industrial dispute criminal prosecutions, and raise questions as to the actual 
motivation of some of the judiciary in refusing certain bail applications. 
Preventing further offending may have been one consideration, but the 
relative influence of any hostility to the strike in progress also needs to be 
considered, and looked for, by researchers. 
The judiciary could display bias during industrial disputes in their 
verdicts or sentences concerning prosecutions against employers, 
management or their strike allies. Since the number of such cases which 
reached the courtroom is very small, both absolutely and in comparison to 
prosecutions against unionists, it would not be surprising if instances of pro-
employer judicial bias were difficult to find. A few examples which have been 
85 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.164-165. 
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uncovered by historians indicate the possibilities for favouritism. At 
Silksworth, England in 1891 violence ensued when attempts were made to 
evict strikers from company housing. Prosecutions followed, as did claims 
'that partiality on the part of local magistrates led to the dismissal of assault 
charges against the two superintendents' concerning the disturbance.8? In 
Queensland in 1891 John Burn, manager of the Retro sheep station and 
justice of the peace, pleaded guilty to a charge of assaulting a unionist at an 
otherwise peaceful demonstration by strikers against the arrival of troops in 
the strike area. Police Magistrate Morey fined Burn £5 stating that this 'was 
the heaviest penalty under the Act,.88 Five pounds was a significant fine and 
one which most unionists would have had difficulty paying by themselves. 
The sentencing would appear be an example of exemplary judicial fairness. 
The potential existence of a judicial double-standard is, however, suggested 
by Morey's actions a few months later. Once again strikers and employers 
were in Morey's court in connection with allegations of assault. This time the 
accused were two unionists and the victims were pastoralists (the owners of 
sheep stations). Each of the accused were convicted and sentenced to one 
month's hard labour. Svensen commented: 'Morey had evidently found a 
different Act from that which he used to fine John Burn the maximum penalty 
of £5.'89 A variety of explanations are possible of the events in Silksworth 
and Queensland, but given the available evidence the "conspiracy" or bias 
interpretation is at least as plausible as a conclusion of no bias. At the least 
86 
87 
Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.143-145; the quote is from pp.l44-145. 
Emsley, The English Police, 2nd edition, p.l15. 
88 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.94 and 102; the quote is from p.102. It 
should also be noted that the assault prosecution was not brought by the police, but by 
the victim, Dan Murphy. (Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.102). 
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these examples indicate potential ways in which judicial favouritism could 
influence court cases. 
Questionable court procedures allowed by judges and magistrates 
during hearings or trials could also reduce the chances that the unionist 
defendant would be found not guilty. Queensland striker Timothy Reardon 
was arrested and tried in 1891 on an intimidation related charge, but there 
was a major omission in his first summary hearing and conviction. 
[Police Magistrate] Morey gave Reardon three months' hard labour. The 
prisoner pointed out that he had not been given the opportunity of saying 
anything in his own defence, and he denied making the statement attributed 
to him. Morey was obliged to cancel the sentence. Reardon was again 
locked up on remand and was eventually sentenced to a month. 90 
Jury selection was another important court procedure which judges were 
supposed to oversee to ensure a fair trial. Problems were again possible, as 
in the trial for seditious conspiracy of seven strike leaders following the defeat 
of the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike. 'The jurymen all came from rural 
Manitoba, where considerable anti-Labour hysteria had been whipped up, 
and there was some evidence of undue Crown influence in choosing the jury.' 
Six of the seven accused were convicted and sentenced to terms ranging 
from six months to one year. 91 
89 
90 
Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.104; also see pp.98-103. 
Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.104. 
91 Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, p.44. For a 
detailed and useful discussion of the arrests, the charges and the two jury trials see D. 
G. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1950), pp.67, 102-107, 111, 113-124 and 127. In all, eight of the strike's leaders 
were tried for seditious conspiracy, seven of whom were convicted. R. B. Russell was 
tried and convicted to two years' imprisonment at a separate and earlier jury trial to 
the other seven accused. The appeal against Russell's conviction had already been 
dismissed by the Manitoba Court of Appeal before the second jury trial commenced. 
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Judges could also influence a jury through their summing up (also 
known as charges to the jury) before the jurors retired to deliberate their 
verdict. Brown and Brown, citing Hanson's thesis, state that in two of the 
trials resulting from the Estevan strike "riot" of 1931 'the presiding judges 
showed obvious bias in their charges to the jurors. ,92 A similar statement 
could be made from evidence Svensen presents on the conspiracy trial during 
the Queensland "Shearers War", though Svensen prefers to allow the content 
of Judge Harding's summary to speak for itself.93 A later jury trial of strikers 
over which Harding presided earns the distinction of involving, in Svensen's 
view, 'one of the most bitterly hostile summings up heard in a British court,.94 
Once a striker or sympathiser with the strike had been found guilty 
biased judges and magistrates had the power to impose excessively harsh 
sentences. The textile strike in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912 provides a 
clear example of such prejudice. 'In an outbreak of judicial fury one local 
judge sentenced 34 strikers to a jail sentence of one year or more each, after 
brief five- or ten-minute trials. Their sentences were later changed to small 
fines by the State Superior Court, but in the meantime the union had to raise 
(See Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, pp.116 and 120). Concerning the 
controversy over the selection and composition of the jury for the second trial see 
Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike, pp.120-121. 
92 Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the RCMP, p.75, citing 
Hanson, 'The Estevan Strike and Riot, 1931', p.160. 
93 See Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.176-180. Also see pp.163 and 193. 
For a contrasting interpretation of Judge Harding's role in the conviction of twelve of 
those accused of conspiracy see Bolton and Gregory, 'The 1891 Shearers Strike 
Leaders: Railroaded?', pp.117-122. 
94 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.193. Svensen does not go into any more 
detail as to the content of the summing up. Another example of a judicial summing 
up hostile to the accused striker can be found associated with the Winnipeg General 
Strike of 1919. Fred 1. Dixon was charged with seditious libel in relation to a number 
of his speeches and two editorials during the strike. The jury received' a very hostile 
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$27,200 bail to win their release pending appeal,,95 During the weekend of 8 
and 9 May 1926 disturbances associated with the British General Strike 
resulted in hundreds of arrests. The severity of sentences arising from these 
incidents, especially for minor offences such as 'insulting men on their way to 
work', suggests judicial harshness, if not actual bias, against those associated 
with the strike. 
Hundreds of men and women received severe sentences when they came 
before the magistrates on Monday or Tuesday of the following week. Two 
hundred people were arrested in Glasgow, and about half of them received 
sentences of three months' imprisonment. In Hull, twenty-five of those 
arrested received sentences varying from three to nine months. In London 
the sentences varied from one to three months, for such offences as 
interfering with the traffic and insulting men on their way to work. Elsewhere, 
the arrests were fewer in number, but sentences were equally severe. 96 
Specific cases provide further evidence of the harshness of some sentences 
associated with the 1926 General Strike. Ten lads at Bolton received up to 
three months' imprisonment for drawing the draw-pin of a coal cart. 97 At 
Farnworth a man was sent to gaol for a month for tearing down a Government 
summing up from the bench', but still acquitted Dixon. (Masters, The Winnipeg 
General Strike, p.125). 
95 Lens, The Labor Wars, p.176. Lens notes that during the entire dispute only 
54 strikers were given sentences of imprisonment, while 220 were fined (p.176). 
96 Julian Symons, The General Strike: A Historical Portrait, (London: 
Cresset Press, 1957), pp.194-195; the quote is from p.195. For accounts of the 
weekend disturbances see Farman, The General Strike, pp.192-193; Laybourn, The 
General Strike, pp.92 and 98; and Renshaw, The General Strike, pp.18-19. For 
additional, though brief, discussions of the sentences given in Glasgow see Bhaumik, 
'The Strike in the Regions: Glasgow', pA07; and Paul Carter, 'The West of Scotland', 
in Jeffrey Skelley (ed), The General Strike 1926, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1976), pp.116 and 133. 
97 Burns, The General Stril{e May 1926, p.73. 
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poster.98 A Communist found chalking "seditious" slogans on a pavement at 
Castleford was gaoled for two months with hard labour and fined £200.99 At 
Penrith the local secretary of the National Union of General Workers went to 
prison for three months with hard labour for issuing a leaflet urging workers 
not to become special constables. 10o 
An excessive sentence was also imposed on at least one striking miner 
in Britain in 1984-1985. The man 'painted "SCAB" on the wall of a working 
miner's house [which was owned by the Coal Board] and blacked out the 
windows. The offence took place at night, a fact the magistrate noted as 
particularly heinous. Explicitly for purposes of deterrence, a sentence of two 
months' imprisonment was given. The sentence itself was heavy enough for 
a man whose only contact with the law had been as a juvenile when he was 
fined £20 for assault,.101 Waddington notes, in connection with the same 
strike, that the 'hard-line approach [of the police] to picket-line misconduct 
was sanctioned by severe court sentencing of offenders.'102 Unfortunately, 
Waddington does not present any sentencing examples or provide references 
to trace these sentences. 
Further instances of judicial hostility to strikers are visible through 
sentences in which the judge displayed a lack of leniency compared to non-
strike periods or compared to other judges during the same industrial dispute. 
In Queensland in 1891 two strikers were sentenced to seven years' 
98 Burns, The General Strike May 1926, p. 73; and Farman, The General 
Strike May 1926, p.199. Farman describes the convicted as a striker; Burns describes 
the convicted as a man. 
99 Farman, The General Strike May 1926, p.199. 
100 Farman, The General Strike May 1926, p.199. 
101 McCabe and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and Civil Liberties, 
p.1 01. 
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imprisonment for setting fire to grass. Svensen concludes that the grass 
firing was probably no more than a prank, and very little, if any, damage was 
caused. 'It would seem from the evidence that the unionists knew that they 
were being watched by the police, and for a joke the two men sprinkled some 
kerosine on the wet grass and ignited it. .103 It is hard to imagine such severe 
sentences being given for a relatively minor incident in Queensland in the 
1890s if it had not taken place during the "shearers' war". 
Also in Queensland in 1891 a confrontation at Peak Downs between 
strikers, strikebreakers, police and troops resulted in two related trials. 
Charges of 'molesting hired servants' (that is, intimidation of strikebreakers) 
were heard by Police Magistrate Morey at Clermont, and nine of the thirteen 
accused strikers were convicted. Morey was lenient in his sentencing of four 
of those convicted because of their youth. Three of the four youths were 
'found guilty but discharged because of their age', and the fourth was 
sentenced to a month, reduced to an hour. Two of the older unionists were 
imprisoned for three months each, two more for one month each, and the fifth 
was found guilty but was discharged. 104 Nine unionists, including the four 
youths, were committed to Rockhampton for trial on charges of unlawful 
assembly and rioting also relating to the incident at Peak Downs. Two of the 
102 Waddington, Contemporary Issues in Public Disorder, p.l 04. 
103 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.141. Also see pp.132-133 for the lighter 
sentences handed down earlier in the strike to fourteen unionists for more serious 
instances of firing grass. 'Three of the men were sentenced to three months and 
another eleven were fined or given shorter prison sentences.' (p.133). Svensen does 
not discuss the possibility that these were cases of relative judicial leniency towards 
strikers. His explanation is that 'fortunately for the men, the magistrate at Mitchell 
had evidently not read Tozer's "Notes for Peace Officers", which stated that setting 
fire to grass was a felony worth a minimum of three years' hard labour and a possible 
whipping.' (p.133). 
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youths, David Bowes and John Heathcote, were convicted by the jury, along 
with four of the older unionists. Judge Harding 'did not show the same 
consideration for the tender age of some of the prisoners as had Morey. 
Heathcote was given three years' hard labour, Bowes one and a half.' The 
older unionists each received sentences of between two and three years. i05 
Similar inconsistencies in sentencing are apparent in association with 
the 1984-1985 British Miners' Strike. Another miner, in the same area as the 
man who was imprisoned for two months for painting 'SCAB' and blackening 
out windows, was charged with the grievous bodily harm of a lorry driver at an 
open-cast mine. He received a suspended sentence of nine months and a 
fine of £200. McCabe and Wallington comment: 'From these two cases it 
would seem that damage to the Coal Board's property was thought to be 
more worthy of immediate imprisonment than a serious physical assault upon 
a lorry driver who was helping to execute Coal Board policy.'106 Such 
intriguing judicial sentencing decisions offer insights into the application of the 
"impartial" criminal law during strikes. They also suggest motivations for 
these actions which may not otherwise have been discernible or considered. 
Examples of judicial leniency, or even sympathy, towards strikers can 
also be found in the histories of industrial disputes. A strike of ribbon-
weavers occurred in the textile mills of Paterson, New Jersey in 1877. 
Herbert Gutman argues that 'the local courts displayed their independence of 
104 Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.llO. For details of the "riot" at Peak Downs 
and the preceding events see Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.l06-107. 
105 Svensen, The Shearers' War, pp.llO-lll; the quote is from p.lll. 
Svensen, pp.11 0-111, also notes the interesting definitions of rioting and unlawful 
assembly which Judge Harding presented in his summing up to the jury. 
106 McCabe and Wallington, The Police, Public Order, and Civil Liberties, 
pp.l01-102. 
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the manufacturers and on several occasions weavers charged with disorderly 
conduct went free or suffered, at best, nominal fines. After manufacturer 
William Strange successfully prosecuted two weavers for violating written 
contracts, pressure from city officials, including the mayor, convinced a local 
judge to postpone indefinitely forty additional trials. ,107 During another textile 
strike in Paterson in 1878-1879 Joseph McDonnell, the editor of the Paterson 
Labor Standard, a socialist newspaper supportive of the strike, was convicted 
of libel. McDonnell was fined $500, substantially less than the maximum 
$2,000 fine and two years' imprisonment. 'A second judge, in the case, 
himself originally a Lancashire worker and then the owner of a small bobbin 
pin factory, [had] convinced the presiding judge to go easy on McDonnell.,108 
Gutman's work demonstrates that judicial leniency concerning strikers was 
possible and needs to be looked for. However, the relatively small number of 
studies so far conducted on criminal prosecutions, the judiciary and industrial 
disputes, indicate that judicial hostility against strikers was more frequent than 
judicial sympathy. 
Rigorous enforcement of the criminal law against strikebreakers and 
other allies of the employers is another indication of a judiciary which is not 
prejudiced against strikers. In Braidwood, Illinois in 1874 'two new workers 
[strikebreakers] who got into a fight one Sunday were arrested for violating 
the Sabbath law and fined $50 and court costs. Unable to pay the fine, they 
were put to work on the town streets. One of them, jailed for hitting an elderly 
107 Herbert G. Gutman, 'Class, Status, and Community Power in Nineteenth-
Century American Industrial Cities - Paterson, New Jersey: A Case Study', in 
Frederic Cople Jaher (ed), The Age of Industrialism in America: Essays in Social 
Structure and Cultural Values, (New York: Free Press, 1968), p.270. 
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woman with a club, was fined $100 and court costS.'109 These were 
extremely large fines for those on a worker's income. The rate for digging 
coal in Braidwood was $ '1.25 a ton, before the wage cut to $1.'10 a ton which 
initiated the 1874 lockout. 110 During the iron manufacturing workers' lockout 
of 1874 a justice of the peace in Covington, Kentucky displayed in his 
sentences both leniency to strikers and firmness towards those the employers 
brought into the town to replace the "troublesome" local workers. 
Three strikers were arrested for molesting new hands, but he [the justice of 
the peace] freed one of them and fined the other men a dollar each and court 
costs. A new worker, however, was fined twenty dollars for disorderly 
conduct and for carrying a deadly weapon. He also had to post a $500 bond 
as a guarantee that he would keep the peace. 111 
These examples can also be interpreted, as Gutman has, as acts of judicial 
hostility against the employers involved with the dispute and their allies. The 
lack of any favouritism towards those aiding the employers is clear. Once 
again, though, such events are rare in the international history of industrial 
disputes. 
Research on the judiciary and their use of the criminal law in non-strike 
situations confirms the potential for the repressive actions suggested by the 
work on the judiciary and strikes. Douglas Hay characterised English law in 
the eighteenth century as a means through which the English elite reinforced 
their property ownership rights to the detriment of, and to control, the lower 
108 Gutman, 'Class, Status, and Community Power', pp.273 and 274-275; the 
quote is from p.275. 
109 Gutman, 'The Worker's Search for Power', p.51. 
110 Gutman, 'The Worker's Search for Power', p.49. 
III Gutman, 'The Worker's Search for Power', p.55. 
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classes. 112 Ted Robert Gurr concluded that 'the courts gave harsher 
sentences to convicts and ticket-of-leave holders in early nineteenth-century 
New South Wales, and to Indians in Calcutta during colonial rule, than to 
other defendants . .113 Further evidence of partiality can be found in Victoria, 
Australia in the nineteenth century. The judicially empowered "squatters" 
(large landholders) sometimes used their judicial powers to persecute 
"undesirable" families and settlers in their regions (such as the Kelly Clan) 
with the intention of forcing the lower class "undesirables" to move 
elsewhere. 114 
Everyday employer-employee relationships could also be influenced by 
a biased judiciary, as in Grimsby, England from 1880 to 1902. Grimsby was 
one of the main centres of British deep-sea fishing, along with Hull and 
Yarmouth. Between 1854 and 1880 seamen and apprentices were liable to 
summary imprisonment not exceeding twelve weeks for desertion, and ten 
weeks for being absent without leave or refusing to join ship. The arduous 
nature of deep-sea fishing in the North Sea resulted in hundreds of 
convictions for such offences each year. 115 Employers faced a potentially 
112 Hay, 'Criminal Law', pp.25-26, 36, 44 and 50; Hay, 'Poaching', pp.191-192, 
212,219,240-242,244 and 248-251. 
113 Gurr, 'The Comparative Analysis of Public Order', p.728. 
114 McQuilton, Kelly Outbreak, pp.52-53, 61-62, 70-73, 82 and 146; and 
O'Malley, 'Bushranging', p.276. Also see McQuilton pp.35 and 52 regarding the 
beneficial treatment of other members of the squatter class by the squatter judiciary 
concerning cases of the misappropriation of land, once again with the lower class 
settlers as the victims of judicial bias. 
115 John Rule, 'The Smacksmen of the North Sea: Labour Recruitment and 
Exploitation in British Deep-Sea Fishing, 1850-90', International Review of Social 
History, vol. 21, part 3, 1976, pp.401-402. For further discussion of desertion and 
absconding by apprentices at Grimsby and their imprisonment see Pamela Horn, 
'Pauper Apprenticeship and the Grimsby Fishing Industry, 1870 to 1914', Labour 
History Review, vol. 61, no. 2, Summer 1996, pp.176-178, 179, 184-186, 187, 190 
and 191. 
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costly problem with the passage of the 1880 Payment of Wages Act which 
'removed the right of summary imprisonment. Hands who failed to join ship 
could still be proceeded against in the civil courts after issue of a warrant, but 
since apprentices had no wages or property, civil remedy against them was 
futile. Further the new act enabled lads to free themselves from the charge of 
desertion by giving forty-eight-hours notice of their intention not to sail'.116 To 
maintain the apprenticeship system and the resulting supply of cheap and 
indentured labour in the 1880s and 1890s the 'Grimsby local justices were 
interpreting the law in a different way, one which clearly favoured the owners.' 
At the other ports [including Hull and Yarmouth] the owners decided that 
without the sanction of imprisonment apprenticeship was a redundant 
institution. At Grimsby it was decided that if an apprentice gave forty-eight-
hours notice of his intention not to join ship, this could be regarded as a 
breach of his indentures under an unrepealed section of the 1854 act. The 
lad could, they held, be proceeded against for disobedience of a lawful order. 
At the other ports this was taken to mean disobedience at sea. At Grimsby 
the courts stretched it to cover disobedience of the order to join ship. 
Accordingly, when imprisonment of apprentices virtually ceased elsewhere, 
Grimsby continued to use imprisonment to preserve its "peculiar institution". 
At Hull the total number of imprisonments for desertion from 1883 to 1893 
was 172; at Grimsby it was 1,304. After 1893 there were no further 
imprisonments at Hull; at Grimsby there were a further 385 before they finally 
ended in 1902.117 
Judicial bias could be utilised during periods of perceived social 
change and heightened class tension in a ruling class attempt to maintain the 
current power structure. Powerful examples of judicial bias in such contexts 
can be found in the history of Barbados between the 1870s and the 1900s. 
116 
117 
Rule, 'The Smacksmen ofthe North Sea', p.403. 
Rule, 'The Smacksmen of the North Sea', p.404. 
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In 1877 a field labourer received 12 months' imprisonment with hard labour 
for 'conspiring' to raise the wages of a cane-cutting contract. In 1909 an 
estate manager arbitrarily stopped wages for alleged worker indiscretions. 
When his employees disputed the decision with his bookkeeper, they were 
convicted on assault charges. Both examples are drawn from an era when 
there was fear of "alarming change" among the ruling class of Barbados 
sOciety.118 
Harring argued that the same motivation was the cause of the 
repressive use of the criminal law against unemployed protesters in Buffalo 
during the heightened class tensions of the 1890s depression. In August 
1894 "Count" Rybakowski's "industrial army" of 175 unemployed men arrived 
on the outskirts of Buffalo. The "army" was bound for Washington, D.C. to 
'demand federally financed public works programs and work for everyone,.119 
Buffalo's large Polish working class community welcomed the "army" and 
Rybakowski decided to stay a little longer in the Buffalo area. Police officials, 
city officials and businessmen did not appreciate the presence of the socialist 
Rybakowski in their city or the highly visible symbols of working class protest 
which were his "army" and march across the United States. The high level of 
working class militancy before the Count's arrival was enough' of a problem 
for the authorities without the Count and his army inspiring greater protest. A 
joint decision was made by police officials, city officials and businessmen to 
118 Brian Stoddart, 'Cricket and Colonialism in the English-Speaking Caribbean 
to 1914: Towards a Cultural Analysis', in Hilary McD. Beckles and Brian Stoddart 
(eds), Liberation Cricket: West Indies Cricket Culture, (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.13. 
119 Harring, 'Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps in Buffalo, 1892-
1894', pp.894 and 898; the quote is from p.894. 
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remove the potential "threat".12o After an eviction notice was ignored by the 
"army" on 24 August, ninety of its members were tried on charges of being 
tramps later the same day. About seventy of the accused were convicted and 
sentenced to imprisonment as tramps that afternoon, with eight additional 
men imprisoned the next morning. A few days later the eleven leaders (who 
had been remanded to prison at the 24 August trial) were also convicted and 
imprisoned as tramps after the district attorney decided not to proceed with 
assault charges carrying a longer term of imprisonment. 121 The abuse of the 
criminal law by the convicting judges is readily apparent in the sentencing of 
those convicted, as well as in the imprisonment for being tramps of a number 
of Buffalo residents who legally could not be defined as tramps. 
The sentences ... ranged from six months (the maximum under the Tramp 
Act) to discharge. As the [Buffalo] Express reported: "It was a puzzle to 
discover the basis for discrimination in sentencing." The key variables 
appeared to be (1) whether or not the accused had a family; (2) length of 
"tramphood"; and (3) degree of dirtiness or raggedness. But these 
guidelines were followed erratically. About ten were discharged without 
punishment; most of these were from Buffalo and had just joined the Army, 
120 Harring, 
905-906. 
'Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps', pp.895-900 and 
121 Harring, 'Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps', pp.900-905. 
Preceding the mass trial the police and special deputies conducted a club-swinging 
charge outside the court to ensure the suddenly reluctant army (which had voluntarily 
marched for an hour under police escort to reach the court) would enter. No one was 
convicted of any violent offence concerning this incident; the only convictions were 
for being a tramp. (The sequence of events is a little complicated, but it appears the 
Count calmed a tense standoff between his men and the police at the army's camp by 
agreeing to be tried as a tramp. His men showed their support for him by 
accompanying him to the court, though it is unclear whether or not they realised they 
were to be tried as well. Along the way to the court the army learnt that the evening 
newspapers were already reporting them to have been convicted and imprisoned. The 
army grew nervous and at the end of the march refused to enter the court. An 
apparently peaceful standoff ensued until the police charged. After the nine "tramps" 
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though a few were family men from Cleveland and Detroit. Other Buffalo 
residents were given jail terms, sentences which were illegal because the 
Tramp Act only applied to people outside their county of residence. The 
lengths of the sentences were deliberately staggered so that men would be 
released and thrown out of town at different times to prevent regrouping. 
Much of the difference in sentence lengths was purely arbitrary.122 
Two additional aspects of the mass trial of Rybakowski's "industrial army" 
provide further evidence that Judge Foster's priority on 24 August 1894 was 
neither judicial impartiality nor fair hearings. A pile of commitment forms to 
Erie County Penitentiary had been completed before the mass trial, and 
seventy men were tried (and fifty-nine sentenced) by a single judge in less 
than two hours.123 
The potential for, and wide range of, biased actions by those 
empowered to try, convict and sentence under the criminal law is clear from 
the examples and evidence presented in this chapter. The extent, if any, to 
which a judicial crackdown was enacted in Wellington during the heightened 
social tensions of 1913 shall be determined using an analysis of first, 
conviction rates, secondly, any evidence of questionable trial procedures 
allowed by judges, thirdly, the severity of sentences, and fourthly, bail 
applications allowed and refused. 
seriously wounded in the charge were taken to hospital the trials commenced. See 
Harring, pp.900-903 for a detailed discussion of these events.) 
122 Harring, 'Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps', p.903. Also see 
pp.904, 905 and 907. Harring on p.909 reproduces the New York Tramp Act of 1885; 
see paragraph 6 for the exclusion of local residents from prosecution as tramps. 
123 Harring, 'Class Conflict and the Suppression of Tramps', pp.901 and 903. 
Harring, p.904, notes that 'by the time the judge had finished with the first 70 tramps, 
the police brought in 20 more picked up in a massive search of the area. They were 
also sentenced on the spot.' This, along with the 'about ten' men convicted but not 
imprisoned (quoted above), explains any apparent contradiction in the number of 
convictions on 24 August given above. 
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c) The Government and the Criminal Law during Industrial Disputes 
The government, as well as the police and the judiciary, could utilise 
the criminal law to aid the defeat of workers during industrial disputes. Most 
government intervention which directly made use of the criminal law was 
carried out by the police or, less frequently, by the military. The 
implementation by the police of one example of such intervention, 
government directives to arrest and prosecute strike leaders, has been 
discussed above. The government could also designate normally legal 
activities as illegal for the duration of the dispute or modify the criminal law to 
make repression easier. 
Marches and demonstrations could be banned as during the Winnipeg 
General Strike of 1919, in Estevan, Canada in 1931, and in Akron, Ohio in 
1913.124 The bans could apply to all mass public gatherings, to only those by 
certain groups, or to particular planned protests which the authorities knew 
about in advance. Any individuals who defied these government decrees 
became liable for arrest on such criminal charges as unlawful assembly. 
These bans, by inhibiting peaceful protest, often contributed to or hastened 
the defeat of strikes. For example, Rosswurm argued the riot decree 
prohibiting parades, picketing and demonstrations issued by Akron's mayor in 
1913 was one of "the repressive tactics of city officials" which aided the 
rubber employers' victory.125 Harring elaborated on the impact of the ban in 
124 Winnipeg and Estevan: Brown and Brown, An Unauthorized History of the 
RCMP, pp.42 and 70 respectively; Akron: Rosswurm, 'A Strike in the Rubber City', 
pp.81-82 and 85-87; and Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.130. In each of these 
examples the ban came from the level of local government: in Winnipeg and Akron 
from the mayor; in Estevan from the town council. 
125 Rosswurm,' A Strike in the Rubber City', pp.85-87; the quote is from p.86. 
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Akron: 'With use of the streets curtailed, it was impossible to rally strikers' 
spirits or to persuade nonstriking workers peacefully to stay out. Left to their 
own devices, the strikers drifted back to work.'126 
The government could also devolve authority to ban meetings to senior 
police officers, as during the British Miners' Strike of 1926. The Home 
Secretary, 'Joynson-Hicks, by an order of 19 October, empowered police 
chiefs to prohibit meetings without reference to him if they believed they might 
lead to a breach of the peace' .127 The chief constable of Staffordshire used 
his new power to ban a mass meeting due to be addressed by the Secretary 
of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain [MFGB]. The local miners' officials 
'were threatened with arrest if they attempted to hold the meeting anywhere in 
Staffordshire.'128 Morgan's summary of the impact of the Home Secretary's 
decision provides useful insights into the motivation for and the repressive 
potential of such actions: 'In all, sixty-three meetings were prohibited in 
England and Wales in the period between the making of the order and 14 
November. The issue of the police ban on meetings was raised by Labour 
members in the House of Commons. The outcry against the Home 
Secretary's order finally led to its being revoked on 26 November, but by that 
time the effect had been achieved and the miners were back at work, crushed 
and embittered.'129 
The modification of the criminal law during an industrial dispute had the 
potential to significantly influence the outcome of that dispute. In response to 
126 
127 
128 
129 
Harring, Policing a Class Society, p.131. 
Morgan, Conflict and Order, p.207. 
Morgan, Conflict and Order, p.208. 
Morgan, Conflict and Order, p.208. 
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the 1894 shearers' strike Queensland Colonial Secretary Tozer introduced 
the draconian Peace Preservation Bill. 
This measure applied only to certain districts, meaning that citizens of one 
part of the colony lived under entirely different laws from those that applied in 
the other part. A person living in the designated district could be detained for 
up to thirty days without trial, and no longer had the right to refuse to answer 
a question on the grounds that it might incriminate them. Trial by jury was 
abolished. Eight of the seventeen Labour Members of Parliament, including 
Glassey, were suspended and ejected from the House during the debate on 
the bill. Fortunately, the strike was over before these measures came into 
effect. 130 
The negative impact of Tozer's Bill on the strike and on the civil liberties of the 
strikers if the dispute had lasted longer can be easily imagined. 
Legislators in New South Wales reacted in a similar manner to the 
timber workers' strike of 1929. Sections of the criminal law were rewritten to 
improve the success rate of prosecutions against troublesome strike leaders. 
130 
The Intimidation and Molestation Act [of 1929] as finally passed ... contained 
modifications of criminal procedure. In July 1929 seven union leaders were 
arrested in Sydney on charges of conspiracy to unlawfully molest, intimidate, 
and assault non unionists. The offenses in question were subject to trial 
before a jury, and for want of sufficient evidence the prosecution was unable 
to obtain a conviction. To assure future convictions on similar charges, the 
government had the act provide for the relevant offenses to be tried 
summarily rather than before a jury.131 
Svensen, The Shearers' War, p.207. 
131 Grabosky, 'Sydney: The Politics of Crime and Conflict, 1788 to the 1970s', 
p.397, and see pp.395-397 for the broader context of the legislation. For a detailed 
analysis of the timber strike see Miriam Dixson, 'The Timber Strike of 1929', 
Historical Studies Australia and New Zealand, vol. 10, no. 40, May 1963, pp.479-
492. Dixson briefly discusses the arrests, trial and acquittals on pA87. 
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The hypotheses discussed and developed within this chapter and in 
Chapter Three indicate the wide range of ways in which crime and the 
criminal law could be used for the purposes of protest, conflict, repression 
and attempts to maintain civil order during industrial disputes. The extent to 
which these hypotheses account for the crime and criminal prosecutions in 
Wellington in 1913 will be determined in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Crime as Protest and the 1913 General Strike in Wellington 
If a police constable uses his baton to you give him one back, and if one won't do 
make it a double-header. If we have got to fight the police force and the military, it 
has got to be done in style and effectually. .... If the employers are not prepared to 
act in a conciliatory spirit, and if they put on 'scabs' to work cargo, there will not be a 
wharf for 'scabs' to work on. .... If I have got to incite the multitude I will incite them, 
and in a proper manner. 
William Thomas Young (president of the United Federation of 
Labour and secretary of the Wellington Branch of the Seamen's 
Union) to a meeting of strikers and sympathisers at the Basin 
Reserve, Wellington on 26 October 1913.1 
"Apparently", continued counsel, "to be a striker nowadays is to be one of the 
damned, and the mere fact that a man is a striker is taken as conclusive evidence 
against him." 
Mr. J. F. W. Dickson defending a striking waterside worker 
(Thomas Acland) during a criminal prosecution in the Wellington 
Magistrate's Court on 03 December 1913.2 
URGENT. Please wire urgent to all men in charge of stations in your district to try to 
rouse settlers and others to come here with horses to act as Special Constables and 
assist in settling strike quickly. If we get assistance quickly the strike will be over 
quickly. If no assistance forthcoming it will drag on and business throughout the 
country will be paralysed. I will arrange for special train for men and horses when 
necessary. 
Telegram from the Commissioner of Police, John Cullen, 
to Police Inspector Wilson, Wanganui, 30 October 1913.3 
I am quite satisfied that there will never be industrial peace in this country as long as 
the Red Feds are allowed to control matters or even interfere. At first I thought it 
was possible to make satisfactory arrangements for a settlement of the difficulty 
without attempting to oust the Red Federation. I am not of that opinion now. 
Prime Minister William Massey (in a telegram to J. H. Gunson, 
chairman of the Auckland Harbour Board), 11 November 1913.4 
Young was prosecuted by the Wellington police for these comments and 
convicted (see footnote 145 below, pp.205-206). The quote above is from the official 
wording of the charge as reported in The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 4. 
2 The Dominion, 04 December 1913, p.9, col. 8. Acland pleaded not guilty but 
was convicted by Magistrate J. S. Evans. 'The Magistrate said he saw no reason to 
doubt the evidence of the police, who were positive in their identification. ' 
3 This telegram is part of the '1913 Strike - North Island File' held at Archives 
New Zealand, Wellington (AAAC, W3539 / 52b). 
4 Telegram, Massey to 1. H. Gunson, 11 November 1913, held at Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington, under Prime Minister, Strike Files, 1913 Waterfront Strike, 30 
October - 30 November, (Archives reference: P.M. 9/13). Also quoted in Hughes, 
, 'Massey's Cossacks", p.23; and quoted in part in Hill, The Iron Hand in the 
Velvet Glove, p.320. 
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On 18 October 1913 the Wellington Shipwrights Union, consisting of 
less than fifty men, chose to strike over 3. relatively minor issue of transport 
time. 5 Within four days the dispute had escalated into a complete stoppage 
of all work on the Wellington wharves by the 1,600 members of the 
Wellington Watersiders Union. 6 A separate dispute at Huntly resulted in a 
coal miners' strike starting on 20 October. The grievance of the Huntly 
miners concerned dismissals by the mine owners which were perceived to be 
anti-union.? So began the General Strike of 1913. During the following two 
months a total of 14,000 to 16,000 unionists throughout the country would 
become involved in the second major industrial dispute in New Zealand's 
history.8 The strike in the ports of New Zealand would end on 20 December 
1913, with the total defeat of the United Federation of Labour and its policy of 
militant unionism (that is, the use of the strike).9 
5 Pettit, Wellington Watersiders, p.51 stated that the union comprised 30 men; 
Olssen, 'The Great Strike of 1913', p.2024 gave the figure as 38; and in his later 1988 
work, Red Feds, p.176, Olssen noted there were 47 men in the union prior to the 
strike, and on p.180 wrote that' about 40 shipwrights struck.' 
6 For full accounts of the escalation see Oissen, 'Great Strike', p.2024; Olssen, 
Red Feds, pp.176 and 180-181; Roth, Trade Unions in New Zealand, p.37; also see 
Pettit, Wellington Watersiders, pp.53-55 and 63; Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet 
Glove, p.305; and The Evening Post, 18 October 1913 to 25 October 1913 and 31 
October 1913. 
7 Olssen, Red Feds, p.180; Olssen, 'Great Strike', p.2023; and The Dominion, 
21 October 1913, p.8, cols. 1-2. 
8 Martin, Holding the Balance, p.116; and Roth, Trade Unions, p.38. Also see 
Chapter One, footnote 3 (p.2) in the current thesis. On the spread of the strike to 
Auckland, Lyttelton, Christchurch, Dunedin, the West Coast and Oamaru see Olssen, 
Red Feds, pp.l81-182, 190 and 193. On the further escalation of the strike in 
Auckland and the smaller escalations in the other centres see Olssen, Red Feds, 
pp.191-194, 196 and 198-200; and Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.314 
and 316. 
9 The United Federation of Labour officially ended the strike in the ports on 
Saturday 20 December and requested that the strikers report for work on 22 December 
1913. The last of the miners did not end their strikes until January 1914. (OIssen, 
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The origins of the strike and the issues at stake within it were, of 
course, not as simple as an issue of transport time affecting less than fifty 
men or the dismissal of three miners who had been elected to the executive 
of the Huntly coal miners' union. This most violent of New Zealand industrial 
disputes was not fought over conditions of work nor the level of wages. 
Instead, what was at stake was the relative level of political and economic 
power that the working classes of New Zealand (or at least those who 
supported the United Federation of Labour) had in relation to their employers 
and the government. With the growth of the (United) Federation of Labour 
between 1909 and 1913 the power of militant trade unions and their working 
class members was, for the first time since the defeat of the Maritime Council 
in 1890, perceived as a challenge to the power and authority of the employing 
and governing elites. 1o Prime Minister Massey clearly articulated this on 11 
November 1913, as quoted above (see p.143). By 1913, after the decisive 
defeat of unionists in the Waihi Strike of 1912 and the partially successful 
attempts at the unification of all unionists which had followed,11 a major 
'Great Strike', p.2033; Olssen, Red Feds, pp.207-209; and Roth, Trade Unions, 
p.39). 
10 The Federation of Labour was formed in 1909, and became the United 
Federation of Labour in mid-1913. (Roth, Trade Unions, pp.30 and 35-36). On the 
hostility of many employers to the (United) Federation of Labour see Olssen, Red 
Feds, p.l86; and Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.304-305 and 314. 
II For detailed discussions of the Waihi Strike see Olssen, Red Feds, pp.134-143 
and 148-160; Erik Olssen, 'Trouble At Waihi', New Zealand's Heritage, vol. 5, part 
72, 1971, pp.l989-1992; Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.283-295; 
Roche, The Red and the Gold; Laurie Barber, 'The Waihi Strike of 1912', The New 
Zealand Law Journal, February 1983, pp.57-60; Barry Gustafson, Labour's Path to 
Political Independence: The Origins and Establishment of the New Zealand 
Labour Party 1900-19, (Auckland: Auckland University Press and Oxford 
University Press, 1980), pp.59-66; for a contemporary unionist perspective on the 
events at Waihi see H.E. Holland, "Ballot Box" (i.e. F.E. O'Flynn) and R.S. Ross, 
The Tragic Story of the Waihi Strike, (Wellington: "Worker" Printery, 1913). For 
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confrontation between militant unionists and the largest employers of 
unskilled workers had become almost inevitable. 
Historians of the General Strike have tended to agree that the strike 
was intentionally provoked by employers, or at least intentionally prolonged by 
employers once the opportunity presented itself. The employers' aim in either 
instance was to severely weaken, if not destroy, the United Federation of 
Labour before it consolidated its position. 12 
The ongoing hostility between the (United) Federation of Labour and 
many of the country's employers was exasperated by the actions of the rank-
and-file watersiders in Wellington. On the morning of 20 October 1913 the 
Wellington watersiders held a stop-work meeting to consider the union's 
position in relation to the strike by the shipwrights. After the stop-work 
meeting a small number of watersiders found that their current labour 
assignments had been given to other workers who had not attended the 
detailed discussions of the rise of the Federation of Labour (which became the United 
Federation of Labour in 1913) see Olssen, Red Feds, pp.l-179; Erik Olssen, 'Some 
Reflections about the Origins of the 'Red' Federation of Labour 1909-1913', in Eric 
Fry (ed), Common Cause: Essays in Australian and New Zealand Labour 
History, (Wellington: Allen and Unwin and Port Nicholson Press, 1986), pp.27-41; 
Erik Olssen, 'The "Red Feds" " New Zealand's Heritage, vol. 5, part 74, 1973, 
pp.2066-2072; Gustafson, Labour's Path, pp.24-36 and 47-73; Erik Olssen and Len 
Richardson, 'The New Zealand Labour Movement, 1880-1920', in Eric Fry (ed), 
Common Cause, pp.8-12; Roth, Trade Unions, pp.30-36. 
12 For the relative consensus in historical opinion see Hill, The Iron Hand in 
the Velvet Glove, pp.304-305, 310, 314 and 319; Roth, Trade Unions, pp.37-39; 
Pettit, Wellington Watersiders, pp.51 and 55; and Miles Fairburn, 'The Farmers 
Take Over 1912-1930', in Keith Sinclair (ed), The Oxford Illustrated History of 
New Zealand, 2nd edition, (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.197-198 
who argue that the 1913 Strike was provoked by employers. Martin, Department of 
Labour 1891-1995, p.l16, and Olssen in both 'Great Strike', pp.2024-2028, and Red 
Feds, pp.181-182, 184-186, 189, 191-192 and 200, are less certain that the destruction 
of the United Federation of Labour was the employers' goal at the beginning of the 
strike but both agree that by early November 1913 this had indeed become the 
employers' and the Massey government's intention. 
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meeting. 'The [shipping] company offered to give other work to the men as it 
became available but, in defiance of their president, they held another 
meeting [on 22 October] and 1,500 decided "That no work shall be accepted 
until such time as the victimised men are re-instated".'13 On 24 October 'the 
shipowners offered to reinstate the 1912 agreement if work resumed, but 
some 1,500 wharfies rejected the proposal.' On the evening of 28 October a 
meeting between the Wellington shipowners and the wharfies' leaders was 
held (with the executive of the United Federation of Labour in attendance). 
'The employers once more insisted that, if the union would not register under 
the Arbitration Act, it had to offer a bond of £1,000 as a guarantee that the 
agreement would not be broken. The UFL's [United Federation of Labour] 
negotiators accepted the proposal, but the wharfies' leaders refused and on 
the 29th [of October] a mass meeting endorsed the refusal.'14 
Many of the rank-and-file Wellington watersiders 'felt that the Union 
Company had "assumed a DICTATORIAL ATTITUDE" and thrown down the 
gauntlet.'15 The hostility of the rank-and-file to their employers was only 
intensified when the government of William Massey began recruiting 
thousands of "special" constables to protect civil order and to help re-open the 
ports. The special constables were also extremely unpopular with strikers 
and strike sympathisers. 16 The first mounted special constables from rural 
13 
14 
15 
Olssen, Red Feds, pp.180-181 (the quote is from p.181). 
Olssen, Red Feds, p.181. 
Olssen, Red Feds, p.181 (the capitalisation is in Olssen). 
16 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.305, 308, 310 and 312; and see 
the editorial entitled 'Law or Anarchy?' in The New Zealand Times, 31 October 
1913, p.6, cols. 3-4. 
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areas arrived in Wellington on the night of 29 October, and were sworn in the 
next day.17 
For Erik Olssen, 'the conflict had become intractable when the 
waterfront employers handed control of the dispute to the Employers' 
Federation on 30 October.' 'And so, to break the UFL, the Employers' 
Federation withdrew the previous offer of a three-year agreement and a 
bond.,18 
In early November the employers announced that they would only deal 
with unions which were registered under the Arbitration Act. (This was an 
unacceptable condition of settlement for those unions affiliated with the 
United Federation of Labour. These unions had chosen to leave the 
Arbitration system and had no intention of returning to it, or to once more 
experience the limits it placed on their collective bargaining power and on 
their right to strike). A conference presided over by the Prime Minister was 
held between the United Federation of Labour and the employers on 04 
November. At the start of the conference 'the unionists were told that 
"nothing short of compulsory arbitration would do. Tom Young asked if that 
was the Ultimatum, and Foster [for the employers] replied "Absolutely"." 
Young snapped: "it is no use for this conference to continue sitting." The 
Prime Minister promptly ended' the conference. 19 On 06 November a new 
Arbitration union of wharf labourers was registered and began work on the 
17 See The Dominion, 30 October 1913, p.8, cols. 3-4; and 03 December 1913, 
p.9, col. 2 (report of a court case related to the reception given to the special 
constables upon their arrival); and Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.308. 
18 Olssen, Red Feds, p.186. 
19 Olssen, Red Feds, p.l86. 
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Wellington wharves.2o The Dominion of 07 November contained the 
'manifesto' of the Wellington Citizens' Defence Committee. (The Committee 
was a powerful group set up to oppose the strike and assist the employers in 
re-opening the port). The manifesto announced that The Committee is 
pledged not to employ labour belonging to organisations not registered under 
the Arbitration Act'.21 Many strikers appear to have suspected this was the 
employers' intention all along. 
Regardless of which side bears more responsibility for the initiation 
and escalation of the strike, the result of the early stages of this industrial 
dispute was the heightening of class tensions in New Zealand society, 
arguably to unprecedented levels. These social tensions were especially 
acute in the port cities where militant unionists and special constables (or 
"Massey's Cossacks") encountered each other on a daily basis during the 
height of the strike. Frequently these encounters turned violent, especially so 
in Wellington where riots, cavalry charges by mounted constables, missile 
throwing, deliberate property damage and assaults occurred on an almost 
daily basis from the end of October through to the first week of November. 
The most serious of these riots received the designation "The Battle of 
20 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 7. On the regular occupations of 
these Arbitrationists see Chapter One of the current thesis, pp.3-4. 
21 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.3, cols. 2 and 3. Erik Olssen, Red 
Feds, p.186, described the Committee in the following way: ' Pryor [the secretary of 
the Employers' Federation], uneasy that some of his allies (especially the Union 
Steam Ship Company), might withdraw as the situation worsened, took the initiative 
in organizing a citizens' committee in Wellington. Others were formed in major 
cities. Dominated by rabid anti-unionists, these committees kept watch over the 
Employers' Federation.' 
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Featherston Street".22 Even when disturbances were not in progress, the 
threat of, and potential for, violence remained high for many weeks. The 
social tension in Wellington is evident by the fact that day after day during the 
height of the strike, angry crowds of unionists and their supporters faced 
Royal New Zealand Artillerymen armed with rifles and machine-guns at the 
barricades constructed at the Taranaki and Tory Street intersections with 
Buckle Street. These army personnel were assigned to protect the quarters 
of the mounted special constables stationed in Wellington. (The "specials" 
were one of the State's main tools for crushing the unionist opposition).23 
Leader of the Parliamentary Opposition, Sir Joseph Ward, evocatively 
captured the reality of those turbulent weeks in Wellington in late 1913: 
describing it as 'a system of Mexican revolt and civil war' which existed on the 
normally tranquil streets of Wellington.24 
The level and intensity of violence experienced during the General 
Strike played an important role in Keith Sinclair writing that The years 1912 
and 1913 witnessed the most violent scenes since the Anglo-Maori wars as 
the Government, the employers, and the "cow-cockies" [dairy farmers - mainly 
small scale and North Islanders] smashed the "Red Feds".'25 It seems 
remarkable that no one was killed during the strike, although the list of the 
injured must have been large, among unionists, the forces of the state, and 
22 For an evocative, detailed and revealing account of the major violent incidents 
during the 1913 Strike throughout New Zealand, especially thorough on the violent 
events in Wellington see Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.305-321. 
23 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.309, 312-313 and 320; and see 
Olssen, Red Feds, pp.183-184. 
24 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 167, p.l084, 12 December 1913, 
quoted in Roth, Trade Unions, p.38. 
25 Keith Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, [The Pelican History of New 
Zealand], revised edition, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969), p.209. 
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even the general public of Wellington.26 Miles Fairburn stated that 'In 1912 
and 1913 New Zealand came closer to class war than at any other time in its 
history,.27 
The months of October through December 1913 were unquestionably 
a period of heightened social tension and overt social conflict in the port cities 
and mining communities of New Zealand. In addition to mass 
demonstrations, angry crowds, fiery rhetoric from the strike leaders, the 
presence of hundreds of mounted special constables armed with batons, and 
the replacement of strikers with volunteer workers there were outbreaks of 
serious violence and rioting and the fear of further disorder and violence. 
In numerous major industrial disputes crime has been utilised by 
strikers as protest.28 The enforcement of the criminal law has also frequently 
changed during strikes and lockouts in response to the heightened social 
tension and overt social conflict. 29 
The current chapter and Chapter Six will analyse criminal prosecutions 
and other reported crimes in Wellington for any evidence that crime or the 
enforcement of the criminal law were influenced by the 1913 strike. The 
current chapter will focus on crime as protest. Various ways in which crime 
26 During the previous year not all of those involved in the Waihi Strike had been 
as fortunate. One unionist, Frederick George Evans, died of injuries sustained during 
an assault on the union headquarters of the Waihi strikers by the "scab" or non-union 
labourers; an illegal raid which, as far as historians can tell, was aided and abetted by 
the police stationed in the area. Evans became the first (and so far only) person to die 
as a direct result of confrontation between police and workers in an industrial dispute 
in New Zealand. (Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.288-293; also see 
Roche, The Red and the Gold, pp.117 -131; Campbell, 'The Role of the Police in the 
Waihi Strike', pp.38-40; Olssen, Red Feds, pp.159-160; and Gustafson, Labour's 
Path, pp.62-63). 
27 Fairburn, 'The Farmers Take Over', p.197. 
28 See Chapter One and Chapter Three. 
29 See Chapter Four. 
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has been used as protest during industrial disputes outside of New Zealand 
were described in Chapter Three. Chapter Six will analyse the uses made of 
the criminal law. The ways in which the enforcement of the criminal law has 
been used in some situations to repress strikers and their sympathisers have 
been discussed in Chapter Four, as has the possibility for a crackdown on 
offending which is not intentionally repressive but is simply intended to 
prevent more serious disorder during a period of heightened social tension. 
Together this chapter and Chapter Six will examine whether or not crime and 
the criminal law were used for similar purposes in 1913 as they were in 
numerous other major strikes throughout the industrialised world. 
The Crimes: 
Before any analysis of the purposes of criminal offences and criminal 
prosecutions can be attempted knowledge of the charges which are being 
discussed is needed. 
In connection with the two month period of the General Strike, from 18 
October 1913 to 20 December 1913, those accused of 78 violent crimes, 82 
cases of larceny and 141 other potentially protest related offences directed 
against the State committed in the wider Wellington region (including the Hutt 
electorate) were prosecuted in the Magistrate's Court in Wellington. 3D The 
30 No attempt has been made to divide the cases by the general location of the 
crime. Such an attempt would just create a mass of figures and tables of even greater 
complexity than they are at the moment, without generating significant additional 
explanatory power. The vast majority of prosecuted crimes were committed in 
Wellington city and its suburbs. Only three of the violent crimes (3.85%; two in 
Eastbourne and one in Trentham), and five larcenies (6.10%; three in Lower Hutt, one 
in Petone, and one on the high seas), were committed outside the Wellington electoral 
districts. These eight cases still need to be considered in the overall analysis of social 
conflict and protest through crime, in case the illegal expression of strike-related 
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majority of these charges were brought before the Court and dealt with during 
the strike or in the three days following the calling off of the strike. The 
remaining cases (two violent crimes, 27 thefts, and three other potential 
protest offences) appeared before the Magistrate in January or February 
1914, apart from one theft charge heard on 29 December 1913. The 
breakdown of the specific types of cases can be seen in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 31 
Thirty criminal charges of rioting and unlawful assembly were 
prosecuted within the Wellington judicial system and eight of the strikers' 
leaders were charged with uttering seditious language or inciting public 
disorder. One strike leader, Harry Holland, was sentenced to a year in jail for 
seditious language. Allegations of assaults on and verbal abuse towards 
special constables became a daily feature of court proceedings. Less serious 
strike related offending also occupied the court's time. One striking 
watersider was convicted of loitering, and two individuals were prosecuted for 
setting off fireworks in a public place so as to endanger passers by.32 
hostilities spread beyond the confines of the Wellington city and suburbs boundaries. 
Given the relative ease of transport between Wellington and Lower Hutt and to a 
lesser extent for the wider Wellington rural region as a whole, this scenario of the 
spread of strike-related hostility may well have occurred and needs to be considered. 
The small number of such cases, in any instance, should have little impact on the 
overall body of data that is analysed; while ensuring that a potential site of social 
conflict or protest through crime outside the specific centre of the strike is not 
overlooked. 
31 In categorising violent crime and crimes against the state, when there was 
more than one charge per individual regarding a particular set of events (for example, 
obstruction and attempting to incite a breach of the peace, or property damage and 
resisting arrest) each charge has been considered as a separate "criminal" act. 
32 On the loitering conviction see The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.12, 
col. 4; and The Evening Post, 28 November 1913, p.8, col. 1. For the fireworks 
prosecutions see The Dominion, 20 December 1913, p.6, col. 2. The original charges 
were 'so as to endanger passers by'. They were amended to 'so as to frighten passers 
by'. (See Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 83, December 
1913, prosecution no.s 6567 and 6568). 
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Table 1: Categorisation of Violent Crimes Committed in Wellington 
During the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Type of Violent Crime Frequency % of Total Individuals 
Charged 
Against Persons: 
Attempted Murder 1 1.28% 
Serious Assault = Actual or Grievous Bodily Harm 3 3.85% 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm with a firearm 1 1.28% 
Assault "" 40 51.28% 39 individuals 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a 16 20.51% 21 individuals 
Breach of the Peace was occasioned 
- of which 5 were fights / brawls in public places (10 individuals) 
Total: 61 78.21% 
Against Property: 
Wilful damage or destruction: 
of windows (including 1 window & street lamp) 8 10.26% 
of barriers / barricades (definitely strike related) 5 6.41% 
of shrubs in a city reserve 1 1.28% 
of motor car (damage of) 2 2.56% 
of a cell door 1 1.28% 
Total: 17 21.79% 
Total Violent Crime in Wellington: 78 100.00% 
- During the General Strike of 1913 
33 Four of these assault charges were private prosecutions (none of which were 
strike related). In all other strike period assaults and violent crimes the prosecutor was 
the police. 
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Table 2: Categorisation of Crimes of Theft Committed in Wellington 
During the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court 34 
Type of Larceny Frequency % of Total 
Attempted Theft (of money) 1 1.22% 
Breaking and Entering (nothing stolen) 2 2.44% 
Breaking and Entering & Committing Theft 12 14.63% 
False Pretences with Intent to Defraud 1 1.22% 
Theft 66 80.49% 
Total: 82 100.00% 
Type of Items Stolen (including the attempted theft) 
Animals and lor Animal Related Goods 2 2.50% (1 cocker spaniel & 2 fowls) 
Building materials I raw materials 5 6.25% 
Bicycles 4 5.00% (including 1 motor bicycle) 
Clothing: 28 35.00% 
Overcoats 9 11.25% 
Boots 9 11.25% 
Miscellaneous 10 12.50% 
Clothing & Household Items 1 1.25% 
Clothing & Valuable Goods 2 2.50% (incl. 1 diary & 1 tie pin) 
Foodstuffs: 5 6.25% 
Alcohol 2 2.50% 
Food 2 2.50% 
Tobacco 1 1.25% 
Household Goods 9 11.25% (incl. 2 brief bags & 1 swag) 
Money 8 10.00% 
Money & Valuables 7 8.75% 
Valuables: 7 8.75% (incl. in one instance 
Combination of jewellery 3 3.75% 1 revolver) 
Rings 1 1.25% 
Watches 3 3.75% 
Tools 2 2.50% (including 1 wheelbarrow) 
Total instances where items were stolen: 80 100.00% 
34 The categories of items stolen listed in this table are based on Rude's model, 
Criminal and Victim, p.ll. These figures are tabulated for informative purposes only. 
The statistically small sample would lead to any major conclusions drawn from any 
analysis by type of item stolen or by type of larceny to be of uncertain validity. General 
trends will be commented upon, but this will be as far as this analysis of specific types 
of larceny and items stolen will progress. 
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Table 3: Categorisation of the Crimes Against the State Committed in 
Wellington During the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 35 
Type of Crime Against the State I % of 
I Frequency Total 
Violence Against the State 
Against Persons 
Attempted Murder of the Commissioner of Police (charge not 1 3.57% 
Iproven) 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm with a Firearm 1 3.57% 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm / causing Actual Bodily Harm 2 7.14% 
Assault against regular police 7 25.00% 
Assault against special constables 12 42.86% 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach of the Peace was 3 10.71% 
occasioned - in connection with "riots" (3) 
Against Property 
Wilful damage or destruction: of a cell door; of a pane of glass 2 7.14% 
Total Violent Crime Against the State: 28 100.00% 
Theft against the State 
Theft: of certain brass fittings value £2 1 
Total Theft Against the State: 1 
Other Crimes Against the State %of 
Total 
Taking Part in a Riot 25 17.73% 
Taking Part in an Unlawful Assembly 5 3.55% 
Inciting diverse persons to assault / resist police constables 6 4.26% 
Inciting a breach of the peace / persons to commit a breach of the 5 3.55% 
peace 
Uttering Certain Seditious Words 5 3.55% 
Application for sureties of the peace by the State (based on seditious I 3 2.13% words) 
Threatening Behaviour 6 4.26% 
Threatening Behaviour with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the 2 1.42% 
Peace 
Insulting Words with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 21 14.89% 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 
Obscene Language 42 29.79% 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 
Setting off fireworks in a public place so as to endanger passers by I 2 1.42% 
35 This table includes those violent crimes and theft already categorised in Tables 1 and 
2 which were directed against the enforcers of the law, government institutions, or the State's 
definition of good order (the latter especially encompassing cases of 'Threatening Behaviour 
whereby a Breach of the Peace was occasioned' during "riots") as well as all other crimes 
against the State which could be considered as possible means of social conflict for or against 
the State. 
Use of the 
term scab 
or similar 
term scab 
or similar 
15 
7 
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Loitering in a public place 1 0.71% 
Possession of a Firearm (though all air rifles by children) 2 1.42% 
Deemed to be a Rogue & a Vagabond found with an offensive 2 1.42% 
weapon 
Did Commit Mischief by Burning two panels of a padded cell 1 0.71% 
Resisting Arrest 7 4.96% 
Obstruction 2 1.42% 
Driving a motor-car in a dangerous manner (victims: special 1 0.71% 
constables) 
Negligently driving a tramcar (victims: special constables) 1 0.71% 
Did not exhibit license for vehicle when requested to by police 1 0.71% 
constable 
Did not stop vehicle engine as requested to by constable 1 0.71% 
Total All Other Crime Against the State: 141 100.00% 
Total All Crime Against the State: 170 
Another striking waterside worker was fined £3 for yelling "there goes one of 
the parasites" at the driver of a passing motor-car.36 
None of the Wellington cases were quite as bizarre as one of the 
Auckland strike related crimes. William Thomas Doyle was prosecuted for 
carrying explosives (six gelignite cartridges) with intent to commit a crime or 
enable some person or persons unknown to commit a crime. He admitted 
that he had the explosive in his possession, but pleaded not guilty to any 
criminal intent. At his Supreme Court trial Doyle 'swore that the only reason 
he carried the gelignite explosives was for the purposes of self-defence, in 
case he found himself in a crowd which was charged by mounted "specials".' 
36 The Dominion, 22 November 1913, p.7, col. 1. 
-~~-.-.--
22 
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Expert evidence was given at the trial that each cartridge upon explosion 
would kill or maim everyone within a radius of fifteen to twenty feet. 37 
Not all crime committed during the strike was connected with the 
industrial tension. The Wellington newspapers described those cases and 
incidents they felt were connected with the strike separately from "regular" 
crimes. These newspaper reports provide invaluable information on which 
crimes were directly related to the strike. This data is presented in Tables 4 
and 5.38 Whether or not all the offences and charges which the newspaper 
court reporters interpreted as not strike related actually had no connection 
with the strike is less clear. As well as any covert protest crimes (such as 
those revealed by the work of James C. Scott), there is the problem of very 
limited reports on many of the "not strike related" offences. Often there is too 
little contextual information, if any, provided to be certain the offence has 
nothing to do with the strike. One simply has to trust (or at least accept) the 
court reporters' judgement. 
37 The Dominion, 27 November 1913, p.8, col. 7. The presiding judge advised 
the jury that 'a man might use reasonable force in order to defend himself, but 
explosives were not a reasonable force. ' 
38 In a small number of instances the newspapers reported offences as strike 
crimes even though the connection with the strike was extremely tenuous or 
coincidental. For example, a Thomas Barker (a different person to the IWW 
organiser) shot a dog at 5 a.m. on 11 November 1913. The gunshot was heard by a 
constable on patrol and Barker was arrested for being a rogue and a vagabond found 
with an offensive weapon. In court, Barker explained that he had recently arrived in 
Wellington to obtain work on the wharves, and that he had 'heard that people here 
were carrying revolvers for purposes of protection.' (The Dominion, 12 November 
1913, p.lO, col. 4; also see 19 November 1913, p.8, col. 8). This was the only 
connection between Barker's case and the strike. To protect the validity of the 
analysis within this thesis such cases have been considered as non-strike related, and 
are not included in any of the quantitative or qualitative information concerning strike 
related offences. They are included instead in the quantitative statistics and 
comparative analysis of non-strike related offences. 
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Forty-five of the 78 prosecuted violent crimes (57.69%) committed 
during the strike were directly related to the industrial dispute, as were 97 of 
the 141 "other" anti-State offences (68.79%). Only one of the 82 larcenies 
(1.22%) was reported as a strike crime, and in this case the connection was 
only made because the police prosecutor stated that the accused 'had been 
prominent among those who were disorderly on the waterfront.,39 This petty 
theft, of one bag of coal from the Wellington City Corporation, was in all other 
respects no different from an "ordinary" or pre-strike theft, and does not 
appear to have been an act of protest. The accused had also been convicted 
of three similar petty thefts in the sixteen months before the strike.40 
39 The Dominion, 17 November 1913, p.8, col. 3. 
40 Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Books, no. 82, November 
1913, prosecution no. 5837; no. 73, July 1912, prosecution no.s 2953 and 2966; no.75, 
October 1912, prosecution no. 4990; and New Zealand Police Gazette, 1913, p.739. 
The accused was convicted of another petty theft in April 1914 (New Zealand Police 
Gazette, 1914, p.316). (The Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, 
no. 82, actually covers the period 01 October 1913 to 02 December 1913, but for ease 
of reference it is referred to as November 1913 throughout this thesis, unless 
otherwise specified. Almost all the references from book no. 82 cited in this thesis are 
drawn from the November entries. Citing book no. 82 as November 1913 also helps to 
distinguish it more clearly from book no. 83). 
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Table 4: Categorisation of Strike Related Violent Crimes Committed in 
Wellington During the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Type of Strike Related Violent Crime Frequency % of Total Individuals 
Charged 
Against Persons: 
Attempted Murder 1 2.22% 
Serious Assault = Actual or Grievous Bodily Harm 2 4.44% 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm with a firearm 1 2.22% 
Assault 27 60.00% 27 individuals 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a 7 15.56% 8 individuals 
Breach of the Peace was occasioned 'I 
- of which 1 was a fight / brawl in a public place (2 individuals) 
Total: 38 84.44% 
Against Property: 
Wilful damage or destruction: 
of windows (including 1 window & street lamp) 2 4.44% 
of barriers / barricades 5 11.11% 
Total: 7 15.56% 
Total Strike Related Violent Crime in Wellington: 45 100.00% 
- During the General Strike of 1913 
41 Including one Insulting Behaviour whereby a Breach of the Peace was 
occasioned. 
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Table 5: Categorisation of the Strike Related Crimes Against the State Committed in 
Wellington During the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Type of Strike Related Crime Against the State I Frequency %of Use of the 
Total term scab 
Strike Related Violence Against the State or similar 
Against Persons 
Attempted Murder of the Commissioner of Police (charge not proven) 1 4.00% 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm with a Firearm 1 4.00% 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm I causing Actual Bodily Harm 2 8.00% 
Assault against regular police 6 24.00% 
Assault against special constables 12 48.00% 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach of the Peace was occasioned 3 12.00% 
- in connection with "riots" (3) 
Against Property 
none 0 0.00% 
Total Strike Related Violent Crime Against the State: 25 100.00% 
Strike Related Theft against the State 
none -
Total Strike Related Theft Against the State: 0 
Strike Related Other Crimes Against the State %of term scab 
Total or similar 
Taking Part in a Riot 25 25.77% 
Taking Part in an Unlawful Assembly 5 5.15% 
Inciting diverse persons to assault I resist police constables 6 6.19% 
Inciting a breach of the peace I persons to commit a breach of the peace 5 5.15% 
Uttering Certain Seditious Words 5 5.15% 
Application for sureties of the peace by the State (based on seditious words) I 3 3.09% 
Threatening Behaviour 4 4.12% 
Threatening Behaviour with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 2 2.06% 
Insulting Words with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 19 19.59% 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 15 
Obscene Language 15 15.46% 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 7 
Setting off fireworks in a public place so as to endanger passers by 2 2.06% 
Loitering in a public place 1 1.03% 
Deemed to be a Rogue & a Vagabond found with an offensive weapon 1 1.03% 
Resisting Arrest 0 0.00% 
Obstruction 0 0.00% 
Driving a motor-car in a dangerous manner (victims: special constables) 1 1.03% 
Negligently driving a tramcar (victims: special constables) 1 1.03% 
Did not exhibit license for vehicle when requested to by police constable 1 1.03% 
Did not stop vehicle engine as requested to by constable 1 1.03% 
Total All Other Strike Related Crime Against the State: 97 100.00% 22 
Total All Strike Related Crime Against the State: 122 
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The Victims and the Accused: 
In the 301 criminal cases during the strike period 140 individuals were 
named as victims, including the Commissioner of Police, John Cullen, who 
was identified as the victim of an alleged murder attempt. There were, in 
addition, 57 prosecutions where the victims were not named but instead 
described only by their current occupation (concerning 49 of these charges 
the victims were police or special constables). 
The number of individuals accused was 217. Among the 91 men and 
three women accused of strike related offences were one future Prime 
Minister of New Zealand (Peter Fraser) and the future leader of the 
parliamentary Labour Party from 1918 to 1933 (Harry Holland). Fraser, 
somewhat ironically, would be Minister in charge of the Police between 1935 
and 1949. Other prominent working class leaders of the 1913 strike also 
found themselves appearing before the Wellington judiciary, including the 
President of the United Federation of Labour (William Thomas Young) and an 
organiser for the International Workers of the World (Thomas Barker).42 
42 For discussion of the court proceedings against these strike leaders see pp.143, 
153, 204-206 and 215-216 in the current chapter and see Chapter Six, pp.230, 256, 
258-261, 273-274, 280-283 and 285. For biographies of Peter Fraser see James 
Thorn, Peter Fraser: New Zealand's Wartime Prime Minister, (London: Odhams 
Press, 1952); Margaret Clark (ed), Peter Fraser: Master Politician, (Palmerston 
North: The Dunmore Press, 1998); and Tim Beaglehole, 'Fraser, Peter', The 
Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, volume 4,1921-1940, (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press; and Wellington: Department ofInternal Affairs, 1998), pp.182-186. 
On Fraser as Minister of Police see Dunstall, A Policeman's Paradise?, pp.273-274, 
357, 451 (note 5), and 518. For biographies of Harry Holland see P. J. O'Farrell, 
Harry Holland: Militant Socialist, (Canberra: Australian National University, 1964), 
and Patrick O'Farrell, 'Holland, Henry Edmund', The Dictionary of New Zealand 
Biography, volume 3, 1901-1920, (Auckland: Auckland University Press; and 
Wellington: Department of Internal Affairs, 1996), pp.226-229. Concerning the 
career of William Thomas Young see Neill Atkinson, 'Young, William Thomas', The 
Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, volume 3, 1901-1920, pp.578-579; and 
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Protest Through Crime?: Initial Impressions from the Quantitative Data 
on Criminal Prosecutions: 
If protest had been enacted through criminal means during the time of 
heightened social tensions of the strike, it would be expected that the number 
of crimes committed (and theoretically the number of prosecutions) would rise 
considerably, as more crime was perpetrated against those who were aiding 
the defeat of the strike and more "criminals" were caught. From the average 
monthly incidents of each general category of crime for each period 
presented in Table 6 (p.167) it becomes apparent that there was a dramatic 
jump in the level of prosecutions for violent crime from 16.24 per month 
before the strike to 39 per month during the strike, and an even more 
pronounced increase in the levels of prosecutions for other anti-state offences 
from 10 to 70.5 per month. This data provides general supporting evidence 
for the proposition that violent and other anti-state crime may have been used 
as a means of social conflict in the General Strike of 1913. 
Further indications of the influence of the strike on criminal 
prosecutions is visible in the specific types of violent crime and other anti-
Conrad Bollinger, Against the Wind: The Story of the New Zealand Seamen's 
Union, (Wellington: New Zealand Seamen's Union, 1968), pp. as listed in Bollinger's 
index on p.260. On the career of Thomas Barker, and his involvement with the 
I.W.W., see Tom Barker, Tom Barker and the I.W.W., recorded, edited and with an 
introduction by E. C. Fry, (Canberra: Australian Society for the Study of Labour 
History, 1965); Erik Olssen, 'Barker, Tom', The Dictionary of New Zealand 
Biography, volume 3, 1901-1920, pp.30-31; and Verity Burgmann, Revolutionary 
Industrial Unionism: The Industrial Workers of the World in Australia, 
(Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. as 
listed in Burgmann's index on p.329, including pp.70-71 on Barker's time in New 
Zealand. Also see the brief biographies of each of these men in Gustafson, Labour's 
Path, pp.154, 156, 158 and 169. The Maoriland Worker, 03 December 1913, p.8, 
col. 6, provides useful descriptions of the characters and temperaments of Fraser, 
Holland and Young. 
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state offences.43 Assaults against either special constables or regular police 
constituted nearly half of all assault prosecutions during the strike (19 out of 
40 assaults). In the two years before the strike the police were only the 
victims in twelve of 189 "common" assaults (6.35 per cent). 
The crimes of rioting (25 charges), unlawful assembly (5 charges), 
inciting breaches of the peace (5), inciting resistance of constables (6), use of 
seditious words (8), and use of insulting words or threatening behaviour with 
intent to provoke breaches of the peace (21 and 8 charges respectively) were 
all frequently prosecuted during the strike. Together these offences 
constituted 78 of the 141 other anti-state prosecutions. In the preceding two 
years only four charges in any of these seven categories of crime were 
prosecuted (one case of threatening behaviour with intent to provoke a 
breach of the peace, and three instances of inciting to resist police. The 
accused in one of the three latter offences had encouraged a person being 
arrested for drunkenness to resist arrest. In contrast, four of the strike period 
inciting resistance prosecutions related to speeches given in front of hundreds 
of strikers and sympathisers, and the remaining two charges concerned 
comments or actions during riots which encouraged other persons to assault 
special constables).44 In addition, obscene language prosecutions tripled, 
from 6.37 per month pre-strike to 21.5 per month for the strike period. 
43 See Appendices 2, 3a, 3b and 4 for the specific types of violent crime, larceny 
and other anti-state offences committed and prosecuted in the two year pre-strike 
period. These tables are directly comparable with Tables 1,2,3,4 and 5 in the current 
chapter. 
44 Concerning the pre-strike inciting to resist police prosecutions see The 
Dominion, 10 December 1912, p.3, col. 4; and 14 January 1913, p.3, col. 4; and The 
Evening Post, 12 October 1912, p.5, col. 3. (Two of these three men - James Patrick 
Hassett and Antonio Stuparich - were later convicted of taking part in a riot during the 
1913 strike. See The Dominion, 25 November 1913, p.9, col. 4; 03 February 1914, 
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The crime of larceny, however, does not appear to have been used as 
a form of social conflict (at least no more so than usual). The average 
monthly prosecution rate during the strike was a third higher than the two year 
average (41 compared to 33.31). However, two factors immediately reduce 
the probable significance of this slight increase. Monthly averages for theft 
fluctuated considerably during the two years before the strike. For instance, 
during the six and a half months immediately prior to the strike (01 April 1913 
to 17 October 1913) the monthly average was 41.54, almost identical with the 
strike theft rate.45 The second cautionary issue is the impact of two 
individuals (one burglar and one compulsive thief of boots) on the strike 
prosecuted theft rate. Acting separately these two men committed eighteen 
of the 82 larcenies (21.95%) of the period. Each had committed multiple 
similar offences prior to the strike, which indicates that their acts were unlikely 
to have been caused by the tensions resulting from the strike.46 Without the 
p.8, col. 5; 06 February 1914, p.5, cols. 1-3; and 09 February 1914, p.3, cols. 4-5). 
For the strike period inciting resistance charges see The Dominion, 12 November 
1913, p.8, cols. 4-5; 13 November 1913, p.8, cols. 4-5; 27 November 1913, p.9, cols. 
3-4; 28 November 1913, p.9, col. 3; 29 November 1913, p.6, cols. 4-6; 05 December 
1913, p.8, cols. 4-5; and 10 December 1913, p.6, col. 5; and The Evening Post, 29 
November 1913, p.9, col. 6. 
45 Unless otherwise specified the use in this thesis of the term monthly 
prosecution rates refers to crimes committed during a particular month (or set of 
months) which were prosecuted at some time, not to the actual number of 
prosecutions brought before the Magistrate's Court in a particular month or set of 
months. The lowest number of prosecuted larcenies for any month between October 
1911 and September 1913 was 17 for November 1911 and May 1912. The highest 
number of larceny prosecutions was 74 for July 1913. The next highest months were 
June 1912 (43 prosecutions), October 1911 (42 prosecutions) and September 1913 (40 
prosecutions). For a complete list of the pre-strike monthly totals for larceny 
prosecutions see Appendix 13. 
46 The burglar committed 11 breaking, entering, and theft offences in Wellington 
during the strike (including one offence where nothing was stolen). In the two months 
prior to the strike he committed 11 similar crimes in Wellington, as well as burglaries 
in Hastings and Napier. The chronic boot thief was convicted of seven separate thefts 
of boots in Wellington during the strike. The first of these offences was committed 
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efforts of these two men, or if they had conducted their crime sprees a few 
months earlier or a few months later, the rate of larcenies during the strike 
would have been 32 per month, which is lower than the two year pre-strike 
average. 
Elsewhere in the lower North Island some instances of theft were more 
closely related to the strike. Coal was stolen from railway stations along the 
Main Trunk line. The Dominion explained the cause of the thefts as the 
shortage of coal due to the strike. 47 The Fielding Star warned its readers that 
a number of conmen were operating in the area. They were taking advantage 
of peoples' sympathies by pretending to be collecting donations for the wives 
and children of the strikers.48 The theft of the coal may have been in part 
protest against the role of the government in the strike, but there is insufficient 
detail on these thefts to reach any definitive conclusion. The motivation of the 
conmen can be safely assumed to have been purely utilitarian. There were 
no reports of either type of incident in Wellington. 
only a week after he had been released from 3 months imprisonment for three thefts in 
Wellington in April and July 1913. The items stolen in these three earlier offences 
were a gentleman's bicycle and two pairs of boots. 
47 The Dominion, 25 November 1913, p.6, col. 7. 
48 As reported in The Evening Post, 18 November 1913, p.8, col. 7. 
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Table 6: Numbers of Crimes Committed in Wellington During and in the 
Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which 
resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
a) Total No. of Crimes in Wellington During the General Strike of 1913: 
18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913 
Total Average per month 
Violent Crime: 78 39 
Theft: 82 41 
Other Offences Against the State: 141 70.5 
Total No. of Crimes: 301 150.5 
b) Total No. of Crimes in Wellington during the 24 & 1/2 Month Pre-Strike Period: 
1 October 1911 to 17 October 1913 
Total Average per month 
Violent Crime: 398 16.24 
Theft: 816 33.31 
Other Offences Against the State: 242 9.88 
Total No. of Crimes: 1456 59.43 
The occupations of those accused of offences during the strike provide 
additional supporting evidence of a relationship between crime and protest. 
Those appearing before the Wellington judiciary were predominantly unskilled 
blue collar workers: labourers, seamen, ship's firemen, and drivers. Of 217 
accused, 153 (70.51%) worked in unskilled blue collar jobs (see Tables 7 and 
8). It was among these same occupations that the greatest support for the 
United Federation of Labour existed.49 Those who went on strike in 
Wellington in 1913 were all unskilled manual workers except for the 
shipwrights: the wharf labourers, seamen, ship's firemen, drivers, and building 
labourers. 
49 Olssen, Red Feds, pp.xiv and 219-220. It should also be noted that the term 
'judiciary', as used in this chapter, refers to the combined category of magistrates and 
Supreme Court judges. 
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The vast majority of the 94 individuals who were prosecuted for strike 
related offences were strikers or other unskilled workers in similar 
occupations. Thirty-seven of the accused have been identified as strikers, 
with another 38 men having occupations which indicate they may have been 
on strike but there is no corroborating evidence to be certain they were 
strikers (for example, labourer, seaman or driver). In addition, two women 
who were probably the wives or sisters of striking waterside workers were 
among the remaining accused, as was a ship's fireman who stated in court he 
was not on strike on the date he allegedly took part in a riot but that he was in 
sympathy with the strike.50 As strikers and other unskilled workers were the 
groups most active in disturbances connected with the strike these results are 
not unexpected. The large proportion of strikers among the accused, 
however, suggests that many of these offences were committed as acts of 
industrial protest, either by strikers themselves or by those who sympathised 
with the strike. Of the latter group a significant number were probably. 
unionists. 
50 For the ship's fireman who was not on strike but was in sympathy with the 
strikers see The Dominion, 04 February 1914, p.5, col. 2 and 10 February 1914, p.9, 
col. 4. This accused pleaded not guilty to taking part in the Post and Telegraph Stores 
riot of 30 October 1913. He was acquitted at his second jury trial on 09 February 
1914. The first jury had been unable to agree upon a verdict. (On the first jury trial 
see The Dominion, 04 February 1914, p.5, cols. 1-2. On the second jury trial see The 
Dominion, 10 February 1914, p.9, col. 4). 
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Table 7: Occupations (Grouped by Broad Categories) of those Accused 
of Crimes Committed in Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a 
Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
All Accused Strike Period Crime: 
Middle Class 4 1.84% all clerks 
Blue Collar 172 79.26% incl. 8 working class leaders 
Schoolboys 12 5.53% 
Other Juveniles 8 3.69% 
Unknown 21 9.68% 
Total: 217 100.00% 
All Accused Pre-Strike Crime: 
Middle Class 31 2.91% incl. 16 clerks 
Blue Collar 614 57.65% 
Schoolboys 102 9.58% 
Other Juveniles 57 5.35% incl. 4 schoolgirls 
Unknown 261 24.51% 
Total: 1065 100.00% 
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Table 8: Specific Occupations of those Blue Collar Workers Accused of 
Crimes Committed in Wellington During the General Strike of 1913 
which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
---
Ali Blue Collar Accused Strike Period Crime: % of all blue % of all 
no. collar accused accused 
a) Skilled Manual Workers: 
engine-driver 3 1.74% 1.38% 
tram conductor 2 1.16% 0.92% 
tram motorman / tram driver 2 1.16% 0.92% 
carpenter 2 1.16% 0.92% 
1 blacksmith, 1 bootmaker, 1 fire brigade man, 1 machinist, 1 plasterer, 
and 1 railway ganger 6 3.49% 2.76% 
Total - skilled: 15 8.72% 6.91% 
b) Unskilled Manual Workers: 
labourer 63 36.63% 29.03% 
fireman 27 15.70% 12.44% 
seaman 18 10.47% 8.29% 
carter / driver 9 5.23% 4.15% 
prostitute 7 4.07% 3.23% 
miner 3 1.74% 1.38% 
wife of a waterside worker 1 0.58% 0.46% 
leaders of unskilled manual workers' unions and strikes: 
8 4.65% 3.69% 
other: 1 barman, 2 bottlemongers / bottle-gatherers, 2 cleaners, 1 cook, 
4 domestics / domestic servants, 2 hawkers, 1 hotel-porter, 1 steward, 2 storemen, 
and 1 waiter 17 9.88% 7.83% 
Total - unskilled: 153 88.95% 70.51% 
c) Blue Collar but unclear whether Skilled or Unskilled Manual Workers: 
4 2.33% 1.84% 
Total A" Blue Collar: 172 100.00% 79.26% 
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Table 9: Specific Occupations of those Blue Collar Workers Accused of 
Crimes Committed in Wellington During the Twenty-four and a Half 
Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
All Blue Collar Accused Pre-Strike Crime: % of all blue % of all 
no. collar accused accused 
a) Skilled Manual Workers: 
bootmaker 12 1.95% 1.13% 
butcher 9 1.47% 0.85% 
carpenter 8 1.30% 0.75% 
tailor / tailoress 7 1.14% 0.66% 
painter 5 0.81% 0.47% 
hairdresser 5 0.81% 0.47% 
baker 4 0.65% 0.38% 
3 blacksmiths, 1 boilermaker, 1 brassmoulder, 3 cab-drivers / taxi-drivers, 1 chauffeur, 
3 compositors, 2 confectioners, 1 coppersmith, 1 electrician, 1 engine-driver, 1 fitter, 
3 machinists, 3 mechanics, 1 milliner, 2 plumbers, 3 printers, 1 railway cadet, 1 saddler, 
1 stereotyper, 2 tinsmiths, 2 umbrella-makers, 1 unspecified apprentice, 3 upholsterers, 
and 1 workshop foreman 42 6.84% 3.94% 
Total - skilled: 92 14.98% 8.64% 
b) Unskilled Manual Workers: 
labourer 204 33.22% 19.15% 
fireman 77 12.54% 7.23% 
seaman 66 10.75% 6.20% 
domestic / domestic servant 27 4.40% 2.54% 
cook 25 4.07% 2.35% 
prostitute 24 3.91% 2.25% 
steward 17 2.77% 1.60% 
carter / driver 14 2.28% 1.31% 
hawker 8 1.30% 0.75% 
porter: hotel- ; railway-, etc. 6 0.98% 0.56% 
waiter / waitress 5 0.81% 0.47% 
gardener 5 0.81% 0.47% 
storeman 4 0.65% 0.38% 
miner 3 0.49% 0.28% 
other: 1 barman, 1 bottlemonger / bottle-gatherer, 3 bushmen, 1 carpet-cleaner, 1 factory hand, 
3 farm hands, 1 fisherman, 1 kitchenman, 2 scullerymen, 1 ship's boy, 1 slaughterman, 
and 2 trimmers 18 2.93% 1.69% 
Total - unskilled: 503 81.92% 47.23% 
c) Blue Collar but unclear whether Skilled or Unskilled Manual Workers: 
19 3.09% 1.78% 
Total All Blue Collar: 614 100.00% 57.65% 
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The following sections will analyse the nature of the link between crime 
and protest, and determine if the apparent link so far described is anything 
more than a statistical coincidence. 
Protest Against Employers Through Crime? 
International research (as discussed in Chapter Three) indicates that 
criminal acts against the persons or property of their employers have been 
used by some strikers as forms of protest. One clear example of such an act 
in Wellington in 1913 was a confrontation in Mr. Falk Cohen's shop on 01 
November. 
51 
At the Pistol's Point - Revolver Presented in Shop 
At about ten minutes to five on Saturday afternoon three men, 
apparently strikers, entered the premises of Mr. Falk Cohen, clothier and 
mercer, of Willis Street. 
"You're Mr. Cohen, ain't you?" said one of the trio. 
"Yes, I'm Mr. Cohen," said the genial ex-City Councillor. 
"Mr. Cohen, of the Harbour Board, ain't you?" said the speaker, 
embellishing his conversation with expletives. 
"No, I'm not - a lot of people think I'm that Mr. Cohen." 
"We know you, and we know you're on the Harbour Board!" And with 
that, the man drew a revolver, and presented it at Mr. Cohen. 
"Now, put that away," said Mr. Cohen, now genuinely alive to the 
situation. "It might go off!" 
"It's going to go off, you - !" said the man, who appeared to have 
been drinking. "We're going to perish you!" 
Mr. Cohen again explained he was not the Mr. Cohen who was a 
member of the Harbour Board, and sought to prove it. His words evidently 
had a ring of conviction, for one of the other men told the aggressor to put his 
revolver away, and the third one backing him up also urged the gunman to 
desist, and with that he replaced the revolver in his pocket. 51 
The Dominion, Monday 03 November 1913, p.8, cols.l-2. 
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The intention of the perpetrators (who were never prosecuted) was to 
intimidate and to vent their frustration against one of the employers who were 
prolonging the strike by refusing to accept the strikers' terms for a return to 
work. The act was misdirected, Mr. Falk Cohen, clothier and mercer, was not 
the Mr. Cohen who was a member of the Wellington Harbour Board, but the 
purpose of the confrontation is obvious. 
To help determine how frequent such protests against employers 
through crime were in 1913 the occupation of the victims, and the relationship 
between the victims and accused, in prosecuted cases of violent crime, 
larceny, and other crimes against the State in Wellington during the strike (as 
displayed in Tables 10 and 11) will be examined. The possibility that the 
targets of protest crime included those employers whose workers were not on 
strike but who were perceived to be aiding the defeat of the strike will also be 
considered. 
Only one employer whose employees went on strike in 1913 was the 
victim of crimes which were later prosecuted in the Wellington Magistrate's 
Court. The Wellington Harbour Board experienced the destruction on two 
separate occasions of its rapidly built and re-built eight foot high barrier near 
King's Wharf. The purpose of the specially constructed barrier was to limit 
the number of access points to King's Wharf, provide protection for those 
willing to handle cargo during the strike, and hinder the movement of 
unauthorised visitors (including crowds of angry strikers) around the wharves. 
Rank-and-file striking waterside workers were not pleased with such actions 
by the Harbour Board, and on consecutive days (24 and 25 October 1913) 
large groups of strikers twice demolished the barrier and threw the wood it 
was constructed from into the harbour.52 Four individuals alleged to have 
taken prominent roles in this destruction of property were prosecuted. Three 
were striking watersiders and the fourth was a sailor who was 'newly arrived in 
New Zealand at strike time'. The sailor pleaded guilty, two of the watersiders 
52 For newspaper descriptions of these incidents see The Dominion, 25 October 
1913, p.6, col. 1, and 27 October 1913, pA, col. 3; and The Evening Post, 25 October 
1913, p.6. 
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Table 10: Occupations (Grouped by Broad Categories) of the Victims of 
Crimes Committed in Wellington During the General Strike of 1913 
which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
hllindividually Named Victims of Strike Period Crime: 
Middle Class bJ 27 19.29% 
Blue Collar 29 20.71% 
Stores and companies 10 7.14% 
Government b4 5 3.57% 
Police 16 11.43% 
Special Constable 12 8.57% 
Unknown 41 29.29% 
Total: 140 100.00% 
Other Incidents where the Victims were Described as 
Groups or were Unnamed Individuals: 
Blue Collar (a fellow worker) 1 
Police: unnamed regular police 6 
Special Constable(s 40 
Specials and Regular Police 3 
Men unloadinglloading steamers bb 3 
Men working on the wharves 1 
Other passengers on a train 1 
The working driver of a cart bo 1 
An unnamed woman 1 
Total: 57 
53 Special constables with middle class occupations are not included in the 
'Middle Class' count. They have instead been counted in the special constable 
category in both Tables 10 and 11. 
54 The Government category includes (central) government departments, local 
government, and local government bodies. The five such victims of crimes 
committed during the strike were the Police Department (three separate incidents 
only), the Post and Telegraph Department, the Petone Railway Workshops, the 
Wellington City Council, and the Wellington Harbour Board. 
55 In two of these three incidents the men unloading or loading steamers were 
middle class clerks and other staff from the offices of the shipping companies. 
56 It is not clear whether this working driver of a cart was a permanent worker or 
a volunteer. If the latter, he may have been either middle class or a blue collar worker. 
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Table 11: Occupations (Grouped by Broad Categories) of the Victims of 
Crimes Committed in Wellington During the General Strike of 1913 
which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
- Breakdown by General Type of Crime 
a) All Individually Named Victims of Strike Period Crime: 
Type of Crime Middle Blue stores & State b( Special Unknown 
Class '''' Collar companies Constables 
All Violent Crime: 6 7 1 11 9 14 
12,50% 14,58% 2,08% 22,92% 18,75% 29,17% 
All Theft: 20 20 8 3 - 27 
25,64% 25,64% 10.26% 3,85% 0.00% 34.62% 
All Other Against State: 2 3 2 12 5 -
8.33% 12,50% 8,33% 50,00% 20,83% 0,00% 
b) Other Incidents where the Victims were Described as Groups or were Unnamed Individuals: 
Violent Crime: 
Special Constable( s) 8 
Specials and Regular Police 1 
Total 
48 
100,00% 
78 
100,00% 
24 
100,00% 
Men unloading/loading steamers 2 who in 1 of these 2 incidents were middle class 
Total: 11 
Theft: 
no victims described in this way 
Other Crimes Against the State: 
Blue Collar (a fellow worker) 1 
Police: unnamed regular police 6 
Special Constable(s) 36 
S.pecials and Regular Police 2 
Men unloading/loading steamers 3 who in 2 of these 3 incidents were middle class 
Men working on the wharves 1 
Other passengers on a train 1 
The working driver of a cart 1 not clear if a permanent worker or a volunteer 
An unnamed woman 1 
Total: 52 
57 The category 'State' includes individual regular policemen who were victims 
along with the small number (5 in all) of government departments and local 
government victims. 
58 See footnote 53 in this chapter. 
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were convicted by a jury, and the third watersider was found not guilty at his 
jury trial. The sentences imposed on the three men convicted ranged from 
three to seven months imprisollrnellt. 59 
The demolition of the barrier was an overt act of protest by a large 
group of strikers against one of the employers of both casual and permanent 
labour on the Wellington wharves. The barrier's construction was clearly 
considered provocative by the strikers, and they responded with violence. 
The strike was less than a week old and hopes of an early settlement were 
still high. The Harbour Board did not attempt to rebuild the barrier until mid-
November,6o which suggests it realised how provocative its actions had been. 
Other incidents of minor property damage or attempted property 
damage against the Harbour Board and some of the shipping companies who 
employed wharf labour were reported by Wellington newspapers, though no 
prosecutions followed concerning any of these events. A shipment of muriatic 
acid stacked on the wharves was tampered with on the night of 24/25 
October, with the result that a large quantity of the acid flowed out on to the 
wharves and blackened everything it came in contact with.61 Early in the 
morning of 26 October a Harbour Board patrol found a bundle of shavings 
and sticks of wood heaped up against one of the sheds on Glasgow Wharf, 
59 For newspaper reports of the relevant hearings, trials and sentencings see The 
Dominion, 01 December 1913, p.9, col. 2; 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 8; 10 
December 1913, p.6, col. 5; 04 February 1914, p.5, col. 1; 07 February 1914, p.6, 
col.3; and 09 February 1914, p.3, cols. 4 and 5. A warrant for the arrest ofa fifth man 
(occupation not stated) was issued, but he was never brought before the Court. This 
warrant was cancelled at the request of the police on 10 December 1913 (Wellington 
Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 83, December 1913 to January 1914, 
prosecution no. 6396). 
60 The Dominion, 18 November 1913, p.8, col. 5. 
6! The Dominion, 27 October 1913, p.4, col. 4. 
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ready to be lit. The Dominion report suggested that whoever had built the pile 
of kindling had been interrupted before a fire could be started.62 
Each of these unprosecuted criminal actions was most likely the work 
of an individual acting alone or with the aid of, at most, a few other persons. 
The acts were covert, and committed at night or in the early morning. The 
purpose of the sabotage is impossible to be certain of due to the minimal 
evidence. The destruction of property as a form of protest against the 
employers of wharf labour may have been the motivation for or the intention 
of these incidents. Inebriated, or juvenile, mischief makers with no 
connection with the strike were other potential culprits. It is also possible that 
the Harbour Board patrols and newspaper reporters were overly suspicious in 
interpreting accidental damage to a shipment of acid, or coincidental 
gatherings of wood by a shed. 
62 The Dominion, 27 October 1913, pA, col. 7. The Evening Post reported on 
27 October (p.8, col. 1) that dynamite had been found on the Wellington wharves. 
This report was subsequently denied by the chairman of the Harbour Board and by 
Captain Munro, the wharfinger (The Evening Post, 28 October 1913, p.8, col. 5). 
Three weeks later The Evening Post (19 November 1913, p.8, col. 5) stated that an 
attempt had been made to burn down the house of a Harbour Board official, but a 
mistake had been made by the perpetrator or perpetrators and the wrong house had 
been targeted. According to The Evening Post the ladies of a house belonging to a 
'city business man, in no way connected with the strike or strikers' had found a card 
on a table in their home. On the card were 'the initials "I. W. W.", and a print of a hand 
in red. The card stated that the house would be burned down, and the name of the 
householder was mentioned. It was evident that a mistake had been made in the 
address, but the name on the card was that of a Harbour Board official living close by. 
Sure enough, an attempt appears to have been made to burn down the house. A fire 
was discovered in one room, and was confined to it, although the damage there was 
considerable.' The next day The Evening Post (20 November 1913, p.8, col. 6) 
retracted much of its earlier report. 'Further enquiries regarding the "Red Hand" 
incident reported in yesterday's Post, go to show that there is very little to connect any 
organisation with the matter. The suggestion that the alleged symbol was meant for a 
Harbour Board official is not borne out. In official circles little or no importance is 
attached to the incident.' This was the entire report. No mention was made if there 
actually had been a fire or the probable cause of any such fire. 
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The conclusion which can be reached from the available information is 
that violence against the persons or property of strikers' employers was not a 
widespread feature of the 1913 strike in Wellington, though, a small number 
of such crimes as protest against employers were committed. The 
intimidation of Mr. Cohen and the destruction of the wharf barrier are clear 
examples of protest by strikers against their employers through crime. 
The property of other employers and businesses also became the 
target for violence when they assisted or were suspected of assisting the 
special constables. On the evenings of 03 and 04 November crowds 
surrounded the Royal Tiger Hotel in Taranaki Street. Stone-throwers 
amongst the crowds broke nearly every window in the hotel, with some 
assistance from those armed with sticks and iron bars.63 The cause of the 
assemblies and the violence was a belief that special constables had been 
served in the bar of the hotel (and that they may even have been 'shouted' 
free drinks).64 Three men and one woman were prosecuted in connection 
with these disturbances, all of whom were convicted. Mrs. Florence Nelson 
was convicted for the destruction of one window and one lamp, Archibald 
Campbell for taking part in a riot and for being a rogue and a vagabond in that 
he was found by night with an offensive weapon, Robert Hill for assaulting a 
regular police constable who was trying to prevent further damage to the hotel 
63 The Dominion, 04 November 1913, p.8, cols. 3-4, and p.9, col. 8; 05 
November 1913, p.7, col. 4; 19 November 1913, p.6, col. 7, and p.8, col. 8; and The 
New Zealand Times, 19 November 1913, p.7, col. 5. 
64 The Dominion, 07 February 1914, p.6, col. 3; The New Zealand Times, 13 
November 1913, p.3, cols. 3 and 4; and Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, 
p.313. Margaret McIntosh, licensee of the Royal Tiger Hotel, stated during the 
Supreme Court trial of an alleged rioter that special constables had been served on the 
premises and this was why the hotel had been attacked (The Dominion, 07 February 
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by arresting a stone-thrower, and Sydney Claridge for using threatening 
behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace towards regular 
mounted policemen. 65 
A suspicious fire inside the Stewart Timber and Hardware Company's 
mill in Courtenay Place on 29 October may also have been an act of protest 
and sabotage by a strike sympathiser. The company was manufacturing 
batons for the Police Department and the fire started in close proximity to 
where the batons were being made.66 No one was prosecuted. Two weeks 
later another maker of batons, this time in Masterton, became the victim of 
strike-related protest through property damage. The word "scabs" was cut 
into the plate-glass windows of his furniture establishment. The purpose of 
the vandalism was unmistakable.67 
One instance of theft from the wharves was reported by The Dominion 
on 30 October 1913. The victim of the 'wharf pillaging' was a 'well-known 
providore in shipping circles in Wellington'. Eight of the twelve sacks of 
potatoes he had stacked on Railway Wharf had disappeared, even though 
1914, p.6, col. 3). In the Magistrate's Court on 12 November 1913 McIntosh gave 
similar evidence (The New Zealand Times, 13 November 1913, p.7, cols. 3 and 4). 
65 The New Zealand Times, 13 November 1913, p.7, cols. 3-4; 19 November 
1913, p.7, col. 5; and The Dominion, 19 November 1913, p.8, col. 8; 28 November 
1913, p.9, col. 3; and 01 December 1913, p.9, col. 2. A stay of proceedings was 
entered concerning a second charge against Robert Hill of taking part in a riot after 
three juries were unable to agree on a verdict (see The New Zealand Times, 18 May 
1914, p.8, col. 5). A charge of taking part in an unlawful assembly was withdrawn 
after Florence Nelson was convicted of the property damage (see The Dominion, 26 
November 1913, p.8, col. 3). The original charge against Sydney Claridge of taking 
part in a riot was withdrawn because of the extenuating circumstances described on 
p.227 of Chapter Six. 
66 The Dominion, 30 October 1913, p.8, col. 3. 
67 The Dominion, 12 November 1913, p.9, col. 5. Also see The Dominion, 17 
November 1913, p.8, col. 7, though in this report of comments made at a strikers' 
meeting the victim is described as an undertaker. 
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'pickets and patrol men were on duty all night' in the general vicinity.68 No 
prosecution followed. There is insufficient information available to determine 
if this 'pillaging' from the wharf was in any wayan act of protest, or simply a 
convenient opportunity for self-gain which was taken advantage of. 
The only types of crime which were used as protest against employers 
and which resulted in more than five strike related prosecutions were 
desertion by crew members on commercial ships, the wilful disobedience of 
the lawful commands of a ship's officer, and similar offences.69 On 26 
November 1913 the stokehold firemen of the Union Company's S.S. 
Maunganui refused to continue work. They walked off their vessel in protest 
that they were being required to assist the defeat of the New Zealand strike. 
The Maunganui usually sailed between Australia and New Zealand, and its 
crew were signed on under Sydney articles. Due to the strike the Maunganui 
had been temporarily transferred to the Lyttelton-Wellington ferry service, a 
route normally worked by those seamen and firemen employed under New 
Zealand articles who were on strike. The vacancies left in the stokehold of 
the Maunganui by the firemen's protest were filled by Arbitrationists. The 
Maunganui's seamen refused to work with Arbitrationists and also came 
68 The Dominion, 30 October 1913, p.8, col. 7. 
69 Desertion and similar offences are not included in the prosecution data 
analysed throughout the rest of this thesis (as listed in Tables 1,2 and 3, pp.l54-157). 
Such offences were very different to any of the other Wellington strike related 
prosecutions (see Tables 4 and 5, pp.l60 and 161). They were usually private 
prosecutions by ship's officers or representatives of shipping companies, or if the 
police prosecuted the charges were instigated at the request of the shipping 
companies. The sheer number of such prosecutions, the uniformity of the occupations 
of the accused (seamen or firemen), and the uniformity of the sentences would also 
have a significant, and probably misleading, impact on the overall results for the 
number and types of strike related offences, the occupations of those accused of these 
offences, and the trends in sentencing. The specific context of the strike related 
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ashore.7o Fifty-four of the Maunganui's crew were arrested and prosecuted 
for desertion. After agreeing to return to work they were each convicted and 
ordered to forfeit 14 days pay.71 
On 27 November twenty-seven of the firemen on the S.S. Corinthic 
refused to continue work. They stated their grievance was that "the ship is 
carrying 'scab' cargo, and 'scabs' are aboard."72 The firemen were arrested 
and were each charged with having wilfully disobeyed the lawful commands 
of their commanding officer. Each man was also prosecuted on a second 
charge of having combined with others to disobey the lawful commands of 
their commanding officer, to neglect duty and to impede navigation of the 
ship. At their court appearance on 28 November the men were given the 
opportunity to return to work by their employer. If they agreed to work then 
the company would ask the magistrate to convict the men, but not impose a 
punishment. Three of the firemen accepted the offer, the other twenty-four 
refused and were sentenced to one month's imprisonment each.73 
One of the twenty-four men then asked the magistrate "May I speak, 
sir?" Magistrate Riddell replied "No, you can't speak. Take the defendant 
desertion and similar offences, however, warrants a discussion of them in the current 
section of this thesis. 
70 The Dominion, 27 November 1913, p.8, col. 5; and The Evening Post, 27 
November 1913, p.3, col. 3. For a 'detailed and nuanced' analysis of desertion as 'an 
important means of resistance and protest among seamen' see Eric W. Sager, 
Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820-1914, 
(Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), as recommended by 
Marcus Rediker in his review of Sager's book in Journal of Social History, vol. 24, 
no. 3, Spring 1991, pp.647-649 (see particularly p.648 of the review). 
71 The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, col. 8, and 08 December 1913, p.8, 
col. 7; and The Evening Post, 28 November 1913, p.8, col. 2. 
72 The Dominion, 28 November 1913, p.8, col. 4; and see p.8, col. 3. 
73 The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, col. 8; and Wellington Magistrate's 
Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 1913, prosecution no.s 6020 to 6075. 
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away. ,,74 Later the same morning Captain Hart spoke to his twenty-four 
former crewmen and 'asked what the man who wished to speak in Court had 
to say. The man said that he wanted to know if they would be allowed to go 
free after serving sentence in gaol, and Captain Hart explained that at the end 
of the month they would be again placed on the ship, and, if they refused 
duty, then further Court proceedings would be taken. This rather changed the 
attitude of the men.' Captain Hart also pointed out to the men that the 
Wellington strike leaders had not bothered to provide them with legal counsel 
even though the firemen had disobeyed orders at the request of the strike 
leaders. A few minutes later the twenty-four firemen agreed to return to their 
ship if their sentences were remitted. 75 At the afternoon sitting of the Court 
Magistrate Riddell agreed to the prosecution's request to remit the penalty. 
The men were ordered to come up for sentence when called upon and to pay 
4/- court costs each. The firemen returned to the Corinthic and the ship 
sailed that afternoon. 76 
Fifteen of the S.S. Opawa's firemen left their vessel on 30 November in 
an act of sympathy with the New Zealand strikers. The Opawa sailed 
between London and New Zealand, and while in Wellington it had been 
loaded by Arbitrationists. The fifteen men were arrested and charged with 
having unlawfully absented themselves from the steamer. Before their court 
appearance on 01 December the Opawa's captain had interviewed the men 
and 'they had told him that if .they were placed on board [the vessel] again 
74 
75 
The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, col. 8. 
The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, col. 7. 
76 The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, cols. 7 and 8; and Wellington 
Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 1913, prosecution no.s 
6020 to 6075. 
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they would refuse to work. They gave as their reason for this attitude the fact 
that what they termed "scab" cargo was in the steamer's holds.' Each 
accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to fourteen days imprisonment 
and was ordered to be placed on board the vessel should it leave port before 
the expiry of the term of imprisonment. 77 
Later on the same day the men were put on board the Opawa and the 
vessel left for London. Once the ship was well outside the harbour limits the 
men were mustered on deck and asked by the captain if they still refused 
duty. Fourteen of the firemen replied in the affirmative. The Opawa returned 
to Wellington. The fourteen men were arrested and charged with while on the 
high seas combining with the other persons to disobey the lawful commands 
of the master of the ship, and to neglect duty and to impede the navigation of 
the ship and the progress of her voyage. This was a considerably more 
serious charge than being absent from the ship. The maximum penalty for 
merchant seamen combining on the high seas was twelve months in prison.78 
On 02 December each of the firemen pleaded not guilty and they were 
committed to the Supreme Court for trial. 79 Bail of £50 each was required, but 
77 The Dominion, 02 December 1913, p.6, col. 4. For the date of the offence see 
The Dominion, 02 December 1913, p.6, col. 3 and Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 1913 to 02 December 1913, prosecution 
no.s 6163 to 6177. Also see The Dominion, 01 December 1913, p.8, col. 4. The 
Opawa's original stokehold crew comprised twelve firemen and nine trimmers (The 
Dominion, 03 December 1913, p.8, col. 4). The term 'fireman' was usually used in 
newspapers of the period as a generic description for any individual who worked as a 
fireman or a trimmer in the stokehold of a ship. Occasionally, as above, a distinction 
was made between firemen and trimmers. Of the fifteen 'firemen' who had absented 
themselves from the Opawa on 30 November 1913, nine were firemen, four were 
trimmers, and the exact job of the fifteenth 'fireman' was not specified (The 
Dominion, 03 December 1913, p.8, col. 4 - the fifteenth man had not committed a 
second offence so was not mentioned in this report of the second court appearance of 
the Opawa firemen). 
78 The Dominion, 02 December 1913, p.6, col. 4. 
79 The Dominion, 03 December 1913, p.8, col. 4. 
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it was not until almost six weeks later that the accused were released on bail, 
after the bail amount had been reduced to £5.80 At the next Supreme Court 
sitting in February 1914 the accused changed their pleas to guilty. The Chief 
Justice treated the firemen 'very leniently' because of the long period they 
had already spent waiting for bail in Wellington Prison, and because 'although 
they had technically been guilty, they had minimised their offence by 
intimating before the vessel left that they would not work.' Each fireman was 
sentenced to fourteen days gaol.81 The vacancies in the Opawa's stokehold 
were filled by volunteers and the ship sailed on 03 December.82 
After the second appearance of the Opawa's firemen in the Wellington 
Magistrate's Court on 02 December there were no further prosecutions for 
desertion or similar offences related to the strike. 83 On 06 December about 
twenty of the firemen on the S.S. Kia Ora attempted to leave their ship the 
evening before it departed for London. They rushed the gangway, but were 
'beaten back' by four policemen and the officers and some of the engineers of 
the Kia Ora. The police then 'threatened to draw their batons if further 
provocation was given.' One of the firemen was particularly determined to 
leave the ship. He leapt from the ship's rail to the wharf (a drop of between 
80 The Dominion, 03 December 1913, p.8, col. 4; and 03 February 1914, p.8, 
col. 5; and Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 
1913 to 02 December 1913, prosecution no.s 6178 to 6191. 
81 The Dominion, 03 February 1914, p.8, col.5. Also see col.4 on the same page. 
82 The Dominion, 02 December 1913, p.6, col. 4 and 04 December 1913, p.8, 
col. 6. Also see The Dominion's editorial entitled 'Unfulfilled Predictions' 
(04 December 1913, p.6, cols. 5-6). The Dominion, 04 December 1913, p.8, col. 6, 
stated that 'practically all' of the Opawa's replacement firemen were farmers. 
83 On 05 December four seamen from the S.S. Canada Cape were prosecuted for 
wilful disobedience of the lawful commcmds of the master of their ship on 05 
December. These charges appear to have had no connection with the strike. 'Mr. P. 
Levi, who appeared for Captain Friend', stated in court 'that the four men had flatly 
refused duty. There was no reason to think that their action had anything to do with 
the strike.' (The Dominion, 06 December 1913, p.14, col. 3). 
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eighteen and twenty feet). He landed on the wharf 'in a heap' and was taken 
to Hospital suffering from a broken ankle and several bruises. It is unclear, 
however, if the firemen were attempting to desert in sympathy with the New 
Zealand strikers when they rushed the gangway, or simply intended to 
temporarily leave the ship for a few hours in protest at their captain arbitrarily 
cancelling shore leave. 'The local officials of the [Shaw Savill shipping] 
company had been advised that certain proposals were about to be put 
before the firemen and trimmers, with the object of inducing them to leave 
their ship at the last moment, and thus prevent the Kia Ora leaving port. 
Realising that there would be trouble, the order went forth that all leave be 
stopped.' The confrontation was connected with the strike, but the actions the 
firemen would have taken if they had been successful in their attempt to leave 
the ship are uncertain. The Kia Ora left port at 5 a.m. the next morning with 
the 'whole' of its original crew. 84 
Earlier in the strike the employers of the crew of the R.M.S. Moana 
decided not to go through with the prosecution of the men who had walked off 
the ship on 07 November. Thirty-five warrants for arrest on the charge of 
desertion against the former seamen of the Moana were cancelled in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court on 21 November, and the charges against the 
two crewmen who had been arrested were withdrawn.85 Unlike the Corinthic, 
the Kia Ora, the Maunganui or the Opawa, the Moana operated on the New 
Zealand coastal trade and its crew were signed on under New Zealand 
articles. 
84 The Dominion, 08 December 1913, p.8, col. 4. 
85 Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 
1913, prosecution no.s 5914 to 5950. 
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In Sydney on 07 December warrants were issued for the arrest of the 
crew of the T ofua, who were under New Zealand articles, for a breach of 
those articles in giving twenty-four hours' notice in a foreign port. 86 The 
twenty-seven men were arrested, charged with desertion and remanded on 
bail. 87 On 11 December the Union Company withdrew the charges after the 
crew agreed to return to the ship and to forfeit the wages for the period of 
their absence from the ship.88 
Violent Vengeance against Strike Breakers 
Violence by strikers has been a frequent response to the introduction 
of free labour or replacement workers during industrial disputes. Examples 
from Australia, Britain, France, Ireland, and the United States have been 
described in Chapter Three and the motivations for such actions explored. 
Major industrial disputes in New Zealand have resulted in similar incidents. 
During the 1951 waterfront lockout a new union was formed in Auckland at a 
meeting on 28 April. While the new unionists were leaving this meeting one 
of the officials of the new union (who had been a deregistered unionist) was 
assaulted by a deregistered unionist still loyal to the old union.89 As shipping 
schedules were restored during the Seamen's Strike of 1922-1923 'unionists, 
who had earlier gathered to laugh at their queasy replacements, began to 
attack the "free labourers". Although the union stressed that picketing should 
86 
87 
88 
The Evening Post, 08 December 1913, p.8, col. 3. 
The Dominion, 10 December 1913, p.6, col. 4. 
The Dominion, 12 December 1913, p.6, col. 7. 
89 Young, 'The Activities and Problems of the Police in the 1951 Waterfront 
Dispute', pp.46-47. Also see Michael Bassett, Confrontation '51: The 1951 
Waterfront Dispute, (Wellington: A. H. and A. W. Reed, 1972), pp.l68-169 and 
246 concerning the assault on 28 April, and further assaults on 30 April, 01 May, and 
05 July 1951. 
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be peaceful, away from the police patrols there were several assaults on non-
union sailors.'9o In Wellington in connection with the 1890 Maritime Strike 
seven strikers were prosecuted in the Magistrate's Court for seven separate 
assaults against free labourers who had replaced the strikers on the 
wharves. 91 Lyttelton "scabs" and "blacklegs" (in colloquial terms) were also 
the victims of assault by unionists in 1890.92 
Although strike related violence in Wellington in 1913 was much more 
frequent than during the 1890 strike, it was rare for this violence to be 
directed against replacement workers. Only three assaults against strike-
breakers, or those suspected of being strike-breakers by their assailants, 
were prosecuted in the Magistrate's Court, numerically fewer than in 1890. In 
a fourth assault charge the victim was a storeman who had assisted a 
replacement worker. Two further instances of violence directed at strike-
90 John Walsh, 'The Seamen on Strike, 1922-1923', in Pat Walsh (ed), Trade 
Unions, Work and Society: The Centenary of the Arbitration System, 
(Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1994), p.99. Also see Walsh, pp.101-102: 
'In Lyttelton unionists [not involved in the dispute] from the overseas steamer 
Carpentaria, fuelled with a keg of beer won in a football game played against striking 
seamen, set about the "free labour" crew of the Union Company's Whangape with 
fists, sticks and iron bars.' 
91 The Evening Post, 12 September 1890, p.2, cols. 7-8; 16 September 1890, 
p.3, col. 2; 18 September 1890, p.3, col. 2; 29 September 1890, p.2, col. 9; 30 
September 1890, p.2, col. 9; 04 October 1890, p.2, col. 4; 07 October 1890, p.3, coLI; 
06 November 1890, p.3, cols. 1-2; and 07 November 1890, p.2, cols. 4, 5 and 9. Also 
see New Zealand Mail, 03 October 1890, pp.22, cols. 4-5, p.23, col. 3, p.27, col. 4, 
and p.30, col. 4. For a related incident which did not lead to a prosecution see The 
Evening Post, 20 October 1890, p.3, col. 2. 
92 Ian Arthur Merrett, 'A Reappraisal of the 1890 Maritime Strike in New 
Zealand', (unpublished MA thesis, University of Canterbury, 1969), pp.l76-178, and 
see pp.116-117. Also see Barry Thomson and Robert Neilson, Sharing the 
Challenge: A Social and Pictorial History of the Christchurch Police District, 
(Christchurch: J. C. Rowe and the Christchurch Police District History Book 
Committee, 1989), p.l28. 
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breakers were reported in The Dominion for which no charges were ever 
laid.93 
The assaults on "scabs" which were committed were of two distinct 
types, distinguished by the location of the violence, the type of "scabbing" the 
victims were involved in, and the regular occupations of the victims. 
In the first week of the strike the shipping companies sent small 
numbers of their clerks and other office workers to the wharves to load or 
unload their own vessels. On 24 October around twenty men were working 
cargo on three separate steamers. The response of rank-and-file striking 
watersiders was to break through the weak points in the police cordon of the 
wharf entrances, rush the wharves and steamers where cargo was being 
handled, and persuade the "free labourers" to halt their work. On 24 October 
two of these attempts at persuasion resulted in violence against "free 
labourers" whose regular occupations were as shipping clerks. One 
prosecution, conviction, and sentence of one month's imprisonment and a 
£50 bond to keep the peace followed, though the perpetrator of the second 
assault (by throwing a broken bottle which hit John Breen in the head) was 
never identified by the police. The Dominion reported a third separate violent 
incident on 24 October where blows were exchanged between members of 
the invading crowd and the "free labourers" wearing white shirts, but again no 
charges resulted. 94 
93 The relevant reports for the non-prosecuted assaults are The Dominion, 25 
October 1913, p.5, col. 8; 29 November 1913, p.6, col. 5; and 06 December 1913, p.6, 
col. 7. These incidents are described briefly on the current page of this chapter. 
94 For reports of the wharf rushes on 24 October and the resulting violence 
against free labourers see The Dominion, 25 October 1913, p.5, cois. 7-8, and p.6, 
cols. 2-3; 29 November 1913, p.6, col. 5; and 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 7; and The 
Evening Post, 24 October 1913, p.8, col. 3. Both The Dominion and The Evening 
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A second conviction for assault by a striker against a shipping clerk 
arose from the efforts of crowds of strikers on 24 October to prevent any free 
labouring on the wharves. In this case the victimised clerk was not working 
cargo, and had simply been out in the harbour in a launch. The motivation for 
the assault was the same as the other assaults on 24 October, though the 
selection of the target was less accurate. The assailant was sent to gaol for 
six weeks with no option of a fine. 95 
In each of the assaults against strike-breakers or those suspected of 
free labouring during the first week of the strike the location of the violence 
was on the wharves, the type of scabbing was the loading or unloading of 
cargo from steamers, and the victims were almost always clerks. Assaults 
against "scabs" later in the strike had none of these characteristics. 
The success of the rank-and-file strikers on 24 and 25 October 1913 in 
preventing work on the wharves through sheer numbers, intimidation and a 
small number of acts of violence would lay the basis for the eventual defeat of 
the strike. The disorder on the wharves on these two days provided the 
Government with the justification and public support to issue a call for special 
constables to protect the peace, guard the wharves and guard those willing to 
act as strike-breakers. 96 On 04 November more than 1,000 mounted specials 
and some 500 foot specials were available for duty.97 By the time a new 
Post use the term "free labourers" when describing these incidents. For a report of the 
related prosecution for assault see The Dominion, 03 December 1913, p.9, col. 1. 
95 The Dominion, 22 November 1913, p.6, col. 8 and p.7, col. 1. 
96 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.30S. 
97 Olssen, Red Feds, p.184. The 01 November issue of The Dominion (p.6, 
col. 8) reported that 'well over 1000 persons' had so far been enrolled as special 
constables, and that 'applications for enrolment will still be received'. Also see Hill, 
The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.308, 310 and 313. For studies of the regular 
occupations of those who enrolled as special constables in Christchurch see Moffat, 
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Arbitration union of waterside workers was registered on 06 November 1913 
the wharves were effectively sealed from incursions by strikers, unless the 
strikers were willing to use serious violence with the very real possibility of 
severe injuries and fatalities. 98 
The cordon of hundreds of special constables, many mounted, around 
the wharves made confrontations with strike-breaking wharf labourers while 
they were at work on the wharves almost impossible. The risks and effort 
needed were too high. The opportunity for hostile encounters away from the 
wharves was also severely limited. Until early December the majority of the 
Arbitration watersiders ate and slept on the wharves, or on steamers tied up 
at the wharves or at anchor in the harbour. 99 These factors help to explain 
, "Let all Hands Wade in with Batons" " especially pp.64-93; and Rachel Barrowman, 
'Who Were Massey's Cossacks?: The Social Composition of Special Constables 
Enlisted during the 1913 General Strike (A Study of Class Conflict)', (unpublished 
HIST 316 research essay, Victoria University of Wellington, 1983). Detailed studies 
of the regular occupations of the Wellington special constables have not yet been 
conducted. 
98 For descriptions of the regular and special police presence protecting the 
waterfront and the Arbitrationists see The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 4; 
08 November 1913, p.6, col. 5; and 10 November 1913, p.8, col. 2. 
99 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 4; 08 November 1913, p.7, col.6; 
19 November 1913, p.8, col. 5; 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 6 and p.9, col. 3; 24 
November 1913, p.6, col. 5; 25 November 1913, p.8, col. 4; 29 November 1913, p.6, 
col. 3; 02 December 1913, p.6, col. 5; 04 December 1913, p.8, col. 6; and 22 
December 1913, p.6, col. 1; and The Evening Post, 14 November 1913, p.7, col. 9; 
19 November 1913, p.8, col. 6; and 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 6. As late as 02 
December there were still about 800 Arbitrationists being accommodated on the 
wharves (The Dominion, 04 December 1913, p.8, col. 6). The number of 
Arbitrationists available for wharf labour on 02 December was about 1350. (The 
nominal total on the Arbitration Union's membership roll was 1751, with about 200 
of those on the roll at sea manning ships and another 200 having returned to their 
homes in the country. See The Dominion, 02 December 1913, p.6, col. 5, and 03 
December 1913, p.8, col. 5). A week later the Employers, Farmers, and Citizens' 
Defence Committee reported that they were providing accommodation on the 
waterfront for 400 Arbitrationists (The Evening Post, 10 December 1913, p.8, col. 3). 
The provision of wharf and houseboat accommodation for the Arbitrationist wharf 
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the rather surprising feature of prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's 
Court, that no Arbitrationist watersiders appeared as the victims of violent 
crime during the strike. The most serious offences against Arbitrationist 
watersiders brought to the court's attention were a few instances of verbal 
abuse and obscene language. 1oo 
With the resumption of work on the wharves a different group of strike-
breakers, carters and drivers, became viable targets for the expression of 
frustration, and occasionally for violence. On 11 November the Wellington 
Drivers' Union responded to the United Federation of Labour's call for a 
general strike in Wellington. 101 From the outset there were non-union drivers 
and other volunteers willing to transport the "black" cargo handled by the 
Arbitration watersiders, as well as former unionists who left the striking union 
and formed their own separate Arbitration drivers' union. 102 These strike-
breakers could not stay behind the protective cordon of special constables at 
the wharves, they had to deliver the cargo throughout the city, and this made 
labourers only ended on 23 December, after the strike had been called off (The 
Dominion, 22 December 1913, p.6, col. 1). 
100 See The Dominion, 15 November 1913, p.6, col. 8; and The New Zealand 
Times, 08 December 1913, p.8, col. 4. Other incidents against Arbitrationists 
(including strikers who had returned to work) were reported by the newspapers, but no 
prosecutions followed. For examples see The Evening Post, 07 November 1913, p.8, 
col. 1 (Arbitrationists working in the hold of the steamer Willochra were pelted with 
coal by members of the ship's crew); and The Dominion, 04 December 1913, p.8, 
col. 3 (intimidation by strike pickets towards the wife of a striker who had returned to 
work, though it is not clear if the ex-striker was a wharf labourer or a driver). 
101 The Dominion, 11 November 1913, p.6, col. 6 and p.9, col. 8 
102 See The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 3; 14 November 1913, p.9, 
col. 5; 15 November 1913, p.6, col. 7; 17 November 1913, p.8, col. 5; 18 November 
1913, p.9, col. 1; 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 7; 24 November 1913, p.6, col. 3; 25 
November 1913, p.8, cols. 3 and 5; 28 November 1913, p.8, col. 3; and 04 December 
1913, p.8, col. 3; The Evening Post, 18 November 1913, p.8, cols. 2 and 7; 19 
November 1913, p.8, cols. 2, 5 and 7; 20 November 1913, p.8, cols. 1 and 6; and 27 
November 1913, p.8, col. 3; and New Zealand Truth, 15 November 1913, p.6, col. 5 
(2nd version of this issue on the microfilm). 
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them vulnerable to being stopped by strikers and others who wished to 
"persuade" them to cease work. 103 
Sometimes these exchanges between those who supported the strike 
and those whose work was defeating the strike became violent. One charge 
of assault against a working driver was heard in the Magistrate's Court (a 
sentence of one month's imprisonment being imposed), and a storeman who 
assisted an amateur driver to back a horse up to a platform on 24 November 
was the victim in a separate assault case. The first assault prosecution was 
the outcome of a crowd of strikers and their sympathisers stopping and 
interfering with a working driver, his horse and cart on 19 November. The 
second assault was by a striking driver acting alone. 104 On at least one other 
occasion (again on 19 November) violence arising from a confrontation 
between a crowd and a working driver was averted by the arrival of a squad of 
mounted special constables, and no charges were laid. 105 
One further prosecution was related to the expression of hostility by 
strikers against "scabbing" drivers: a conviction for the use of insulting words 
with intent to provoke a breach of the peace on 19 November. The accused 
103 John Crawford, 'Overt and Covert Military Involvement in the 1890 Maritime 
Strike and 1913 Waterfront Strike in New Zealand', Labour History, no. 60, May 
1991, p. 77, commented that mounted special constables were used to escort carters 
who were breaking the strike. Also see The Dominion, 26 November 1913, p.8, col. 
5. It is apparent from the prosecutions and other newspaper reports of similar 
incidents discussed below that escorts were not provided for all carters all of the time. 
Also see The Evening Post, 20 November 1913, p.8, cols. 1,2 and 3. 
104 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 5; 21 November 1913, p.8, co1.8; 
08 December 1913, p.8, col. 5; and 09 December 1913, p.8, col. 8. Also see The 
Otago Daily Times, 01 December 1913, Summary For Europe, p.2, col. 6. 
105 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 4. 
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was a striking waterside worker, and this incident was separate from the two 
disturbances on the same date already described.106 
The enrolment of the special constables and their presence guarding 
the wharves changed a number of the characteristics of violent offences 
against strike-breakers. In each of the prosecuted assaults against strike-
breakers or-those who assisted them from 01 November to 20 December the 
location of the violence was on the streets of Wellington (usually some 
distance from the wharves), the type of scabbing was the transportation of 
cargo to or from the wharves, and the victims were working drivers or other 
blue collar workers who aided the scabs. One aspect of the assaults 
remained the same: the offenders were strikers or sympathisers with the 
strike. 
Assaults against replacement workers (whether defined as free 
labourers, Arbitration unionists, or the office workers of shipping companies 
unloading their own goods) were a more significant feature of court 
proceedings in South Island ports and at Sydney in 1913 than in Wellington. 
Reports of violence against strike-breakers and subsequent criminal 
proceedings formed a large proportion of all press reports published in The 
Dominion concerning strike-related crimes and court cases in Lyttelton, 
Dunedin and Sydney.107 Each of these areas did not experience the frequent 
confrontations between supporters of the strike and special constables which 
106 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 5; 21 November 1913, p.8, col.8; 
and 22 November 1913, p.7, col. 1. 
107 For examples see The Dominion, 10 November 1913, p.7, col. 6 (Dunedin); 
22 November 1913, p.7, col. 4 (Lyttellon); 24 November 1913, p.6, col. 8 and p.7, 
col. 1 (Lyttelton); 25 November 1913, p.8, col. 7 (Dunedin); 02 December 1913, p.6, 
col. 7 (Dunedin); 17 December 1913, p.8, col. 3 (Sydney); and 18 December 1913, 
p.6, col. 6 (Sydney). 
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kept the courts busy in both Wellington and Auckland, and this is reflected in 
the strike-related crime and court reports. 
Incidents such as William John Newman, a striker, using obscene 
language and striking William Miller, an Arbitrationist, on one of Dunedin's 
tramcars were more representative of overall strike-related crime and 
prosecution patterns in Dunedin, Lyttelton, Christchurch and Sydney than in 
Wellington or Auckland. 108 At Blackball an attempt was even made to burn 
down the home of the secretary of the new Arbitration miners union.109 More 
research is needed to determine the precise numbers and seriousness of 
criminal incidents against strike-breakers in each of these regions (excluding 
Wellington). 
In Wellington, reports of insulting language and violence against 
Arbitrationist watersiders became more frequent after the strike was defeated 
than during it. With ex-strikers and Arbitrationists working together on the 
wharves there was the opportunity for direct confrontations and conflict, 
opportunities which had been extremely limited while the strike was still in 
progress. For example, James Wallace, an ex-striker who had resumed work 
on the wharves on 23 December 1913, was imprisoned for fourteen days for 
setting upon, knocking down, and kicking an elderly Arbitrationist wharf 
labourer on 23 December. 11o Two weeks later a confrontation on King's 
108 The Dominion, 17 December 1913, p.8, col. 1. For reports of similar assaults 
see The Otago Daily Times, 13 December 1913, p.10, col. 4. For reports of other 
types of offences by strikers against strike-breakers see The Dominion, 01 December 
1913, p.8, col. 8; and 02 December 1913, p.6, col. 7; and The Otago Daily Times, 12 
December 1913, p.6, col. 2. 
109 l'hc Dominion, 29 December 1913, p.S, col. 1. The Blackball miners did not 
end their strike until the first week of January 1914 (Roth, Trade Unions, p.39). 
110 The Evening Post, 24 December 1913, p.7, col. 2. The victim of this assault 
had been a striking watersider but had returned to work while the strike was still in 
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Wharf between groups of ex-strikers and Arbitrationists resulted in allegations 
of insulting language, threatening behaviour and assault. 111 Relatively few 
criminal charges were laid concerning such incidents. 112 Difficulty in 
identifying perpetrators and obtaining sufficient evidence hindered 
prosecution, as The Dominion noted with regret on 06 January 1914.113 The 
employers of wharf labour also preferred to take immediate action in 
connection with relatively minor incidents rather than refer the matters to the 
police. Those who were caught using verbal abuse towards Arbitrationists 
(often involving the word "scab") were dismissed from their work assignments 
for the day.114 
progress. The accused was also convicted of using insulting language with intent to 
provoke a breach of the peace concerning the same assault. 
III The Dominion, 27 January 1914, p.9, cols. 4-5. The date of the disturbance 
was 09 January 1914. After the defeat of the 1922-1923 New Zealand Seamen's 
Strike similar types of intimidation and harassment were used by ex -strikers against 
those strike.:breakers who continued to work. For a useful analysis of these incidents 
see Walsh, 'The Seamen on Strike, 1922-1923', pp.106-107; and also see p.102. The 
secretary of the (Arbitrationist) Timaru Wharf Labourers' Union was also the victim 
of obscene language, assault and intimidation in the months following the defeat of 
the Timaru watersiders strike of May to June 1913 (see the police file on the 
secretary's complaint to the Minister of Justice concerning the leniency of the Timaru 
magistrate against those who had committed offences against him - in 1913 Strike -
Prosecution File - Archives New Zealand - AAAC, W3539 / 52f). 
112 For examples of prosecutions see footnotes 110 and 111 above, and The 
Dominion, 31 January 1914, p.14, col. 2; and 10 February 1914, p.11, col. 5. For 
examples of post-strike insulting language and violence which did not result in 
prosecutions see The Dominion, 01 January 1914, pA, col. 8; 05 January 1914, p.6, 
col. 4; 06 January 1914, p.7, col. 3; 07 January 1914, p.6, col. 2; and 09 February 
1914, p.8, cols. 2-3. 
113 The Dominion, 06 January 1914, p.7, col. 3. Also see the memorandum from 
the Commissioner of Police to The Hon. Minister of Justice dated 04 March 1914 
concerning an Arbitrationist wharf worker having been struck by a piece of coal (in 
1913 Strike - Prosecution File - Archives New Zealand - AAAC, W3539 /52f). The 
Commissioner concluded: 'In the circumstances no action can be taken against any 
person owing to lack of evidence, but no doubt the fact that the police have made 
enquiries in the matter will make evil disposed persons more cautious in future.' 
114 The Dominion, 01 January 1914, pA,colsA-5; and 06 January 1914, p.7,col.3. 
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There is some evidence that post-strike retribution against 
Arbitrationists may also have been enacted through theft. To reward those 
who had joined the Arbitration union by 08 December 1913 these watersiders 
were given a right of preference in obtaining any available casual work. The 
proof of preference was a badge. 115 In January 1914 a number of 
Arbitrationists had their preference badges stolen. 116 The thief or thieves may 
have been motivated by an interest in gaining preference in employment. It 
also seems plausible that at least some of these thefts were acts of revenge. 
There was continuing overt hostility between ex-strikers and Arbitrationists. 
Most of those who did not have preference badges were ex-strikers, very few 
of whom would have wanted their fellow workers to consider them to be 
"scabs". In addition, the theft of the badges was an effective "punishment" of 
the Arbitrationist victims, due to the Arbitration union policy of not replacing 
badges which were lost or otherwise disappeared. 117 
Protest Against the State through Crime 
Sergt. M'Glone gave evidence as to the riot at the Post and Telegraph Stores, 
Waterloo Quay, on October 30. He said that a mob of about one thousand 
had rushed along from Post Office Square, and broke down about half a 
chain of the fence round the yard in which special constables and their horses 
were stationed. Many of the mob were armed with stones and pieces of 
wood, and he saw four men with revolvers. Before the crowd got to the 
horses the special men mounted and galloped away in a shower of missiles. 
115 The Evening Post, 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 3; The New Zealand Times, 
09 December 1913, p.5, col. 7; The Dominion, 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 3 and 
p.7, col. 2; 18 December 1913, p.6, col. 3; 23 December 1913, p.6, col. 1; and 24 
December 1913, p.6, cols. 1 and 6. 
116 The Dominion, 16 January 1914, p.8, col. 2. 
117 Concerning the non-replacement of preference badges see The Dominion, 16 
January 1914, p.8, col. 2. 
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Vile epithets were called out after them. Several police were injured in the 
affair. 
Evidence given by Police Sergeant McGlone on 05 December 1913 in 
support of the application for sureties of the peace against Robert Semple 118 
Employers and strike-breakers were not the only potential target for 
expressions of working class (and especially unionist) hostility during the 
strike. The State, through its governing bodies and the enforcers of its laws, 
the police and the military, was also perceived to be aiding the employers of 
the striking waterfront workers. 
The most publicly visible aspect of the State's intervention, in what was 
in basis an industrial dispute, was the recruitment of special constables, the 
conferment upon them of legal authority to use force and make arrests, and 
their use in often violent and confrontational roles. Nearly 2000 special 
constables were enrolled in Wellington. Their official role was to protect civil 
order by preventing or controlling disturbances by strikers and their 
sympathisers. The special constables also guarded the waterfront alongside 
the regular police. Their presence and actions aided the defeat of the strike 
by allowing cargo handling to resume on the wharves. 119 
The response of strikers in Australia, Britain, France, Ireland, Italy and 
the United States to similar State intervention has often been violent (as 
discussed in Chapter Three). Wellington strikers and their sympathisers also 
used violence and crime as protest against the State's actions in 1913. 
Violence against regular police and special constables formed the 
majority of all strike related violence against the person prosecutions in 
118 The Dominion, 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 5. 
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Wellington (25 out of 39 cases - 64.10%), and nearly half of all such strike 
period offences (26 of 61 - 42.62%).120 When rioting and unlawful assembly 
charges are added to the violence against the person prosecutions the 
proportions rise to 74.63 per cent for strike related offences (50 out of 67 
cases) and 57.30 per cent for all strike period violence against the person (51 
of 89).121 The frequency of violence against law enforcers was substantially 
greater than in the two years before the strike, as was their proportion of all 
victims of violence against the person. Between 01 October 1911 and 17 
October 1913 only twelve assaults against police constables were 
prosecuted, constituting 6.35% of all (189) assault prosecutions; compared to 
nineteen assaults out of 40 (47.50%) in the strike period. 122 
Special constables were the victims in fourth-fifths of the strike related 
violence against the person directed at the enforcers of the law (40 out of 50 
cases - 80%) and 44.94% of all strike period violence against the person (40 
of 89).123 Stone throwing was the prevalent type of violence inflicted upon the 
specials. Other violent acts ranged from the throwing of a mug of beer to the 
119 See Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.305-314, 320-321 and 322. 
Also see pp.189-190 in the current thesis; and The Dominion, 12 February 1914, p.6, 
col. 1 (statement by the prosecutor during a Supreme Court trial related to the strike). 
120 See Tables 4 (p.160) and 5 (p.161) for the breakdown of the specific strike 
related charges and Tables 1 (p.154) and 3 (pp.156-157) for the strike period charges. 
121 In 28 of the 30 riot or unlawful assembly charges the victims were persons, in 
the two remaining charges the target was property (in both instances the Royal Tiger 
Hotel). No information on the victims in these cases is provided by the Criminal 
Record Books but their identity has been found from the newspaper reports of the 
disturbances, arrests, hearings and trials. 
122 Common assault was the only violence against the person charge with 
policemen as victims prosecuted in the two year pre-strike period. No special 
constables were the victims of violence before the strike. Excluding private 
prosecutions the police were the victims in twelve of 101 (11.88%) prosecuted 
assaults, compared with nineteen assaults out of 36 (52.78%) during the strike. 
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intention to do grievous bodily harm with a firearm.124 Most of the charges (25 
of 40 - 62.50%) arose from the "riots" of 29 October, 30 October (two 
separate riots) and 05 November. These four riots were a direct response to, 
and acts of protest against, the presence of the specials in Wellington. 125 
Eight further charges concerned violence against specials as they were 
returning to their barracks in Mount Cook after a day of guarding the 
waterfront, or against the small groups of specials patrolling the public 
thoroughfares bordering on the waterfront. 126 
Special constables were also frequent targets for insulting or obscene 
language and threatening behaviour. Seventeen of the 34 (50%) strike-
related prosecutions for obscene language or insulting words with intent to 
provoke a breach of the peace were for insults directed at specials, as were 
four of the six charges (66.67%) concerning strike related threatening 
behaviour which did not lead to violence. 127 Ten of these seventeen 
language offences involved the use of the term "scab", in insults such as "You 
123 In two of these cases the victims were a mixture of regular police and special 
constables. For a breakdown of all offences against special constables see Appendix 5, 
section a) Crimes Against Special Constables. 
124 See The Dominion, 18 November 1913, p.9, col. 3 concerning the mug of 
beer case; and 27 November 1913, p.9, col. 2 and 05 February 1914, p.9, cols.5-6 with 
regard to the firearm charge. 
125 For a valuable analysis ofthese riots and their causes see Hill, The Iron Hand 
in the Velvet Glove, pp.308-314 and 320. Also see the relevant newspaper reports. 
The Dominion, 06 November 1913, p.8, col. 3, for example, notes the strong 
resentment of the crowd of strikers and others in Featherston Street to the appearance 
of the special constables in the streets of Wellington the previous afternoon. 
126 For examples see The Dominion, 08 November 1913, p.6, col. 5; 
20 November 1913, p.8, col. 4 and p.9, cols. 5-6; 21 November 1913, p.8, col. 8 to 
p.9, col. 1; 05 December 1913, p.8, col. 3; and 10 December 1913, p.6, col. 5. 
127 Threatening behaviour and threatening behaviour with intent to provoke a 
bleach of the peace (as listed above and in Tables 3 and 5) are considered to be 
different types of offences than threatening behaviour whereby a breach of the peace 
was occasioned (i.e. where violence actually resulted from the provocation). Those 
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dirty scab" and "You are a b***** lot of scabs, and not men." Expletives were 
often used in conjunction with the word "scab", but not in every case. 128 As 
with the stone throwing and other violence the use of "scab", other derogatory 
phrases, and threatening behaviour were overt acts of protest against the 
presence of the special constables in Wellington and their role in aiding the 
defeat of the strike. 129 
Strike related offences against the regular police were relatively 
uncommon. The combined total of prosecutions for violence against the 
person (twelve), offensive language (three) and threatening behaviour (two) 
directed at the regular police was seventeen charges, compared to 61 for the 
equivalent offences against special constables. 13o 
The strike related violence which involved the regular police as victims 
usually arose from their efforts to protect special constables from violent 
attacks (e.g. the Post and Telegraph Stores riot and the Whitcombe and 
Tombs bookshop riot), or protect those who had aided the special constables 
and incurred the wrath of those hostile to the specials (e.g. the Royal Tiger 
Hotel riots). The throwing of stones, hunks of iron and other missiles (similar 
incidents where violence did occur are included in the violent crimes category in this 
thesis (see Tables 1 and 4). 
128 Special constables were the victims in a large proportion (45.45% - 10 of 22) 
of all prosecutions involving the term "scab". 
129 For examples of similar incidents in other New Zealand ports see The 
Dominion, 14 November 1913, p.6, col. 7 (Auckland); 27 November 1913, p.8, col. 8 
(Auckland); and The Evening Post, 28 November 1913, p.8, col. 5 (Christchurch). 
In at least one additional Auckland case one of those convicted for insulting specials 
was a union official (see The Dominion, 26 November 1913, p.9, col. 2). 
130 The two totals above both include the two riot charges where both regular 
police and special constables were the victims. 
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to that described by Sergeant McGlone and quoted on pp.196-197) was the 
most frequent type of violence inflicted upon the regular police. 131 
The prevalence of the specials among the victims of prosecuted 
violence is not slJrprisinq, /lor is the context 8nr/ rel8thfP infreqllency of 
offences against the permanent police. The presence of the specials was 
widely resented among strikers and their sympathisers. In contrast, the 
regular police were perceived by the strike leaders and many of the rank-and-
file strikers as potential allies. The majority of the rank and file police came 
from blue collar backgrounds and earlier in 1913 an attempt to form a police 
union had been repressed by Police Commissioner Cullen and Minister of 
Justice Herdman through the use of 'punishment' transferrals and forced 
resignations. 132 Speakers at strike meetings repeatedly urged strikers not to 
molest or interfere with the regular police. 133 This advice did not extend to the 
131 For examples see The Dominion, OS November 1913, p.7, col. 4; 06 
November 1913, p.8, cols. Sand 6; 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 6; 18 November 
1913, p.9, col. 2; 28 November 1913, p.9, col. 4; OS February 1914, p.9, cols. 4-S; and 
07 February 1914, p.6, col. 3. Concerning the Whitcombe and Tombs riot especially 
see The Evening Post, 31 October 1913, p.7, cols. 8-9; and The Dominion, 29 
November 1913, p.6, col. S. 
132 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.296-303 and 320-321. For the 
previous occupations of police recruits also see 'The Police Force of the Dominion 
(Annual Report On)' in the Appendix to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives of New Zealand (henceforth AJHR): 1911, H-16, p.6; 1912, H-16, 
p.S; 1913, H-16, p.S; 1914, H-16, p.S. For example, included among the 324 men 
taken on throughout New Zealand from 01 April 1910 to 31 March 1914 were 102 ex-
constables, 72 labourers, 31 farm labourers, 12 blacksmiths, and 9 miners (figures 
-~ 
compiled from yearly recruitment numbers published in AJHR, 1911-1914, H-16, 
pages as above). For further evidence of the strike leaders trying to gain the sympathy 
of the regular police see the two references provided by Olssen, Red Feds, p.266, 
note 50. 
133 For examples see The Evening Post, 27 October 1913, p.3, cols. 4-S; and 31 
October 1913, p.8, col. 1; and The Dominion, 03 November 1913, p.9, col. 5. 
Another reason for avoiding confrontations with the police was expressed by E. E. 
Canham, president of the Auckland Waterside Workers' Union. On 29 October, in 
Post Office Square, Canham called on the Wellington strikers 'not to come into 
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specials, as the chair of the strikers' meetings made clear on 02 November: 
, "Anyone who interfered with the duties of the permanent police is helping to 
defeat the waterside workers", said Mr. Bailey. "The permanent police only", 
he added, and the crowd laughed.'134 
Rank-and-file strikers usually heeded their leaders' words. Strike 
pickets helped rescue one foot policeman from the mob during the 
Whitcombe and Tombs riot on 30 October, and held back a crowd while 
regular constables struggled with two drunken seamen who were resisting 
arrest in Post Office Square on 27 October. 135 On 04 November a crowd 
initiated a vigorous fusillade of stones against the Royal Tiger Hotel about 
7.30 p.m. 'The police, including two mounted men, now arrived on the scene. 
The mounted men were subjected to a short fire of stones, but the majority of 
the mob quickly suppressed this. "We don't want to stone our own 
constables", was the cry.'136 That strikers and their allies during the 
Featherston Street riot on 05 November openly shouted 'Leave the blue 
police alone, go for the specials' was commented on by Colonel Heard, 
commander of the New Zealand Military Forces during the strike. 137 
conflict with the police. Not that he had any respect for law and order, but because he 
did not want to see a repetition of the fatal affair at Waihi' of November 1912. (The 
Evening Post, 29 October 1913, p.8, cols. 2-3. The quote is from col. 3). 
134 The Dominion, 03 November 1913, p.8, col. 8. 
135 The Evening Post, 31 October 1913, p.7, col. 9; and The Dominion, 28 
October 1913, p.8, cols. 1-2, and 29 October 1913, p.5, col. 5. In the disturbance on 
27 October neither of the troublesome seamen were in any way connected with the 
strike. 
136 The Dominion, 05 November 1913, p.7, col. 4. 
137 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.321. For further evidence of the 
general lack of hostility and violence towards the regular police, especially in 
comparison with that towards the special constables, see the references in Crawford, 
'Overt and Covert Military Involvement', p.80, footnote 110 (though there appears to 
be a printing error in the main text related to this footnote). For an example of strikers 
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Those accused of strike related violence and language offences 
against special constables and the regular police were predominantly strikers 
or sympathisers with unskilled blue collar jobs. Of the 52 men and one 
woman prosecuted for such charges twenty-one (39.62%) are identifiable as 
strikers (nineteen striking watersiders, one seaman on strike, and one wife of 
a striking watersider). Another nineteen individuals (35.85%) had occupations 
which suggests they may have been strikers, but insufficient evidence has 
been found to determine whether or not they actually were strikers (seven 
labourers, eight seamen, two firemen, and two drivers).138 Among the 
remainder of the accused were six skilled workers and one clerk.139 Only two 
accused (one tram motorman and one non-striking driver) are known to have 
stated in court that they were not in sympathy with the strike. 140 
The occupations and roles in the strike of those prosecuted for 
offences against special constables followed the overall pattern described 
in Christchurch cheering the regular police see The Dominion, 26 November 1913, 
p.9, col. 3. 
138 The source of the occupations of these seven labourers was the New Zealand 
Police Gazette, which extremely rarely distinguishes in its entries between labourers 
and wharf labourers. Of all accused studied in this thesis for offences between 1911 
and 1913 only four are identified as wharf labourers in the Police Gazette, though it is 
known from newspaper reports that at least 30 were watersiders. Most (twenty) of 
these other accused are described in the Police Gazette as labourers. 
139 For a complete listing of the occupations and role in the strike of the 53 
accused see Appendix 6. 
140 The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 6; 16 December 1913, p.6, col.4; 
07 February 1914, p.6, col. 3; and New Zealand Police Gazette, 1913, p.752. The 
attitude of the accused to the strike is rarely stated in the newspaper court reports. 
The Dominion only mentions sympathy or lack of in three cases (the two described 
above, and concerning a non-striking seaman who commented he was sympathetic 
towards the strikers: 10 February 1914, p.9, col. 4 and 17 November 1913, p.8, col. 3). 
The description "striker" appears to have been sufficient when needed. Each of the 
not in sympathy with the strike statements were presented as part of the accused's 
defence, and it would seem logical for most (if not all) of those who could use this 
defence to have used it. Given the unusual and unexpected nature of a lack of support 
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above almost exactly (as can be seen in Appendix 6b). In the strike related 
cases with regular police as the victims the absence of any skilled workers 
among the accused is noticeable (see Appendix 6c). The significance, if any, 
of this difference is unknown. 
Prosecutions for offences against the authority of the state were a 
prominent feature of the court cases arising from the strike. Eight strike 
leaders were brought before the Wellington courts in relation to statements 
they made during public speeches to strikers. Robert Semple was charged 
with inciting persons to resist constables for his comments on 01 November 
(two days before the alleged attempted murder of Police Commissioner 
Cullen): 
Cullen is sheltering in an office, and will not be seen leading the men. I hope 
that there is no shooting, but if any is done, and Cullen will come out, I 
undertake to shoot him first. 141 
George Bailey was prosecuted for inciting persons to commit a breach of the 
peace for using on 29 October the following words concerning the grooms 
attending the horses of the mounted constables: "Any persons who know the 
grooms should try to induce them to cease work. You could drop a few 
matches or indulge in a little sabotage which is the latest method of industrial 
warfare.'.142 The authorities deemed such comments to be inflammatory, and 
for the strike it would seem likely that all (or nearly all) such comments would be 
reported. 
141 The official wording of the charge as reported In The Dominion, 20 
November 1913, p.9, col. 4. 
142 The official wording of the charge as reported In The Dominion, 20 
November 1913, p.9, col. 4. The other strike leaders prosecuted in Wellington in 
November 1913 were Thomas Barker, Peter Fraser, Harry Holland, and William 
Thomas Young. In mid-December 1913 Hubert Armstrong and Edward Hunter 
appeared before the Wellington Magistrate's Court. None of the eight strike leaders 
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therefore unacceptable during a period of disorder and heightened social 
tension. 143 In all seventeen charges were laid for seditious utterances, or 
inciting violence, disorder and other illegal acts (see Appendix 5, s8ction d). 
The extent to which most of the orators intended their speeches to be 
inflammatory was probably low. The problematic speeches were more acts of 
verbal protest and defiance against the actions and attitude of the Reform 
Government, and fiery rhetoric to hearten and entertain the strikers, than a 
call for revolution. The strike leaders knew that actual violence would only 
harm the strikers' cause and lose the public sympathy and support which was 
needed for a successful resolution of the dispute. 144 In addition, Erik Olssen 
has argued that the leaders of the United Federation of Labour (William 
Thomas Young and Pat Hickey) were extremely concerned in late October 
1913 over their lack of control 'over the obstreperous wharfies, whose 
confidence was unbounded. In order to retain some influence their rhetoric 
became more fiery.,145 A number of the more ardent Socialists among the 
were charged with any offence which was not connected with speeches they had made 
to strikers. 
143 See The Dominion, 05 December 1913, p.8, cols. 4-5; 06 December 1913, 
p.6, cols. 4-6; 12 February 1914, p.6, col. 1; and 13 February 1914, pA, cols. 1-2. 
144 See The Evening Post, 31 October 1913, p.8, col. 1; and The Dominion, 29 
November 1913, p.6, col. 7. Also see The Dominion, 12 February 1914, p.6, cols.I-2 
(Edward Hunter's first Supreme Court trial, of two, for using seditious words). 
145 Olssen, Red Feds, p.182. William Thomas Young was prosecuted in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court on three charges relating to a single speech he gave at 
the Basin Reserve, Wellington, on 26 October 1913. On the charge of inciting diverse 
unknown persons to resist constables he was found guilty by Magistrate Riddell and 
sentenced to three months imprisonment and to enter a bond of £250, with two 
sureties of £250 each. (Young served this sentence from 02 February 1914 to 01 May 
1914 following an unsuccessful appeal to the Supreme Court). After the initial 
conviction for inciting the charge asking for sureties of the peace was withdrawn by 
the police, though Riddell made the unusual decision to impose sureties anyway as 
part of the sentence for the first charge. The third charge was uttering certain 
seditious words, for which Young was convicted by a jury (with a strong 
recommendation to mercy) at his second trial on 15 May 1914. (The jury had been 
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speakers may have hoped that their words might spark an anti-capitalist 
uprising, but even they would have been extremely surprised if such had been 
the outcome. 
Unlike violence against the person, insulting language, threatening 
behaviour and public speeches, crimes involving theft and violence against 
property were not used as forms of protest or reprisal against the State. Only 
one theft (of £2 of brass fittings from the New Zealand Government's Railway 
Workshops at Petone) and two incidents of property damage (of a police cell 
door and a window in a police station, respectively) involved the State. None 
of these three offences was strike related. 146 
In at least two strike related Wellington court cases the defendants and 
some of the defence witnesses committed perjury. On 10 December 1913 
Arthur Hodkinson, a waterside worker who was on strike, was charged with 
having assaulted certain special constables during the Featherston Street riot 
of 05 November. The prosecution alleged that Hodkinson had thrown a stone 
at the specials. 'Hodkinson denied that he had been in Featherston Street at 
the time of the riot. He added that he had been at his boardinghouse in Lome 
unable to agree on a verdict at his first trial on 19 February 1914). After an 
unsuccessful appeal' to the Court of Appeal Young was treated leniently by the 
sentencing judges (Chief Justice Stout and Justice Hosking). He was not imprisoned, 
but only ordered to come up for sentence when called upon (that is, he would only 
reappear before the Court if he committed another offence). (The Dominion, 29 
November 1913, p.6, cols. 4-6; 05 December 1913, p.8, cols. 4-5; 03 February 1914, 
p.ll, col. 6; 20 February 1914, p.10, cols. 5-6; 16 May 1914, p.6, cols. 1-2; and 
11 August 1914, p.9, col. 5; and New Zealand Police Gazette, 1914, pp.316 and 
468). Pat Hickey was not prosecuted in Wellington. 
146 The Dominion, 12 November 1913, p.10, col. 4; 17 December 1913, p.11, 
col. 5; and 13 January 1914, p.ll, col. 5. For some unknown reason The Dominion 
reports George Walsh's damage of the police cell door in the strike related crime 
section, though no connection with the strike is mentioned in the report and the 
offence has all the characteristics of similar offences by extremely drunk individuals 
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Street when the disturbance occurred. He called three strikers to support his 
statements.' Under cross examination one of the defence witnesses admitted 
that he had seen the accused at the place the prosecution witnesses stated 
that Hodkinson had thrown the stone from. When this witness was asked 
"were you throwing stones?" he refused to answer on the grounds that he 
might incriminate himself. When subsequently asked if he had seen the 
accused throwing stones he replied: "I decline to answer". Magistrate Riddell 
concluded "I think the defendant has committed perjury", and convicted 
Hodkinson.147 
On 21 November 1913 another striking watersider, Walter Burton, 
admitted lying under oath concerning his throwing of stones during the 
Featherston Street riot. Burton was prosecuted on two charges related to two 
sepqrate offences during the Featherston Street riot. The more serious 
charge, taking part in a riot, was dealt with first. The prosecution witnesses 
testified that Burton had thrown stones at the special constables. No 
evidence was presented by the defence and Burton pleaded not guilty. He 
was committed to the Supreme Court for trial. The second charge concerned 
an assault on a bystander who had been watching the parade of the specials. 
The bystander, E. V. Bevan, had smacked and sent away a telegraph 
messenger boy who he had seen throwing stones. Burton and three or more 
others had objected to Bevan's action by attacking him. They committed a 
prolonged assault on Bevan involving dozens of blows, some of which were 
before the strike. This case is therefore considered throughout this thesis as not 
related to the strike. 
147 The Dominion, 11 December 1913, p.8, col. 5. Hodkinson was fined £4, with 
the alternative of fourteen days imprisonment, and was required to enter into a bond of 
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inflicted while Bevan was jammed against a wall and his arms were held. In 
the course of the hearing of this summary charge Burton lied under oath and 
a few minutes later admitted he had lied: 
[Chief Detective Broberg - the prosecutor] Did you find any stones? 
[Burton] - "No." 
Did you throw any stones? - "No." 
You heard the witnesses swear that you threw stones? - "Yes." 
Were they lying? 
Burton hesitated. 
The Chief Detective: Yes or No? 
Mr. Dickson [Burton's lawyer]: I don't think this is fair. 
The Magistrate: It is quite fair. He might be charged with perjury. 
The Chief Detective: Yes or No? 
Burton: No! 
The Chief Detective: They told the truth? 
Burton: Yes. 
The Chief Detective: You threw stones? 
Burton: Yes. 148 
Burton was then convicted of assaulting Bevan and sentenced to six weeks 
imprisonment. 149 When the rioting charge came before the Supreme Court 
Burton changed his plea to guilty and was sent to prison for eight months. 15o 
Richard Jones's court hearing on 17 November also appears to have 
involved perjury by defence witnesses. Jones, a striking wharf labourer, was 
charged with assaulting a mounted constable during the disturbance in Post 
Office Square on 30 October. Jones 'swore that he was not in the Square at 
£40, with two sureties of £20 each, to keep the peace for six months (The Dominion, 
11 December 1913, p.8, col. 5). Hodkinson was not prosecuted for perjury. 
148 The Dominion, 22 November 1913, p.6, col. 8. 
149 The Dominion, 22 November 1913, p.6, col. 8. For Burton's occupation see 
The Evening Post, 14 November 1913, p.7, col. 9. Burton was not prosecuted for 
perJury. 
150 The Dominion, 03 February 1914, p.8, col.5; and 09 February 1914, p.3,col.4. 
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the time of the trouble. He asserted that he was in the four-penny bar of the 
Pier Hotel. Accused was then cross-examined by Chief-Detective Broberg, 
and some of his statements were afterwards contradicted by witnesses with 
whom he went into the Pier HoteL' Earlier in this prosecution Mr. Dickson, the 
lawyer for the defence, had cross-examined Detective Rawle and asked 'if he 
would swear that Jones was in the Square at 5.40 p.m.' Detective Rawle 
answered 'Yes'. Mr. Dickson continued, 'If I call two witnesses to say that he 
was not there, will you say they were lying?'. Detective Rawle replied 'Yes, 
they would be lying and committing perjury at that.' Magistrate Riddell 
convicted Jones and sentenced him to six weeks in gaol.151 
In a strike related prosecution heard in the Auckland Magistrate's Court 
on 26 November Magistrate Frazer stated 'the conclusion was irresistible that 
the four witnesses for the defence were guilty of perjury.' The accused was a 
waterside worker on strike who had been charged with using insulting 
language. He denied the charge. Three defence witnesses 'each swore 
positively that accused did not call out or address the complainant in any way. 
Each witness was cautioned that it was a serious matter, and were warned to 
be careful, because of the definite statements of witnesses for the 
lSI The Dominion, 18 November 1913, p.9, col. 2. For Jones's occupation and a 
critique of Magistrate Riddell's decision to convict in this case see New Zealand 
Truth, 22 November 1913, p.5, cols. 6-7 (1st version of this issue on the microfilm). 
In a further five Wellington prosecutions for strike related offences the magistrate 
refused to believe the alibis or claims of mistaken identity offered by the accused and 
convicted the accused. In these cases no comments concerning alleged perjury or 
false testimony were reported in the newspaper court reports. Four of the five accused 
were striking waterside workers. The fifth accused was an engine-driver at a timber 
yard who allegedly committed his offence (supplying rioters with missiles) while he 
was at work. See The Evening Post, 09 December 1913, p.7, col. 9 and p.8, col. 1; 
and The Dominion, 27 November 1913, p.9, cols. 2-3; 28 November 1913, p.9, col. 
3; and 04 December 1913, p.9, col. 8. For extra useful information on the occupation 
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prosecution, and the independent evidence of the police.' The accused was 
convicted and fined £3, with the default for non-payment set at fourteen days 
imprisonment. 152 
On 22 November Magistrate Frazer had reached the same conclusion 
concerning another Auckland strike related case. William Windsor, a cook 
and waiter, 'was charged with having used threatening behaviour in Symonds-
street. It was alleged accused, addressing a storekeeper who had interfered 
with a crowd chasing some men, remarked to other men: "Mark him boys," 
and "I'll do for you to-night." The allegations were denied by the accused and 
several witnesses. The Magistrate said he didn't believe the evidence for the 
defence. He was going to severely discourage any attempt at perjury.' A fine 
of £5 was imposed, with the alternative of fourteen days hard labour.153 
The heightened social tensions caused by the strike, the overt social 
conflict of the period, and the circumstances of each criminal incident suggest 
that some or many of those involved in giving false testimony were not simply 
trying to protect their friends or avoid being convicted. The individuals may 
have considered the prosecutions to be unjustified, even if there had been a 
technical violation of the law. The acts of perjury may have been protest 
against the authorities for proceeding with the specific prosecutions, and 
more generalised protest and defiance against the role of the state in the 
strike. Fear of an excessive or harsh penalty from the magistrate may also 
of one of the above accused see The New Zealand Times, 28 November 1913, p.8, 
col. 4. 
152 The Evening Post, 27 November 1913, p.3, col. 6. Also see the related report 
in The Dominion, 29 November 1913, pA, col. 7. 
153 The Evening Post, 22 November 1913, p.6, col. 3. For the name of the 
magistrate at this hearing, the occupation of the accused, and a more detailed report on 
the hearing see The New Zealand Herald, 24 November 1913, p.5, col. 4. 
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have influenced the decision to present false evidence. Though impossible to 
definitively prove, the possibility that perjury was used as protest against and 
in defiance of the authorities should not be overlooked. 154 
Explaining the Patterns of Violence and Verbal Abuse 
The analysis conducted in this chapter has demonstrated that while 
special constables were frequently victims of violence, there was very little 
violence against employers and strikebreakers. The lack of violence against 
strikebreakers is particularly surprising. The remainder of this chapter will 
suggest a number of possible explanations for these patterns of violence. 
The motivation for the violence against special constables has already 
been discussed above. A brief summary here will suffice. Strikers and their I 
! 
sympathisers believed that the special constables had volunteered to help 
defeat the strike, and that the presence of the specials would harm the 
success of the strike. Stone throwing, other forms of violence, verbal abuse: 
and threatening behaviour were used as acts of protest against the specials. 
The sheer number of special constables, their marches through and 
patrols on the streets of Wellington, and the ease of identifying who was a 
special by simply looking for a horse or a baton allowed considerable 
opportunity for violence and abuse. The only consideration for many 
154 It is possible that the perjury in some of these cases was committed by the 
prosecution witnesses rather than by the defence witnesses and the defendants. This 
cannot be proven from the available evidence. It is also possible that some of the 
defence witnesses had been so drunk at the time of the original incident that they 
genuinely believed the evidence they were giving was correct. Again this cannot be 
proven from the available evidence. It seems safe to assume that at least some of the 
cases involved deliberate perjury by the defence witnesses and that these defence 
witnesses were usually (if not always) supporters of the strike. 
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protesters before they committed an illegal act of protest would have been the 
risk of being apprehended. 
As the strike progressed the specials became less tolerant of verbal 
abuse and stone throwing and attempted to arrest every individual who 
committed an offence against them. After 05 November there were no further 
mass riots and the specials were able to devote their time and attention to 
chasing down specific offenders. In response strikers and their sympathisers 
became less willing to directly confront the specials using tactics which would 
make them liable to arrest. 155 
The number of reported incidents of violence or verbal abuse fell 
dramatically. The proportion of offenders who were arrested and prosecuted 
increased considerably. For the period of the mass disturbances and riots 
against special constables (29 October to 05 November) it is impossible to 
quantify the number of specific offences, or the number of individuals who 
committed illegal acts of protest. It has been estimated that one thousand 
persons took part in the attack on the special constables at the Post and 
Telegraph Stores on 30 October. 156 How many of these persons actually 
threw stones, verbally abused the specials, or were guilty of "taking part in a 
riot" is unknown. The number may have been ten or one hundred. Six 
persons were prosecuted, and four were convicted. For the entire period of 
29 October to 05 November it seems safe to assume that the number of 
individual offences and offenders must have been at least in the hundreds. 
155 See The Dominion, 10 November 1913, p.9, col. 4; and The Evening Post, 
20 NOv~fllbcr 1913, p.7, col. 8 and p.8, col. 2. /\\so see TllC Dominion, 7.1 November 
1913, p.8, col. 8 and p.9, col. 1. 
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Twenty-one men and one woman were prosecuted for offences against 
special constables on these dates. Offences against specials from 06 
November to the end of the strike resulted in the prosecution of 28 men. The 
last date of an offence against a special which led to a prosecution was 29 
November. 157 The small number of reported offences not ending in arrest 
and prosecution is clear from the news items and court reports in The 
Dominion. 158 
156 Evidence given by Police Sergeant McGlone on 05 December 1913 in support 
of the application for sureties of the peace against Robert Semple (The Dominion, 06 
December 1913, p.6, col. 5). 
157 See The Dominion, 02 December 1913, p.6, cols. 4-5. There was one later 
offence on 11 December which seems to have been in part directed at a special 
constable, though the newspaper report in The Dominion (13 December 1913, p.6, 
col. 1) is not particularly clear as to who the victim or victims of the threatening 
behaviour was or were. A prosecution resulted but because of the context of the 
incident and the uncertainty over who the victim was this has been considered as a 
non-strike related crime throughout this thesis, and it is better to exclude this example 
from the above analysis. The 'accused had made himself obstreperous in the bar of 
the Royal Tiger Hotel. The licensee had then called on a special constable to remove 
him. This was done after considerable trouble. Out on the footpath a constable had 
come on the scene, and it was only after great trouble that accused was got to the lock-
up.' (The Dominion, 13 December 1913, p.6, col. 1). It appears most likely that any 
offence against the special (if there was one) was not directed at him because he was a 
special constable but rather because he had attempted to assist the licensee. The same 
result would have occurred if the individual had been a regular police constable or 
simply a member of the public. The accused, in fact, resisted arrest by a regular police 
constable minutes after the first incident. (Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal 
Record Book, no. 83, December 1913, prosecution no. 6458; and The Dominion, 13 
December 1913, p.6, col. 1). The accused also had a considerable criminal record 
with at least thirteen previous convictions. The previous convictions included 
resisting police, obscene language, wilful damage, vagrancy, being drurtk and 
disorderly, fighting, and breaches of a prohibition order. He had been convicted 
between 1911 and 1913 at courts in Wellington, Carterton, Masterton, L yttelton, 
Palmerston North and Dannevirke. (See New Zealand Police Gazette, 1911, pp.43, 
240,293,457,575 and 601; 1912, pp.47, 379,434 and 650; 1913, pp.16 and 334; and 
1914, p.33). 
158 See The Dominion, 10 November 1913, p.9, col. 4; 11 November 1913, p.8, 
col. 8; 15 November 1913, p.6, col. 8; 20 November 1913, p.8, cols. 4-6; 
21 November 1913, p.8, col. 8 and p.9, col. 1; and 25 November 1913, p.9, col. 4. 
Also see The Evening Post, 04 December 1913, p.8, col. 1. 
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The special constables were part of the reason why there was so little 
violence against employers and strikebreakers. As noted above the hundreds 
of specials guarding the wharves from 06 November onwards presented an 
almost insurmountable obstacle to those who wanted to intimidate or attack 
strikebreaking wharf labourers while they were at work. By guarding the 
wharves the specials also protected the business property of the employers of 
watersiders and seamen. With the majority of the "scab" watersiders 
choosing to sleep and eat on the ships they were loading or unloading or in a 
converted wharf shed the specials guarded these "scabs" twenty-four hours a 
day. In addition, the specials escorted some of the strikebreaking carters 
around Wellington. 
The violent confrontations from 03 November to 05 November between 
the special constables and those who supported the strike may have drained 
many of the strike supporters of their enthusiasm for and willingness to 
engage in collective violence. The disturbances of 29 and 30 October had 
been successful for those hostile to the specials. The specials had been 
forced to gallop away from their attackers on the morning of 30 October and a 
special sought sanctuary from an angry crowd in a Lambton Quay bookshop 
in the afternoon. The violence of 03 to 05 November had not driven the 
specials from the streets or prevented the race horses being shipped to 
Lyttelton. The stone-throwers had been repeatedly forced to scatter by the 
charges of the specials. 159 Violence no longer appeared as an effective way 
of ensuring the success of the strike, nor as a viable form of protest. This 
may help to explain why there were so few attacks on those strikebreakers 
159 See Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.308-309 and 312-314. 
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who were not constantly protected by special constables, in particular those 
wharf labourers who returned to their Wellington homes each evening and the 
carters. It should be remembered that the first of the Arbitrationists only 
started work on 06 November. 
Another influence on the low level of violence against employers and 
strikebreakers appears to have been the unwillingness of many strikers to 
resort to violence, unless the target was a special constable. There were 
repeated calls by union leaders and officials to avoid violence. The strike 
leaders and many of the rank and file realised that violence would have a 
negative impact on public opinion and public sympathy towards the strike. 
The leaders also feared that violence might lead to the reading of the Riot Act 
or 'a repetition of the fatal affair at Waihi' of November 1912 when a striker 
died from injuries he received during a confrontation between strikebreakers, 
strikers and the police. 16o At the first strike meeting after the arrest of the 
Wellington strike leaders a message from the arrested leaders was read 
'expressing the hope that the workers would not go near the gaol in which 
they were confined.'161 
Early in the strike some leaders had publicly stated that violence 
against special constables, regular police, and against the property of 
160 See The Evening Post, 29 October 1913, p.8, col. 3 (which contains the quote 
concerning the Waihi fatality); and 31 October 1913, p.8, col. 1; and The Dominion, 
03 November 1913, p.9, col. 5. On the Waihi miners' strike of 1912 and the fatality 
see the references given on p.32 (Chapter One) and p.l51 (Chapter Five) of the 
current thesis. In Christchurch on 25 November 1913 strike leaders 'addressed the 
strikers, urging restraint, stating they must disregard an attempt to create an excuse for 
the appearance of armed "specials".' (The Dominion, 26 November 1913, p.9, col. 3). 
For an analysis of the attitude, comments and actions of strike leaders in New South 
Wales in the late nineteenth century concerning violence during industrial disputes see 
Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', pp.65-66. 
161 The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 3. 
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employers might be necessary if the situation became desperate. For 
instance, on 29 October Peter Fraser declared that if the employers tried to 
starve the strikers in to submission 'then the workers of Wellington, and of 
New Zealand, are going to get food, and if a few doors have to be burst, like 
the Basin Reserve gate, all the worse for the doors.'162 On 26 October 
William Thomas Young had encouraged the strikers to retaliate if they were 
hit with a baton and he threatened that the wharves would be destroyed if 
scabs were employed.163 As argued above, most of these "inflammatory" 
comments were probably intended to entertain and hearten the strikers, 
rather than to incite violence. 
The work of R. B. Walker on violence during industrial disputes in late 
nineteenth century New South Wales suggests two further factors which may 
have contributed to the low level of violence against employers and 
strikebreakers in Wellington in 1913. The first factor was a respect for the 
law, or at least many aspects of the law, among blue collar workers. The 
second influence was that there were no precedents of violence gaining 
victories for labour.164 Both the influences seem to be applicable to New 
Zealand in 1913. These factors fail to account for the violence against the 
special constables, though they may explain why such violence was not even 
more widespread, more serious and longer lasting than it was. 
162 The source of the quote is the official wording of the related criminal charge as 
reported in The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 5. 
16 Young's comments are quoted on p.143 of the current chapter. The source of 
this quote is the official wording of the related criminal charge against Young as 
reported in The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 4. Also see the strike 
speeches by Henry Holland on 26 October 1913 and Robert Semple on 01 November 
which formed the basis of criminal prosecutions against them (as quoted in The 
Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 5, and 20 November 1913, p.9, col. 4, 
respectively). Semple's comment is quoted on p.204 of the current chapter. 
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Another potential explanation for the low level of violence against 
certain groups involved in the strike was that trade unions and political 
organisations were effective in channelling the grievances and conflict into 
non-violent forms. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly suggested this 
may have been part of the reason why strikes in Germany between 1891 and 
1913 were much less likely to involve collective violence than German strikes 
of the period 1864 to 1880.165 The New Zealand strikers of 1913 were 
encouraged by their leaders to demonstrate, to picket, to march, and to attend 
meetings. The strikers also knew that if the strike was not successful they 
could attempt to improve their situation by voting for labour candidates at the 
next national election. Violence was not the last or only option. 
164 Walker, 'Violence in Industrial Conflicts in NSW late 19th C', pp.66-70. 
165 Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930, p.227. The 
decline in strike violence was from collective violence in about five per cent of all 
strikes in the earlier period to 0.25 per cent between 1891 and 1913 (p.227). The 
relevant totals of strikes involving collective violence and of all strikes are presented 
on p.11 (Chapter One) of the current thesis. 
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Chapter 6 
Intensified Efforts to Control Disorder or the Repressive Use 
of the Criminal Law?: Criminal Prosecutions, Verdicts, 
Sentences and the 1913 General Strike in Wellington 
Another marked feature [of proceedings in the Wellington Magistrate's Court] 
has been the attitude of hostility displayed towards anyone connected with 
strike offences by all the officials - magistrate, police force and detectives. 
No lawyer defending a strike charge has a chance of airing his eloquence. 
The accused seemed to be condemned before they stepped into the box.1 
The court reporters and editors of New Zealand Truth repeatedly 
criticised decisions made by magistrates in Wellington and Christchurch 
concerning strike related charges. In their opinion the magistrates were at 
best too trusting of the testimony given by special constables, and at worst 
biased and acting according to instructions received from Minister of Justice 
Herdman. The most severe criticism was directed at Magistrate Riddell of 
Wellington. The police were also implicated in the criticism through their role 
in "creating crime" by bringing prosecutions over trivial or extremely minor 
incidents. 2 
New Zealand Truth, 22 November 1913, p.5, col. 8 (1st version of this issue 
on the microfilm). (Three editions were published of each weekly issue of the New 
Zealand Truth: the South Island edition, the Country edition, and the Wellington 
edition. It was not stated on the individual newspapers which edition was which. The 
contents of each edition often varied considerably. For October 1913 to February 
1914 only two of the three editions were microfilmed. It is not clear which edition is 
missing.) 
2 See New Zealand Truth, 22 November 1913, p.5, cols. 7-8 and p.6, col. 1 
(1st version of this issue on the microfilm); 29 November 1913, pA, col. 5 (1st 
version on microfilm); 29 November 1913, p.6, cols. 6-8 (2nd version on microfilm); 
06 December 1913, p.6, col. 1 (2nd version on microfilm); and 13 December 1913, 
pA, cols. 4-5 and 6 (1st version on microfilm). In its 06 December issue, (1st version 
on microfilm, p.6, col. 5) New Zealand Truth praised Wellington Magistrate Evans 
for dismissing a strike related prosecution. A week later, Evans was severely 
criticised for upholding the conviction in a strike related re-hearing (New Zealand 
Truth, 13 December 1913, pA, col. 5 - 1st version on microfilm). 
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The validity of New Zealand Truth's criticism for the specific cases it 
discusses is extremely difficult to determine. The critiques seem plausible, 
but then so do the basic justifications for prosecution and conviction as are 
visible in the descriptions of evidence presented in the (more conservative) 
daily newspapers. Any attempt to analyse the court proceedings on a case 
by case basis would only engender the inconclusive debate associated with 
all controversial judicial decisions.3 In addition, there is the problem of 
incomplete evidence on the court hearings. However detailed the newspaper 
reports are, they are only summaries, and full transcripts or official court 
records for most cases do not exist. The level of detail and the specific 
information reported on a particular case also varied considerably between 
different newspapers.4 
In other countries the repressive use of the criminal law by the judiciary 
and the police during industrial disputes was sometimes more than simply the 
imagination of the working-class press. Numerous incidents of questionable 
3 For example, consider the ongoing debates in New Zealand in the 1990s and 
2000 over the convictions of David Bain and Scott Watson for multiple murders. Not 
only are the verdicts of the juries questioned, but also the reliability of the prosecution 
evidence. For a few of the hundreds of relevant reports see Cate Brett, 'Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt: Can We Be Sure About David Bain?', North and South, no. 113, 
August 1995, pp.90-101; Neil Reid, 'Police Case "Nonsense" " The Evening Post, 
19 April 1997, pp.15 and 16; Neil Reid, 'Karam's Allegations Rejected', The 
Evening Post, 26 November 1997, p.11; and The Evening Post, 13 November 2000, 
pA, cols. 1 and 2 (first editorial: 'Secret Witnesses: Can They Be Believed?'). 
4 The reporting of William George Cockell' s hearing in the Wellington 
Magistrate's Court on 20 November 1913 for taking part in the Featherston Street riot 
is illustrative. Each of The Dominion, The Evening Post, The New Zealand Times, 
cmd NevI' Zcnhlnd Trllfh provided extensive coverage of proceedings in the 
Wellington courts, especially concerning strike related offences. The Evening Post's 
report (20 November 1913, p.8, col. 1) on Cockell's hearing was a highly summarised 
15 lines. In contrast, the equivalent article in The Dominion (21 November 1913, 
p.8, cols. 7-8) was 129 lines long. 
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arrests, prosecutions, convictions and sentences have been highlighted by 
historians, criminologists and sociologists (as discussed in Chapter Four). 
In addition, intensified efforts to police, prosecute and punish offenders 
were a very real possibility during periods of social conflict and heightened 
social tensions. 5 Such a control response could contribute to an impression 
that the criminal law was being misused. Greater numbers of prosecutions, 
less leniency by the police and judiciary, more convictions, larger fines and 
longer terms of imprisonment, could appear to be repressive when the 
intended effect of these actions was not malicious but simply to deter further 
offending and minimise or prevent future disturbances. Intensified efforts at 
social control could also have repressive functions and motivations. 
This chapter will examine the extent to which the police and the 
judiciary intensified their efforts at social control using the criminal law on the 
streets and in the courtrooms of Wellington in late 1913. The possibility that 
such efforts were intended to be repressive and hasten the defeat of the 
strike will also be considered. First, prosecutions by the police will be 
examined. Secondly, the response of the judiciary to a period of heightened 
social tension and civil disorder will be analysed. 6 Any attempts by the 
government to modify the criminal law in response to the 1913 strike will also 
be discussed. 
The prosecutions will be considered as a whole, and trends in the 
prosecutions will be discussed and compared with pre-strike patterns. This 
5 See Chapter Four. 
6 As previously noted, the term 'judiciary' is used in this chapter to refer to the 
combined category of magistrates and Supreme Court judges. When magistrates only 
are being discussed the term magistrates will be used, and similarly the terms judge, 
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should avoid the problems inherent in any attempt to judge the merits and 
"fairness" of each individual conviction. The extent, if any, to which "law and 
justice were set aside" and "crime was created" (to paraphrase the New 
Zealand Truth) will also be clarified.? 
Maintaining Social Order or Suppressing Dissent ? ~ Prosecutions by 
the Police 
If the police in Wellington intensified their efforts to prosecute in 
response to the strike and the associated disturbances, this, theoretically, 
should have resulted in a considerable rise in the number of prosecutions. 
The same result would have occurred if the police had used their power to 
prosecute to suppress dissent. This condition was fulfilled in relation to a 
number of types of crime brought before the· Magistrate's Court. As 
previously noted charges of rioting, unlawful assembly, inciting breaches of 
the peace, inciting resistance of constables, use of seditious words, and use 
of insulting words or threatening behaviour with intent to provoke breaches of 
the peace experienced the most dramatic rise: from four in the pre-strike 
period to 78 during the strike. Obscene language prosecutions tripled, from 
6.37 per month prior to the strike to 21.5 per month for the strike period. 
Violent crime prosecutions (excluding private prosecutions) tripled, from 12.33 
per month to 37 per month during the strike.8 The proportion of prosecuted 
violent offences against policemen (regular or special) also rose, from 4.10% 
judges, or the Chief Justice will be used when referring only to a Supreme Court judge 
or judges. 
7 New Zealand Truth, 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 1 (2nd version of this issue 
on the microfilm). 
8 Including private prosecutions the increase in violent crime prosecutions was 
from 16.24 per month before the strike to 39 per month during the strike. 
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(12 of 293) of all violent crime against persons in the pre-strike period, to 
42.62% (26 of 61) while the strike was in effect.9 
These figures alone are not sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
rise in prosecutions was an effect of intensified efforts by the police to 
maintain social order or to repress protest. The increase in prosecutions may 
have been solely a reflection of a greater level of criminal offending, 
motivated to a considerable extent by antagonisms arising from the strike. 10 
An analysis of charges withdrawn before they reached trial indicates 
that police prosecutors took extra effort during the strike to increase the 
probability that those accused of strike related crimes were convicted. Of all 
97 prosecutions for strike related "other" offences against the State 21 
(21.65%) were withdrawn. This compares with a withdrawal rate of less than 
one percent for "other" crimes against the State for the pre-strike period (two 
of 242 - 0.83%), and a rate of 4.55 per cent for similar non-strike related 
offences (two of 44). 
Most of the withdrawn charges related to the strike were for two types 
of offences: rioting (including unlawful assembly) and inciting disorder. The 
withdrawal rate for rioting and unlawful assembly was 43.33 per cent (13 out 
of 30 prosecutions); and almost as high, 36.36 per cent (4 out of 11), for 
charges of inciting persons to resist constables or inciting breaches of the 
peace. 
9 Excluding private prosecutions the equivalent figures are 5.85% (12 of 205) 
prior to the strike and 45.61 % (26 of 57) in the strike period. For a detailed analysis 
of the violence against the police (regular and special) see Chapter Five, pp.156, 161, 
162, 164, 178-179, 196-204 and 211-217. 
10 Strike related offending is analysed in Chapter Five. 
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Table 12: Withdrawn Strike Related Charges 
(concerning Offences Allegedly Committed in Wellington During the 
General Strike of 1913) 11 
Type of Strike Related Crime I Total No. of Prosecutions Withdrawn 
I I for that Type of Crime No. % 
Strike Related Violent Crime: 
I 
a) Violent Crime Against Persons: 
I 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach of the Peace 16 1 6.25% 
was occasioned 
I 
a) Total Violent Crime Against Persons: 39 1 2.56% 
I 
b) Violent Crime Against Property: 
I 
Wilful damage or destruction of barriers / barricades 5 1 20.00% 
I 
b) Total Violent Crime Against Property: 7 1 14.29% 
I 
Total All Violent Crime: 46 2 4.35% 
I 
Strike Related Other Crimes Against the State: 
I 
Taking Part in a Riot I 25 8 32.00% 
Taking Part in an Unlawful Assembly 5 5 100.00% 
Inciting diverse unknown persons to resist constables 6 2 33.33% 
Inciting persons to commit a breach of the peace 5 2 40.00% 
Uttering Certain Seditious Words 5 1 20.00% 
Insulting Words with Intent to Provoke a Breach of 17 1 5.88% 
the Peace I 
Threatening Behaviour 4 1 25.00% 
Obscene Language I 15 0 0.00% 
Did not exhibit license for vehicle when requested to 1 1 100.00% 
by police constable 
I 
Total Other Crimes Against the State: 97 21 21.65% 
11 None of the strike related charges in the table below were private prosecutions. 
For each charge the decision to prosecute was made by the police, after either 
witnessing the offence or receiving a complaint from a member of the public. The 
only private prosecutions in Wellington connected to the strike were the desertion and 
similar charges brought by the shipping companies against some of their employees, 
as discussed in Chapter Five, pp.180-186. 
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Table 13: Cases Withdrawn - Wellington 
(concerning the Twenty-four and a Half Months 
preceding the 1913 Strike) a 
Type of Crime I Total No. of Prosecutions Withdrawn 
I for that Type of Crime No. 
Violent Crime: 
a) Violent Crime Against Persons: 
Assault (one involving a police constable as victim) 189 12 
excluding private prosecutions 93 
Aggravated Assault 6 1 
Actual Bodily Harm with Intent to do Grievous Bodily Harm 1 1 
Assault so as to cause Actual Bodily Harm 8 1 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach of the Peace 65 1 
was occasioned 
a) Total Violent Crime Against Persons: 294 16 
b) Violent Crime Against Property: 
Wilful damage 91 3 
Throwing a stone to the danger of property 4 1 
b) Total Violent Crime Against Property: 104 4 
Total All Violent Crime: 398 20 
Larceny: 
Theft 684 17 
Attempted Theft 7 1 
Breaking and Entering (nothing stolen) 8 1 
False Pretences 19 3 
Receiving stolen property 16 1 
Total Larceny: 816 23 
Other Crimes Against the State: 
Obscene Language 156 2 
Total Other Crimes Against the State: 242 2 
a For the specific types and proportions of strike period but not strike related 
charges withdrawn see Appendix 8. 
% 
6.35% 
2 
16.67% 
100.00% 
12.50% 
1.54% 
5.44% 
3.30% 
25.00% 
3.85% 
5.03% 
2.49% 
14.29% 
12.50% 
15.79% 
6.25% 
2.82% 
1.28% 
0.83% 
2.15% 
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Twenty-one individuals (nineteen men and two women) had strike 
related "other" charges against them withdrawn. Only one of these persons, 
however, left the justice system without a conviction for a strike related 
offence. Each of the other twenty accused were convicted on a second 
charge related to the same incident as the withdrawn charge. Nineteen were 
convicted in the Magistrate's Court, and the twentieth by a Supreme Court 
jury.12 The individual not convicted of any offence was William John 
Compton. He was charged with having used insulting words with intent to 
provoke a breach of the peace. The charge was withdrawn by the police 
because 'the wrong man had been arrested' .13 
The strategy of the police prosecutors in most of these cases was to 
present multiple charges (usually two) of varying seriousness concerning 
each "criminal" incident. Once a conviction was achieved the police withdrew 
the remaining charge. For example, at William Henry Lawton's hearing in the 
Magistrate's Court on 21 November Chief-Detective Broberg stated that the 
prosecution intended to 'proceed with the hearing of the charge that Lawton 
took part in a riot, and to withdraw the unlawful assembly charge if the 
accused were committed [to the Supreme Court] on the former'. Lawton 
pleaded guilty to the riot charge, was committed for sentence to the Supreme 
Court, and the unlawful assembly charge was withdrawn.14 
Twelve of the nineteen instances of both a conviction and a withdrawn 
charge in the Magistrate's Court conform to this pattern. In an additional four 
12 Three of these accused were in addition convicted of strike-related crimes 
committed on a different day to their withdrawn charge and related conviction. 
13 The Dominion, 09 December 1913, p.8, col. 8. 
14 The Dominion, 22 November 1913, p.6, cols. 7-8 (the quote is from col. 7). 
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cases the sequence of conviction and withdrawal is not clearly stated in the 
newspaper court reports. (For three of these cases the reports imply that the 
second charge was withdrawn after a conviction resulted from the first 
charge).15 Of the twelve accused for whom the sequence of conviction and 
withdrawal is known ten had the more serious charge withdrawn (including six 
of the taking part in a riot charges), and two were convicted of the more 
serious offence (taking part in a riot, and inciting diverse persons to resist 
constables, respectively). 
The alternate charges for the six withdrawn taking part in a riot charges 
involved considerably less serious penalties than the punishment for rioting, 
though the penalties were still substantial. Mandatory imprisonment for 
between eight months and two years was the punishment for the ten men 
convicted of taking part in a riot (five pleaded guilty, five were convicted by a 
jury after pleading not guilty). None of the six men against whom taking part 
in a riot charges were withdrawn (after being convicted on a related charge) 
received a sentence of mandatory imprisonment. Instead they were fined 
SUbstantial amounts and ordered to find sizeable sureties to keep the peace. 
Two of the men were unable to pay their fines or find sureties and in default 
spent the months of December 1913 and January 1914 in prison. 16 
15 Information on the sequence of conviction and withdrawal, and the causes of 
charges being withdrawn has been obtained from the court reports of the three 
Wellington daily newspapers: The Dominion, The Evening Post, and The New 
Zealand Times. The Criminal Record Books are only informative on the sequence of 
conviction and withdrawal for the three individuals who had a charge against them 
withdrawn on a different day to the resolution of the related charge. 
16 Both of these men (Thomas Acland and Robert James Christopher Seal) were 
later convicted by Supreme Court juries in early February 1914 on other strike related 
charges. For these convictions they respectively received sentences of twelve months 
and seven months mandatory imprisonment. See The Dominion, 04 December 1913, 
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In two other cases there was a different cause for multiple charges. 
The police took into account unusual or extenuating circumstances affecting 
the accused, withdrew the more serious charge, and replaced it with a lesser 
charge. Sydney Claridge was initially accused of taking part in the Royal 
Tiger Hotel riot, by throwing fireworks at the feet of the horses ridden by 
mounted regular police who were attempting to protect the Hotel. Due to his 
weak 'intellectual condition' (he 'was 29, but had the mind of a boy') along 
with a good character reference the police requested that the charge be 
reduced to one of the use of conduct likely to provoke a breach of the 
peace. 17 For participating in the Featherston Street riot on 05 November 
Agnes Udall was charged with taking part in an unlawful assembly. The start 
of criminal proceedings against her resulted in repeated attacks of hysteria 
which led to her being hospitalised. Both her lawyer and the police 
prosecutor 'feared the consequence' on her health of persisting in the 
prosecution, and agreed to reduce the charge to threatening behaviour 
whereby a breach of the peace was occasioned. The alteration of the charge, 
combined with her lawyer pleading guilty on her behalf, also dispensed with 
the necessity of the accused's attendance in Court. 18 
The only information known about the nineteenth withdrawal is that the 
charge against Frank Law of taking part in an unlawful assembly was 
withdrawn by the police two days before he was convicted on a lesser charge 
of threatening behaviour whereby a breach of the peace might have been 
p.9, col. 8; 05 February 1914, p.9, cols. 4-5; 07 February 1914, p.6, col. 3; and 09 
February 1914, p.3, col. 4; and The Evening Post, 08 December 1913, p.7, col. 9. 
17 The Dominion, 28 November 1913, p.9, col. 3. 
18 The Dominion, 27 November 1913, p.9, col. 4. On the sentences Udall and 
Claridge received see pp.272-273 in the current chapter. 
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occasioned. The newspaper reports do not explain why this charge was 
withdrawn. 19 
The prosecution strategy of obtaining a conviction then withdrawing the 
extra charge was not used prior to the strike. Two explanations seem to 
account for this difference: the seriousness of the offences and the 
confidence of the police in obtaining a conviction. The pre-strike "other" 
offences against the State were relatively minor infractions of the law 
(obscene language, resisting arrest, or obstructing constables in the 
execution of their duty constituted 221 of the 242 crimes), with an extremely 
high conviction rate of 98.43 per cent. The cases were reasonably simple 
(obscene language had either been used or it had not, a constable had been 
resisted or interfered with or he had not), the proportion of guilty pleas was 
high (73.73%), and the magistrate was willing to convict on only the testimony 
of the arresting constable if no other witnesses were available.2o 
In contrast, the strike related incidents concerning which multiple 
charges were laid and one was withdrawn were extremely serious (rioting, 
unlawful assembly, inciting disorder), or were at least perceived to be 
extremely serious by the authorities. There was also considerable uncertainty 
whether or not a conviction would result from the most serious charge. The 
percentage of guilty pleas fell to 34.03 per cent (for all strike related 
offences).21 Defence witnesses and defence lawyers presented alibis for the 
accused, or argued that in the confusion of the crowd the wrong person had 
19 See The Dominion, 19 November 1913, p.8, col. 8; 21 November 19l3, p.8, 
col. 8 and p.9 col. 1; The Evening Post, 18 November 1913, p.8, col. 1; 20 November 
19l3, p.8, col. 1; and The New Zealand Times, 19 November 1913, p.7, col. 5; and 
21 November 19l3, p.7, col. 5. 
20 For the pleas see Table 14, p.233. 
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been arrested.22 The most serious charges were usually indictable, requiring 
trial by jury if the accused pleaded not guilty. Securing a conviction from a 
jury was much less likely than from a magistrate, especially when the defence 
argument was plausible. 23 For example, Robert Hill pleaded not guilty to a 
summary charge of assaulting Police Constable Longbottom by throwing a 
bottle at him. He was convicted by Magistrate Riddell and imprisoned for 
fourteen days, but three Supreme Court juries were unable to agree on a 
verdict on the second charge of taking part in a riot concerning the same set 
of events. A stay of proceedings was then entered on the riot charge.24 
For these reasons laying two or more charges regarding the same 
incident ensured the greatest chance of achieving at least one conviction. If 
the summary charge was successful, then the indictable charge could be 
21 See Table 14, p.233. 
22 For examples see The Evening Post, 09 December 1913, p.7, col. 9 and p.8, 
col. 1; The Dominion, 25 November 1913, p.9, col. 4; 04 February 1914, p.5, cols. 
1-2; 10 February 1914, p.9, col. 4; and The New Zealand Times, 13 November 1913, 
p.7, cols. 3-4. 
23 Of the seventeen individuals tried by juries for strike related offences only ten 
(58.82%) were found guilty. Five were acquitted of all charges (29.41 %), and a stay 
of proceedings was entered concerning two men (11.76%) for whom multiple juries 
could not agree on a verdict. In the pre-strike period the acquittal by jury rate for 
violent crime was 33.33 per cent (6 of 18 accused); the conviction by jury rate was 
66.67 per cent (12 of 18 accused). No "other" crimes against the state went before 
juries in the pre-strike period. For the strike related acquittals see The Dominion, 04 
February 1914, p.5, col. 1; 05 February 1914, p.9, col. 4; 06 February 1914, p.5, col.3; 
10 February 1914, p.9, col. 4; and 11 February 1914, p.8, col. 6. Also see the 
memorandum from the Crown Law Office (dated 27 November 1913) as quoted on 
pp.231-232 of this chapter. 
24 The Dominion, 07 February 1914, p.6, col. 3; 11 February 1914, p.8, col. 6; 
15 May 1914, p.5, col. 2; and The New Zealand Times, 13 November 1913, p.7, 
cols. 3-4; and 18 May 1914, p.8, col. 5. For examples of Wellington magistrates not 
believing the alibis offered in strike related cases sec The Evening Post, 09 December 
1913, p.7, col. 9 and p.8, col. 1; and The Dominion, 18 November 1913, p.9, col. 2. 
For criticism of the decision to convict in the alibi case heard in November see New 
Zealand Truth, 22 November 1913, p.5, cols. 6-7 (1st version of this issue on the 
microfilm). 
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withdrawn (as happened concerning eight accused).25 If the summary charge 
was dismissed there was still a possibility a jury would convict on the 
indictable count. The only instance of the latter sequence of court 
proceedings involved the strike leader Harry Holland. Holland faced two 
summary charges and two indictable charges. Neither summary charge 
resulted in a conviction. On 04 December 1913 one was dismissed and the 
second was withdrawn. The next day he was committed to the Supreme 
Court for trial on both indictable charges of uttering seditious words. A jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on each indictable charge in February 1914.26 
The threat of a Supreme Court trial with a possible punishment of up to 
two years in prison might also encourage the accused to plead guilty to the 
lesser summary charge on the understanding that the indictable charge would 
then be withdrawn. Alfred Jansen, a striking waterside worker, faced two 
charges concerning his actions on Queen's Wharf on 24 October. 
Proceedings were initiated by the police on 29 November when an indictable 
charge of taking part in a riot was laid. At his second remand on 05 
December a summary charge (threatening behaviour whereby a breach of the 
peace was occasioned) was added to the charge list. Four days later Jansen 
pleaded guilty to the summary charge, 'the understanding being that the 
police would make application to withdraw the indictable charge.' After a 
25 The same outcome may also have eventuated for another two men for whom 
the sequence of conviction and withdrawal is not clear from the newspaper reports. 
One additional accused pleaded guilty in the Magistrate's Court to an indictable 
charge (taking part in a riot) after which the second indictable charge against him 
(taking part in an unlawful assembly) was withdrawn. (See pp.225-226 above). 
26 See The Dominion, 05 December 1913, p.8, cols. 4 and 5; 06 December 1913, 
p.6, cols. 7-8; 13 February 1914, p.4, cols. 1 and 2-3; and The Evening Post, 05 
December 1913, p.3, col. 3. Also see pp.256 and 258-261 below. Court proceedings 
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conviction and sentence was entered by Magistrate Riddell the indictable 
charge was withdrawn.27 The limited available evidence suggests that 
another four of those convicted of strike related offences also engaged in this 
type of plea bargaining.28 
The decision to withdraw five of the rioting charges may have been 
influenced by advice from the Crown Law Office. On 27 November a 
memorandum was sent from the Crown Law Office to the Attorney General 
concerning the prosecution of "strikers" charged with taking part in riots. 
I enclose a list cut out from a newspaper showing the number of persons 
(amongst others) who have been committed for trial on the ground of taking 
part in riots. These persons have been committed for trial at the next sittings 
of the Supreme Court in February. I am inclined to think that the Crown will 
have difficulty in getting a jury to be unanimous in convicting these strikers. 
Secondly the Crown will be put to enormous expense in bringing special 
constables down from various parts of the North Island to give evidence. I 
think that unless there are exceptional circumstances involved that these 
strikers should be prosecuted under the summary jurisdiction of the Court. 
For instance under the summary jurisdiction there is power to charge a man 
with assault, for using offensive language, and thirdly he may be bound over 
to keep the peace ..... The Magistrate may require substantial sureties and 
unless such sureties are found the defendant may be committed to prison 
until he finds such sureties. Up to the present persons have been charged 
with taking part in a riot, an indictable offence. They have been committed 
for trial and bail has been fixed. In many cases I believe the accused 
persons have not been able to find bail and are therefore confined in prison. 
The same result would happen in a prosecution under the Justices of the 
concerning each of the four charges began on 12 November 1913 (see The Dominion, 
13 November 1913, p.8, cols. 5-6). 
27 The Evening Post, 29 November 1913, p.5, col. 9 to p.6, col. 1; 05 December 
1913, p.8, col. 1; and 09 December 1913, p.8, col. 1. (The quote is from the 09 
December newspaper report). 
28 It should be noted that at least two of the plea bargains were influenced by 
extenuating circumstances affecting the accused. (See the discussion of the 
proceedings against Sydney Claridge and Agnes Udall on p.227 above). 
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Peace Act for a breach of the peace. I respectfully suggest therefore that the 
Police should be instructed to proceed against strikers under the summary 
jurisdiction of the Court unless the circumstances of the cases are sufficiently 
serious to warrant the offences being treated as indictable. I may add that I 
have put my view before the Solicitor-General and he concurs in the view 
which I have taken. 29 
The Police Commissioner instructed his officers on 03 December to 'Please 
act in all future cases as suggested by the Assistant Law Officer.,3o In four 
cases resolved after 03 December (and probably in the fifth instance too) the 
rioting charge was only withdrawn after a conviction had been achieved on an 
alternative charge. Obtaining a conviction was the primary purpose of the 
chosen prosecution strategy. If the convicted person was unable to produce 
a required bond and sureties this was an added guarantee that the individual 
would not cause or take part in further strike related disorder.31 
29 Memorandum from Crown Law Office to the Attorney General, 'Re 
Prosecution of Strikers', dated 27 November 1913, in file entitled 'Prosecution of 
Strikers: Advice of Crown Law Office', in 1913 Strike - Prosecution File (Archives 
New Zealand - AAAC, W3539 / 52£). 
30 Handwritten note from Commissioner Cullen to Superintendent Ellison, dated 
03 December 1913. Written on the back of the first page of the typed memorandum 
'Re Prosecution of Strikers', dated 27 November 1913 (AAAC, W3539 / 52£). 
31 For further discussion of the bonds required for strike related offences see 
pp.273-274 below. 
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Table 14: Comparison of the Pleas of those Accused of Offences in 
Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the 
General Strike of 1913 - excluding private prosecutions 32 
Type of Crime During Strike During Strike Pre-Strike 
(01 Oct 1911 to 
Strike Related not Strike Related 170ct1913) 
No. % No. % No. % 
All Violent Crime: 
Pleaded Guilty 17 36.17% 22 61.11% 240 59.26% 
Pleaded Not Guilty 29 61.70% 13 36.11% 141 34.81% 
No Plea Recorded 1 2.13% 1 2.78% 24 5.93% 
All Other Crime Against State: 
Pleaded Guilty 32 32.99% 31 64.58% 188 73.73% 
Pleaded Not Guilty 47 48.45% 12 25.00% 59 23.14% 
No Plea Recorded 18 18.56% 5 10.42% 8 3.14% 
All Crimes Prosecuted in Wellington: 
(excluding Theft) 
Pleaded Guilty 49 34.03% 53 63.10% 428 64.85% 
Pleaded Not Guilty 76 52.78% 25 29.76% 200 30.30% 
No Plea Recorded 19 13.19% 6 7.14% 32 4.85% 
Total: 144 100.00% 84 100.00% 660 100.00% 
All Theft: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
63 
17 
5 
74.12% 
20.00% 
5.88% 
725 76.88% 
186 19.72% 
32 3.39% 
32 To maintain comparability with all other tables and findings in this study the 
division between pre-strike and strike crime in all tables concerning pleas, verdicts 
and sentences has been made by the date of offence, not the date of prosecution or 
verdict. For the combined strike period figures see Appendix 7, section e). Private 
prosecutions have been excluded from Table 14 to focus the analysis on prosecutions 
by the police. In addition, none of the strike related charges were private 
prosecutions, and only four of the non-strike related charges (four assaults and zero 
larcenies) were not prosecuted by the police. Therefore, it is more statistically 
accurate to compare the strike period pleas with the equivalent police prosecutions in 
the pre-strike period. As previously noted none of the other crimes against the State 
are private prosecutions. The impact of private prosecutions on overall plea trends is, 
in any case, slight. 
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Further evidence that the police intensified their efforts at social control 
during the strike is generated by an analysis of the pleas of those accused of 
crime. There were major changes in the pleas of the accused between the 
two periods for both other crimes against the State and violent crime. Guilty 
pleas for other crimes against the State dropped from 73.73% in the pre-strike 
period to 32.99% for strike related offences, and not guilty pleas rose from 
23.14% to 48.45% (or to 64.95% when the sixteen withdrawn charges for 
which no plea was recorded are included).33 Pleas of guilty for violent crime 
decreased from 59.26% pre-strike to 36.17% strike related, with not guilty 
pleas increasing from 34.81% to 61.70%.34 In contrast, the pleas for non-
strike related violence, larceny and other anti-State offences were very similar 
to the pre-strike proportions (see Table 14, p.233). 
These figures suggest that a significantly larger than normal proportion 
of prosecutions for crime against the State and violence were not seen as 
justified by those accused of committing these offences. From the viewpoint 
of the working class accused (and their sympathisers) many of these 
prosecutions must have appeared to be police persecution (particularly the 
charges against the strike leaders), or at least an excessive response to 
minor or technical infringements of the law.35 Some offenders would not 
33 When charges with juveniles as the accused are excluded the drop in the 
percentage of guilty pleas becomes marginally smaller (from 71.97% to 31.96%). 
Excluding private prosecutions is not necessary due to no private prosecutions being 
included in the other crime against the state category. 
34 Private prosecutions have been excluded from the above figures for the 
reasons listed in footnote 32 on p.233. When charges with juveniles as the accused 
are also excluded the drop in the proportion of guilty pleas becomes slightly smaller 
(frorD 57.82% to 36.17%). 
35 Consider the comments and criticisms in New Zealand Truth, 22 November 
1913, p.5, cols. 7-8 (1st version of this issue on the microfilm); 29 November 1913, 
pA, col. 5 (1st version on microfilm); 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 5 (1st version on 
microfilm); 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 1 (2nd version on microfilm); and 13 
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perceive certain actions to be problematic, which the law and the police 
defined as criminal. 36 For example, calling out "scab" to special constables 
(which was prosecuted as insulting language with intent to provoke a breach 
of the peace), the use of obscene language against Arbitrationists or specials, 
loitering in a public place, or fiery rhetoric during strike speeches. Not all 
those accused of such offences pleaded not guilty, but most of those who 
admitted certain actions (along with those who denied the charges) would 
probably have considered their prosecution as pedantic or ridiculous, at best, 
if not repressive as well. 
A related problem was mistaken identity. An actual offence had been 
committed but there was some doubt if the offender had been apprehended, 
or rather someone else who had happened to be near the offender at the time 
of the incident, or who resembled the offender. Two prosecutions were 
dismissed, one withdrawn, and juries refused to convict three accused (John 
Edward Harrington and Alexander Churchman were acquitted, and multiple 
juries were unable to agree on a verdict on the charge against Robert Hill) for 
this reason. 37 A defence of mistaken identity was unsuccessful in at least six 
December 1913, pA, cols. 4-5 and 6 (1 st version on microfilm). Also see the reports 
of resolutions passed at trade union meetings protesting the arrest of the strike leaders 
(for example, in The Evening Post, 12 November 1913, p.8, col. 6 {Port Chalmers 
Marine Labourers' Union}; and 13 November 1913, p.3, col. 7 {strikers in Westport}), 
and comments on the same arrests made at strikers' meetings in Wellington (for 
example, in The Dominion, 14 November 1913, p.9, cols. 4 and 5; and 15 November 
1913, p.6, col. 6). An 'indignation meeting' to be held in Wellington 'of strikers and 
trade unionists to protest against the arrest of the strike leaders was advertised in The 
Evening Post, 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 4. Also see the comments made by Peter 
Fraser on the arrest of himself and other strike leaders (The Maoriland Worl{er, 10 
December 1913, p.1, col. 1 - as quoted on p.281 of the current chapter). 
36 See Davis, 'Prosecutions and Their Context: The Use of the Criminal Law in 
Later Nineteenth-Century London', pp.399, 413-414, 418, 421, 422 and 423. 
37 See The Dominion, 25 November 1913, p.9, col. 4; 09 December 1913, p.8, 
col. 8; 04 February 1914, p.5, cols. 1-2; 05 February 1914, p.9, col. 4; 07 February 
1914, p.6, col. 3; 10 February 1914, p.9, col. 4; 11 February 1914, p.8, col. 6; 15 May 
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other cases. Concerning three of these prosecutions defence lawyers argued 
their clients had not been anywhere near the disturbance in question, and the 
accused must only bear a resemblance to the offender.38 
Whether or not any of these prosecutions were, in addition, malicious 
or repressive is unclear. The opportunity for suppressing dissent or obtaining 
personal revenge for insults or abuse was available through arrest and 
prosecution. It was also relatively easy for evidence to be fabricated or 
exaggerated when only personal testimony was involved, and cases were 
decided upon the word of the arresting constable (regular or special) against 
the word of the accused. 39 
If such abuses of police power took place is less certain. New Zealand 
Truth argued that some special constables were less than truthful in their 
testimony, and Richard Hill has concluded that 'when magistrates accepted 
the word of "cockatoo constables" over others, there were undoubtedly some 
miscarriages of justice.,40 In defence of the prosecution witnesses it was 
possible they sometimes misheard shouted comments or genuinely, if 
mistakenly, believed that the accused was the person who had committed the 
1914, p.5, col. 2; and The New Zealand Times, 08 December 1913, p.8, col. 4. Also 
see pp.225, 229 and 254-255 in the current chapter for detailed discussions of some of 
these cases. Concerning the case of Robert Hill also see The Evening Post, 13 
November 1913, p.3, col. 3; and The New Zealand Times, 13 November 1913, p.7, 
cols. 3-4; and 18 May 1914, p.8, col. 5. 
38 See The Evening Post, 09 December 1913, p.7, col. 9 and p.8, col. 1; The 
Dominion, 18 November 1913, p.9, col. 2; 27 November 1913, p.9, cols. 2-3; 28 
November 1913, p.9, col. 3; and 04 December 1913, p.9, col. 8. 
39 For a very useful study of malicious prosecutions see Douglas Hay, 
'Prosecution and Power: Malicious Prosecution in the English Courts 1750-1850', in 
Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain 1750-
1850, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp.343-395. (Hay's article focuses upon 
private prosecutions rather than police prosecutions). 
40 F or the relevant New Zealand Truth articles see footnote 2 (p.218) in this 
chapter. Hill's conclusion is from Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.311. 
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offence. Magistrates in Wellington and Auckland also stated during three 
separate strike related hearings that they believed the accused and some of 
the defence witnesses had deliberately given false evidence in court.41 
The most accurate conclusion which can be reached is that the police 
intensified their efforts to arrest and prosecute offenders during the strike, 
and, at least occasionally, mistakenly arrested the wrong person. A large 
proportion of the arrests could be interpreted as repressive, and some as 
malicious, by those inclined to do so, for the variety of reasons already 
discussed, but in the majority of the controversial cases the problematic 
actions were illegal under New Zealand law, or the offence being prosecuted 
was committed by someone, if not necessarily by the accused. 
Not all offences, however, were used to "crackdown" on offending or 
suppress dissent. Charges of resisting arrest and obstruction were not 
frequent in either period. In the two month strike period only seven cases of 
resisting arrest and two of obstruction were brought before the courts (none of 
which were strike related). The pre-strike monthly average for resisting arrest 
was a slightly lower 1.88, with the number of charges for a particular month 
varying from zero to seven.42 For obstruction the pre-strike monthly average 
of 0.78 charges was almost identical to the strike period rate.43 
There was also no increase in the level of drunkenness convictions in 
the strike period. The monthly average for the strike was 182, which was 
41 See pp.206-211 in Chapter Five. Also see The Press, 01 December 1913, p.8, 
cols.3-4. 
42 The pre-strike peaks for resisting arrest offences were December 1911 (seven 
charges), November 1912 (seven charges), and September 1912 (four charges). 
43 The range of pre-strike monthly variation for obstruction was from zero to 
three offences in a particular month. 
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slightly lower than the 221 per month in the preceding two years.44 It is clear 
that there was not a universal "control response" by the police against all 
types of criminal activity during the strike. 
Nor was every opportunity to arrest and prosecute strikers and their 
sympathisers utilised by the police. The Chief Justice (Sir Robert Stout) 
publicly criticised the police authorities for the small number of arrests made 
in connection with the rioting of 05 November. During the trial of an alleged 
rioter on 04 February 1914 Stout commented that 'he could not see why on 
the day of the Featherston Street riot, some 50 or 60 persons were not 
arrested, instead of only five or six.'45 An editorial in The Dominion was 
similarly critical of no arrests having been made during the riot near the Mount 
Cook Barracks on the evening of 03 November.46 This evidence suggests 
that the arrest and prosecution of all identifiable offenders was not part of the 
policing strategy chosen to control strike related disorder (at least during this 
phase of the strike). 
44 The number of drunkenness convictions have been gathered from the Criminal 
Record Books. The range of pre-strike monthly variation for drunkenness convictions 
was from a low of 162 in November 1911 to a high of 331 in October 1912. For a 
complete list of the monthly totals for drunkenness convictions see Appendix 12. 
45 As reported in The Dominion, 05 February 1914, p.9, col. 4. In all, eight 
persons were charged with having taken part in a riot or an unlawful assembly on 05 
November. Five of these accused were arrested on the day of the riot, the others were 
arrested between 13 and 20 November. 
46 The Dominion, 04 November 1913, p.6, cols. 5-6. The editorial argued that 
'many arrests might have been made and a wholesome lesson taught the rioters' if a 
larger force of mounted special constables had been called out to disperse the crowd. 
Only one person was ever prosecuted concerning this riot. James Patrick Hassett was 
arrested on 08 November 1913 and charged with taking part in a riot and with the 
attempted murder of the Commissioner of Police (as well as with assaulting a special 
constable after being arrested). A Supreme Court jury acquitted Hassett of the 
attempted murder charge, but convicted him of rioting and he received two years 
imprisonment. (See The Dominion, 10 November 1913, p.8, col. 3; 11 November 
1913, p.8, col. 8; 06 February 1914, p.5, cols. 1-3; and 09 February 1914, p.3, col. 4; 
and Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.312). 
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Several contributing factors appear to explain the small number of 
arrests during the mass disturbances between 24 October and 05 November 
1913. First, by not making arrests the police were trying to avoid further 
escalating a particular disturbance. Second, those policemen at the scene of 
a riot considered the risk to themselves (especially of serious physical injury) 
of trying to make arrests prohibitively high. Thirdly, the police realised that the 
arrested persons would only be rescued by the crowd anyway and escape 
prosecution (as happened, temporarily, in at least two strike related 
prosecutions). For example, consider testimony given by regular Constable 
McGowan concerning the disturbance on the night of 29 October. Twenty-
four mounted special constables had arrived in Wellington. They were 
escorted to the police station by a number of uniformed police, including 
Constable McGowan. The group were followed by a crowd of men using filthy 
language and throwing stones. Several of the specials were hit, but none 
were seriously hurt. On 04 February 1914 Thomas Acland, a waterside 
worker who had been on strike on 29 October, was on trial in the Supreme 
Court for taking part in this 'riot' and for using obscene language. In reply to a 
question from the defence lawyer Constable McGowan stated 'He did not 
think it would have been wise to attempt to arrest the accused then, because 
the force of police was small, and he knew there could be no doubt about the 
identity of the accused if he were [sic] wanted later. About ten days later he 
pointed the man out to Detective Cassells. ,47 
47 The Dominion, 05 February 1914, p.9, cols. 4-5 (the quote is from col. 5). 
Concerning the escapes from arrest see The Dominion, 18 November 1913, p.9, 
col. 2; and 10 December 1913, p.6, col. 5. 
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Another factor may have been that senior police officers, and perhaps 
certain Ministers in the Massey government, preferred that the rioters and 
disorderly groups were physically "charged" into submission by the mounted 
special constables rather than being arrested and prosecuted.48 Such a 
policy would have been less expensive in the long run and possibly more 
effective. The state would have had to pay the upkeep of every rioter who 
was imprisoned. There were the sUbstantial costs involved in Supreme Court 
trials if the accused pleaded not guilty of rioting.49 In addition, the more 
quickly the disorderly crowds were dissuaded from violence and the ports 
were reopened (whether by the formation of new Arbitration unions or by the 
strikers agreeing to return to work) the less impact the strike would have on 
the New Zealand economy and government tax revenue. Once the strike had 
48 Richard Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.308-309 and 313-314, 
presented a related argument concerning Police 'Commissioner Cullen's apparently 
reckless tactic of exposing specials to the strikers and their allies without sufficient 
backup.' Hill suggested that Cullen hoped these tactics would provoke attacks on the 
specials. Such attacks could be used to justify the enrolment and presence in 
Wellington of the special constables and encourage more men to volunteer. When 
appropriate the attacks could be responded to with mounted charges and the swinging 
of batons in an attempt to dissuade "would-be rioters" from further violence. 
Concerning the march of 800 mounted specials from the Mount Cook barracks to the 
railway station on 05 November and the ensuing Featherston Street riot Hill wrote: 
'Yet again [Colonel] Heard was puzzled by Cullen's tactics: the specials marched in a 
huge column through busy streets, "assailed by a multitude of strikers and strike 
sympathisers". The rear of the column was especially vulnerable to attack from 
projectiles .... The rear contingents' patience snapped, and they charged into the 
crowd again and again; "many skirmishes took place, the chief weapons being batons 
on the one side and road metal on the other". .... Once again, the battles went on 
longer than usual because members of the crowd were able to throw things from 
positions where they could not be reached by mounted men. Cullen meanwhile kept 
the foot specials under cover nearby, ensuring the continuation of riot .... ' (The first 
quote is from p.308; the remaining two quotes are both from p.313). 
49 On the substantial costs of Supreme Court trials for those accused of rioting 
see Memorandum from Crown Law Office to the Attorney General, 'Re Prosecution 
of Strikers', dated 27 November 1913, in file entitled 'Prosecution of Strikers: Advice 
of Crown Law Office', in 1913 Strike - Prosecution File (Archives New Zealand -
AAAC, W3539 / 52f). (As quoted on pp.231-232 of the current chapter). 
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ended expenditure on extra policing associated with the dispute would also 
cease. 50 
Sympathy for the strikers by some regular police could have caused 
them to overlook some strike related offences. Richard Hill argued that there 
were 'some occasions when individual policemen sympathised with the 
strikers, or at the very least refrained from interfering with them in the 
absence of any serious breach of law.'51 Wellington Police Inspector 'Ellison 
believed that some of his men, including an NCO, had "shirked their work" 
during the Battle of Featherston Street by refusing to arrest rioters on the 
spot.'52 A relatively small number of regular police acting out of sympathy 
with the strikers, however, would only be a small part of the explanation for 
why there were so few arrests during disturbances. 
In at least two instances the Wellington police chose not to arrest strike 
leaders for the provocative statements in their speeches. On 20 November 
1913 the Crown solicitor, H. H. Ostler, wrote to the Attorney General 
concerning the charges the police were considering laying against Pat Hickey 
and W. T . Mills. 
I have shown the two newspaper cuttings which I submitted to you this 
afternoon to the Solicitor-General. In his opinion neither of the statements 
are sufficient to warrant a prosecution for sedition. In the case of Hickey he 
points out that the speech was made before the other strike leaders were 
arrested, and Hickey's arrest at this stage for that speech would look like an 
afterthought on the part of the Crown. In any case he thinks the statements 
50 On the cost of extra policing associated with the 1913 strike see Hill, The 
Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, pp.317, 318 and 322; '1913 Strike - North Island 
File' held at Archives New Zealand, Wellington (AAAC, W3539 / 52b); and '1913 
Strike - Claims For Supplies File' held at Archives New Zealand, Wellington (AAAC, 
W3539/ 52a). 
51 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.320. Italics as in the original. 
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are sufficiently ambiguous to make it doubtful whether the prosecution would 
be successful. In regard to Mills' case he is of the opinion that the words I 
have pointed out to you are not strong enough to warrant a prosecution. 53 
Ostler added that he had 'instructed Detective Cassells to keep his ears open 
for any future seditious speeches by Farland, Hickey, or Mills, and the other 
detectives are also doing so independently'. 54 None of these three labour 
leaders were prosecuted for comments made in their 1913 strike speeches, 
though W. T. Mills was brought before the Christchurch Magistrate's Court on 
03 December for 'holding a meeting on the Sumner esplanade, so as to 
impede persons passing' on 26 November. The case was dismissed.55 
The decisions not to prosecute Hickey and Mills would seem 
perplexing if the main intention of the Wellington prosecutors in arresting 
strike leaders was to weaken the strike. Magistrate Riddell on 12 and 19 
November had already set the precedent of refusing bail on summary 
charges related to strike speeches. 56 It is extremely unlikely that he would 
have acted differently concerning Hickey and Mills. Their prosecution would 
ensure their detention in Wellington prison for a minimum of one week and 
probably longer. (On 19 November the speech related cases against the six 
arrested leaders had been remanded to 28 November. 57 Any speech charges 
52 Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, p.320. 
53 
'Memo for The Hon. the Attorney-General', 'Re. Hickey and Mills', dated 20 
November 1913, in 1913 Strike - Prosecution File (Archives New Zealand - AAAC, 
W3539/ 52t). 
54 'Memo '" Re. Hickey and Mills', dated 20 November 1913. 
55 The Press, 04 December 1913, p.8, cols. 4-5. The Dominion, 04 December 
1913, p.8, col. 3 described the offence as 'holding a public meeting at Sumner, so as 
to obstruct traffic'; and see The Dominion, 03 December 1913, p.9, col. 2. 
56 See pp.280-283 below in this chapter. 
57 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.9, cols. 4-5. 
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against Hickey and Mills would not have been dealt with before 28 November, 
unless they had pleaded guilty). 
That prosecutions were not initiated provides evidence that the police 
and Crown prosecutors were not willing to arrest labour leaders unless an 
actual offence (as defined by the criminal law) had been committed, and they 
were reasonably certain of obtaining a conviction. It is possible that six of the 
strike leaders already being in gaol on remand influenced the Hickey and Mills 
decisions (additional arrests may have seemed less necessary or less 
urgent). Each of the six arrested leaders, however, eventually consented to 
being bound over to keep the peace or were convicted by a magistrate or 
jury.58 This suggests that the criteria the police used to determine which of 
the strike speakers they would prosecute was not substantially different on 11 
November (when the first strike leaders were arrested) than on 20 November. 
Evidence that some special constables displayed considerable 
tolerance of abuse directed towards them is provided by testimony given 
during the prosecution of William Robertson on 19 November. Robertson 
was charged with having used obscene language and assaulting special 
constable Herbert Edward Rogers. 'Evidence was given that the accused had 
followed the "specials" down the road abusing them. He was allowed 
considerable latitude, but upon his picking up a piece of wood, witness 
[special constable Rogers] went to arrest him. While being taken into custody 
the accused struck witness with his improvised baton. Asked whether he 
wished to make a statement, the accused said: "I can't. I was too jolly well 
58 On the arrests, remands without bail, and outcomes of the cases against the six 
strike leaders see pp.230, 256, 258-259, 271, 273-274, 280-283 and 285 in the current 
chapter and also see Chapter Five, pp.143, 153, 162,204-206 and 215-216. 
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drunk." ,59 The first opportunity to remove this supporter of the strike from the 
streets of Wellington was not made use of by special constable Rogers, and it 
appears that only when violence was threatened was Robertson arrested. 
Maximising the number of charges against strikers and sympathisers 
who were brought before the Court was also not a strategy utilised by the 
police. At least three of those prosecuted for strike related offences resisted 
arrest when they were apprehended, but were not charged with resisting 
arrest. For example, Constable Longbottom stated in court that Archibald 
Campbell had 'violently resisted' when arrested on 04 November. Campbell 
was prosecuted for taking part in a riot and for being a rogue and a vagabond 
in that he was found by night with an offensive weapon. No charge of resisting 
arrest was laid.5o A man, alleged to have been William Williams, resisted 
Detective Andrews's attempts to arrest him on 06 November, and with the 
assistance of a crowd managed to escape. Williams, a watersider on strike, 
was only (re)arrested three weeks later. He was charged with and convicted 
of assaulting certain mounted special constables. This was the offence which 
initiated the unsuccessful arrest. Williams claimed he was minding his baby 
at the time of the incident. Detective Andrews and regular Constable 
59 The Evening Post, 19 November 1913, p.7, col. 9. For the name of the 
assaulted special constable see The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.9, col. 6. The 
date of the offences was 18 November. Compare The Evening Post's (20 November 
1913, p.8, col. 2) interpretation of events during the journey of hundreds of foot and 
mounted special constables from the wharves to Mount Cook Barracks at the end of 
the day's work on 19 November: 'A bystander who called the specials "scabs" was 
next summarily dealt with, being caught and handed over to the regular police. These 
were only small incidents in their way, but, combined with the altered if sullen 
demeanour of the rougher class of onlookers, they show that the special constables are 
now in no mood to be t(lmpered with, nor to put up with the abuse to which for a long 
time past they have been SUbjected. If they will not stand epithets they certainly will 
not stand stones and sticks without giving as good as they get, and that with interest.' 
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Longbottom were certain Williams was the offender. Magistrate Riddell 'held 
that on the evidence the accused must be convicted.' The efforts at resisting 
arrest and calling upon the crowd to help him escape were never 
prosecuted.61 
Prior to the strike, and concerning much less serious criminal acts, it 
was not unusual for one individual to face three or four charges, including 
resisting arrest, in regard to one series of related incidents. The usual pattern 
and sequence of events began with an arrest being made for drunkenness, 
disorderly behaviour while drunk, or obscene language. The accused 
violently resisted arrest (either immediately or on the way to the police 
station), and in the process damaged the policeman's uniform, damaged the 
taxi-cab which was transporting the offender and policeman to the police 
station, assaulted the policeman, used obscene language, or a combination 
of these actions. The next morning the accused appeared before a 
magistrate and was convicted on a variety of charges involving drunkenness, 
resisting arrest, property damage, assault and obscene language. The court 
proceedings against John Henderson on 27 December 1911 are illustrative. 
60 The New Zealand Times, 13 November 1913, p.7, col. 4. For more details on 
Campbell's prosecution also see p.178 in Chapter Five. 
61 The Dominion, 10 December 1913, p.6, col. 5; The Evening Post, 09 
December 1913, p.7, col. 9; and The New Zealand Times, 28 November 1913, p.8, 
col. 4. (The quote is from The Evening Post, 09 December 1913, p.7, col. 9). 
Concerning the third unprosecuted resisting arrest incident see The New Zealand 
Times, 13 November 1913, p.7, col. 3; and The Dominion, 07 February 1914, p.6, 
col. 3. In another two cases it is less clear if the actions of the accused warranted a 
prosecution for resisting arrest, but it may have been possible for such a charge to be 
laid. Neither accused was prosecuted for resisting arrest. (See The Dominion, 
18 November 1913, p.9, col. 2; and 22 November 1913, p.6, col. 8). 
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Henderson was charged with and convicted of drunkenness, resisting arrest, 
damaging a constable's uniform, and smashing six taxi-cab windows.62 
Adding an extra charge to a charge list reduced the chance that an 
accused would leave court without a conviction. Resisting arrest was a 
relatively easy charge to prove (the testimony of the arresting constable was 
almost always sufficient evidence), and had an extremely high conviction rate. 
In the two years before the strike (01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913) all 46 
prosecutions for resisting arrest resulted in convictions.63 In addition, a 
successful prosecution for resisting arrest maximised the penalties the 
accused would receive. An extra conviction was especially effective if fines 
were imposed and the accused was able to pay the fines. (Fines were 
cumulative, but multiple sentences of imprisonment in default were usually 
allowed to run concurrently, as were one sentence of mandatory 
imprisonment and one or more sentence(s) of a fine or prison in default).64 
The legal requirement that a person could not be convicted twice for one 
action should not have been an issue for the prosecutor. Resisting arrest was 
distinct from the accused's other problematic behaviour which was the basis 
of the charge(s) which were laid. 
62 The Dominion, 28 December 1911, p.2, col. 8. For similar examples see 
The Dominion, 10 February 1912, p.15, col. 4; 22 October 1912, p.3, cols. 4-5; 
03 September 1913, p.5, col. 4; The New Zealand Times, 28 June 1913, p.2, col. 6; 
24 September 1913, p.6, col. 7; New Zealand Police Gazette, 1912, pp.314, 497, 
607 and 627; and New Zealand Police Gazette, 1913, pp.37, 437 and 509. 
63 In nine of these cases (19.57%) the accused pleaded not guilty. In the other 37 
cases a plea of guilty was entered. 
64 For examples see New Zealand Police Gazette, 1911, p.601; 1912, pp.524 
and 597; 1913, pp.254, 376, 405, 509 and 717; and 1914, pp.25 and 49. Compare the 
dates tried with the dates of release for the cases in which two or more sentences were 
given to one accused and one of these sentences was the option of paying a fine or 
going to gaol. 
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That the police were reasonably lenient in their treatment of 
Arbitrationists is suggested by a report in The Evening Post on 06 December. 
This morning one of the men who had been unloading coal from the Katoa 
came on to the Railway Wharf and commenced an altercation with another 
worker. Losing control of his temper he whipped off his coat and assumed a 
menacing attitude, whereupon the man he was arguing with hit him with a 
broom handle. The sequel was the arrest on a charge of insobriety of the 
man who started the disturbance.65 
The police could have chosen to lay a second charge against the accused of 
threatening behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or 
threatening behaviour causing a breach of the peace. Only the drunkenness 
offence was prosecuted. The accused pleaded guilty and was convicted and 
discharged without a fine. 66 
No other Arbitrationists were identified in the newspaper reports as 
defendants in Wellington criminal cases. It is probable that more than one of 
the 364 drunkenness prosecutions during the strike involved Arbitrationists. 
The newspaper reports rarely provided occupation details on those accused 
of drunkenness, unless other offences had been committed. The lack of 
known Arbitrationists appearing before the court on charges more serious 
than drunkenness indicates that policing of the behaviour of Arbitrationists 
was less strict than either the policing of the "disorderly" actions of strikers 
and their sympathisers, or of "regular" non-strike related rowdy behaviour. 67 It 
65 The Evening Post, 06 December 1913, p.6, col. 4. 
66 Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 83, December 1913, 
prosecution no. 6361. 
67 Campbell, 'The Role of the Police in the Waihi Strike', p.38, notes a similar 
trend in the policing of the Waihi Strike of 1912: 'While assaults and language 
offences committed by the Federationists [the strikers] are described in lurid detail 
through the police files on the strike, offences by arbitrationists are referred to rather 
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seems extremely unlikely there were no fights among the Arbitrationists or 
instances of obscene language being used to a constable by a drunken 
Arbitrationist which would have resulted in prosecution under normal 
circumstances. 
The overall conclusion reached from the data presented above is that 
the police intensified their efforts to control certain types of offences, in 
particular, socially threatening "crimes" associated with the strike. Many of 
the offences were very serious and would have warranted police attention in 
more tranquil times. Other prosecutions, especially those related to offensive 
language, insulting words with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, and 
the single loitering charge, concerned incidents which would have often been 
overlooked or an informal warning given before the strike.68 This focus had a 
significant impact on the criminal prosecutions of the Strike. 
Certain social groups predominated among the accused, strikers and 
other unskilled workers, but as these were the groups most active in strike 
related disturbances this is neither unexpected nor evidence of attempts to 
suppress legitimate (if rowdy) protest. The determination of the police to 
suppress violence and rioting is apparent, as is the extremely firm response to 
offensive and insulting language. The latter could be interpreted as 
lightly. On November 10 [1912 Police Commissioner] Cullen telegraphed [Minister 
of Justice] Herdman, " ... a number of the most obnoxious women belonging to the 
strikers got rotten eggs going home and one window in a shop where the owner 
exhibited very offensive paragraphs relating to police, mine owners and workers was 
smashed some time during the night." '. 
68 On the use of police discretion not to prosecute law-breaking behaviour by 
members of the working class, including by utilising informal sanctions and warnings 
instead, see Davis, 'Prosecutions and Their Context: The Use of the Criminal Law in 
Later Nineteenth-Century London', pp.399-401, 420, 422, 424 and 425. For a New 
Zealand perspective see Dunstall, A Policeman's Paradise?, p.4. 
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repressive, but such language was illegal in public places as well as being 
provocative and having the potential to incite further disorder. 
In at least a few instances the wrong person was arrested and 
prosecuted. In the confusion, excitement and tension associated with large, 
rowdy, and hostile crowds such mistakes are not unexpected. It is almost 
surprising that more cases were not withdrawn or dismissed for this reason. 
An element of repression or anger at being attacked or verbally abused may 
have been influential in some of the problematic arrests, but this is impossible 
to conclusively prove. 
The police displayed a surprising degree of restraint in making arrests. 
Except for desertion and related offences by seamen and ship's firemen, and 
the November charges against six strike leaders, there were none of the 
mass arrests and mass prosecutions which were so central a part of the 
police response to the Waihi Strike of 1912. R. J. Campbell has usefully 
summarised the relevant Waihi prosecutions. 
Large numbers of arrests and trials began during September [1912]. 
On September ii, 18 men (all Federationists) were charged with conduct 
tending to provoke a breach of the peace. Fourteen of them were convicted, 
four bound over to keep the peace for 12 months, and the remainder ordered 
to find sureties to keep the peace for 12 months. All of this last group 
refused to find sureties and went to gaol instead. On September 14, eight 
men were charged (including one arbitrationist) with various offences. In the 
rest of September, 37 more men were charged with various offences arising 
out of the strike, all but one of them Federationists. Everyone of the 
Federationists ordered to find sureties elected to go to gaol. Thus, by 
September 20, the police had managed to imprison 45 of the most active 
members of the Federationist union. 69 
69 Campbell, 'The Role of the Police in the Waihi Strike', p.37. New Zealand 
Police Gazette, 1912, pp.645-648 records the release from Auckland Prison on 13 and 
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Campbell notes that 'in all, 72 strikers came before the Court'.70 In relation to 
the entire two months of the 1913 strike in Wellington only 94 individuals were 
prosecuted for strike related offences (excluding the desertion and similar 
charges).71 Somewhere between 37 and 77 of these Wellington accused 
were strikers. 72 
The eighteen Waihi strikers charged on 11 September 1912 were each 
prosecuted in connection with the same incident of intimidation. Benjamin 
Sheard, president of the recently formed (arbitrationist) Engine Drivers' Union, 
had been followed and jostled by a crowd numbering about 200. The 
defendants included the president (William E. Parry) and vice-president (W. 
McLennan) of the striking miners' union.73 Sizeable numbers of defendants 
appeared in the Wellington Magistrate's Court each day to answer charges 
related to the 1913 strike, but it was rare for more than one or two individuals 
to be charged concerning a particular disorderly incident. In the few instances 
where more than two persons were charged (for example, the Royal Tiger 
Hotel riot, the Featherston Street riot, and the Post and Telegraph Stores riot) 
the number of prosecutions were much lower than they could have been had 
14 November 1912 of 66 miners who were convicted at Waihi and ordered to find 
sureties or spend twelve months in gaol. These miners were released because the 
required sureties had been provided. 
70 Campbell, 'The Role of the Police in the Waihi Strike', p.37, footnote 20. 
71 On desertion and related prosecutions see pp.180-186 in Chapter Five. Due to 
no cases of desertion or similar offences being prosecuted at Waihi, and because such 
offences were very different to any of the Waihi prosecutions and to all the non-
desertion or similar Wellington strike related prosecutions, desertion and similar 
offences have been excluded from the above comparison. 
72 See Chapter Five, p.168. The maximum above of 77 includes two women 
who were probably the wives or sisters of striking waterside workers. 
73 The Dominion, 12 September 1912, p.5, col. 8. 
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the police chosen to arrest every person whom they saw commit an offence, 
or for whom witnesses were willing to provide testimony for the prosecution. 74 
The following section of this chapter will examine the next stage of the 
legal process: the verdicts reached and sentences handed down by the 
judiciary of Wellington. 
The Judicial Response to Disorder, Protest, and the Threat of Disorder 
Less tolerance, less leniency, more convictions, larger fines and longer 
terms of imprisonment were the reaction of many judiciaries to periods of 
social conflict, civil disorder, and heightened social tensions. These actions 
were attempts to control disorder and deter further offending. Instances of 
individual members of the elite using their judicial powers for the benefit of 
themselves and fellow members of the ruling class at the expense of 
subordinate groups, are also relatively common throughout the social history 
of crime and the criminal law (as demonstrated in Chapter Four). The 
response of the Wellington judiciary to disorder, protest, and the threat of 
further disorder in late 1913 shall be determined using an analysis of first, 
conviction rates, and secondly, the severity of sentences. In addition, a 
number of intriguing judicial decisions relating to strike related jury trials will 
be commented upon, as will some of the decisions concerning bail 
applications and the amounts required for bail. 
74 
Five. 
See pp.238-241 and 243-244 in the current chapter, and pp.178-179 in Chapter 
~b~ 
Table 15: Comparison of the Rates of Conviction For Decisions Made 
By Magistrates (due to accused pleading not guilty) 75 
(For Crimes Committed in Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half 
Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court) 
Decision Made By Magistrate (accused pleaded not guilty) 
a) Violent Crime Convicted Not Total As % of All 
Convicted Similar 
i) 18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913: Charges 
Strike Related 22 1 23 48.94% 
95.65% 4.35% 100.00% (of 47) 
no private prosecutions or cases with juveniles as the accused 
Not Strike Related (all) 13 1 14 35.00% 
92.86% 7.14% 100.00% (of 40) 
excluding private prosecutions 10 1 11 36.67% 
and excluding juvenile accused 90.91% 9.09% 100.00% (of 30) 
ii) 01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913: 
Pre-Strike (all) 121 29 150 29.82% 
80.67% 19.33% 100.00% (of 503) 
excluding private prosecutions 89 11 100 29.50% 
and excluding juvenile accused 89.00% 11.00% 100.00% (of 339) 
b) Other Crime Against the State: Convicted Not Total As % of All 
Convicted Similar 
i) 18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913: Charges 
Strike Related 22 5 27 27.84% 
81.48% 18.52% 100.00% (of 97) 
no private prosecutions or cases with juveniles as the accused 
Not Strike Related (all) 12 12 25.00% 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% (of 48) 
excluding juvenile accused 12 12 27.91% 
and no private prosecutions 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% (of 43) 
ii) 01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913: 
Pre-Strike (all) 58 58 22.75% 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% (of 255) 
excluding juvenile accused 58 58 24.27% 
and no private prosecutions 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% (of 239) 
75 Cases where the accused pleaded not guilty and then the charge was withdrawn are 
not included in the Decisions Made by Magistrates figures. 
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Table 15 (continued): Comparison of the Rates of Conviction For 
Decisions Made By Magistrates (due to accused pleading not guilty) 
Decision Made By Magistrate (accused pleaded not guilty) 
c) Theft: Convicted Not Total As % of All 
Convicted Similar 
i) 18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913: Charges 
Strike Related none none 
Non-Strike Related (all) 12 5 17 20.00% 
70.59% 29.41% 100.00% (of 85) 
excluding juvenile accused 12 5 17 22.08% 
and no private prosecutions 70.59% 29.41% 100.00% (of 77) 
ii) 01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913: 
Pre-Strike (all) 108 29 137 14.21% 
78.83% 21.17% 100.00% (of 964) 
excluding private prosecutions 91 17 108 15.13% 
and excluding juvenile accused 84.26% 15.74% 100.00% (of 714) 
The impact of the strike on conviction rates for violent crime and 
larceny was negligible. The only cases in which guilt or innocence was 
directly decided by the judiciary were those which did not require a jury trial 
and where the accused pleaded not guilty. In these cases (usually decided 
by a single stipendary magistrate) there was little difference in the percentage 
of convictions between the strike and pre-strike periods (see Table 15). The 
decision made by magistrate conviction rates for both strike related (95.65%) 
and non-strike related violence (92.86%) during the strike appear significantly 
higher than the pre-strike rate (80.67%). However, when private prosecutions 
and charges against juveniles are excluded, the pre-strike conviction rate 
(now directly comparable to the strike related prosecutions) rises to 89 per 
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cent. 76 This figure is very similar to both of the strike rates, especially when 
the small size of the strike samples is considered (the difference between the 
pre-strike and strike rates is only one or two strike charges). Larceny 
conviction rates fell during the strike (from 78.83% to 70.59%).77 
The percentage of convictions for strike related other crimes against 
the State (81.48%) was considerably lower than either the pre-strike period 
(100%) or the rate for non-strike related offences during the strike (100%).78 
Five such strike related cases were dismissed: three charges of insulting 
words with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, one obscene language 
charge, and one inciting diverse persons to resist constables. The four 
insulting or obscene language cases were dismissed because of insufficient 
or conflicting evidence which left considerable doubt if the alleged problematic 
language had actually been used or that the accused had been the actual 
offender. For example, Ernest Hackett was charged with insulting words with 
intent to provoke a breach of the peace for using on 15 November the phrase 
"Get out, you dirty scab" to 'a member of the arbitration union of waterside 
workers'. The informant gave evidence as to the words having been used, 
but he could not swear that Hackett was the man who had made use of the 
76 None of the strike related violence charges were private prosecutions or 
involved juveniles as the accused. Excluding such charges from the pre-strike data 
allows a more accurate comparison to be made with the strike related prosecutions. 
77 There were no strike related larceny prosecutions. When private prosecutions 
and charges with juveniles as the accused are excluded the drop in the conviction rate 
becomes slightly larger (from 84.26% to 70.59%). 
78 Private prosecutions are by definition not included in this category (see 
Chapter Two, pp.41-42, especially footnote 2). The number and proportion of 
convictions are not changed by the exclusion of juvenile accused (see Table 15). 
Controlling for strike rc]nted cases which were prosecuted a vleek or more after the 
strike ended has only a slight effect on the conviction rate. One charge, which was 
dismissed, is excluded. The relevant conviction rate becomes 84.62 per cent (22 of 26 
charges). 
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expression. Another witness called was also uncertain. His Worship 
[Magistrate Riddell] dismissed the information.'79 
Concerning a separate incident William George Renouf, a wharf 
labourer on strike, was also accused of insulting words with intent to provoke 
a breach of the peace. It was alleged that on 19 November Renouf had 
called out "You dirty b***** scabs" to a group of mounted special constables 
as they rode past the section of the crowd he was standing in. Two 
prosecution witnesses, both special constables, testified that they were 
certain the accused had uttered the words. Five defence witnesses then gave 
rebutting evidence stating that it was a man standing near Renouf who had 
called out. '''It is a very suspicious case", said His Worship [Magistrate 
Riddell]. "It seems to be that everyone has given his evidence fairly, although 
it was conflicting in regard to details. Defendant must have the benefit of the 
doubt, and the information will be dismissed." ,80 None of the four accused 
who had language related prosecutions against them dismissed (one striking 
wharf labourer, one seaman, one man for whom no occupation details are 
known, and one barman whose comments may have contributed to a striking 
79 The New Zealand Times, 08 December 1913, p.8, col. 4. Hackett's 
occupation is not reported in the relevant newspaper reports. Only one Ernest 
Hackett, a seaman, is listed in the New Zealand Electoral Roll 1914 (Wellington 
East, roll no. 7706) for any of the Wellington or Hutt electorates, and it has been 
assumed in this thesis that he was probably the accused in this criminal case. 
80 The Dominion, 25 November 1913, p.9, col. 4. On the court hearing also see 
The New Zealand Times, 25 November 1913, p.8, cols. 1-2. For the incident and 
arrest report see The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.8, cols. 4-5. The insulting 
language quoted above is from Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, 
no. 82, November 1913, prosecution no. 5891. On the other two dismissed language 
prosecutions (both dismissed by Magistrate Evans) see The Dominion, 18 November 
1913, p.8, col. 3; 04 December 1913, p.9, cols. 7 and 8; and 10 January 1914, p.2, 
col. 6. For a similar dismissal of a strike related charge in the Dunedin Magistrate's 
Court see The Otago Daily Times, 29 November 1913, p.lO, col. 2. 
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watersider hurling a glass at a special constable) were charged with any other 
offence, and each left court without a conviction. 
The inciting charge against the strike leader Harry Holland was 
dismissed for a more complicated set of reasons. On 04 December 1913 the 
prosecutor attempted to progress through the cases against the strike leaders 
more quickly by presenting only some of the prosecution evidence. This 
unusual prosecution strategy strongly influenced Magistrate Riddell's decision 
to dismiss the inciting charge. In announcing his decision Riddell 'remarked 
that all this showed the danger of attempting arrangements and not calling the 
whole of the evidence.' Riddell also expressed his doubts that Holland's 
words fell within the criteria of the section of the Police Offences Act of 1908 
under which this charge was laid. The next day Riddell committed Holland to 
the Supreme Court for trial on two charges of sedition, one of which 
concerned the same inflammatory words as the dismissed charge. 81 
The conviction rates and the contextual details of the dismissed cases 
suggest that the strike had little influence on the decisions of Wellington 
magistrates to convict. An accusation of involvement in a strike related crime 
was not sufficient to ensure conviction and punishment. 
It is possible that the quality and certainty of evidence required for a 
conviction was not as high as prior to the strike. Magistrates may have been 
too trusting of the testimony given by some of the special constables, and 
overly critical of the defence witnesses, entering convictions where previously 
81 See The Dominion, 05 December 1913, p.8, cols. 4 and 5; and 06 December 
1913, p.6, cols. 7-8; and The Evening Post, 05 December 1913, p.3, col. 3. The 
quote is from The Dominion, 05 December 1913, p.8, col. 5. For the remaining 
charges against the strike leaders (including Holland) the Crown prosecutor reverted 
to calling all the prosecution witnesses. 
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the benefit of doubt would have been given to the accused.82 Which 
witnesses, if any, committed perjury is impossible for the historian to prove, as 
is the number of instances of mistaken identity which resulted in conviction. 
The evidence of the conviction rates, the court proceedings concerning 
the dismissed charges, and reading the newspaper reports of each of the 
other hearings suggest that any incorrect decisions were accidental. The 
magistrate assessed the reliability of the various witnesses, if each side's 
argument was plausible, and the consistency, or inconsistency, of the 
evidence which was presented. 
These assessments may have been affected to some extent by the 
attitudes and preconceptions of the magistrates to the strike, to those 
involved in the strike, and to strike disorder. The hostility of sizeable sections 
of the middle class towards those who preached or supported revolutionary 
industrial unionism is evident in the editorials, letters to the editor, and news 
reports of the Wellington daily newspapers. 83 Appreciation of the work done 
by the special constables was widespread among the middle class. Those 
who publicly praised the efforts of the special constables included the Chief 
Justice. On 29 November 1913, while sentencing two participants in strike-
related riots, the Chief Justice commented: 'But for the fact that a large 
82 For a brief discussion of, and references concerning, these possibilities see 
pp.218-219 and 236 in this chapter. 
83 For a selection of the hundreds of relevant items see The Dominion, 29 
January 1912, pA, col. 4; 02 February 1912, pA, col. 3; 09 February 1912, p.S, col. 8, 
p.6, col. 1 and p.6, col. 7; 23 October 1913, p.6, cols. 4-5; 27 October 1913, pA, col. 
2; 06 November 1913, p.6, cols. 4-5; 10 November 1913, p.5, col. 2; 14 November 
1913, p.6, col. 5 (as quoted on p.1 of this thesis) and col. 6 and p.10, col. 1; 18 
November 1913, p.6, col. 4; 22 November 1913, p.7, col. 6; 26 November 1913, p.8, 
cois. 4-5; 29 November 1913, p.l2, col. 4; 11 December 1913, p.8, col. 3; The 
Evening Post, 07 October 1911, pA, col. 7; 02 November 1911, pA, col. 7; and 04 
December 1913, p.3, cois. 3-4. 
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number of men had come forward and volunteered their services in the cause 
of law and order, the community might have been in a very dangerous 
position.'84 The Wellington magistrates and judges were also determined to 
punish those who had committed strike related offences, as will be 
demonstrated later in this chapter. It seems unlikely, however, that the 
magistrates deliberately convicted anyone simply for being a striker or 
sympathiser accused of an offence. 
This is not to say that the Wellington judiciary was never biased in its 
decisions to convict or the procedures it employed during jury trials. Barry 
Gustafson in 1980 commented upon the unfairness of the trial for seditious 
utterances of the working class leader Harry Holland. 
The Court refused to accept the text of the speech [in which the seditious 
utterances were alleged to have been made] as printed in the [Maori/and] 
Worker from Holland's own notes and accepted in preference shorthand 
notes taken by a reporter from the Dominion. Holland was allowed to 
challenge only six jurors but the prosecution which was unrestricted, ordered 
twenty-two wage-earners to stand aside. The jury that convicted Holland was 
made up entirely of professional and business men. 85 
84 The Dominion, 01 December 1913, p.9, col. 2. Also see a similar comment 
by the Chief Justice during strike-related proceedings on 04 February 1914 (The 
Dominion, 05 February 1914, p.4, col. 5). For examples of newspaper editorials, 
letters to the editor, resolutions at citizens' meetings, and public ceremonies praising 
the special constables see The Dominion, 08 November 1913, p.4, cols. 6-7, and p.7, 
col. 8 (the letter by 'A Wellington Citizen'); 11 November 1913, p.lO, cols. 2 and 3; 
28 November 1913, p.9, col. 5; 01 December 1913, p.6, col. 4; 13 December 1913, 
p.4, col. 7; 19 December 1913, p.8, cols. 3-4. The entirety of the middle class were 
not as supportive. Liberal members of Parliament and Liberal newspapers were 
critical of the actions and behaviour of some of the specials, and in some instances 
were critical of the decision to enrol and use special constables. (See the editorial 
entitled 'Law or Anarchy?' in The New Zealand Times, 31 October 1913, p.6, cols. 
3-4; and see reports in The Evening Post, 31 October 1913, p.4, cols. 2-5 and p.6, 
cols. 6-7; and The New Zealand Times, 14 November 1913, p.9, cols. 1-2). 
85 Gustafson, Labour's Path, p.76. For biographies of Sir Robert Stout see 
Waldo Hilary Dunn and Ivor L. M. Richardson, Sir Robert Stout: A Biography, 
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Holland was sentenced to twelve months in jail. 
The cause of the considerable imbalance in the number of jurors 
challenged by the defence and the prosecution is unclear. The Juries Act of 
1908 (sections 122 and 123) stipulated that the defence was only allowed to 
challenge six jurors, unless there were exceptional circumstances for any 
additional challenges. 86 Section 120 indicates that the prosecution was 
entitled to six peremptory challenges and additional challenges if there were 
exceptional circumstances: 'On the trial of all criminal cases, and of all civil 
cases to which the King is a party, there shall be the same right of challenge 
on behalf of the King as any prisoner or party possesses under this Act.'87 
The Maori/and Worker reported that the prosecution had ordered 
twenty-five jurors to stand aside, twenty-two of whom were 'wage-workers,.88 
The names and the occupations of the challenged jurors were printed in The 
Maori/and Worker, as were the names and occupations of the jury which 
convicted Holland.89 The Maori/and Worker criticised 'the extraordinary and 
(Wellington: A. H. and A. W. Reed, 1961), particularly pp.l57-178 and 205-206 on 
his twenty-six years as Chief Justice; and David Hamer, 'Stout, Robert', The 
Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, volume 2, 1870-1900, (Wellington: Bridget 
Williams Books and Department of Internal Affairs, 1993), ppA84-487. Neither of 
these biographies discuss his role in the trials and sentencings related to the 1913 
strike. 
86 The Consolidated Statutes of the Dominion of New Zealand 1908, vol. 3, 
p.l05. On exceptional circumstances for additional challenges ('challenges for cause') 
see The Crimes Act, 1908, section 421 (The Consolidated Statutes, vol. 1, p.662). 
87 The Consolidated Statutes 1908, vol. 3, p.l 05. 
88 The Maoriland Worker, 18 February 1914, p.2, col. 3; 25 February 1914, 
pA, col. 4; and 04 March 1914, p.6, cols. 3-4. 
89 The Maoriland Worker, 04 March 1914, p.6, cols. 3-4. 'The Crown thus 
challenged 5 labourers, 2 carpenters, 2 bootmakers, 2 drivers, 1 motorman, 1 
salesman, 1 cabinetmaker, 1 caretaker, 1 printer, 1 clerk, 1 patternmaker, 1 
blacksmith, 1 boilermaker, 1 storeman, 1 musician, 1 foreman, 1 contractor, 1 town 
traveller. Out of the 25 rejected by the Crown, 22 were wage-workers.' (col. 3). The 
260 
unfair method of selecting the jury provided by the present law.'9o 'Indeed, 
the law as it stands is a menace to the collective and individual liberties of the 
whole people, and places in the hands of any authorities unscrupulous 
enough to fully use it a power to exercise for injustice and tyranny that ought 
not be tolerated.'91 
The reports of Holland's trial in The Dominion, The Evening Post, and 
The New Zealand Times made no mention of anything unusual in the jury 
selection. As was standard reporting practice for trials none of the reports 
stated how many jurors were challenged, though The Evening Post and The 
New Zealand Times named the members of the jury which heard the case.92 
The manner in which such a large number of jurors were challenged by the 
prosecution and removed from the jury remains puzzling, as does the role of 
the Chief Justice in these challenges. 
Two comments made by the Chief Justice in his summing up to the 
jury in Holland's trial indicate that Stout was not favourably disposed towards 
Holland. 'As to the meaning that lay in Holland's words, his Honour quoted 
the following: - "We are going to win, and, by God, we are going to do it, no 
matter what happens." "No matter what happensl" repeated his Honour. 
jury which convicted Holland comprised a merchant, two accountants, a manager, a 
dairyman, an 'agent', three carpenters, a printer, a bricklayer, and the occupation of 
the twelfth man was not included in the report (col. 4). This is not quite a jury 'made 
up entirely of professional and business men' as described by Gustafson, Labour's 
Path, p.76. 
90 The Maoriland Worker, 25 February 1914, p.2, col. 3. 
91 The Maoriland Worker, 25 February 1914, pA, col. 4. 
92 The Dominion, 13 February 1914, pA, cols. 1 and 2-3; The Evening Post, 12 
February 1914, p.8, cols. 2-3; and 13 February 1914, p.2, col. 8; The New Zealand 
Times, 13 February 1914, p.4, cols. 3-4. Strangely, no report of Holland's trial can be 
found in New Zealand Truth, 14 February, 21 February, 28 February, or 07 March 
1914. 
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"What can the accused mean by that?" ,93 Stout also remarked: "The primal 
right of mankind wherever he lives is the right to work. If that is denied him, 
then he is living in a state of serfdom".94 The Chief Justice's attitude would 
have been conveyed to the jury in the summing up, and may have influenced 
their decision. 
The trial of Robert James Christopher Seal for destroying the 
Wellington Harbour Board's barricade on King's Wharf also problematises 
whether jury selection in strike related cases was as fair as it was supposed 
to be. The accused, who had been a striker, requested the removal from the 
jury of a man who had worked as a 'free-labourer' during the strike. The 
Chief Justice ruled that this was not a justifiable cause for exclusion of the 
juror. Instead, the accused had to use one of his limited number of 
peremptory challenges.95 The Crimes Act of 1908 (section 421, paragraph 1) 
allowed 'every prosecutor and every accused person '" any number of 
challenges for cause' on the grounds 'that any juror is not indifferent between 
the King and the accused,.96 It appears the Chief Justice considered a free-
labourer deciding the guilt or innocence of a striker involved no conflict of 
interests and would not impinge on the defendant's right to a fair trial. 
93 The Evening Post, 13 February 1914, p.2, col. 8. 
94 The Dominion, 13 February 1914, p.6, col. 7. An editorial in New Zealand 
Truth, 28 February 1914, p.4, col. 5 (1st version of this issue on the microfilm) 
commented that the Chief Justice was 'strongly biassed [sic] against the men who had 
taken part in the strike, and therefore was not capable of holding the scales of justice 
evenly and fairly.' This editorial was a reaction to Stout expressing his surprise that 
the Riot Act had not been read during the 1913 strike. 
95 The Dominion, 09 February 1914, p.11, col. 4 (which reported this challenge 
as a humorous anecdote, in a separate article to the description of the trial). Seal was 
found guilty by his jury and sentenced by the Chief Justice to seven months 
imprisonment (see The Dominion, 07 February 1914, p.6, col. 3; and 09 February 
1914, p.3, col. 4). 
96 The Consolidated Statutes 1908, vol. 1, p.662. 
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An analysis of sentencing patterns demonstrates that the Wellington 
judiciary responded to the heightened social tension and disorder of late 1913 
with heavier sentences for violent crime and other offences against the State 
than prior to the strike. Part of the explanation for the longer terms of 
imprisonment, larger fines, and increased proportion of those convicted who 
received mandatory imprisonment was the greater seriousness of the crimes 
prosecuted. An equally influential factor was the determination of the 
judiciary to deter or prevent further strike related disorder. 
Mandatory imprisonment for strike related violent crime (46.34%) was 
six times greater than the pre-strike average (7.42%). For anti-state offences 
mandatory imprisonment tripled from 9.8% pre-strike to 33.33% for strike 
related incidents.97 Most of these increases were concentrated in one month 
to three months sentences for violent crime, and sentences longer than six 
months for offences against the State.98 The overall level for imprisonment 
(when those who were given the choice of a fine or imprisonment and could 
not pay the fine are added to the mandatory gaol figures) was also 
97 See Table 16 (p.263) in the current thesis. 
98 Sentences greater than six months for crime against the State rose from one 
pre-strike to 14, or 22.22% of all strike related anti-state convictions. Two of these 
sentences (3.17%) were for more than one year: one year and nine months, and two 
years respectively. 
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Table 16: Comparison of the Sentences for Offences Committed in Wellington During 
and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 99 
a) Violent Crime: 
Pre-Strike (01 Oct 1911 Strike Period 
Sentence Strike Related to 17 Oct 1913) Not Strike Related 
f\lo. % No. % No. % 
Cautioned and Discharged 0 0.00% 36 9.21% 6 17.14% 
Fine 0 0.00% 17 4.35% 3 8.57% 
Fine or Imprisonment 22 53.66% 286 73.15% 22 62.86% 
Fine Paid 12 29.27% 176 45.01% 8 22.86% 
Imprisonment Chosen 10 24.39% 100 25.58% 14 40.00% 
Part Gaol & Part of Fine Paid 2 0.51% 
Option Taken Not Recorded 8 2.05% 
Imprisonment 19 46.34% 29 7.42% 2 5.71% 
Committed to Rehabilitative Institution - 1 2.86% 
Corporal Punishment 16 4.09% 
Probation 3 0.77% 
Bond 1 0.26% 2.86% 
Ordered to come up for sentence 3 0.77% 
when called upon 
Unknown / Not stated 
Totals: 41 100.00% 391 100.00% 35 100.00% 
b) Other Crime Against the State: 
Pre-Strike (01 Oct 1911 Strike Period 
Sentence Strike Related to 17 Oct 1913) Not Strike Related 
No. % No. % No. % 
Cautioned and Discharged 1 1.59% 15 6.12% 5 11.36% 
Fine 4 6.35% 1 0.41% 1 2.27% 
Fine or Imprisonment 29 46.03% 201 82.04% 31 70.45% 
Fine Paid 15 23.81% 107 43.67% 11 25.00% 
Imprisonment Chosen 13 20.63% 86 35.10% 18 40.91% 
Part Gaol & Part of Fine Paid 1 1.59% 8 3.27% 2 4.55% 
Imprisonment 21 33.33% 24 9.80% 5 11.36% 
Committed to Rehabilitative Institution - 1 0.41% 
Corporal Punishment 1 0.41% 
Probation 1 1.59% 
Bond 7 11.11% 
Ordered to come up for sentence 2.27% 
when called upon 
Ordered to be handed to naval authorities 1 2.27% 
Bread and Water 0.41% 
Unknown / Not stated 0.41% 
Totals: 63 100.00% 245 100.00% 44 100.00% 
99 This table contains the sentences for all individual charges (focused upon in this study) which 
were brought before the Wellington Magistrate's Court and resulted in a conviction in either the 
Magistrate's Court or the Wellington Supreme Court. One hundred and eighteen of the sentences 
were decided by a Supreme Court judge: 20 strike related, 93 pre-strike (80 of which were for 
larceny), and five strike period but not strike related (all for larceny). When one sentence was 
imposed concerning two or more charges that sentence is only counted once in this table. 
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Table 16 (continued): Comparison of the Sentences 
c) Theft: 
Pre-Strike (01 Oct 1911 
Sentence Strike Related to 17 Oct 1913) 
Strike Period 
Not Strike Relrlteo 
none strike related 
Cautioned and Discharged 
Fine 
Fine or Imprisonment 
Fine Paid 
Imprisonment Chosen 
Part Gaol & Part of Fine Paid 
Imprisonment 
Committed to Rehabilitative 
Institution 
Corporal Punishment 
Probation 
Bond 
Ordered to come up for sentence 
when called upon 
Unknown / Not stated 
Totals: o 0.00% 
No. % No. % 
61 
12 
168 
191 
35 
46 
8 
1 
107 
9.70% 5 
1.91% 1 
26.71% 26 
63 10.02% 
103 16.38% 
2 0.32% 
30.37% 18 
5.56% 1 
7.31% 
1.27% 
0.16% 
17.01% 9 
8.33% 
1.67% 
43.33% 
6 10.00% 
18 30.00% 
2 3.33% 
30.00% 
1.67% 
15.00% 
629 100.00% 60 100.00% 
significantly higher than usual concerning strike related offences. Overall 
imprisonment for violent crime was 33.51 % pre-strike and 70.73% strike 
related, and for crimes against the state the relative proportions were 48.17% 
pre-strike and 55.55% strike related. 10o 
Fines for strike related offences and the length of the imprisonment 
default for not paying these fines were greater than prior to the strike. Four-
fifths (81.82%) of the fines imposed for strike related violence were more than 
£2. Before the strike only 9.57% of all fines for violent crime were over £2, 
100 See Table 16 (p.263). These overall imprisonment figures include the small 
number of cases where the accused served two days or more of the imprisonment 
default and then paid the remainder of the fine. 
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with 62.30% of all fines for violence set at £1 or less.101 The increases in the 
size of the fines for other offences against the state were more moderate. 
Nearly two-thirds (63.67%) of fines for strike related other anti-state crimes 
were greater than £2, compared with 47.52% pre-strike. The proportion of 
"other" offences with fines of £4 or £5, in contrast, were six times higher: 
5.94% pre-strike, increasing to 30.30% for strike related incidents.102 
Sentences of eight days or more imprisonment in default of paying a fine for 
violence increased from 16.43% pre-strike to 77.27% strike related (of all 
punishments for violence where the option of a fine or gaol was allowed the 
accused). Sentences for violence of 15 days or more in default rose from 
2.10% pre-strike to 40.91 % strike related. 103 The equivalent increase in 
sentences of 15 days or more in default for other offences against the state 
was from 4.98% pre-strike to 31.03% strike related. 
Mandatory imprisonment rates for non-strike related violent crime 
(5.71 %) and non-strike related other anti-state crime (11.36%) committed 
during the strike show almost no deviation from the pre-strike proportions.104 
However, there was a SUbstantial increase in the proportion of sentences for 
101 Excluding private prosecutions and juvenile offenders has an extremely minor 
impact on the proportions. The equivalent pre-strike figures are 9.43% of fines were 
over £2, with 63.02% of fines set at £1 or less. None of the strike related violence 
cases were private prosecutions or involved juvenile accused. 
102 No juvenile offenders were ordered to pay fines for either pre-strike or strike-
related other offences against the state, thus cases involving juveniles had no influence 
on the extent of these increases. Private prosecutions are by definition not included in 
this category (see Chapter Two, pp.41-42, especially footnote 2). 
103 When private prosecutions and charges with juveniles as the accused are 
excluded the increase in the proportion of imprisonment defaults of eight days or more 
becomes slightly larger (from 15.69% pre-strike to 77.27% strike related) and the 
increase in defaults of 15 days or more becomes marginally smaller (from 2.35% pre-
strike to 40.91 % strike related). 
104 See Table 16 (p.263). 
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non-strike related other anti-state crimes with lengthy imprisonment 
alternatives for the non payment of fines. Before the strike four per cent of 
these sentences (ten of 245) required imprisonment for 21 days or longer if 
the fine was not paid (the maximum default imposed was one month). For 
non-strike related strike period offences the equivalent figure was 27.27 per 
cent (12 of 44 sentences), with four of these sentences having a three month 
imprisonment default,105 Eleven of these sentences concerned obscene 
language and the twelfth was for insulting language with intent to provoke a 
breach of the peace. 
For larceny the analysis of sentences is extremely straight forward. 
The mandatory imprisonment rate was slightly lower for offences committed 
during the strike (30.00%) than prior to the strike (30.37%). The overall 
imprisonment level was higher for strike period offences: 60.00% strike 
compared to 46.75% pre-strike. This increase was largely caused by fewer 
juveniles than usual being convicted of strike period thefts (only 13.33% of 
strike accused compared to 24.01 % pre-strike). When juvenile accused are 
excluded the overall imprisonment rates are a closer 69.24% strike and 
61.51 % pre-strike. 106 Finally, there was little difference in the lengths of 
sentences between the two periods. From this data it is apparent that the 
105 The proportion of those sentenced to a fine or lengthy imprisonment who did 
not pay the fine was lower for non-strike related offences (five of twelve - 41.67%) 
than prior to the strike (seven often - 70%). Though the percentage of all sentences in 
which the accused served 21 days or more in gaol in default of a fine was still 
significantly higher (11.36% - five of 44) for non-strike related offences than for pre-
strike crime (2.86% - seven of245). 
106 Excluding juvenile accused has little impact on the mandatory imprisonment 
rates. The slight decrease in such sentences for larcenies committed during the strike 
simply becomes more noticeable: 34.62% strike compared to 39.96% pre-strike. 
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strike had extremely little, if any, impact on the sentencing decisions made by 
the judiciary concerning those convicted of larceny. 
Obscene language sentences provide an insight into the attitude of the 
Wellington judiciary towards offences committed during the strike. The 
seriousness of an obscene language offence does not fluctuate to the same 
extent that the seriousness of assaults fluctuate. A "common" assault can 
range from a slap on the face or the throwing of one small stone to dozens of 
punches and kicks. 107 In contrast, the context in which obscene language is 
used may change but the words themselves do not vary dramatically. This 
property allows direct comparisons to be made between pre-strike and strike 
obscene language sentences, with a high level of expectation that reasonably 
similar offences are being compared. 
The most prominent difference between pre-strike and strike related 
obscene language sentences was the proportion of sentences of mandatory 
imprisonment. Before the strike 7.19 per cent of sentences (11 of 153) 
involved mandatory imprisonment, but for strike related offences this rate rose 
to fifty per cent (7 of 14).108 For example, on 07 November 1913 Thomas 
107 The Crimes Act 1908, section 207, defined an assault as 'the act of 
intentionally applying force to the person of another, directly or indirectly, or 
attempting or threatening by any act or gesture to apply such force to the person of 
another, if the person making the threat has, or causes the other to believe upon 
reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose. ' (The 
Consolidated Statutes of the Dominion of New Zealand 1908, vol. 1, Wellington: 
John MacKay, Government Printer, 1908, p.607). 
108 It should be noted that two of the seven sentences of mandatory imprisonment 
for strike related obscene language were joint sentences with more serious offences 
(assault so as to cause actual bodily harm, and taking part in a riot, respectively). 
These were also the longest sentences related to obscene language (12 months each). 
Excluding these two sentences has little impact on the overall trends. The relevant 
mandatory imprisonment rate is only a slightly lower 41.67% (five of twelve), instead 
of fifty percent (seven of fourteen). 
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Rodgers was sentenced to 14 days gaol for using obscene language to 
special constables. '''Will there be no fine, sir?" he plaintively inquired. "Call 
the next case", , was Magistrate Riddell's only response. 109 Non-strike related 
strike period sentences were also significantly different to the pre-strike 
sentences. Lengthy imprisonment defaults of 21 days or more for the non-
payment of fines were seven times more frequent for non-strike related 
obscene language (11 of 25, or 44.00%) than prior to the strike (9 of 153, or 
5.88%). 
These figures indicate that the Wellington magistrates were less 
tolerant of any use of obscene language during the strike, and responded with 
heavier punishments concerning both strike related and non-strike related 
incidents. Such a conclusion is supported by a statement made by 
Magistrate Evans on 03 December 1913 when sentencing four men who had 
each pleaded guilty to using obscene language. 'The use of obscene 
language in the public streets within the hearing of passers-by had [sic] got to 
be put down'. Evans also noted 'its prevalence in Wellington'. The 
punishment for each accused was a large fine of £5 with the alternative of 
three months imprisonment. None of the four offences were related to the 
strike. 110 
109 The Dominion, 08 November 1913, p.7, col. 5 (the quote is from this report); 
and The New Zealand Times, 08 November 1913, p.5, col. 5. The accused's 
surname is spelt as it appears in the Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record 
Book, no. 82, November 1913, prosecution no. 5667 and in New Zealand Police 
Gazette, 1913, p.739. 
110 The Evening Post, 03 December 1913, p.8, col. 9 and p.2, col. 5. (The quotes 
are from p.8, col. 9). Also see The Dominion, 04 December 1913, p.ll, col. 5. Three 
of the convicted men paid the remainder of their fines after serving between one and 
five days of the prison alternative. The fourth man (Arthur Gorham) was released 
from Wellington Prison in March 1914. (See Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal 
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In a separate sentencing on 20 November Magistrate Riddell 
commented that he was not inflicting the maximum penalty for obscene 
language allowed by the law of a fine of £20 or one year's imprisonment. The 
accused instead received one month's mandatory imprisonment for his four 
words directed at a troop of mounted special constables. 111 None of those 
convicted of obscene language in Wellington during the strike received the 
maximum sentence, nor anything above one quarter of the maximum 
penalty.112 In contrast, the maximum fine of £20 was imposed on 17 
December 1913 in the Hastings Magistrate's Court concerning a case with no 
apparent connection to the strike, the extreme seriousness of the offence 
being the use of obscene language in the hearing of women. 113 This 
evidence demonstrates that although Wellington magistrates imposed heavier 
penalties for obscene language than prior to the strike they chose not to 
enforce the law to anywhere near its full potential. 
A similar trend is evident in the sentences imposed for strike related 
violent crime and rioting. When sentencing Edmund Barlow to one month in 
jail for throwing a stone at a group of passing policemen Magistrate Riddell 
noted that "anyone is liable to three months' imprisonment for assaulting a 
Record Book, no. 83, December 1913, prosecution no.s 6215,6216,6217 and 6218; 
and New Zealand Police Gazette, 1913, pp.773, 789 and 791, and New Zealand 
Police Gazette, 1914, p.195). 
III The Dominion, 21 November 1913, p.8, col. 8, and 20 November 1913, p.8, 
cols. 5-6; and Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, 
November 1913, prosecution no. 5894. 
m Assuming that the two senten~es of twelve months discussed in footnote 108 
(p.267) were largely in response to the related assault and taking part in a riot 
convictions. 
113 The Dominion, 19 December 1913, p.5, col. 7. 
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constable.,,114 The Chief Justice, Sir Robert Stout, made a similar statement 
on 29 November 1913 at the Supreme Court sentencing of two strikers who 
had pleaded guilty to rioting. He commented that the law allowed a 
punishment of two years imprisonment with hard labour, and that 'the Court 
also had power to order the accused to be submitted to reformative treatment 
for any period up to ten years.' The two men received sentences of eight 
months and nine months' imprisonment, respectively.115 
Though the maximum penalties were rarely imposed the punishments 
for strike related violence were still substantial. In sentencing William Henry 
Lawton for taking part in the Whitcombe and Tombs riot the Chief Justice 
stated 'he intended to deal more leniently with the prisoner as he had pleaded 
guilty, and in view of his past record [of good behaviour]. He could not, 
however, treat the crime as a light thing; it was a very serious crime, and far 
more serious than stealing property, forgery, and such offences, in as much 
as it was a crime against the community and against good order. But for the 
fact that a large number of men had come forward and volunteered their 
services in the cause of law and order, the community might have been in a 
very dangerous position.' Lawton was sentenced to nine months 
imprisonment, in addition to the three months he had received in the 
Magistrate's Court for two related offences during the same riot. 116 
The Wellington judiciary were determined that those guilty of strike 
related disorder received significant punishments, and intended their 
sentences to act as warnings to other potential offenders. Magistrate Riddell 
114 
115 
The Dominion, 08 November 1913, p.7, col. 5. 
The Dominion, 01 December 1913, p.9, col. 2. 
116 The Dominion, 01 December 1913, p.9, col. 2. On the two related convictions 
see The Dominion, 22 November 1913, p.6, cols. 7-8. 
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was adamant that "This interference must cease" when he sentenced 
Thomas Vann to one month's imprisonment for assaulting Walter Johnson, a 
working carter. Vann had been one member of a crowd who had first 
followed, then impeded and verbally abused Johnson as Johnson attempted 
to return his employer's horse and cart to Brooklyn at the end of the working 
day on 19 November. 117 A week later Riddell ordered George Bailey to 
produce a bond of £200 to keep the peace for twelve months, with two 
sureties of £200 each, for the inflammatory words he had used at a strike 
meeting. Riddell informed Bailey 'he should know that statements such as he 
had made were not conducive to law and order. It had been quite 
unnecessary to make statements of the kind under review.'118 
On 07 February 1914 the Chief Justice sentenced thirteen men who 
had either pleaded guilty to or had been convicted by a jury for strike related 
offences. 'His Honour stated at the outset that he would not allow probation' 
to 'men who had committed offences of this nature'. The lightest sentence he 
handed down on this date was three months imprisonment. Eleven of the 
men were sent to prison for seven months or longer.119 At one of the related 
rioting trials, three days earlier, the Chief Justice had told the jury in his 
summing up 'that there could be no law and order if incidents such as those 
117 The Dominion, 21 November 1913, p.8, col. 8. A slightly different wording 
was reported in The Evening Post, 20 November 1913, p.7, col. 9: "This interference 
must be stopped." For additional reports of the incident see The Dominion, 20 
November 1913, p.8, col. 5; and The Evening Post, 20 November 1913, p.3, col. 3. 
118 The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, col. 7. See Chapter Five, p.204 for 
more details on Bailey's prosecution. 
119 The Dominion, 09 February 1914, p.3, cols. 4-5. (The quotes are from col. 4). 
The thirteenth man was sentenced to four months imprisonment (col. 4). 
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related in the evidence were to be tolerated.'12o The accused, Thomas 
Acland, received twelve months imprisonment on 07 February.121 
Additional evidence of the determination of the judiciary to both punish 
the guilty and deter further strike related offending is apparent in the 
sentences given to Agnes Udall and Sydney Claridge. Due to extenuating 
circumstances the initial charges of unlawful assembly against Udall and 
rioting against Claridge were withdrawn by the police. Udall was in hospital 
suffering from a nervous breakdown caused by the court proceedings. On 26 
November 1913 her lawyer entered a plea of guilty on her behalf to a lesser 
charge of threatening behaviour whereby a breach of the peace was 
occasioned. Rather than considering the nervous breakdown sufficient 
punishment for her strike related misdeeds and only entering a conviction 
against her Magistrate Riddell imposed a reasonably small fine of £1.122 
Claridge's rioting charge was withdrawn because of his weak 'intellectual 
condition' along with a good character reference. He pleaded guilty to a 
reduced charge of the use of conduct likely to provoke a breach of the peace. 
Riddell sentenced the accused to pay a moderate fine of £2 or spend seven 
days in gaol in default of payment, and to enter into a sizeable bond of £20 
and one surety of £20 to keep the peace for six months. The accused's 
employer, who acted as Claridge's character witness, stated before the 
120 
121 
The Dominion, 05 February 1914, p.9, col. 5. 
The Dominion, 09 February 1914, p.3, col. 4. 
122 The Dominion, 27 November 1913, p.9, col. 4; and The Evening Post, 18 
November 1913, p.8, col. 1. 
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sentence was announced that he was willing to supply a bond for Claridge. It 
was Magistrate Riddell's choice to require such a bond. 123 
Eighteen of those accused of Wellington strike related offences were 
required to provide bonds and sureties to keep the peace for either six or 
twelve months. For eleven of these persons the bond was in addition to the 
punishment of mandatory imprisonment or a fine concerning the same 
charge. 124 The sizeable financial penalty for infringement of these good 
behaviour bonds was an effective guarantee that the offender would avoid 
becoming involved in further strike related disorder. 
Even greater certainty of no re-offending during the period of the bond 
was ensured when the accused was unable to produce the bond or find 
sureties. In these cases the individual was forced to remain in prison until 
either the bond and sureties were obtained, or the six or twelve month 
duration of the bond had expired. Thomas Barker, an organiser for the 
I.W.W., experienced considerable difficulty in finding £500 for his bond and 
two sureties of £500 each. He was not released from Wellington Prison until 
15 January 1914, forty days after Magistrate Riddell set the bond amounts on 
123 The Dominion, 28 November 1913, p.9, col. 3. On the court proceedings 
against both Udall and Claridge also see p.227 above in the current chapter. 
124 In the two years before the strike (01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913) only 
seven persons were ordered by the Wellington magistrates to provide bonds to keep 
the peace. (Two of these cases concerned violent crimes, none related to other 
offences against the state, and the third bond was for a 15 year old juvenile convicted 
of theft. The remaining four bonds were the outcome of three private applications and 
one police application for sureties of the peace which were not accompanied by either 
a prosecution for actual physical violence or a police prosecution for an anti-state 
offence. The last four applications have not been included in the pre-strike 
quantitative data analysed throughout this thesis. Their only relevance for, and use in, 
this thesis is for the discussion in the current footnote. See Chapter Two, pp.41-42 for 
the reasons for this data selection decision). 
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05 December 1913.125 William Parker, a striking watersider, spent eighteen 
days in Wellington Prison (09 December 1913 to 27 December) waiting for his 
bond of £50 and two sureties of £25 each to be arranged. 126 
Magistrate Evans treated one drunken striker more leniently. On 03 
December the seaman, lately employed on the s.s. Moana, was charged with 
being a rogue and vagabond in that he was found by night without lawful 
excuse in Hannah's Buildings. The accused's lawyer explained that while in a 
state of drunkenness his client had wandered into the building where - on the 
fourth floor - he was found asleep and arrested. 'Counsel submitted that 
there was no guilty intent. Inspector Hendrey [the police prosecutor] agreed 
that perhaps there was no guilty intent.' The striker was convicted and 
discharged without punishment.127 The reasons for the lenient sentence 
would have included the lack of premeditation or criminal intent by the 
accused and that the offence was in no way connected with strike related 
disorder. In contrast, at the same court sitting Magistrate Evans fined four 
men £5 each with the alternative of three months in prison for obscene 
language offences which were not related to the strike. 128 
125 See The Evening Post, 05 December 1913, p.7, col. 9; The Dominion, 06 
December 1913, p.6, cols. 6-7; 30 December 1913, p.4, col. 6; and 06 January 1914, 
p.4, col. 7; and New Zealand Police Gazette, 1914, p.63. 
126 The Dominion, 10 December 1913, p.6, col. 5; and New Zealand Police 
Gazette, 1914, p.24. Parker also had to find £50 bail and sureties concerning a 
separate charge for which he had been committed to the Supreme Court for trial (see 
The Dominion, 10 December 1913, p.6, col. 5). On Parker's occupation, Supreme 
Court trial, and Supreme Court sentence see The Dominion, 04 February 1914, p.5, 
col. 1 and 09 February 1914, p.3, col. 4. 
1~7 Dominion, 04 December 1913, p.ll, col. 5. This offence is not included 
in the quantitative data analysed throughout the rest of this thesis. It does not fall into 
any of the categories of potential protest crime which are analysed, and is simply a 
crime by a striker, rather than a strike related crime. 
128 The Dominion, 04 December 1913, p.11, col. 5. Also see p.268 above. 
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On 25 November Magistrate Riddell had shown leniency concerning a 
similar trespass offence by Robert Martin. In this case the accused was not a 
striker. The property where the drunken trespasser was sleeping was the 
stable at the Lambton Quay Police Station. Inspector Hendrey stated in court 
'that he did not think for a moment that Martin was in the stable with the 
intention of doing any harm.' 'The Magistrate remarked to Martin that he was 
liable to a long term of imprisonment. In the circumstances, however, he 
would merely convict him, and order him to appear for sentence when called 
on.'129 Leniency was possible during the strike, even if the accused was a 
striker or had committed an offence against the police. 
Overall the Wellington judiciary responded to strike related disorder 
with longer jail terms, larger fines, and a greater proportion of sentences of 
mandatory imprisonment than prior to the industrial dispute. Mandatory 
imprisonment, however, was not imposed for every offence it could have 
been. Only 31 of the 83 persons (37.35%) convicted of strike related 
offences were sentenced to mandatory imprisonment.13o In nearly all the 
remaining instances mandatory imprisonment was a legal option (if an 
unusually harsh option for relatively minor incidents and for those who had no 
previous convictions). For example, Walter Percival Jackson, a striking wharf 
worker, was fined £5 or 14 days jail in default for using obscene language on 
129 The Dominion, 26 November 1913, p.10, col. 6. This offence is also not 
included in the quantitative data analysed throughout the rest of this thesis. See 
Chapter One, footnote 86 (pp.36-37) for the reasons why vagrancy offences have been 
excluded from the main quantitative analysis. 
130 The relevant figures for only those convicted of strike related violence or 
rioting were 25 of 43 persons (58.14%). 
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31 October towards two regular policemen. 131 On 24 October 1912 Ada 
Edwards had been sentenced to two months mandatory imprisonment on the 
same charge. 132 Imprisoning every person who had contributed to strike 
related disorder (or even a majority of those who were apprehended and 
convicted) was not a strategy used to control or deter disorder. 
Wellington was not the only city in which sentencing decisions were 
influenced by the strike. In Christchurch, for example, the magistrates 
responded firmly to any behaviour they considered had the potential to 
escalate the industrial tensions into overt disorder. On 24 November 1913 
George Barnes appeared before Magistrate Bishop in the Christchurch 
Magistrate's Court charged with obscene language. The offence was in no 
way connected with the strike. It was admitted that Barnes was under the 
influence of liquor at the time of the incident. Bishop's response to this 
information was "That makes it all the worse! I shall deal severely with all 
cases of disorder during this special time." The defence counsel 'asked that 
the special consideration always extended by the Court to a first offender, 
should be extended to his client.' Bishop replied "Yes, at any other time, but 
not now!". When sentencing the accused to fourteen days gaol with hard 
131 The Dominion, 01 November 1913, p.6, col. 5; and 03 November 1913, p.11, 
col. 5. The fine was paid (see Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, 
no. 82, November 1913, prosecution no. 5578). For similar strike related examples 
see The Dominion, 11 November 1913, p.8, col. 8; 20 November 1913, p.9, col. 6; 
10 December 1913, p.6, col. 6; and 11 December 1913, p.8, col. 5. 
132 The Dominion, 25 October 1912, p.9, col. 3. For similar pre-strike examples 
see The Dominion, 13 January 1912, p.13, col. 6; 04 March 1912, p.3, col. 3; 
26 October 1912, p.14, col. 4; 05 November 1912, p.ll, col. 4; 23 November 1912, 
p.14, col. 5; and 04 August 1913, p.3, col. 4. 
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labour, Bishop 'added that anything which inflamed the public mind at this 
time was a danger.,133 Three days later: 
Robert James Dougall, a young man, was charged before Mr. H. W. 
Bishop, S.M., in the [Christchurch] Magistrate's Court yesterday with being a 
rogue and a vagabond, in that he was found yesterday armed with an 
offensive weapon, to wit a bludgeon, with felonious intent. 
Accused said the whole affair was a joke, and he, with a "mob" of 
other fellows, was only acting the goat. 
The Magistrate: A rather dangerous way of "acting the goat", when the 
whole city is excited. 
Senior-Sergeant Mathieson said the accused's statement was quite 
correct. There was a mob of youths, and they were all armed with batons. 
They went about accosting people, and endeavouring to create a 
disturbance. The accused had a bad record. 
The Magistrate: That alters the case. Sentenced to fourteen days' 
hard labour! 134 
Magistrate Bishop's intention to minimise the potential for disorder 
while the strike continued is once again visible in a lenient sentence given to 
Samuel Lee on 29 November. Lee was charged with being an idle and 
disorderly person, in that he had insufficient lawful means of support. He was 
convicted and ordered to come up for sentence when called upon, not to be 
called provided he immediately left Christchurch. "We are not going to have a 
lot of loafers about the town at this time", declared his Worship.135 
133 The Press, 25 November 1913, p.4, col. 4. Magistrate Bishop made a similar 
comment on 22 November (see The Dominion, 24 November 1913, p.7, col. 1). 
134 The Press, 28 November 1913, p.8, col. 1. 
I3S The Press, 01 December 1913, p.5, col. 6. Another man charged with a 
vagumcy offence received a simibr sentence from a second Christchurch magistrate, 
Mr. T. A. B. Bailey, S.M., on 28 November. 'William Brown, an old man, was 
charged with being a rogue and a vagabond, in that he was found by night without 
lawful excuse on the premises of Walter Harvey, Hereford street. He was convicted 
and discharged on the understanding that he left Christchurch for a long stay in the 
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The determination of the Wellington magistrates to prevent further 
disorder is also apparent from their decisions concerning bail for those 
accused of strike related offences. On 05 November Magistrate Riddell 
refused the bail applications of two men alleged to have been involved in the 
unlawful assembly outside the Royal Tiger Hotel the previous evening. 'Not in 
the present circumstances', was his response when they asked for bail. 'You 
should know the law, and you have already been warned against frequenting, 
and congregating in, the streets during the present trouble.'136 In other cases 
where bail was allowed the amounts were usually considerable. John Edward 
Harrington, a seaman, was required to find (and obtained) £100 bail while on 
remand for taking part in the Post and Telegraph Stores riot of 30 October. 
On 22 November Harrington was committed to the Supreme Court for trial on 
the same charge and his bail was increased to £200.137 Bail was also fixed at 
£200 for another seaman, Charles Frederick Beaumont, accused of taking 
part in the same riot and committed on 20 November to the Supreme Court 
country.' The Press does not report that Magistrate Bailey made any reference to the 
strike while dealing with this case. (The Press, 29 November 1913, p.2, col. 3). 
136 The Dominion, 06 November 1913, p.8, cols. 2-3 (the quotes are from col. 3). 
Each of the accused, Robert Hill and Archibald Campbell, spent seven days on 
remand without bail in Wellington Prison. At their next Magistrate's Court appearance 
on 12 November the charges against them were resolved through a conviction and a 
committal to the Supreme Court each (see The New Zealand Times, 13 November 
1913, p.7, cols. 3-4). 
\37 The New Zealand Times, 17 November 1913, p.7, col. 7; 24 November 1913, 
p.6, col. 1; The Dominion, 24 November 1913, p.7, col. 5; and Wellington 
Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 1913, prosecution no. 
5838, relevant dates 15 November and 22 November. The magistrate at both of 
Harrington's Magistrate's Court appearances was Riddell. Harrington was released on 
bail on 17 November (see New Zealand Police Gazette, 1913, p.738). The relevant 
reports in The Dominion, The Evening Post and The New Zealand Times provide 
no explanation as to why bail was increased. It appears that Harrington was able to 
raise the extra £100 for his bail: there are no later discharged from gaol entries for 
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for trial. 138 A striking watersider, Charles Johnson, charged with assaulting a 
mounted special constable was ordered on 19 November to provide £150 for 
bail.139 When setting bail at £80 for two men charged with having taken part 
in the unlawful assembly of 05 November in Featherston Street Riddell 
'remarked that the defendants had a right to bail, but the amount must be 
substantial.,14o In addition, Riddell advised the two men that they 'would have 
to behave themselves and keep away from the crowds. If they broke this 
pledge they would be re-arrested.'141 
The purpose of sizeable bail requirements was to deter the accused 
from becoming involved in strike disturbances while awaiting hearing or trial. 
A second motivating factor may have been a hope by the magistrate that the 
defendant would be unable to raise the bail and would have to remain in gaol. 
This outcome would also achieve the goal of reducing the potential for further 
disorder on the streets of Wellington. Such a motivation is extremely difficult 
to prove. The possibility that a strike "offender" would be bailed by fellow 
strikers or their union suggests that the hope the accused would remain in 
prison was not the main motivation for setting high bail. The cases of 
Harrington in the New Zealand Police Gazettes for 1913 or 1914 after his 17 
November 1913 release on bail. 
138 The Evening Post, 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 1; and The Dominion, 21 
November 1913, p.8, col. 7. Beaumont's bail while on remand to appear at the 
Magistrate's Court had been a lower £150, and the magistrate at both of his 
Magistrate's Court appearances was Riddell (see The Dominion, 12 November 1913, 
p.lO, col. 4; and Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, 
November 1913, prosecution no. 5714, relevant dates 11 November and 20 
November). 
139 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.8, col. 4. Johnson's bail would have 
been lower if he h~d not been carrying a concealed modified baton when arrested. 
Johnson was released on bail on 20 November (see New Zealand Police GazeHc, 
1913, p.739). 
140 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 3. 
141 The Evening Post, 06 November 1913, p.8, col. 4. 
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leniency concerning bail (discussed below) provide further indications that the 
intention of the magistrates was deterrence rather than confinement. 
The strike leaders experienced the greatest difficulty in obtaining bail. 
Magistrate Riddell twice refused to allow bail for the six strike leaders arrested 
on 11 and 12 November and charged with seditious utterances or inciting 
disorder.142 Bail was a legal right for persons accused of indictable offences 
(charges which usually required a Supreme Court trial if a plea of not guilty 
was entered). Each of the six men, however, were charged with summary 
offences for which bail could be refused at the magistrate's discretion. (Three 
of the strike leaders faced both summary and indictable charges). Riddell 
used this discretion to first set substantial bail requirements for the indictable 
charges (where applicable), and then refuse bail on the (less serious) 
summary charges. 143 Only on 28 November, after sixteen days remanded in 
142 On 12 November Riddell refused the bail applications of Bailey, Fraser, 
Holland, Semple and Young (The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, cols. 4-6). On 
19 November Riddell again refused bail for these five men, and also refused the bail 
request of Barker who made his first appearance in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
on this date (The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.9, cols. 4-5). It appears that no 
attempt to re-apply for bail was made by the defence lawyers on 28 November. The 
Dominion, The Evening Post, The New Zealand Times, The Otago Daily Times, 
The Press, The Maoriland Worker, and New Zealand Truth contain no mention of 
bail applications or refusal of bail in relation to the 28 November court appearances of 
the strike leaders. If bail had been refused once more this should have been reported 
by at least one of the newspapers, and most likely by all of them. The first two 
refusals of bail on 12 and 19 November received considerable press coverage. That 
the official newspaper of the United Federation of Labour, The Maoriland Worker 
(10 December 1913, p. 7, cols. 4-6), made no comments concerning bail in its lengthy 
report on the 28 November court proceedings involving the strike leaders provides 
strong confirmation that bail was not refused by Magistrate Riddell on this date. Also 
see The Maoriland Worker, 03 December 1913, p.5, col. 2. 
I,D The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, eols. 4-6 (especially eols. 4-5); 
20 November 1913, p.9, eols. 4-5. For reports on the arrests of the strike leaders see 
The Dominion, 12 November 1913, p.8, cols. 4-5; and 13 November 1913, p.8, col. 3 
and col. 6. The three men not charged with an indictable offence were George Bailey, 
Peter Fraser, and Robert Semple. For some indictable offences the accused could 
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Wellington Prison, were the cases against the first two of these men resolved. 
The four remaining strike leaders spent another week in prison waiting for the 
charges against them to be heard and waiting for the reserved decision on 
one of the charges involving William Thomas Young. 144 
In an interview conducted on 04 December 1913 Peter Fraser strongly 
criticised the refusal of bail for himself and the other arrested strike leaders. 
'Mr. Fraser was highly indignant about the Magistrate's refusal to allow bail in 
the first instance. In this matter the whole of the men were treated worse than 
criminals, and in the cases of himself and Bailey, it amounted to three weeks' 
imprisonment for nothing, seeing that they were only bound over. No one 
could help but regard the whole affair as being a "slim" move on the part of 
the Government to get men out of the way.'145 
Comments by Magistrate Riddell concerning the second remand of the 
strike leaders on 19 November suggest that depriving the Wellington strikers 
of six of their most enthusiastic leaders was not his primary intention in 
refusing bail. Upon learning that the defence counsel intended to ask for a 
remand Riddell replied: 'I was prepared to hear the cases to-day. There is 
nothing to be gained by keeping them hanging over. .... I hope there will be 
no further adjournment.'146 
Remands without bail were an effective means of removing those 
perceived to be troublemakers from the streets of Wellington. Such remands 
elect to be tried immediately by a Magistrate, rather than wait a number of weeks or 
months for a jury trial. 
144 The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, cols. 4-7. 
145 The Maoriland Worker, 10 December 1913, p.l, col. 1. 
146 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.9, col. 4. The first set of remands on 12 
November, and the refusal of bail, had been at the request of the Crown prosecutor 
(see The Dominion, 13 November 1913, p.8, cols. 4-6). 
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ensured the accused remained in prison, unlike the potential outcomes 
associated with the actual hearing of a case. Convictions could be appealed 
and the accused was automatically entitled to bail until the appeal had been 
heard. 147 The sentencing options for a particular charge might not include 
mandatory imprisonment,148 A mistake by the prosecutor might require the 
magistrate to dismiss a charge. 149 Committals to the Supreme Court for trial 
allowed bail as a right. For these reasons Riddell's criticism of the request for 
a further remand would seem self-defeating if his purpose had been to keep 
the strike leaders in gaol as long as possible. 
Riddell, though, was still adamant in his refusal to grant bail on 19 
November. His response to the defence counsel's attempt to obtain bail for 
147 This eventuated concerning one of the charges against William Thomas 
Young, who appealed his conviction by Riddell on 04 December 1913 to the Supreme 
Court. (See The Evening Post, 04 December 1913, p.7, col. 9 and p.8, col. 1; and 05 
December 1913, p.3 col. 3). Also see Chapter Five, footnote 145 (pp.205-206). 
148 Four of the strike leaders (George Bailey, Peter Fraser, Robert Semple, and 
Thomas Barker) were only required to provide a bond and sureties to keep the peace 
to resolve the summary charges against them. Thomas Barker, however, experienced 
considerable difficulty in finding £500 for his bond and two sureties of £500 each. He 
was not released from Wellington Prison until 15 January 1914, forty days after 
Riddell set the bond amounts on 05 December 1913. (See The Evening Post, 05 
December 1913, p.7, col. 9; The Dominion, 06 December 1913, p.6, cols. 6-7; 
30 December 1913, p.4, col. 6; and 06 January 1914,p.4, col. 7; and New Zealand 
Police Gazette, 1914, p.63). The other three leaders spent either four or five days 
waiting in gaol for sureties and acceptance by the Magistrate's Court of the suretors 
(see The Dominion, 29 November 1913, p.6, cols. 6-7; 03 December 1913, p.9, 
col. 2; 04 December 1913, p.9, cols. 4 and 8; and 06 December 1913, p.6, cols. 4-6; 
and The New Zealand Times, 11 December 1913, p.7, col. 7). 
149 The prosecutor's attempt to progress through the cases against the strike 
leaders more quickly by presenting only some of the prosecution evidence strongly 
influenced Magistrate Riddell's decision to dismiss one of the four charges against 
Henry Holland on 04 December 1913. Riddell also expressed his doubts that 
Holland's words fell within the criteria of the section of the Police Offences Act under 
which this charge was laid. (See p.256 in this chapter). 
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Thomas Barker was a succinct 'I have given my decision, Mr. Dickson.'15o It 
appears the seriousness of the charges and a concern that the accused might 
incite further disturbances with their militant speeches were Riddell's central 
motivations in denying bail, rather than hostility to the strike or its leaders. 
In at least two strike related cases Magistrate Riddell displayed 
leniency when setting bail. Agnes Udall, a 29 year old woman, was one of 
five persons who appeared in court on 06 November on a charge of having 
taken part in the unlawful assembly in Featherston Street the previous day. 
Each accused was remanded until 12 November. Udall's bail was set at only 
£20. In contrast, bail of £80 each was required from William George Cockell 
and George Johnston. The other two defendants (Alexander Churchman and 
Carl Johnson) made no application for bail at their first remand. On 12 
November all four men were allowed bail of £80 each. Udall's bail remained 
at £20. 151 
150 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.9, col. 5. New Zealand Truth, 22 
November 1913, p.5, col. 8 (1st version of this issue on the microfilm) provided a 
more colourful description of Magistrate Riddell's reply: 'Riddell looked daggers at 
the presumptuous young law fledgling, and snapped out "I have given my decision." , 
151 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 3; and 13 November 1913, p.8, 
col. 6; and Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 
1913, prosecution no.s 5633, 5645, 5646, 5647, and 5648. None of the relevant 
reports in The Dominion, The Evening Post, or The New Zealand Times state why 
bail of only £20 was set for Udall. Udall's experience could be interpreted as being 
caused by a gender differential in the magistrate's attitude to granting bail. The only 
other woman prosecuted in connection with a riot, Florence Nelson, was also allowed 
£20 bail. She was charged with taking part in an unlawful assembly for her role in the 
Royal Tiger Hotel riot of 04 November. At Nelson's first remand on 12 November 
Inspector Hendrey suggested to Magistrate Riddell that the fact that the accused had a 
number of children should be considered when bail was being fixed. This was the 
same couri session at which bail of £20 was allowed for Udall, and £80 each for the 
four men accused of rioting in Featherston Street. (The Dominion, 13 November 
1913, p.8, col. 6. The Dominion misreports the amount of Nelson's bail as £80. 
Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Book, no. 82, November 1913, 
prosecution no. 5724; The Evening Post, 12 November 1913, p.8, col. 1; and The 
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On 19 November John Troy, a seaman, was committed to the 
Supreme Court for trial on the extremely serious charge of assaulting a 
mounted special constable with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Detective 
bailey witnessed ·1 roy throw the Slone wllich struck the victim, and staled In 
the Magistrate's Court that 'the blow was heavy, and the stone large.' At the 
request of Mr. O'Leary (the defence counsel) Riddell agreed to reduce Troy's 
bail from £100 to £80. 'Mr. O'Leary said that the smaller amount could be 
obtained, and that unless bailed Troy would have to remain in prison three 
months awaiting the session of the Supreme Court.'152 Troy was released on 
bail the next day.153 
Even while being lenient Magistrate Riddell continued his efforts to 
minimise further disorder. In granting Udall bail Riddell 'remarked that he did 
so only on the distinct understanding that during the period of her remand she 
kept away from all disturbances or assemblages connected with the strike.'154 
The overall conclusion drawn from the analysis of conviction and 
sentencing patterns is that the Wellington judiciary responded firmly to the 
period of disorder and heightened social tensions, but that this response was 
neither malicious nor indiscriminate. The criminal law was not used as a 
New Zealand Times, 13 November 1913, p.7, col. 4, state that bail was set at £20). 
Bail was apparently not asked for by the third and final woman accused of a strike 
related offence, Minnie Brown (The Dominion, 09 December 1913, p.ll, col. 3; and 
see 16 December 1913, p.6, col. 4). Brown had a lengthy criminal record with at least 
27 previous convictions, thus her not applying for bail is not surprising. (See New 
Zealand Police Gazette, 1914, p.64; 1913, pp.45, 241, 499, 553; and 1912, p.32). 
152 The Dominion, 20 November 1913, p.9, cols.5-6 (both quotes are from col.6). 
The next criminal session of the Supreme Court began on 02 February 1914. Troy 
pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court to the lesser offence of common assault, and 
received four months imprisonment (The Dominion, 03 February 1914, p.8, col. 5; 
and 09 February 1914, p.3, col. 4). 
153 New Zealand Police Gazette, 1913, p.739. 
154 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 3. 
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means to remove (through conviction and imprisonment) all "undesirables" or 
potential "troublemakers" from the streets of Wellington. Simply being an 
enthusiastic striker or strike sympathiser was not considered by the judiciary 
as sufficient cause for imprisonment, even if an individual had committed an 
offence for which mandatory imprisonment was a sentencing option. 
Magistrate Riddell's refusal to grant bail forced six working class leaders to 
remain in jail for two to three weeks during the strike. This decision appears 
to have been motivated by a genuine fear that these leaders would continue 
their fiery speeches if released and generate more instances of serious 
disorder, rather than by a desire to help defeat the strike. Many of those who 
were convicted of strike related offences received longer terms of 
imprisonment and larger fines than were imposed prior to the strike. These 
sentences were intended to deter potential offenders and prevent further 
disorder, as well as to punish those caught. The penalties were firm but not 
as severe as the law allowed. 
The Government and the Criminal law during the 1913 Strike: 
In early December 1913, two weeks before the strike ended, new 
criminal legislation was approved by Parliament. This legislation specifically 
concerned actions which rarely took place unless an industrial dispute was in 
progress. New criminal charges were created to deter strikers and their 
sympathisers from engaging In intimidating behaviour against strike-breakers 
and others who supported employers during strikes and lockouts. Inciting 
another person to commit a breach of the law even if there was no actual 
breach of the law was made an offence, as was threatening to injure the 
property of any person. The new law was a response to the Waihi Strike of 
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1912 and a preparation for any future industrial disputes which would involve 
similar forms of harassment, disorder, or protest, rather than a reaction to the 
1913 strike. The original bill had been introduced into Parliament three 
months before the 1913 strike began. The legislation would not come into 
effect until 1914.155 Thus, the new criminal offences had no impact on the 
1913 strike or the criminal prosecutions related to the strike. 156 
The decision by the Massey government to suspend the provisions of 
the Shipping and Seamen Act, so as to allow persons not qualified as 
seamen to work the ships, had a more substantial effect on the strike and 
associated prosecutions. 157 If the regulations had not been suspended the 
New Zealand coastal vessels would not have resumed their sailings as 
quickly as had happened or the shipowners (or their captains) would have 
been prosecuted for breaking the law and endangering the safety of their 
passengers, their employees, and other ships. The government's action 
155 See The Dominion, 03 December 1913, pA, cols. 2-3; and 06 December 
1913, p.5, col. 1 and p.7, cols. 7-8; and Hill, The Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove, 
pp.278 and 304. 
156 In mid-December 1913 Parliament also passed new legislation concerning 
industrial disputes (see The Dominion, 13 December 1913, p.6, cols. 7-8 and p.7, 
cols. 1-5; and 15 December 1913, pA, cols. 5-6 and p.5, cols. 6-8). Erik Olssen, Red 
Feds, p.212, provided a useful discussion of the implications and effect of the new 
Act: 'The Labour Disputes Investigation Act (1913) destroyed the Red Fed option of 
leaving the arbitration system, yet obtaining legal protection and the right to strike by 
registering under the 1878 Trades Union Act. The new law replaced the Trades Union 
Act and severely limited the right to strike. Faced with this new alternative most 
unions did not hesitate to opt for arbitration'. An article published in The Dominion 
on 20 December 1913 (p.6, col. 8) on the new legislation is also worth consulting. 
157 See Neill Atkinson, 'Auckland Seamen and their Union, 1880-1922', 
(unpublished MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1990), pp.162-163; see the 
comments by the Hon. F. M. B. Fisher, Minister of Marine, to the annual dinner of the 
Wellington letter-carriers on 06 December 1913 (reported in The Dominion, 08 
December 1913, p.8, col. 3); and see OIssen, Red Feds, p.202. 
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assisted the employers to quickly and effectively reduce the effect of the 
seamen's strike. 
Another type of prosecution which could have been widely used by the 
Massey government against unions which belonged to the arbitration system 
but chose to strike or to provide financial assistance to the striking unions was 
used only sparingly. Unions registered under the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act were prohibited from undertaking certain actions, including 
striking while an industrial award they had entered into was still current. 
'Although 18 unions registered under the Arbitration Act went on strike [in late 
1913], and the Supreme Court ruled it illegal for any union registered under 
the Arbitration Act to give financial assistance to strikers in another industry, 
neither the Government nor the Arbitration Court imposed penalties. The 
Employers' Federation, which wanted all strikers to be fined and all arbitration 
unions which struck to be deregistered, was outraged. The permanent 
secretary to the Department of Labour also recommended prosecuting those 
unions registered under the Arbitration Act which had struck. Yet the Massey 
Cabinet decided to do nothing for fear of the electoral consequences. 
[Arbitration Court judge] Sim, who had burnt himself first at Blackball, ignored 
the entire issue and his successor, who took over in March 1914, did the 
same in all but two cases. The new president [of the Arbitration Court], T. W. 
Stringer, privately threatened to suspend the awards of all arbitration unions 
which struck, but in the end did nothing. The idea of punishing unions which 
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had aided and abetted the strike was not even considered by the court or the 
Government.,158 
158 Olssen, Red Feds, p.212. On the Supreme Court ruling concerning the 
illegality of financial donations by unions in the arbitration system to strikers in 
another industry see The Dominion, 13 December 1913, p.6, cols. 4-5; and 15 
December 1913, p.4, col. 6. 
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Conclusion 
Protest through crime was a significant feature of the disorder and 
criminal prosecutions related to the 1913 General Strike in Wellington. 
Protest against the presence and actions of the special constables enrolled 
by the Massey government was central to the most serious disturbances and 
to a large proportion of the lesser offending. Stone-throwing, verbal abuse 
and threatening behaviour were the predominant types of crime against the 
special constables. 
The 'rushes' on to the wharves by hundreds of strikers in the first week 
of the strike were also acts of protest. In these incidents the immediate 
targets of the protest were those who were willing to impede the success of 
the strike by loading and unloading cargo. The more symbolic targets for the 
protest were the shipping companies and the Harbour Board who had 
initiated, encouraged or assisted the strikebreaking activity. The level of 
violence during the wharf rushes was relatively low. There were only four 
assaults, and two acts of property damage. The target for both acts of 
property damage was the wharf barricade erected by the Wellington Harbour 
Board. The number of assaults and the extent of the property damage would 
have been much greater had the strikers not chosen to conduct their protest 
largely through non-violent, if disorderly and intimidating, forms of collective 
action. 
Throughout the entire strike, violence by strikers against the persons or 
the property of their employers and against strikebreakers was rare. This lack 
of violence appears to have been the result of a combination of lack of 
opportunity and the unwillingness of many strikers to attack those who were 
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actively working to defeat the strike unless those individuals were special 
constables. The infrequency of assaults against strikebreakers is particularly 
surprising. In France, the United States, Britain, Ireland and Australia 
violence against strikebreakers was a substantial feature of many of the most 
contentious and bitter industrial disputes. In Wellington there were nearly 
twice as many prosecutions for assaults on strikebreakers during the 1890 
Maritime Strike than there were in 1913. The numbers of assaults on 
strikebreakers which were reported but for which there was no prosecution 
were low during both strikes. (The 1890 strike in Wellington had been in 
nearly every other respect relatively free of violence). 
Violence against the property of employers whose workers were not on 
strike but who were considered to have assisted the special constables was 
slightly more frequent. That such violence was protest was clearly 
understood by the offenders, the victims and the newspaper reporters. The 
participants in these acts of protest were a mixture of strikers and 
sympathisers. 
It was rare for the regular police to become the victims of strike 
violence unless they were engaged in protecting the special constables or 
attempting to stop attacks which were already in progress on the property of 
employers who were perceived to have assisted the special constables. 
Much of the stone-throwing which the regular police endured was aimed at 
the special constables. The regulars were simply in the same vicinity. Strike 
related criminal prosecutions for offensive language or threatening behaviour 
towards regular constables were also very unusual. 
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Verbal protest by strike leaders against the actions of the Massey 
government was a prominent feature of the dispute and the criminal 
prosecutions. Fiery speeches denounced the enrolment, the presence in 
Wellington, and the actions of special constables and the assistance the state 
gave to the employers to reopen the ports. Some speeches encouraged or 
threatened violence if certain actions were taken by the government or the 
employers to attempt to defeat the strike (for example, brutality by the special 
constables, or the use of "scab" labour). A number of speeches called on the 
regular police and the military to consider where their 'class interests' lay and 
act accordingly if instructed to 'repress' the strikers. Such speeches resulted 
in the arrest of eight strike leaders on charges of uttering seditious words or 
inciting resistance to the police or inciting violence. 
Desertion or similar offences by the crews of four overseas steamers 
generated the largest number of prosecutions related to the strike. These 
seamen and firemen deserted or refused to work in sympathy with the New 
Zealand strikers and in protest against the shipping companies who were 
trying to defeat the strike. These shipping companies were also the 
employers of these overseas seamen. 
There is no evidence that theft was used as a form of protest during 
the strike. Violence against the property of the state was almost as 
infrequent. 
Strike related offending (excluding desertion) was concentrated in the 
first two weeks of the strike (from 22 October to 05 November). After the 
Featherston Street riot of the afternoon of 05 November strikers and their 
sympathisers became less willing to openly abuse, taunt or throw stones at 
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the special constables. In addition, opportunities to damage property on the 
wharves or assault and abuse strikebreakers were limited by the hundreds of 
special constables and regular police guarding the wharves and patrolling the 
streets. The risk of arrest became too high for many potential offenders. 
Most of those who had joined in the rioting, property damage, threatening 
behaviour and verbal abuse during the first two weeks of the strike moderated 
their behaviour as the strike dragged on. 
The response of the police to the strike and the related disorder was to 
intensify their efforts to control certain types of offences, in particular, socially 
threatening "crimes" associated with the strike. Many of the offences were 
very serious and would have warranted police attention in more tranquil times. 
Other prosecutions, especially those related to offensive language, insulting 
words with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, and the single loitering 
charge, concerned incidents which would have often been overlooked or an 
informal warning given before the strike. 
The majority of those accused of strike related offences were strikers 
or other unskilled workers. As these were the groups most active in 
disturbances connected with the strike this is neither unexpected nor 
evidence of attempts to suppress legitimate (if rowdy) protest. The 
determination of the police to suppress violence and rioting is apparent, as is 
the extremely firm response to offensive and insulting language. The latter 
could be interpreted as repressive, but such language was illegal in public 
places as well as being provocative and having the potential to incite further 
disorder. 
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In at least a few instances the wrong person was arrested and 
prosecuted. In the confusion, excitement and tension associated with large, 
rowdy and hostile crowds such mistakes are not unexpected. It is almost 
surprising that more cases were not withdrawn or dismissed for this reason. 
An element of repression or anger at being attacked or verbally abused may 
have been influential in some of the problematic arrests, but this is impossible 
to conclusively prove. 
The police displayed a surprising degree of restraint in making arrests. 
Except for desertion and related offences by seamen and ship's firemen, and 
the November charges against six strike leaders, there were none of the 
mass arrests and mass prosecutions which formed a central component of 
the police response to the Waihi Strike of 1912. 
The analysis of conviction and sentencing patterns conducted in 
Chapter Six indicates that the Wellington judiciary responded firmly to the 
period of disorder and heightened social tensions, but that this response was 
neither malicious nor indiscriminate. The criminal law was not used as a 
means to remove (through conviction and imprisonment) all "undesirables" or 
potential "troublemakers" from the streets of Wellington. Simply being an 
enthusiastic striker or strike sympathiser was not considered by the judiciary 
as sufficient cause for imprisonment, even if an individual had committed an 
offence for which mandatory imprisonment was a sentencing option. 
Magistrate Riddell's refusal to grant bail forced six working class leaders to 
remain in jail for two to three weeks during the strike. This decision appears 
to have been motivated by a genuine fear that these leaders would continue 
their fiery speeches if released and generate more instances of serious 
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disorder, rather than by a desire to help defeat the strike. 1 Many of those who 
were convicted of strike related offences received longer terms of 
imprisonment and larger fines than were imposed prior to the strike. These 
sentences were intended to deter potential offenders and prevent further 
disorder, as well as to punish those caught. The penalties were firm but not 
as severe as the law allowed. 
The findings summarised above demonstrate the usefulness of 
studying crime and criminal prosecutions during industrial disputes. Such 
research expands knowledge of the ways in which protest has been 
conducted by strikers. It compliments and adds to works which have focused 
primarily on the collective violence related to a strike or lockout. It provides a 
sound basis from which to explore why violence and crime was not used, or 
used only infrequently, against certain groups in particular disputes. More 
generally, similar research will assist those who attempt to explain why some 
major disputes involved considerable violence while other contentious strikes 
or lockouts were relatively peaceful. 
The analysis of criminal prosecutions also generates valuable 
information on the uses made of the criminal law by the police and the 
judiciary during strikes and lockouts. Such findings help to dispel or confirm 
assertions by contemporaries to a dispute or by later writers concerning the 
'repressive' nature of arrests, prosecutions, convictions and sentences. 
During periods of social conflict or heightened public anxiety public officials 
and senior police officers often issued instructions to the police to exercise 
less tolerance of disorderly behaviour or certain types of offences. Criminal 
See Chapter Six, pp.281-283. 
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prosecutions provide a way to investigate the extent to which these orders 
were actually implemented by rank and file police. A careful examination of 
criminal prosecutions also indicates if less tolerance was exercised 
concerning all disorderly behaviour by any individual or only concerning 
particular offences by certain groups of offenders (for example, strikers) in 
specific areas of a city or town (for example, around the wharves). The 
judiciary, as well as the police, could respond to a perceived crisis with lower 
tolerance for offending and less leniency. 
In New Zealand history there is considerable opportunity for further 
research on crime and criminal prosecutions during industrial disputes. 
Potential areas of research include case studies of crime and criminal 
prosecutions in the other New Zealand ports and the mining communities 
during the 1913 strike, as well as similar case studies of those ports and 
mining towns which were central to the 1890 Maritime Strike and the 1951 
Waterfront Dispute. The results of the current thesis indicate that such 
research will be of value to those interested in labour history, the history of 
crime, the history of policing, the history of protest and the history of social 
conflict. The analysis conducted in this thesis provides a potential framework, 
or part of a framework, for future research on New Zealand and on other 
countries. In addition, the discussions in Chapters Three and Four have 
drawn together data from a wide range of international case studies and 
analyses which will hopefully be of assistance to future researchers. 
Future research could also examine a number of aspects of the 
criminal prosecutions which have not been examined within the current thesis. 
The previous convictions of the accused may have considerable explanatory 
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power for the sentences imposed and the magistrate's belief or otherwise of 
evidence given by the defendant. For such an analysis to be worthwhile more 
than simply the number of previous convictions would need to be considered. 
Knowledge of the specific types of offences which resulted in conviction is 
vital. There is a huge difference in the criminal history of someone convicted 
on seven separate occasions of drunkenness compared to a person who has 
seven previous convictions for burglary. Information on the seriousness of 
each offence, the victims of the crimes, and the amount of time the accused 
had previously spent in prison would also be useful.2 These details could 
account for some of any observed increase in the severity of sentences. A 
person with a long and serious criminal record is unlikely to receive the same 
leniency as a first time offender or someone who has only previously been 
convicted of drunkenness. If a larger proportion than usual of offenders dealt 
with in a particular period have serious criminal records then it is probable the 
overall severity of the sentences for that period will be higher than usual. 
A detailed and comparative analysis of the occupations of the victims 
of theft before and during the strike might reveal a connection between theft 
and the industrial conflict which is not visible from the techniques used in the 
current thesis. It could be possible that theft as protest was not aimed at 
particular employers but at a broader section of the middle class, or even at 
those prosperous skilled blue collar workers who were hostile to the strike. 
Without a pre-strike comparative period any figures generated concerning the 
2 The number of previous convictions, the specific charges involved, the 
sentences imposed and the amount of time spent in prison can be traced reasonably 
easily through the New Zealand Police Gazette. Details on the seriousness of each 
offence (including the degree of violence used, the value of items stolen, or the types 
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strike would be relatively meaningless. 3 It is also possible that a significant 
proportion of the victims of theft during the strike were local residents who 
had volunteered to be special constables. 4 If the fact that a victim was a 
special constable was not mentioned at a court hearing it would not have 
been reported in the newspapers. The research required to thoroughly 
analyse the previous convictions of the accused and the occupations of the 
victims would be very time consuming, but may add valuable perspectives to 
the overall analysis and conclusions. 
In addition, examining the age of the adult accused may provide useful 
results. Magistrates may have been inclined to be more lenient towards 
relatively young offenders. If there was a considerable change in the age 
structure of a group of accused this could have influenced the overall severity 
of items stolen) and some information on the victims can be found by examining the 
relevant Criminal Record Books and newspaper court reports. 
3 Almost no occupations of victims were provided in the Criminal Record 
Books. Some occupations of victims were given in the newspaper court reports, and 
others can be found through electoral rolls and the annual Wises New Zealand Post 
Office Directory. Considerable care, however, must be taken when trying to match 
up the victim from a court record or newspaper report with the individuals in the 
electoral rolls or Wises street directories. For the proportion of the male workforce in 
New Zealand who were employed in middle class occupations in 1896, 1911 and 1926 
see Meuli, 'Occupational Change and Bourgeois Proliferation', p.32. Also see David 
G. Pearson and David C. Thoms, Eclipse of Equality: Social Stratification in New 
Zealand, (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1983), p.46 for their calculation of the 'class 
structure' of the New Zealand workforce (including both men and women) in 1891, 
1911 and 1936. Pearson and Thoms provide separate columns in their tables for male 
and female workers which allows comparison with Meuli' s figures. In addition, 
Pearson and Thorns provide separate figures for skilled and unskilled members of the 
(working class'. Pearson and Thorns, pA 7 is also worth consulling. 
4 Such an analysis of theft in Christchurch would be reasonably simple to 
undertake because the complete lists of special constables enrolled in Christchurch is 
stored at Archives New Zealand, Wellington (AAAC, W3539 / 52e - 1913 Strike -
Special Constable File). 
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or leniency of sentences.5 Related factors to consider would be marital 
status, the number and ages of an accused's children, and previous 
convictions. 6 
Another important focus for research would be an analysis of crime 
and criminal prosecutions after the end of the strike. Evidence presented in 
Chapter Five indicates that violence and intimidation related to the 1913 strike 
were not limited to the duration of the dispute. Hostility between the ex-
strikers and those who had acted as strikebreakers continued to be 
expressed through illegal acts in the following months. There is also some 
evidence that theft was used as post-strike retribution against strikebreakers. 
Further research would help determine the extent and seriousness of these 
offences, how long such crimes continued, and the impact on criminal 
prosecutions of these incidents. 
Padraic Kenney argued that after the unsuccessful Poznanski Textile 
Strike in L6dz, Poland in September 1947 the 'younger workers, briefly active 
during the Poznanski strike, retreated to a form of individual protest, 
5 The age of the accused is provided for almost every individual listed in the 
New Zealand Police Gazette, and for most accused in the Criminal Record Books. 
However, there are sometimes major discrepancies between the ages given in each of 
these sources. Newspaper reports sometimes provided the age of the accused, but the 
difference between the official record of the accused's age and the age stated in a 
newspaper is often considerable. 
6 Newspaper reports sometimes mentioned that the accused was married or was 
married and had children. Newspaper reports rarely commented that an accused was 
unmarried. It seems probable, given the reporting style of the period, that if it was 
stated in court that an accused was married and had children this information would 
be reported by the newspapers. If the accused was married but there were no children 
such information seems to have been less likely to be reported. It was extremely rare 
for the ages of an accused's children to be reported in the newspapers. Criminal 
Record Books and the New Zealand Police Gazette almost never provided details on 
marital status or children. The main exception concerned those women whose 
occupation was described in the New Zealand Police Gazette as 'wife'. Their 
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expressed, again, by theft'.7 Research on post-strike crime and prosecutions 
may clarify if defeated strikers in other countries resorted to similar forms of 
protest against their employers. 
The impact of the strike on post-strike policing and post-strike 
enforcement of the criminal law should also be examined. In Wellington on 
24 December 1913 (four days after the last of the Wellington unions ended its 
strike) Minister of Justice Herdman wrote to the Commissioner of Police. 
Complaints have been made to me of the conduct of certain of the members 
of the old waterside workers' Union and others who frequent Taranaki Street, 
Haining Street, and Frederick Street. I understand that there are a number of 
men with bad characters who loiter about the wharves doing occasional work 
and who are mostly to be found in the streets I have mentioned. In view of 
the representations that have been made to me I should be glad if you will 
instruct the Superintendent of Police to take action against any of the 
members of the old Union and others who are vagrants or idle and disorderly 
persons or who are in the habit of using bad language in the streets or who 
have offended against the law in any other way.8 
The extent to which Herdman's instructions were implemented and the 
influence on criminal prosecutions of this control response against 
'unacceptable' behaviour by ex-strikers are worthy of study. 
marital status is reasonably clear (it is possible that some of these women were 
separated from their husbands). 
7 Kenney, 'Working-class Community and Resistance in pre-Stalinist Poland', 
p.50. For a more detailed discussion of Kenney's findings see Chapter One of the 
current thesis, pp.14-15. 
8 Memo from A. L. Herdman, Minister of Justice, to the Commissioner of 
Police, 24 December 1913 (in '1913 Strike - North Island File' held at Archives New 
Zealand, Wellington - AAAC, W3539 / 52b). 
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Appendix:A~ Scheme of Occupational Classification. 
The scheille o.f occupational classification set out below 
is based on the model provided by ~nerican sociologist 
C.Hright 1,[i11s in' his book: \'fhi te Collar. The American Middle 
-~---
Glasses. Mills traced the chun~e occurring within the Amer-
ican Occupational structure between nlid-nlneteenth century 
and mid-twentieth century, with particular emphasis on the 
expanding' ne\'l middle class. The model he provides enables 
a clearer understanding of similar occupational changes in 
New Zealand as they unfolded between lU96 and 1926. 
]\1ills breaks the workforce dO''ln into three basic groups 
of strata, each of ~hich is further subdivided into its 
various component elements as delineated below. 
OLD MIDDLE CLASS. 
1. Free Professionals: those professional employers and 
self-employed practicing on their own account or in partner-
ship, but independent of public and private institutions and 
who derive their income from fees charged for services rend-
ered, rather than from wages or salaries. Typically then, 
the free professionals category will include the great majority 
of lawyers, doctors" dentists and archi tects, but very fe,'l 
teachers, scientists and clergymen. 
2. Dus inessrnen: cons is ts largely of those employin;;' s ta1~f 
in secondary and tertiary industry (manufacturing, sorvicing 
and processing), but also includes significant nUinbers of 
employers engaged in various branches of primary industry 
other than farming (i.e. rishing, forestry, mining, quarrying, 
gum digging, trappini'.~ arid agricul tural contrac ting), in 
addi tion to self-elilployed businessmen eng'ac;ed in commerce 
(retailers dealing in meat, groceries, pastry, hardware, 
vehicles, softgoods etc.) and fin~nce (dealers in property, 
insurance, shares and stOCks) on their own account. 
3. Farmers: defined as those agricultural or pastoral 
emEloyers and self-employed who own or hold an independent 
. farm unit in their Ol'ln 1."'ight. Includes: sheep, cattle, dairy, 
pig and poultry farmers, arable and mixed farmers, beekeepers, 
orchadists, vine growers, market gardeners, horse and stock 
breeders. 
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NE',V ;:'III)I)L8 CLAS~. 
4. Salaried Professionals: def'ined as being those employees 
'''hose, callini'~ requires hi{~hly specialized kno\"led~j'e and 
lon<.~~; and intensive acodc;iJic tl:'zlining,. bt;t "'ho' HorJ, on 
salary for some institution or ~ther individual, rather 
than as independent practitioners on their own account 
or as employers of other professionals. Includes pro-
fessionals in the employment of the state or local' auth-
orities such as: schoolteachers) vets, en~ineers (mech-
anical, structural, hydraulic, electrical, mining etc.), 
architects, surveyors, scientists, medical specialists, 
the judiciary, departmental experts and accountants; plus 
professionals employed ,by a variety of private institut-
ions and enterprises including; clergy::;en, lawyers, 
accountants, engineers, architects, surveyors, doctors, 
tutors, specialist consultants et.al. 
5. salespeople: det'ined as those mercantile eillployees whose 
occupations involve the buying, selling;, marketing and 
exchanging' of property, ra,., materials, goods and services., 
Includes those employed as commission, advertising, 
import and export, manufacturers, shipping, stock and 
station, land, finance and insurance agents. Plus head 
salesm~n and overseers, commercial travellers, sales 
representatives, company ,promoters, auctioneers and val-
uers, brokers and buyers, in addition to salesmen for 
stockbrokers, merchants, dealers and manufacturers, retail 
and wholesale outle~s, as well as shop assistants, shop-
walkers and window dressers. 
6. White Collar Workers: defined as constituting those whose 
employment is ge~erally salaried, non-manual, non-profess-
ional, and does not warrant the wearing of work clothes 
O'l." proteotivo clothing' - clerks, lllana{~ers, offico workol~s, 
bureaucra ts and public servants of' a clerical, llIi:Ul.a(~'erinl, 
executive, supervisory or administrative description. 
The three sub-groups are: (i) managerial - those employees 
involved in a supervisory, adtninis-crative or executive 
capaci ty with authori ty in ins ti tutions ranl3'ing f'ro,rll banks 
and finance companies to sawmills and coal mines. 
(ii). clerical: those employees engaged in keeping.records 
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or accounts and perforlnin.!s general orfice duties, including: 
la'\v ann bank clerks, records, filing, shippine-, customs, 
store and tally clerks, tellers and c~shiers, underwriters, 
actuaries, average-adjusters and insurance clerks, book-
lceepers and pay ,clerks, cost clerks and pursers, orrice 
assistants, secretaries, typists, public service clerks, 
cadets and civil servants (not otherwise defined). 
(iii). officials: a res idual ca te,_~ory embracing whi te collar 
employees engaged in a variety of general·or ill-defined 
capacities. Including - public service administrative ol~ficers 
loc~l body officers, military and navan officers, law court, 
police and penal officers, ships, railway, friendly society 
public company, ferry service, tranlWays, telephone and 
harbour board officers; plus departmental inspectors and 
miscellaneous officials, both public and. private. 
BLUE COLLAn. 
7. Skilled Manual Workerst artisans, artificers, craftsmen, 
tradeSlOen and journeymen. (self-ell1ployed and employees, 
including apprentices). Craft or specialist ~anual trades 
where an apprenticeship or speciRl trainin~ is required 
and which generally enjoy a margin of superiority over 
unskilled jobs in terms of' remuneration and/or job status .. 
A typical sample 'would include: printers, cowpos i tors, 
bookbinders, wa tchmalcers, gunsmi ths, tinsroi ths, manufact-
uring jewellers, goldsmiths, tanners and curriers, boot-
makers and s~ddlers, butter and che6semakers, millwrights, 
flour and i'lax millers, sawyers, bakers and confectioners, 
brewers, IHal tsters and cordial malc·ers, . butchers and fell-
mongers, coopers, carpenters, builders, masons, brick-
layers, plasterers, painters and decorators, glaziers, 
plumbers and electricians, telephone tecJu1.icians, boiler-
makers, motor mechaniCS, fitters and turners, blackslniths, 
coach or motor body builders, wheelwrights and ironfound-
ers, ship\vTi,;'hts and sailmakers, cabinetmakers and joiners, 
tailors. and upholsterers) engine-, tram.;., truck- and taxi 
drivers, rail\-fay signalmen, lo,comotive drivers, factory 
operatives and machinists, marine engineers, surveyors 
assistants, bargemasters and boatswains, manchester ware-
houselllen,.plus a wide variety of forewen, gangers and 
overs'eers. 
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t>., Unskilled ;,;Bnual \1orkers :derined as bein;~' those en(!;aGed 
in labouring work, on their olVn account or as eillployees, 
,.,here no apprenticeship, no i'orldal training, no spe cial 
or adv,·mced education is required; where levels of skill, 
job prestige, and relilUlwration aro Y'0.iatively 10\v, \vhe)"0 
the nature of' the work is oi'ten menial, tTionotol1.0US and 
dirty; and where little responsibility, specialization, 
authority or job-planning is required. 
A typical sample would include: general labourers, 
agricul tural labourers, marke t g'arden hcl.nds, building 
and construction labourers, sm.,mill and timberyard hands, 
road and railway labourers and nnvvies, ditchdiggers, 
scrub-cut tel's, bushmen, por te rs, 'hote 1 s ervan ts, dome s tic 
servants, storemen, packers, wharf labourers, factory 
hands, livery stable hands, grooms, forestry workers, 
fencers, harvesters, gardeners, miners, gum diggers, 
moat and froozint'~' worlc!J labourors, CishorillOll, S~Q£IIon and 
dockhands, dairy i'act;ory hands, i'lour and flax 111111 hancls p 
errand boys and messengers, draymen and cart drivers, 
hawkers and pedlars, hospital attendants, cleaners and 
laundry hands, janitors and caretakers, postmen, milkmen, 
coalmen, oiler~, greasers and stokers, chimney sweeps 
and dustmen, plus a host of undef'ined'workers I, "wage-
earners", "assistants I ,and 'employees' .. 
After che~king and re-checking the' various sub-totals 
it was discoverod that thG-' margin 'of discrepancy be,tween 
the male workforce total arrived at in this study and the 
of'ficial census figures was very slight... The o;1'£'icial 
datal reJ.a til1.g to the s iz,e: o,f the male population and male 
worktorce is set out below: 
P ... T •. 0 .. 
Appendix 2: Categorisation of Violent Crimes Committed in Wellington in the 
Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which 
resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Type of Violent Crime Frequency % of Total 
Against Persons: 
--
Attempted Murder 1 0.25% 
Manslaughter 1 0.25% 
Discharging a Firearm with Intent to do Grievous Bodily Harm 1 0.25% 
Unlawful Wounding with Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm 1 0.25% 
Actual Bodily Harm with Intent to do Grievous Bodily Harm 1 0.25% 
Assault so as to cause Actual Bodily Harm 8 2.01% 
Aggravated Assault 6 1.51% 
Assault with Intent to do Grievous Bodily Harm 1 0.25% 
Assault (including 88 private prosecutions - 46.56%) 189 47.49% 
Assault - by presenting a revolver 1 0.25% 
Assault and Robbery 5 1.26% 
Assault with Intent to Rob 1 0.25% 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach of the Peace 65 16.33% 
was occasioned = fighting (107 individuals charged) 
Sending a death threat 1 0.25% 
Molestation while a separation order was in effect 2 0.50% 
Owner of a dog which attacked a person whereby the 6 1.51% 
limbs of said person were endangered 
Discharging a Revolver to the Danger of Passers By 1 0.25% 
Throwing a stone to the danger of persons 1 0.25% 
Throwing glass 2 0.50% 
Total (Violence Against Persons): 294 73.87% 
Against Property: 
Arson 3 0.75% 
Wilful damage or destruction: 
of windows and other glass panels 42 10.55% 
of electric lights, power lines, or street lamps (25 charges) 10 2.51% 
of a dwelling house 1 0.25% 
of doors (excluding cell doors & glass door panels) 7 1.76% 
of police (or prison) buildings or facilities 5 1.26% 
of items of police uniforms 15 3.77% 
of two church money boxes 1 0.25% 
of a fortune telling machine 1 0.25% 
of one billiard cloth 1 0.25% 
of one flower pot 1 0.25% 
of one whisky decanter 1 0.25% 
of clothing (excluding police uniforms) 1 .0.25% 
of one set of china ware and two panes of glass 1 0.25% 
of two cocks, two ornaments & one candlestick 1 0.25% 
of trees (16 juveniles charged) 1 0.25% 
of a number of Mallard & Muscovy duck eggs 1 0.25% 
of one set of false teeth 1 0.25% 
Throwing a missile or stone to the danger of property 4 1.01% 
Throwing a stone(s) to the damage of certain property 6 1.51% 
Total (Violence Against Property): 104 26.13% 
Total All Violent Crime: 398 100.00% 
Appendix 3a: Categorisation of Theft Committed in Wellington in the 
Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which 
resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
--
Type of Larceny Frequency % of Total 
Aiding the Commission of an Offence 1 0.12% 
Attempted Breaking and Entering 1 0.12% 
Attempted False Pretences with Intent to Defraud 5 0.61% 
Attempted Theft 7 0.86% 
Breaking and Entering (nothing stolen) 8 0.98% 
Breaking and Entering & Committing Theft 52 6.37% 
Conspiring to defraud 1 0.12% 
False Pretences (to obtain £ or goods) 19 2.33% 
Forging a cheque (to obtain £ or goods) 17 2.08% 
Intent to Defraud [Sending False Telegram] 1 0.12% 
Possession of certain instruments of house-breaking 3 0.37% 
Receiving stolen property 16 1.96% 
Theft 684 83.82% 
Using counterfeit current gold coins 1 0.12% 
Total Larceny: 816 100.00% 
Appendix 3b: Types of Items Stolen in Theft Committed in Wellington in 
the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 
which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Type of Items Stolen 
(including the attempted thefts) Frequency % of Total 
Animals and / or Animal Related Goods 16 2.08% 
Bag & Unspecified "Contents" 6 0.78% 
Bag & Household Items 1 0.13% 
Bicycles 43 5.60% 
Bicycle Accessories 4 0.52% 
Building materials / raw materials 22 2.86% 
Cart 1 0.13% 
Cheques / Money Orders I Postal Notes 17 2.21% 
Clothing: 189 24.61% 
Boots / Shoes 47 6.12% 
Coats / Overcoats 61 7.94% 
Miscellaneous 81 10.55% 
Clothing & a Bag 4 0.52% 
Clothing, Household Items, & Food 1 0.13% 
Clothing & Household Items 8 1.04% 
Clothing & Money 8 1.04% 
Clothing & Tools 1 0.13% 
Appendix 3b: Types of Items Stolen 
!(continued) 
Type of Items ~tolen ____ f-~~~~~I1_c¥J_ % of Total 
-""-_. - ~---~~ -~----~--
Clothing & Valuable Goods 4 0.52% 
Clothing & Unspecified Items 2 0.26% 
Coal 2 0.26% 
Empty Bags 8 1.04% 
Empty Containers (sacks, bottles) 5 0.65% 
Firearms 7 0.91% 
Foodstuffs: 46 5.99% 
Alcohol 2 0.26% 
Food 26 3.39% 
Tobacco 13 1.69% 
Tobacco and Food 5 0.65% 
Fountain Pens 2 0.26% 
Government Statutes 14 1.82% 
Household Goods 56 7.29% 
Household Goods & Food 2 0.26% 
Household Goods & Tools 2 0.26% 
Hurricane Lamp / Brass Port Lights 3 0.39% 
Letters: often containing cheques, stamps 11 1.43% 
Money 153 19.92% 
Money & Food 2 0.26% 
Money & Handbag / Purse 5 0.65% 
Money & Household Goods 1 0.13% 
Money & Tobacco 1 0.13% 
Money & Unspecified "Goods" 5 0.65% 
Money, Valuables, & Clothing 2 0.26% 
Money & Valuables 6 0.78% 
Postage Stamps 3 0.39% 
Valuables: 85 11.07% 
Combination of jewellery 28 3.65% 
Rings 21 2.73% 
Watches 23 2.99% 
Jewellery and household goods 5 0.65% 
Other valuable goods 8 1.04% 
Railway Tickets 1 0.13% 
Tools 8 1.04% 
Tools & Building materials / raw materials 3 0.39% 
Unspecified "Goods" 4 0.52% 
other Miscellaneous Items 4 0.52% 
Total instances where items stolen: I 768 100.00% 
Appendix 4: Categorisation of Crimes Against the State Committed in 
Wellington in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 
1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Type of Crime Against the State Frequency % of Total 
I 
Violence Against the State 
Against Persons 
Assault against police constables 12 30.77% 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach of the 2 5.13% 
Peace was occasioned 
Against Property 
Wilful damage or destruction: 
of items of police uniforms 15 38.46% 
of a policeman's set of false teeth 1 2.56% 
of police (or prison) buildings or facilities 5 12.82% 
of one pane of glass at Lambton Railway Station 1 2.56% 
of one railway carriage window 1 2.56% 
of pane(s) of glass - exact location not stated 2 5.13% 
Total Violent Crime Against the State: 39 100.00% 
Theft Against the State 
Theft 15 88.24% 
Receiving stolen property (two fish) 1 5.88% 
Attempted Breaking and Entering 1 5.88% 
Total Theft Against the State: 17 100.00% 
Other Offences Against the State 
Escape from a place of legal confinement / prison 5 2.07% 
Drunk while in possession of firearms and ammunition 2 0.83% 
Discharging / unlawful use of a firearm 2 0.83% 
Carrying a loaded firearm 1 0.41% 
Possession of Firearm(s) 3 1.24% 
Threatening Behaviour with intent to provoke a 1 0.41% 
Breach of the Peace 
Obscene Language 156 64.46% 
- none using the term "scab", or similar term 
Resisting Arrest 46 19.01% 
Obstruction 19 7.85% 
Inciting to resist Police 3 1.24% 
Attempt to avoid the detection of a crime by the police 1 0.41% 
Attempt to smuggle items to prisoners 2 0.83% 
One horse at large on Parliament Grounds 1 0.41% 
Total All Other Offences Against the State: 242 100.00% 
Total Crime Against the State: 298 
Appendix 5: Crimes Against the State Committed in Wellington During the General 
Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
m categorised by who the victims were 
Appendix 5a: Crimes Against Special Constables Committed in Wellington During 
the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington 
Ililagistrate's Court 
a) Crimes Against Special Constables: (all strike related) 
Type of Crime Against Special Constables I Frequency %of Use of the 
Total term scab 
Violence Against Special Constables - All Against the Person or similar 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm with a Firearm 1 5.56% 
Intention to do Grievous Bodily Harm / causing Actual Bodily Harm 2 11.11% 
Assault against special constables 12 66.67% 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach of the Peace was 3 16.67% 
occasioned - in connection with "riots" (3) 
Total Violent Crime Against Special Constables: 18 100.00% 
Theft from Special Constables 
Total Theft from Special Constables: 0 
Other Crimes Against the State I Frequency %of term scab 
(with special constables as the victims) Total or similar 
Taking Part in a Riot 16 34.78% 
Taking Part in an Unlawful Assembly 4 8.70% 
Encouraging diverse persons to assault certain special constables 1 2.17% 
- by providing the said persons with missiles to throw 
Threatening Behaviour 3 6.52% 
Threatening Behaviour with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 1 2.17% 
Insulting Words with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 7 15.22% J 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 6 
Attempting to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 2 4.35% 2 I 
Obscene Language 8 17.39% I 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 2 J 
Loitering in a public place 1 2.17% i 
, 
Resisting Arrest 0 0.00% , 
Obstruction 0 0.00% 
Driving a motor-car in a dangerous manner 1 2.17% 
(victims: special constables) , 
Negligently driving a tramcar (victims: special constables) 1 2.17% ! 
Did not stop vehicle engine as requested to by constable 1 2.17% 
Total All Other Crime Against the State 46 100.00% 10 
(victims special constables): , 
I 
Total All Crime Against the State (with special constables as the 64 i 
victims): , 
Appendix 5b: Crimes Against the Regular Police Committed in Wellington During 
the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington 
Magistrate's Court 
b) Crimes Against Regular Police: 
Type of Crime Against the State I Frequency % of Use of the 
Total term scab 
Violence Against the Regular Police or similar 
Against Persons 
Attempted Murder of the Commissioner of Police (charge not proven) I 1 10,00% 
Assault against regular police (6 strike related; 1 not strike related) 7 70,00% 
Against Property 
Wilful damage or destruction: of a cell door (1); of a pane of glass (1) 2 20,00% 
Total Violent Crime Against the Regular Police: 10 100,00% 
Theft from Regular Police 
Total Theft from the Regular Police: 0 
Other Crimes Against the State (with regular police as the victims) %of term scab 
Total or similar 
Taking Part in a Riot 3 12,00% 
Threatening Behaviour 1 4,00% 
Threatening Behaviour with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 1 4,00% 
Insulting Words with Intent to Provoke a Breach of the Peace 1 4,00% 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 0 
Obscene Language (3 strike related; 5 not strike related) 8 32,00% 
- using the term "scab", or similar term 2 
Did Commit Mischief by Burning two panels of a padded cell 1 4,00% 
Resisting Arrest (none strike related) 7 28,00% 
Obstruction (none strike related) 2 8,00% 
Did not exhibit license for vehicle when requested to by police 1 4,00% 
constable 
Total All Other Crime Against the State (victims regular police): 25 100.00% 2 
Total All Crime Against the State (with regular police as the victims): 35 
Appendix 5c: Crimes Against Both Regular Police and Special Constables 
Committed in Wellington During the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
c) Crimes Against both Regular Police and Special Constables: 
Type of Crime Against the State I Frequency 
I 
Other Crimes Against the State 
Taking Part in a Riot 2 
Inciting diverse persons to assault police and special constables 1 
Total All Crimes Against both Regular Police and Special Constables: 3 
Appendix 5d: Crimes Against the Authority of the State Committed in Wellington 
During the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court 
d) Crimes Against the Authority of the State: 
- which have no specific persons as the victims 
Frequency %of Use of the 
Total term scab 
Type of Crime Against the State I (of 141) or similar 
I 
Inciting diverse persons to assault / resist police constables 4 2.84% 
Inciting a breach of the peace / persons to commit a breach of the 5 3.55% 
peace 
Uttering Certain Seditious Words 5 3.55% 
Application for sureties of the peace by the State (based on 3 2.13% 
seditious words) 
Deemed to be a Rogue & a Vagabond found with an offensive 2 1.42% 
weapon 
Total All Crimes Against the Authority of the State: 19 13.48% 0 
Appendix 6: Occupations of those Accused of Strike Related Crimes where 
the Victims were Regular Police or Special Constables 
Type of Crimes: Violence against the Person, Taking Part in a Riot or Unlawful 
Assembly, Insulting language, and Threatening Behaviour 
Date of offences: during the 1913 General Strike; Location: Wellington 
COllll of initial jlllisdiction: Wellingtoll Magistrate's Court 
Total number of relevant charges: 76 
Total number of relevant accused: 53 
Table A: Occupations (Grouped by Broad Categories) of these Accused 
Frequency 1 1% of Relevant Accused 1 
Middle Class 1 1.89% 
Blue Collar 51 96.23% 
skilled 1 7 13.21% 
unskilled 43 81.13% 
unclear if skilled or unskilled 1 1.89% 
Schoolboys 0 0.00% 
Other Juveniles 0 0.00% 
Unknown 1 1.89% 
Total: 53 100.00% 
Table B: Role in Strike of these Accused 
% of Relevant 
Role in Strike Frequency Accused 
Strikers 21 39.62% 
watersiders 19 
seamen 1 
carters I drivers 0 
wife of a watersider 1 
Non-strikers 13 24.53% 
in strike type occupations £ 2 
in non-striking occupations 10 
exact occupation unknown 3 1 
Unclear if strikers or non-strikers 19 35.85% 
driver 2 
fireman 2 
labourer 7 
seaman 8 
Total: 53 100.00% 
One of these skilled blue collar workers was apparently both a carpenter (New 
Zealand Police Gazette, 1913, pp.752 and 789) and a 'waterside worker, who is on strike' 
(The Dominion, 11 December 1913, p.8, col. 5). 
2 One seaman and one driver who were not on strike. The driver stated in court that he 
was not sympathetic towards the strike. The seaman commented he was sympathetic towards 
the strikers. 
3 The Dominion, 07 November 1913, p.8, col. 3, describes the accused as having been 
employed at Hutson's brickworks for the past five years. It is not stated what the accused 
actually did at the brickworks, and the accused is not listed in the New Zealand Police 
Gazette. 
Appendix 6 (continued): 
Occupations of those Accused of Strike Related Crimes where the 
Victims were Regular Police or Special Constables 
Table C: Specific Occupations of these Accused 
(where the victims were regular police or special constables) 
% of all middle 
Middle Class no. class accused % of all accused 
(of these offences) (of these offences) 
clerk 1 100.00% 1.89% 
Total: 1 100.00% 1.89% 
% of all blue 
Blue Collar no. collar accused % of all accused 
(of these offences) (of these offences) 
a) Skilled Manual Workers: 
bootmaker 1 1.96% 1.89% 
carpenter [on strike] 'I 1 1.96% 1.89% 
engine-driver 2 3.92% 3.77% 
fire brigade man 1 1.96% 1.89% 
tram motorman / tram driver 2 3.92% 3.77% 
Total - skilled: 7 13.73% 13.21% 
b) Unskilled Manual Workers: 
barman 1 1.96% 1.89% 
bottlewasher 1 1.96% 1.89% 
driver 3 5.88% 5.66% 
fireman 2 3.92% 3.77% 
labourer 25 49.02% 47.17% 
including 18 wharf labourers / watersiders 
seaman 10 19.61% 18.87% 
wife of a waterside worker 1 1.96% 1.89% 
leaders of unskilled manual workers' unions and strikes: 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
Total - unskilled: 43 84.31% 81.13% 
c) Uncertain whether Skilled or Unskilled: 
asylum attendant 1 1.96% 1.89% 
Total uncertain: 1 1.96% 1.89% 
Occupation Unknown: 1 na 1.89% 
Total All Relevant Accused: 53 
-
100.00% 
4 See footnote 1 on previous page. 
Appendix 6b: Occupations of those Accused of Strike Related Crimes where 
the Victims were Special Constables 
Type of Crimes: Violence against the Person, Taking Part in a Riot or Unlawful 
Assembly, Insulting language, and Threatening Behaviour 
Date of offences: during the 1913 General :::>lrike 
Location: Wellington 
Court of initial jurisdiction: Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Total number of relevant charges: 61 5 
Total number of relevant accused: 45 
Table A: Occupations (Grouped by Broad Categories) of these Accused 
(where the victims were special constables) 
Frequency % of Relevant Accused 
Middle Class 1 2.22% 
Blue Collar I 43 95.56% 
skilled b 7 15.56% 
unskilled 35 77.78% 
unclear if skilled or unskilled 1 2.22% 
Schoolboys a 0.00% 
Other Juveniles a 0.00% 
Unknown I 1 2.22% 
Total: 45 100.00% 
Table B: Role in Strike of these Accused 
(where the victims were special constables) 
% of Relevant 
Role in Strike Frequency Accused 
Strikers 19 42.22% 
watersiders 17 
seamen 1 
carters I drivers a 
wife of a watersider 1 
Non-strikers 11 24.44% 
in strike tYRe occuRations ( 1 
in non-striking occupations 9 
exact occupation unknown tl 1 
Unclear if strikers or non-strikers 15 33.33% 
driver 2 
fireman 2 
labourer 3 
seaman 8 
Total: 45 100.00% 
5 Including the two offences (both rioting) where the victims were a combination of 
specials and regular police. 
6 See footnote 1 related to Appendix 6. 
7 One seaman who was not on strike. The seaman commented in court that he was 
sympathetic towards the strikers. 
8 See footnote 3 related to Appendix 6. 
Appendix 6b (continued): 
Occupations of those Accused of Strike Related Crimes where the 
Victims were Special Constables 
Table c: ~recific Occupations of these Accused 
(where the victims were special constables) 
% of all middle 
Middle Class no. class accused % of all accused 
(of these offences) (of these offences) 
clerk 1 100.00% 2.22% 
Total: 1 100.00% 2.22% 
% of all blue 
Blue Collar no. collar accused % of all accused 
(of these offences) (of these offences) 
a) Skilled Manual Workers: 
bootmaker 1 2.33% 2.22% 
carpenter [on strike] 11 1 2.33% 2.22% 
engine-driver 2 4.65% 4.44% 
fire brigade man 1 2.33% 2.22% 
tram motorman / tram driver 2 4.65% 4.44% 
Total - skilled: 7 16.28% 15.56% 
b) Unskilled Manual Workers: 
barman 1 2.33% 2.22% 
driver 2 4.65% 4.44% 
fireman 2 4.65% 4.44% 
labourer 19 44.19% 42.22% 
including 16 wharf labourers / watersiders 
seaman 10 23.26% 22.22% 
wife of a waterside worker 1 2.33% 2.22% 
leaders of unskilled manual workers' unions and strikes: 
0 0.00% 0.00% 
Total - unskilled: 35 81.40% 77.78% 
c) Uncertain whether Skilled or Unskilled: 
asylum attendant 1 2.33% 2.22% 
Total uncertain: 1 2.33% 2.22% 
Occupation Unknown: 1 na 2.22% 
Total All Relevant Accused: 45 
-
100.00% 
9 See footnote 1 related to Appendix 6. 
Appendix 6c: Occupations of those Accused of Strike Related Crimes 
where the Victims were Regular Police 
Type of Crimes: Violence against the Person, Taking Part in a Riot or 
Unlawful Assembly, Insulting Langu,age, and Threatening Bf'haviour 
Date of offences: during the 1913 General Strike 
Location: Wellington 
Court of initial jurisdiction: Wellington Magistrate's Court 
Total number of relevant charges: 17 10 
Total number of relevant accused: 13 
Table A: Occupations (Grouped by Broad Categories) of these Accused 
(where the victims were regular police) 
Frequency 
Middle Class 0 
Blue Collar 13 
skilled 
unskilled 
unclear if skilled or unskilled 
Schoolboys 0 
Other Juveniles 0 
Unknown 0 
Total: 13 
Table B: Role in Strike of these Accused 
(where the victims were regular police) 
Role in Strike Frequency 
Strikers 6 
watersiders 6 
Non-strikers 2 
in strike type occupations 11 1 
in non-striking occupations 1 
Unclear if strikers or non-strikers 5 
labourer 5 
Total: 13 
% of Relevant Accused 
0.00% 
100.00% 
0 0.00% 
13 100.00% 
0 0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
% of Relevant 
Accused 
46.15% 
15.38% 
38.46% 
100.00% 
10 Including the two offences (both rioting) where the victims were a 
combination of specials and regular police. 
II One driver who was not on strike. The driver also stated in court that he was 
not sympathetic towards the strike. 
Appendix 6c (continued): 
Occupations of those Accused of Strike Related Crimes where the 
Victims were Regular Police 
Table C: Specific Occupations of these Accused 
(where the victims were regular police) 
% of a" middle 
Middle Class no. class accused % of a" accused 
(of these offences) (of these offences) 
clerk a na 0.00% 
Total: 0 na 0.00% 
% of all blue 
Blue Collar no. collar accused % of all accused 
(of these offences) (of these offences) 
a) Skilled Manual Workers: 
Total - skilled: 0 0.00% 0.00% 
b) Unskilled Manual Workers: 
bottlewasher 1 7.69% 7.69% 
driver 1 7.69% 7.69% 
labourer 11 84.62% 84.62% 
including 6 wharf labourers / watersiders 
leaders of unskilled manual workers' unions and strikes: 
a 0.00% 0.00% 
Total - unskilled: 13 100.00% 100.00% 
c) Uncertain whether Skilled or Unskilled: 
Total uncertain: 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Occupation Unknown: a na 0.00% 
Total All Relevant Accused: 13 
-
100.00% 
Appendix 7: Pleas 
Table 7a: excluding private prosecutions and excluding juvenile accused 
Table 7b: including private prosecutions and juvenile accused 
Table 7c: private prosecutions only 
Table 7d: juvenile accused only 
Table 7e: combined totals of strike related and not strike related offences 
Table 7a: Comparison of the Pleas of those Accused of Offences in 
Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the 
General Strike of 1913 
(excluding private prosecutions and excluding juvenile accused) 1 
Type of Crime During Strike 
Strike Related 
No. % 
A" Violent Crime: 
Pleaded Guilty 17 36.17% 
Pleaded Not Guilty 29 61.70% 
No Plea Recorded 1 2.13% 
A" Other Crime Against State: 
Pleaded Guilty 32 32.99% 
Pleaded Not Guilty 47 48.45% 
No Plea Recorded 18 18.56% 
A" Crimes Prosecuted in Wellington: 
(excluding Theft) 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
Total: 
A" Theft: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
49 34.03% 
76 52.78% 
19 13.19% 
144 100.00% 
During Strike 
not Strike Related 
No. 
18 
11 
1 
26 
12 
5 
44 
23 
6 
73 
59 
17 
5 
% 
60.00% 
36.67% 
3.33% 
60.47% 
27.91% 
11.63% 
60.27% 
31.51 % 
8.22% 
100.00% 
72.84% 
20.99% 
6.17% 
Pre-Strike 
(01 Oct 1911 to 
17 Oct 1913) 
No. % 
196 57.82% 
123 36.28% 
20 5.90% 
172 71.97% 
59 24.69% 
8 3.35% 
368 63.67% 
182 31.49% 
28 4.84% 
578 100.00% 
536 75.07% 
158 22.13% 
20 2.80% 
For the relevant statistics excluding private prosecutions only see Table 14, 
p.233. 
Table 7b: Comparison of the Pleas of those Accused of Offences in 
Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the 
'Strik~ 191~ 
(including private prosecutions and juvenile accused) :.: 
Type of Crime During Strike 
Strike Related 
All Violent Crime: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
All Other Crime Against State: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
All Crimes Prosecuted in Wellington: 
(excluding Theft) 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
Total: 
All Theft: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
No. 
17 
29 
1 
32 
47 
18 
49 
76 
19 
144 
% 
36.17% 
61.70% 
2.13% 
32.99% 
48.45% 
18.56% 
34.03% 
52.78% 
13.19% 
100.00% 
During Strike 
not Strike Related 
No. 
22 
14 
4 
31 
12 
5 
53 
26 
9 
88 
63 
17 
5 
% 
55.00% 
35.00% 
10.00% 
64.58% 
25.00% 
10.42% 
60.23% 
29.55% 
10.23% 
100.00% 
74.12% 
20.00% 
5.88% 
Pre-Strike 
(01 Oct 1911 to 
17 Oct 1913) 
No. % 
253 50.30% 
177 35.19% 
73 14.51% 
188 73.73% 
59 23.14% 
8 3.14% 
441 58.18% 
236 31.13% 
81 10.69% 
758 100.00% 
728 75.52% 
202 20.95% 
34 3.53% 
2 This table includes every offence examined as part of this thesis. For a 
discussion of the impact and significance of the private prosecutions see Chapter Six, 
footnote 32, p.233. 
Table 7c: Comparison of the Pleas of those Accused of Offences in 
Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the 
General Strike of 1913 
(private prosecutions only) 
Type of Crime 
All Violent Crime: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
All Other Crime Against State: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
All Theft: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
During Strike 
Strike Related 
No. % 
During Strike 
not Strike Related 
No. % 
o 
1 
3 
0.00% 
25.00% 
75.00% 
Pre-Strike 
(01 Oct 1911 to 
17 Oct 1913) 
No. % 
13 
36 
49 
3 
16 
2 
13.27% 
36.73% 
50.00% 
14.29% 
76.19% 
9.52% 
Table 7d: Comparison of the Pleas of those Accused of Offences in 
Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the 
General Strike of 1913 
Type of Crime 
All Violent Crime: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
All Other Crime Against State: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
(juvenile accused only) 
During Strike 
Strike Related 
No. % 
All Crimes Prosecuted in Wellington: 
(excluding Theft) 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
Total: 
All Theft: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
0 
During Strike 
not Strike Related 
No. % 
4 
2 
o 
5 
o 
o 
9 
2 
0 
11 
4 
o 
4 
66.67% 
33.33% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
0.00% 
0.00% 
81.82% 
18.18% 
0.00% 
100.00% 
50.00% 
0.00% 
50.00% 
Pre-Strike 
(01 Oct 1911 to 
17 Oct 1913) 
No. % 
44 66.67% 
18 27.27% 
4 6.06% 
16 100.00% 
o 0.00% 
o 0.00% 
60 73.17% 
18 21.95% 
4 4.88% 
82 100.00% 
189 82.53% 
28 12.23% 
12 5.24% 
Table 7e: Comparison of the Pleas of those Accused of Offences in . 
Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the 
Gf.'n«'''r.::!1 Strike of 1913 
(combined totals of strike related and not strike related offences) 3 
Type of Crime 1. Excluding private prosecutions 
and excluding juvenile accused 
2. Including all offences 
During Strike 4 
All Violent Crime: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
No. 
35 
40 
2 
All Other Crime Against State: 
Pleaded Guilty 58 
Pleaded Not Guilty 59 
No Plea Recorded 23 
% 
45.45% 
51.95% 
2.60% 
41.43% 
42.14% 
16.43% 
All Crimes Prosecuted in Wellington: 
(excluding Theft) 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
Total: 
All Theft: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
93 42.86% 
99 45.62% 
25 11.52% 
217 100.00% 
59 72.84% 
17 20.99% 
5 6.17% 
Pre-Strike 
No. % 
196 57.82% 
123 36.28% 
20 5.90% 
172 71.97% 
59 24.69% 
8 3.35% 
368 63.67% 
182 31.49% 
28 4.84% 
578 100.00% 
536 75.07% 
158 22.13% 
20 2.80% 
During Strike5 
No. % 
39 44.83% 
43 49.43% 
5 5.75% 
63 43.45% 
59 40.69% 
23 15.86% 
102 43.97% 
102 43.97% 
28 12.07% 
232 100.00% 
63 74.12% 
17 20.00% 
5 5.88% 
Pre-Strike 
No. % 
253 50.30% 
177 35.19% 
73 14.51% 
188 73.73% 
59 23.14% 
8 3.14% 
441 58.18% 
236 31.13% 
81 10.69% 
758 100.00% 
728 75.52% 
202 20.95% 
34 3.53% 
3 For the relevant strike related and non-strike related statistics see Table 14, 
p.233, Appendix 7, Table 7a, and Appendix 7, Table 7b. 
4 The figures below include both strike related and non-strike related offences. 
5 The figures below include both strike related and non-strike related offences. 
Table 1e: continued: 
Type of Crime 3. Only excluding private prosecutions 
During Strike 6 
No. % 
All Violent Crime: 
Pleaded Guilty 39 46.99% 
Pleaded Not Guilty 42 50.60% 
No Plea Recorded 2 2.41% 
All Other Crime Against State: 
Pleaded Guilty 58 41.43% 
Pleaded Not Guilty 59 42.14% 
No Plea Recorded 23 16.43% 
All Crimes Prosecuted in Wellington: 
(excluding Theft) 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
Total: 
All Theft: 
Pleaded Guilty 
Pleaded Not Guilty 
No Plea Recorded 
97 43.50% 
101 45.29% 
25 11.21% 
223 100.00% 
63 74.12% 
17 20.00% 
5 5.88% 
Pre-Strike 
No. % 
240 59.26% 
141 34.81% 
24 5.93% 
188 73.73% 
59 23.14% 
8 3.14% 
428 64.85% 
200 30.30% 
32 4.85% 
660 100.00% 
725 76.88% 
186 19.72% 
32 3.39% 
6 The figures below include both strike related and non-strike related offences. 
Appendix 8: Cases Withdrawn - Wellington 
(1913 Strike Period non-Strike Related Offences) 
," I TVi:dI,i'k). oll'Hy,(:-;:i:,L--'ii: i YP" UI (;'IUI(; 
I for that Type of Crime 
Violent Crime: 
a) Violent Crime Against Persons: 
Assault (none involving police constables) 13 
a) Total Violent Crime Against Persons: 23 
b) Violent Crime Against Property: 
no charges of violent crime against property withdrawn 
b) Total Violent Crime Against Property: 10 
Total All Non-Strike Related Violent Crime: 33 
Larceny: 
Theft 65 
Total Non-Strike Related Larceny: 82 
Other Crimes Against the State: 
Threatening Behaviour 2 
Obscene Language 27 
Total Other Crimes Against the State: 44 
--'-;;-';,~,i':;ii'/i'l 
No, % 
3 23,08% 
3 13.04% 
0 0.00% 
3 9.09% 
1 1,54% 
1 1.22% 
1 50,00% 
1 3,70% 
2 4.55% 
Appendix 9: Gender of those Accused of Crimes Committed in 
Wellington During and in the Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the 
General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington 
Court 
(subcategorised by whether the accused was an adult or a juvenile) 1 
a) Strike Related Crime: 18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913: 
no. of charges Man Woman Boy Girl Unknown 
47 All Violent Crime 44 3 - - -
93.62% 6.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0 All Theft: 
- - - - -
97 All Other Crime 95 2 - - -
Against State: 97.94% 2.06% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
144 Total All Charges: 139 5 0 0 0 
96.53% 3.47% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
b) Non-Strike Related Crime: 18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913: 
(excluding theft) 
no. of charges Man Woman Boy Girl Unknown 
40 All Violent Crime 28 6 6 - -
70.00% 15.00% 15.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
- -
48 All Other Crime 35 7 5 - 1 
Against State: 72.92% 14.58% 10.42% 0.00% 2.08% 
88 Total All Charges: 63 13 11 0 1 
71.59% 14.77% 12.50% 0.00% 1.14% 
c) All Strike Period Crime: 18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913: 
no. of charges Man Woman Boy Girl Unknown 
87 All Violent Crime 72 9 6 - -
82.76% 10.34% 6.90% 0.00% 0.00% 
85 All Theft: 72 5 8 - -
84.71% 5.88% 9.41% 0.00% 0.00% 
145 All Other Crime 130 9 5 - 1 
Against State: 89.66% 6.21% 3.45% 0.00% 0.69% 
317 Total All Charges: 274 23 19 0 1 
86.44% 7.26% 5.99% 0.00% 0.32% 
In this Appendix the figures concern the number of charges prosecuted rather 
than the number of separate offences prosecuted. The number of charges is higher 
than the number of separate offences due to some crimes having more than one 
accused. 
Total 
47 
100.00% 
-
0.00% 
97 
100.00% 
144 
100.00% 
Total 
40 
100.00% 
-
48 
100.00% 
I 
i 
881 
100.00%[ 
I 
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Total 
, 
, 
81' 
100.00% 
85 
100.00% 
145 
100.00% 
317 
100.00% 
Appendix 9 (continued): Gender of the Accused 
d) Pre~Stiike Period Crime: 01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913 
no. of charges Man Woman Boy Girl Unknown Total 
503 All Violent Crime 407 26 66 0 4 503 
80.91% 5.17% 13.12% 0.00% 0.80% 100.00% 
964 All Theft: 677 58 222 7 - 964 
70.23% 6.02% 23.03% 0.73% 0.00% 100.00% 
255 All Other Crime 203 33 16 0 3 255 
Against State: 79.61% 12.94% 6.27% 0.00% 1.18% 100.00% 
1,722 Total All Charges: 1,287 117 304 7 7 1,722 
74.74% 6.79% 17.65% 0.41% 0.41% 100.00% 
Appendix 10: Crimes Committed in Wellington During the General 
Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington 
i"'ttr~tp,'s Court and whk:h involv~d Wom~n a.s thf') Accused 2 
a) All Strike Period Violent Crime: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Type of Violent Crime: 
Assault (1 strike related) 5 12.50% of40 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach 1 6.25% of 16 
of the Peace was occasioned 
(strike related) 
Property Damage (1 strike related) 3 17.65% of 17 
Total Number of Violence Cases Involving Female Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 78) 9 11.54% 
Total Number of Females Accused of Violent Crime: 
(Total No. of Accused: 78) 8 10.26% 
Occupations of Female Accused: 
Domestic: 1 (1 strike related charge) 
Wife: 2 (1 strike related charge) 
Prostitute: 3 (1 strike related charge) 
Unknown: 2 
b) All Strike Period Theft: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Categorisation of Theft: 
Theft (none strike related) 5 7.58% of66 
Total Number of Larceny Cases Involving Female Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 82) 5 6.10% 
Total Number of Females Accused of Theft: 
(Total No. of Accused: 57) 5 8.77% 
Occupations of Female Accused: 
Domestic: 3 
Prostitute: 1 
Unknown: 1 
2 None of those prosecuted for offences committed during the strike were girls. 
Appendix 10 (continued): Crimes Committed in Wellington During the 
General Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington 
Magistrate's Court and which involved Women as the Accused 
c) All Strike Period Other Crime Against the State: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Taking Part in an Unlawful Assembly 2 40.00% of 5 
(both strike related) 
Obscene Language (none strike related) 5 12.20% of 41 
Did Commit Mischief by Burning two panels 1 100.00% of 1 
of a padded cell 
(not strike related) 
Total Number of Criminal Cases Involving Female Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 141) 8 5.67% 
Total Number of Female Accused of All Other Anti-State offences: 
(Total No. of Accused: 117) 8 6.84% 
Occupations of Female Accused: 
Domestic: 1 (1 strike related charge) 
Wife: 1 (1 strike related charge) 
Prostitute: 6 
Unknown: 0 
Appendix 10b: Crimes Committed in Wellington in the Twenty-four and 
a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
1n th'f" 'lI.fe!!ln9ton Court 3n«:~ vvhk:h invo'""n 
Women or Girls as the Accused 3 
(01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913) 
a) All Pre-Strike Period Violent Crime: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Type of Violent Crime: 
Assault (including 8 private prosecutions) 12 6.35% 
Threatening Behaviour whereby a Breach 2 3.08% 
of the Peace was occasioned (3 accused) 
Owner of a dog which attacked a person 1 16.67% 
whereby the limbs of said person were endangered 
Arson 1 33.33% 
Wilful damage or destruction of property: 9 9.89% 
Total Number of Violence Cases Involving Female Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 398) 25 6.28% 
Total Number of Females Accused of Violent Crime: 
(Total No. of Accused: 431) 25 5.80% 
Occupations of Female Accused: 
Domestic: 3 
Wife: 0 
Wife of a medical practitioner: 1 
Prostitute: 7 
Unknown: 14 
3 Only four of those prosecuted for offences committed during the pre-strike 
period were girls. The four schoolgirls (ages 10 years to 14 years) were responsible 
for six thefts. These thefts and their accused are included in section b) of the table 
below. No girls were prosecuted for any violent crime or other offence against the 
State. 
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Appendix 10b (continued): Crimes Committed in Wellington in the 
Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which 
resulted in Prosecutions in the \"'ellington Mag Court and vvhich 
involved Women or Girls as the Accused 
b) All Pre-Strike Period Theft: No. of Cases % of Total -' 
(of each category) 
Categorisation of Theft: 
False Pretences 3 15.79% of 19 
Forging a cheque 1 5.88% of 17 
Intent to Defraud [Sending False Telegram] 1 100.00% of 1 
Theft 57 8.33% of 684 
Using counterfeit current gold coins 1 100.00% of 1 
Total Number of Larceny Cases Involving Female Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 816) 63 7.72% 
Total Number of Females Accused of Theft: 
(Total No. of Accused: 496) 40 8.06% 
Occupations of Female Accused: 
Domestic: 21 
House-keeper: 1 
Wife: 2 
Cook: 1 
Milliner 1 
Tailoress 1 
Waitress: 2 
Prostitute: 5 
Schoolgirl: 4 
Unknown: 2 
c) All Pre-Strike Period Other Crime Against No. of Cases % of Total I 
the State: (of each category) 
Obscene Language 33 21.15% of156 
Total Number of Criminal Cases Involving Female Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 242) 33 13.64% 
Total Number of Females Accused of All Other Anti-State offences: 
(Total No. of Accused: 215) 25 11.63% 
Occupations of Female Accused: 
Domestic: 3 
Wife: 0 
Prostitute: 18 
Unknown: 4 
Appendix 11: Crimes Committed in Wellington During the General 
Strike of 1913 which resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington 
Magistrate's Court and which involved Juveniles as the Accused 4 
(none of the offences by juveniles were strike related) 
a) All Strike Period Violent Crime: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Type of Violent Crime: 
Wilful Damage (respectively of a motor car, 3 17.65% of 17 
of shrubs in a city reserve, and 
of a window) 
(none strike related) 
Tolal Number of Violence Cases Involving Juvenile Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 78) 3 3.85% 
Total Number of Juveniles Accused of Violent Crime: 
(Total No. of Accused: 78) 6 7.69% 
Occupations of Juvenile Accused: 
Schoolboy: 2 
Unknown: 4 
b) All Strike Period Theft: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Categorisation of Theft: (none strike related): 
Theft 5 7.58% of66 
Breaking and Entering & Committing Theft 1 8.33% of 12 
Total Number of Larceny Cases Involving Juvenile Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 82) 6 7.32% 
Total Number of Juveniles Accused of Theft: 
(Total No. of Accused: 57) 8 14.04% 
Occupations of Juvenile Accused: 
Schoolboy: 6 
Unknown: 2 
c) All Strike Period Other Crime Against the State: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Possession of a Firearm (though all air rifles) 2 100.00% of 2 
(none strike related) 
Total Number of Criminal Cases Involving Juvenile Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 141) 2 1.42% 
Total Number of Juveniles Accused of All Other Anti-State offences: 
(Total No. of Accused: 117) 5 4.27% 
Occupations of Juvenile Accused: 
Schoolboy: 4 
Telegraph messenger: 1 
4 None of those prosecuted for offences committed during the strike were girls. 
Appendix 11 b: Crimes Committed in Wellington in the Twenty-four and 
a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
Pms~cutions in the V\j~lIington M~gistrate's Court ;'lind which involved 
Juveniles as the Accused 5 
(01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913) 
a) All Pre-Strike Period Violent Crime: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Type of Violent Crime: 
Assault (including 0 private prosecutions) 1 0.53% 
Arson 2 66.67% 
Wilful damage or destruction of property: 15 16.48% 
Throwing a missile or stone to the 1 25.00% 
danger of property 
Throwing a stone(s) to the damage of 5 83.33% 
certain property 
Total Number of Violence Cases Involving Juvenile Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 398) 24 6.03% 
Total Number of Juveniles Accused of Violent Crime: 
(Total No. of Accused: 431) 56 12.99% 
Occupations of Juvenile Accused: 
Schoolboy: 35 
Carpenter's assistant: 1 
Jeweller's assistant 1 
Message-boy: 1 
Unknown: 18 
5 Only four of those prosecuted for offences committed during the pre-strike 
period were girls. The four schoolgirls (ages 10 years to 14 years) were responsible 
for six thefts. These thefts and their accused are included in section b) of the table 
below. No girls were prosecuted for any violent crime or other offence against the 
State. 
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Appendix 11 b (continued): Crimes Committed in Wellington in the 
Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which 
resulted in Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court and which 
involved Juveniles as the Accused 
b) All Pre-Strike Period Theft: No. of Cases % of Total I 
(of each category) 
Categorisation of Theft: 
Aiding the Commission of an Offence 1 100.00% of 1 
Attempted False Pretences with Intent 3 60.00% of 5 
to Defraud 
Attempted Theft 4 57.14% of 7 
Breaking and Entering (nothing stolen) 4 50.00% of 8 
Breaking and Entering & Committing Theft 15 28.85% of 52 
False Pretences 1 5.26% of 19 
Receiving stolen property 3 18.75% of 16 
Theft 120 17.54% of 684 
Total Number of Larceny Cases Involving Juvenile Accused: 
(Total No. of Cases: 816) 151 18.50% 
Total Number of Juveniles Accused of Theft: 
(Total No. of Accused: 496) 119 23.99% 
Occupations of Juvenile Accused: 
Schoolboy: 69 
Blacksmith's apprentice: 2 
Bootmaker (age 16): 1 
Brass boy (age 15): 1 
Clerk (age 15): 1 
Confectioner (age 14): 1 
Draper's assistant (age 15): 1 
Farm hand (age 15): 1 
Jeweller (age 13): 1 
Labourer: I 2 
Machinist (age 14): 1 
Message-boy / Messenger: 14 
Office boy: I 2 
Painter (age 16): 1 
Printer (age 14): 1 
Railway cadet (age 16): 1 
Saddler (age 15): 1 
Ship's boy (age 15): 1 
Tinsmith (age 14): 1 
Apprentice (trade not stated): 1 (age 15) 
Schoolgirl: I 4 
Unknown: I 11 
Appendix 11 b (continued): Crimes Committed in Wellington in the 
Twenty-four and a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which 
I"Pstdtpd in Prospcutions in fhl" VVellinqton M::II~istr;;:ptp's C()urt :md which 
involved Juveniles as the Accused 
c) All Pre-Strike Period Other Crime Against No. of Cases % of Total I 
the State:J (of each category) 
I 
Obscene Language 1 0.64% of 156 
I 
Discharging / unlawful use of a firearm 2 100.00% of 2 
Possession of Firearm(s) 3 100.00% of 3 
I 
Total Number of Criminal Cases Involving Juvenile Accused: 
I(Total No. of Cases: 242) 6 2.48% 
Total Number of Juveniles Accused of All Other Anti-State offences: 
I(Total No. of Accused: 215) 11 5.12% 
Occupations of Juvenile Accused: 
-'Schoolboy: 4 
IUnknown: 7 
Appendix 12: Drunkenness Prosecutions in Wellington between 
01 October 1911 and 31 December 1913 
(including Drunkenness Prosecutions in Wellington During the General 
Strike of 1913) 6 
a) 01 October 1911 to 30 September 1913: 
--
Month Convictions Withdrawn or Dismissed 
October 1911 184 1 Withdrawn 
November 1911 162 
December 1911 244 
January 1912 203 1 Withdrawn 
February 1912 192 
March 1912 178 
April 1912 208 
May 1912 257 
June 1912 278 
July 1912 232 
August 1912 269 
September 1912 191 1 Withdrawn 
Total: Oct 1911 to Sept 1912: 2598 convictions, 3 Withdrawn 
Monthly Average for 
Oct 1911 to Sept 1912: 216.5 convictions 
October 1912 331 2 Withdrawn 
November 1912 226 
December 1912 249 1 Withdrawn 
January 1913 196 1 Dismissed 
February 1913 176 1 Withdrawn 
March 1913 190 2 Withdrawn 
April 1913 212 
May 1913 220 
June 1913 249 
July 1913 257 
August 1913 206 
September 1913 201 1 Withdrawn 
Total: Oct 1912 to Sept 1913: 2713 convictions, 7 Withdrawn, 1 Dismissed 
Monthly Average for 
Oct 1912 to Sept 1913: 226.08 convictions 
Totals: Oct 1911 to Sept 1913: 
Grand Total: 5311 convictions, 10 Withdrawn, 1 Dismissed 
Average per year: 2655.5 convictions, 5 Withdrawn, 0.5 Dismissed 
Average per month: 221.29 convictions -
6 The source of the following totals is a manual count of the entries in the 
Wellington Magistrate's Court Criminal Record Books (October 1911 to January 
1914). To allocate each offence to a month the date of offence rather than the date of 
hearing has been used. In almost all of these cases the conviction was entered the day 
after the date of offence, or on the Monday morning if an offence was committed on a 
Saturday afternoon or evening. (There were no Magistrate's Court sessions on 
Sunday). 
Appendix 12 (continued): Drunkenness Prosecutions in Wellington 
between 01 October 1911 and 31 December 1913 
(including Drunkenness Prosecutions in Wellington During the General 
Strike of 1913) 
b) 01 October 1913 to 31 December 1913: 
Month Convictions Withdrawn or Dismissed 
October 1913 193 
November 1913 152 
December 1913 262 1 Withdrawn 
Total Oct 1913 to Dec 1913: 607 convictions, 1 Withdrawn 
Average per month: 202.33 convictions, 0.33 Withdrawn 
c) Exact Strike Period -18 October 1913 to 20 December 1913: 
Period Convictions Withdrawn or Dismissed 
18 Oct to 31 Oct 1913 80 
01 Nov to 30 Nov 1913 152 
01 Dec to 20 Dec 1913 132 
Total Exact Strike: 364 convictions, o Withdrawn or Dismissed 
Average for the two 
Strike Months: 182 convictions -
Appendix 13: Larcenies Committed in Wellington in the Twenty-four and 
a Half Months Before the General Strike of 1913 which resulted in 
Prosecutions in the Wellington Magistrate's Court 
(01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913) 7 
a) 01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913: a) 01 October 1911 to 17 October 1913 (continued): 
I 
Month L Prosecutions Period Prosecutions 
October 1911 42 01 Oct 1913 to 17 Oct 1913: 19 
November 1911 17 
December 1911 35 Totals: 01 Oct 1911 to 17 Oct 1913: 
January 1912 26 Grand Total: 816 
February 1912 38 Average per month: 33.31 
March 1912 32 
April 1912 20 b) 01 April 1913 to 17 October 1913: 
May 1912 17 (the 6.5 months immediately prior to the 1913 strike) 
June 1912 43 Grand Total: 270 
July 1912 38 Average per month: 41.54 
August 1912 33 
September 1912 26 
Total: Oct 1911 to Sept 1912: 367 
Monthly Average for 
Oct 1911 to Sept 1912: 30.58 
October 1912 35 
November 1912 24 
December 1912 34 
January 1913 29 
February 1913 27 
March 1913 30 
April 1913 37 
May1913 31 
June 1913 32 
July 1913 74 
August 1913 37 
September 1913 40 
Total: Oct 1912 to Sept 1913: 430 
I 
Monthly Average for 
Oct 1912 to Sept 1913: 35.83 
Totals: Oct 1911 to Sept 1913: 
Grand Total: 797 
Average per year: 398.5 
Average per month: 33.21 
7 To allocate each offence to a month the date of offence rather than the date of 
hearing has been used. 
